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PROJECT
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
Mile after mile, acre after acre, in metal cabinets and on computer
tapes, the confidential files of Uncle Sam grow steadily and, some say,
ominously. Who knows what they contain?
WALL STREET JOURNAL,
JUNE 27, 1975, AT I, CoL.

I

(MIDWEST En.)
I should suppose that moral, political, and practical considerations
would dictate that a very first principle of that wisdom would be
an insistence upon avoiding secrecy for its own sake. For when
everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to
be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion.
I should suppose, in short, that the hall-mark of all truly effective
internal security systems would be the maximum possible disclosure,
recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility
is truly maintained.
NEW YORK TIMES v. UNITED STATES,
403 U.S.
WIDTE,

713, 729 (1971)

JJ.,

(STEWART

&

CONCURRING)

As we press forward, better to secure individual privacy protection,
the sirens of simplistic solutions will continue to beckon us. Our
challenge remains, therefore, the hard one of striking a fair balance
between competing interests. And the thoughtful public servant
rarely has the luxury of balancing good and evil. Most often the
competing interests confronting him are one good versus another
good.
.ADDRESS BY DOUGLAS W. METZ,
FEDERAL BAR AssocIATION CONFERENCE,
MAY 22, 1975

Few aspects of government-citizen relations are more central to
the responsible operation of a representative democracy than the
citizen's ability to monitor governmental operations. Critical in this
regard is the existence of a general individual right of access to
government-held information. Concurrently, the psychological wellbeing of a citizenry depends upon governmental recognition of
individual privacy interests. In the process of acquiring, utilizing,
and disseminating personal, identifying information, a government
unresponsive to individual privacy necessarily chills the development
of a creative and individualistic citizenry and stifles or embitters
regenerative governmental criticism.
971
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This Project delineates the federal and state responses to these
two fundamental societal concerns. The course of the discussion
suggests the vitality of these concerns, and the flexibility and continuing development of the governmental responses. Clearly, the interests in maximizing disclosure of government-held information
and minimizing the handling and dissemination of unnecessary or
inaccurate personal information can conflict. The contours of this
conflict, only intimated herein, will doubtless become more bold
with the maturation of the opposing statutory schemes.
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ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

A.

The Classification System

One of the most effective ways in which the federal government
limits public access to information is through its classification system.
When a government agency classifies a document, it is restricted,
for at least a certain period of time, to persons "determined to be
trustworthy," for whom "access ... is necessary for the performance
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of [their] duties."1 To the ex.tent that the information is not otherwise available, everyone else must do without it. The amount of
information withheld from the public by the classification system
is substantial: Between April 1, 1973, and December 31, 1973, well
over 4 million documents were classified by various agencies of the
United States Govemment.2
The exeeutive branch's rationale for establishing a classification
system is that
[W]ithin the Federal Government there is some official information
and material which, because it bears directly on the effectiveness of
our national defense and the conduct of our foreign relations, must
be subject to some constraints for the security of our Nation and the
safety of our people and our allies. To protect against actions hostile
to the United States, of both an overt and covert nature, it is essential
that such official information and material be given only limited
dissemination. 3

Without challenging the legitimacy of this position, it is still necessary to question whether the current classification system goes too far:
In the words of Senator Edmund Muskie, "The system of secrecy
that has flourished in the executive branch since 1940 has not only
denied the Congress the information it requires to make effective
judgments of policy, it has also withheld from the people the knowledge of the Government's behavior that is essential to popular
understanding and democratic consensus."4
This section of the Project will attempt to explain why the classification system is subject to such serious criticism. The formal
structure of the system and the practical problems that arise under
the current approach to classification will be discussed. The legal
theory underlying the system will be closely examined. Finally, some
proposed revisions of the system will be considered, and alternative
solutions to the problems raised by these proposals will be suggested.
I. The Framework of the Current System
Since the Revolutionary War, the federal government has recognized that certain government-held information needs "special
I. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 6(A), 3 C.F.R. 346 (1974).
2. lNTERAGENCY Cr.AssIFICATION REvlEW COMMrrrEE, PROGRESS REPORT: !MPLEMENTA•
TION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 ON CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF NATIONAL
SECURITY INFORMATION AND MATERIAL 23 (1974) [hereinafter ICRC REPORT). The total
of 4,106,321 does not include Defense Department figures for April, May, and December.
3. Exec. Order No. 11652, preamble, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974).
4. Government Secrecy, Hearings on S. 1520, S. 1726, S. 2451, S. 27J8, S. JJ9J, and
S. JJ99 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm.
on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. I (1974) [hereinafter Government
Secrecy Hearings].

May-June 1975]
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treatment"; no formal system of information control was adopted
before this century, however. 5 Until the end of World War II, the
federal classification system covered only military secrets, and only
the military departments had classification authority.6 An executive
order issued by President Truman7 first authorized all federal nonmilitary agencies to limit access to national security information.
Because the system established by the Truman order was subject to
considerable criticism, it was subsequently altered by President
Eisenhower,8 and was again modified by President Kennedy. 9 The
classification issue most recently gained prominence in 1971, in
connection with the Pentagon Papers controversy.10 President Nixon
at that time ordered another review of the security classification
system.11 This review led to the promulgation in March 1972 of the
executive order that established the current classification system.12
The first point to be made about the current system 'is that it
rests on an inverted pyramid of entirely nonstatutory authority.
The narrow base is Executive Order 11652 (the E.O.),18 effective
since June 1, 1972. A National Security Council directive of May
17, 197214 (the Directive), elaborates on the E.O. by prescribing
procedures for achieving its objectives. Finally, the broad top of
the pyramid is composed of regulations issued by the various agencies
of the executive branch that have been given the authority to classify.15 These regulations provide operational .guidance to persons
actually exercising classification authority. Thus, an analysis of the
5. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 92d CONG., 1st SEss., SECURITY CLASSIFICA•
TION AS A PROBLEM IN THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN FOREIGN PouCY 3 (Comm. Print 1971)
[hereinafter SECURITY CLAsslFICATION].
6. Id. at 8-9. For more detailed discussions of the history of the security classification
system, see C. BARKER & M. Fox, Cr.AssIFlED FILES: THE YELLOWING PAGES (1972): J,
WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY (1964).
7. Exec. Order No. 10290, 3 C.F.R. 789 (1949-53 Comp.).
8. Exec. Order No. 10501, 3 C.F.R. 979 (1949-53 Comp.).
9. Exec. Order No. 10964, 3 C.F.R. 486 (1959-63 Comp.). The major modification
introduced by this order was a provision for limited use of automatic declassification,
that is, the termination of classified status merely upon the passage of time.
10. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, supra note 5, at 32. In the period between the Kennedy Administration and the Pentagon Papers affair, as mistrust of the government
grew in response to United States involvement in Vietnam, many people became
convinced that classification was in fact being used as a political tool. See C. BARKER &
M. Fox, supra note 6, at 3-4.
11. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, supra note 5, at 34.
12. Exec. Order No. 11652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974). See SECURITY Cr.AssIFICATION, supra
note 5, at 31.
13. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974).
14. National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading,
Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information, 3A C.F.R. 227 (1972)
[hereinafter NSC Directive].
15. The regulations governing classification for the State Department (including
the United States Information Agency and the Agency for International Development),
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current classification system requires an examination of the implementing Directive and the departmental regulations, as well as of
the E.O. itself.
a. Administration of the system. While the National Security
Council (NSC) is ultimately responsible for monitoring the implementation of the system, the E.O. provides for the establishment of
an Interagency Classification Review Committee (ICRC) to assist
in this task.16 The E.O. requires that the ICRC meet regularly and
take action to ensure compliance with the E.O.; in particular, its
functions are to oversee agency actions and to establish procedures
enabling it to receive, consider and act upon suggestions or complaints from government employees or members of the public. The
E.O. expressly provides that all agencies shall furnish the ICRC
with any particular information or material that it needs.17
The Directive does not restrict the scope of action of the ICRC;
it provides only that the ICRC "shall ... take such actions as are
deemed necessary to insure uniform compliance with the Order and
this Directive."18 Most important, the Directive makes explicit the
ICRC's jurisdiction to hear appeals from denials of requests for
classified information.19
In addition to establishing the ICRC, the E.O. delegates to the
agencies administrative responsibility for implementing the classification program. Each agency is required to develop regulations to
this effect, subject to the approval of the ICRC.20 Each agency head
must appoint "a senior member of his staff" to oversee this process
and to chair an agency committee authorized to act on all suggestions and complaints regarding the agency's administration of the
E.0.21
Justice Department, Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the National Archives and Records Services are collected at 37 Fed. Reg. 15624 (1972).
(This collection also includes the regulations of the now defunct Atomic Energy
Commission, abolished by Act of Oct. 11, 1974, Pub, L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat, 1233,)
Because these agencies together generate over 95 per cent of the classified materials
produced by the federal government, see ICRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 23, the discussion will focus on their regulations.
16. The ICRC as originally established was composed of representatives of the
Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the Atomic Energy Commission, the CIA
and the National Security Council, with a chairman to be designated by the President,
Exec. Order No. 11652 § 7(A), 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972). The Archivist of the United
States was later added to the Committee. Exec. Order No. 11714, 38 Fed. Reg. 10245
(1973).
17. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 7(A), 3 C.F.R. 347 (1974).
18. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IX13, 3A C.F.R. 239 (1972). The ICRC chairman
is authorized to appoint an executive director and to maintain a permanent staff,
19. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § um, 3A C.F.R. 239 (1972).
20. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 7(B)(l), 3 C.F.R. 347 (1974).
21. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 7(13)(2), 3 C.F.R. 348 (1974).
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b. Scope of classification. The stated purpose of the E.O. is to
identify information that must be protected "because it bears directly on the effectiveness of our national defense and the conduct
of our foreign relations . . . ." 22 The E.O. provides that material
requiring this protection shall be classified as Top Secret, Secret, or
Confidential, and that no other categories are to be used, except as
provided by statute.28
According to the E.O., a Top Secret classification is appropriate
only when unauthorized disclosure of the information in question
"could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage
to the national security."24 Examples of "exceptionally grave damage"
include armed hostilities against the United States or her allies,
disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national security,
compromise of vital defense plans or complex cryptologic intelligence
systems, revelation of sensitive intelligence operations, and the disclosure of vital scientific or technical developments. 25
Information merits a Secret classification if its unauthorized disclosure "could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to
the national security."26 The examples given are similar to those set
out for Top Secret, except that this classification applies to "significant" rather than "vital" matters. 27
Information that merits a Confidential rating is such that its
unauthorized disclosure "could reasonably be expected to cause
damage to the national security."28 No examples are provided.
After setting out the above guidelines, the E.O. establishes the
policy that "unnecessary classification and over-classification shall
be avoided." Classification is to be based solely on national security
considerations; classifying to conceal inefficiency or to avoid embarrassment is expressly enjoined.29 The Directive, in a similar spirit,
provides that the least restrictive classification is to be used when
there is uncertainty about the proper treatment of information.80
This relatively straightforward system is complicated somewhat
by the implementing regulations adopted by some executive agencies.
For example, the Department of State has established a category of
"administratively controlled information" described as pertaining
to material that, though it is "not national security material and,
22.
23.
24.
25,
26,
27.
28.
29.
30.

Exec. Order No. 11652, preamble, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974).
Exec. Order No, 11652 § 1, 3 C.F.R. 339-40 (1974).
Exec. Order No. 11652 § l(A), 3 C.F.R. 340 (1974).
Exec. Order No. 11652 § l(A), 3 C.F.R. 340 (1974).
Exec. Order No. 11652 § l(B), 3 C.F.R. 340 (1974).
Exec. Order No. 11652 § l(B), 3 C.F.R. 340 (1974).
Exec. Order No. 11652 § l(C), 3 C.F.R. 340 (1974).
Exec. Order No. 11652 § 4, 3 C.F.R. 342-43 (1974).
NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IE, 3A C.F.R. 228 (1972).
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therefore, cannot be classified, is nonetheless protected by law against
disclosure." 31 This category covers personal and personnel information and information from "privileged sources."82 It is to be
marked "Limited Official Use" and "handled, transmitted, and stored
as if it were 'Confidential.' " 33
The Department of Defense regulations repeat verbatim the
E.O. definitions of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential.84 However,
another regulation, apparently designed to explain further these
categories, states that properly classifiable information includes
information "which is truly essential to national security because
it provides the United States with: 1) A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, or 2) a favorable
foreign relations posture, or 3) a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without,
overt or covert; which could be damaged, minimized or lost by the
unauthorized disclosure or use of the information.''80 A third set of
classification criteria appears in another section of the Defense
Department regulations.86 This last group is the most detailed, and
a classifier is required to consider each criterion before deciding to
apply a classification.87 Under these criteria, a document is to be
classified either because the information it contains is sensitive, or
because, if it is read with other documents, including those in the
public domain, sensitive information will be revealed.88 Public need
for information does not appear as a classification criterion in any
of these regulations.
c. Distribution of classification authority. The E.O. deals explicitly with the problem of distributing classification authority.
31. 22 C.F.R. § 9.28 (1974).
33. 22 C.F.R. § 9.28(a) (1974).
33. 22 C.F.R. § 9.28(a) (1974).
34. 32 C.F.R. §§ 159.104-1 to -3 (1974).
35. 32 C.F.R. § 159.103(a)(l) (1974).
36. 32 C.F.R. §§ 159.202 to .202-15 (1974).
37. 32 C.F.R. § 159.202 (1974). The regulation provides that certain specific considerations be taken into account before reaching a classification decision. For example, according to the regulation a document should be classified if the information it
contains provides the United States with a "scientific, engineering, technical, operational, intelligence, strategic or tactical advantage directly related to national security."
32 C.F.R. § 159.202-3(a) (1974). A document also must be classified if its disclosure
"would weaken the ability of the United States to wage war or defend itself successfully, limit the effectiveness of the armed forces, or make the United States vulnerable
to attack." 32 C.F.R. § 159.202-3(c) (1974). Additionally, there is a requirement that
information should not be classified unless its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably
be expected to result in harm to the national security. 32 C.F.R. § 159.202-3 (1974).
The degree of intended use, possible scientific and technical advantage to be derived
from unclassified use, lead-time advantage, and the physical cost of classifying arc all
to be considered. 32 C.F.R. §§ 159.202-4 to -7 (1974).
38. 32 C.F.R. § 159.202-2 (1974).
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It gives Top Secret authority to thirteen agencies;39 within them,
classification authority rests with the agency head, such of his senior
principal deputies and assistants as he designates in writing, and such
heads of agency subdivisions and their deputies and assistants, as
the agency head designates in writing.40 Persons with Top Secret
authority also have Secret authority. In addition, the heads of thirteen other agencies and such senior principal deputies or assistants
as they designate in writing may classify information as Secret.41
Confidential authority is given to all of the above officials.42 The
E.O. expressly forbids agencies outside these two groups from classifying information.43
The Directive underlines these restrictions, emphasizing that
classification authority may be exercised only by persons specified
in the E.O., and that such officials may not delegate their authority.44 It further requires all agencies to maintain lists of persons
authorized to classify information.45
Agency regulations tend to depart from the restrictive delegation
policy outlined in the E.O. and in the Directive. The Department
of State regulations, for example, provide that any person who pre,
pares a potentially classifiable document must assign a classification
to it at that time; officials with appropriate classifying authority are
thus restricted to giving final approval to these tentative classifications.46 These latter officials are ultimately responsible for the
propriety of the classifications they have approved, however.47
The Defense Department regulations also provide for this tentative classification procedure, although under these regulations the
initial classifier must "maintain a record to show the basis for clas39. These are such offices in the Executive Office of the President as the President
may designate in writing, CIA, Atomic Energy Commission, Department of State,
Department of the Treasury, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Department of Justice, NASA, and Agency for International
Development. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 2(A), 3 C.F.R. 340-41 (1974).
40. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 2(A), 3 C.F.R. 340-41 (1974).
41. These agencies are Department of Transportation, FCC, Export-Import Bank
of the United States, Department of Commerce, United States Civil Service Commission,
United States Information Agency, General Services Administration, Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Maritime Commission, Federal Power Commission, National Science Foundation, and Overseas Private
Investment Corporation. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 2(B), 3 C.F.R. 341 (1974).
42. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 2(C), 3 C.F.R. 342 (1974).
43. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 2(D), 3 C.F.R. 342 (1974). As a check on possible abuse
of classification authority, the E.O. requires classified information to bear on its face
some form of identification of the person who classified it. Exec. Order No. 11652
§ 4(B), 3 C.F.R. 343 (1974).
44. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IA, 3A C.F.R. 227 (1972).
45. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § ID, 3A C.F.R. 227-28 (1972).
46. 22 C.F.R. § 9.7(a) (1974).
47. 22 C.F.R. § 9.7(b) (1974).
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sification ...." 48 Accountability is carried further here than under
the State Department regulations; all officials to or through whom
classified material passes are jointly responsible with the original
classifier for the classification assigned.49
d. Access to classified information. Access to classified information is governed generally by section 6(A) of the E.O.: "No person
shall be given access to classified information or material unless
such person has been determined to be trustworthy and unless access
to such information is necessary for the performance of his duties."" 0
Section 9 permits agencies to impose, "in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access,
distribution and protection of classified information ....""1
The Directive requires that an agep.cy obtain "the specific prior
approval of the head of a Department or his designee," 02 before
promulgating a rule under section 9. The Directive also states that
classified information may not be "disseminated in any manner outside authorized channels" without the consent of the agency that
originally classified it.53
The various agencies affected by the E.O. have promulgated
regulations under section 9. The Department of State, for example,
has established four dissemination control designations: (1) nodis
(no distribution): "no distribution to other than the addressee without the approval of the Executive Secretary" of the Department.
This designation is to be used "only on messages of the highest
sensitivity between the President, the Secretary of State, and chiefs
of mission"; 54 (2) exdis (exclusive distribution): distribution exclusively to officers "with essential need to know." "[O]nly highly sen48. 32 C.F.R. § 159.200 (1974).
49. 32 C.F.R. § 159.200-l(b) (1974).
50. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 6(A), 3 C.F.R. 346 (1974). Section 12 establishes an
exception to section 6(A), rendering it inapplicable "to persons outside the executive
branch who are engaged in historical research or who have previously occupied
policy-making positions to which they were appointed by the President," upon the
determination by the head of the agency that originated the classified information
that access "is clearly consistent with the interests of national security" and his
ensuring that the information sought wiU not be "published or othenvise compro,
mised." Exec. Order No. 11652 § 12, 3 C.F.R. 349 (1974).
According to the Directive, access for researchers under section 12 of the E.O. is
limited to information that can be "located and compiled with a reasonable amount of
effort"; furthermore, the researcher must agree to safeguard the information and to
permit "a review of his notes and manuscript for the sole purpose of determining
that no classified information or material is contained therein." NSC Directive, supra
note 14, § VIB, 3A C.F.R. 236-37 (1972). Access for former presidential appointees
not covered by section 12 of the E.O. "may be authorized,'' according to the Directive.
NSC Directive, supra note 14, § VIC, 3A C.F.R. 237 (1972).
51. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 9, 3 C.F.R. 348 (1974).
52. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § VIF, 3A C.F.R. 237 (1972).
53. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § VIE, 3A C.F.R. 237 (1972).
54. 22 C.F.R. § 9.34(b)(l) (1974).
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sitive traffic between the White House, the Secretary, the Under
Secretaries and chiefs of mission" is to be so marked; 55 (3) limdis
(limited distribution): distribution strictly limited to recipients
with need to know, to be applied only to messages of more than
usual sensitivity; 56 (4) No Distribution Outside Department: precludes distribution to other federal agencies. This designation is
to be used when disclosure to such agencies "would be prejudicial
to the best interests of the Department of State" and may be used
along with exdis and limdis.57
State Department regulations also establish guidelines for disseminating information to persons outside the executive branch.58
Classified information will generally not be released to such
persons.59 However, this information will be released to Congress
upon the approval of the Office of Congressional Relations and the
Office of Security.60 The General Accounting Office (GAO), the
nonexecutive branch agency that oversees federal expenditures for
the Congress, can usually obtain access to the classified information
it requests, but specific State Department approval is necessary in
some situations.61
The Defense Department regulations do not list the special access
rules that have been established under section 9 of the E.O. They
do state that it is the general policy of the Department to adhere
to the access rule outlined in the E.0.; however, procedures for
establishing special rules when necessary are given.62 Classified information held by the Defense Department will be released to persons
or agencies outside the executive branch if this is necessary for the
55. 22 C.F.R. § 9.34(b)(2) (1974).
56. 22 C.F.R. § 9.34(b)(3) (1974).
57. 22 C.F.R. § 9.34(b)(4) (1974).
58. The State Department's regulations dealing with access for researchers and exappointees duplicate in substance those of the E.O. and the Directive. 22 C.F.R. §§ 9.22,
9.25 (1974). See note 50 supra.
59. 22 C.F.R. § 9.23(b) (1974).
60. 22 C.F.R. § 9.23(a) (1974).
61. Such approval is required when, in the opinion of the chief of mission or bureau
head from whom a document is sought, the document: (1) would, if released, "seriously
impair relations between the United States and other countries in the conduct of
foreign affairs, or othenvise prejudice the best interests of the United States"; (2) is
"directed to the President, the National Security Council, or a similar White House
Board"; (3) relates "to formulation of sensitive substantive policy (as distinguished
from a statement of or implementation of policy)"; (4) is of a generally restricted
character, such as personnel records, or material originated by another agency. Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices Before the Subcomm. on
Foreign Operations and Government Information of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1971) (reprinting a GAO report) [hereinafter Government Information Hearings].
62. These procedures involve obtaining permission from either the secretary of the
service department involved or the Secretary of Defense. 32 C.F.R. §§ 159.1200 to -3
(1974).
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"performance of a function from which the Government will derive
a benefit or advantage," and if the particular department that first
classified the information does not object to its dissemination. 63
The Department of Defense regulation governing congressional
access to classified material basically requires the Department to
furnish the information that Congress requests. If the information
asked for is considered to be too sensitive to leave the executive
branch, an alternative means of meeting the request is sought. If
Congress rejects an alternative suggested by the Department, final
refusal to release the information must be expressly approved by
the head of the Defense Department unit concerned. If a congressionally suggested alternative to release of the information is unacceptable to the Department, only the President, under a formal
claim of executive privilege, may refuse the request. 64
Department of Defense regulations expressly limit the GAO's
access to classified information. The governing regulation provides
that budgets for future programs, non-Department of Defense reports, and investigative reports are not to be released to the GA0.0 G
Certain units within the Defense Department have adopted even
more restrictive regulations; for example, the European Command
Headquarters denies the GAO access to most documents related to
war plans.66
e. Declassification. The current E.O. pays careful attention to
the problem of declassification. It establishes a General Declassification Schedule, according to which classified documents are automatically downgraded and eventually declassified at fixed time
intervals. 67 This system does not apply to all classified information,
however. Because "[c]ertain classified information or material may
warrant some degree of protection for a period exceeding that pro63. 32 C.F.R. § 159.700-6 (1974). Access rules for historical researchers and former
presidential appointees do not differ substantially from those set out in the E.O. and
the Directive. See note 50 supra. The only noteworthy addition is that members of
the White House staff and presidential special committees or commissions are excluded
from the category of former presidential appointees. 32 C.F.R. § 159.700-6(£) (1974).
64. Government Information Hearings, supra note 61, at 3156 (quoting Department
of Defense Directive No. 5400.4). For a discussion of executive privilege, see text at
notes 262-307 infra.
65. Government Information Hearings, supra note 61, at 3049 (citing Department
of Defense Directive No. 7650.1). This directive is mentioned in 32 C.F.R. § 159.700-6(c)
(1974) as setting forth procedures for granting access to Defense Department classified
information to representatives of the GAO.
66. Government Information Hearings, supra note 61, at 3049 (dting Department
of Defense Directive No. 7650.1).
67. Top Secret documents are lowered to Secret at the end of the second full year
following the year in which they were originally classified, reduced to Confidential
two years after that, and declassified after the passage of six more years. Secret docu•
ments are downgraded to Confidential after two years and declassified after another
six, while Confidential material is declassified at the end of the sixth year following
the year of classification. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 5(A), 3 C.F.R. 344 (1974).
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vided in the General Declassification Schedule," the E.O. provides
that officials with Top Secret classification authority may exempt
items from the operation of the General Declassification Schedule
if they fall within one of the following four categories: (I) material
furnished the United States by foreign governments or international
organizations "on the understanding that it be kept in confidence";
(2) "material specifically covered by statute, or pertaining to intelligence sources and methods"; (3) material "disclosing a system, plan,
installation, project or specific foreign relations matter the continuing protection of which is essential to the national security";
(4) material that, if disclosed, "would place a person in immediate
jeopardy." 68 A classifier applying the exemption must, if possible,
set a declassification date or indicate an event that will trigger declassification.69
The E.O. requires that exemptions "be kept to the absolute
minimum consistent with national security requirements . . . ." 70
It further provides that information should generally be declassified
within thirty years from the date of classification.71
68. Exec. Order No. ll652 § 5(B), 3 C.F.R. 344 (1974). Another major exclusion
from the General Declassification Schedule involves material classified under the executive order in effect prior to the issuance of the current E.O. Material classified under
this earlier order was placed in one of four downgrading categories, only one of which
culminated in automatic declassification. Exec. Order No. 10964 § l(B), 3 C.F.R. 487
(1959-63 Comp.). The E.O. brings only this fourth category under the General Declassification Schedule. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 5(D), 3 C.F.R. 345 (1974). Material within
the other three categories is subject, as is material classified under the current E.O.,
to the mandatory review requirements discussed below. See text at notes 78-91 infra.
69. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 5(B), 3 C.F.R. 344:- (1974).
70. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 5(B), 3 C.F.R. 344 (1974).
71. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 5(E), 3 C.F.R. 345-46 (1974). For documents classified
after the effective date of the current E.O., such declassification is automatic unless
the head of the originating agency certifies in writing at the time of scheduled declassification that continued protection is essential to national security or that disclosure
would place a person in immediate jeopardy. Such a determination must be accompanied by a specification of the period of continued classification. Exec. Order No.
11652 § 5(E)(l), 3 C.F.R. 345-46 (1974). Thirty-year-old documents classified prior
to the effective date of the E.O. are subject to the same procedure, except that the
declassification is carried out by the Archivist of the United States. Exec. Order No.
11652 § 5(E)(2), 3 C.F.R. 346 (1974).
Whether or not the E.O.'s system has increased the accessibility of such information,
it appears to have speeded up considerably the declassification of information generated
and classified some time ago. The National Archives is in the process of reviewing all
"permanently valuable records" at least 30 years· old' for the purpose of declassification.
ICRC REPom-, supra note 2, at 25. To date, 162 million pages of such documents have
been surveyed to identify files for bulk declassification and over 22 million pages of
old documents have been declassified in bulk. An additional 27 million pages of
documents have been declassified following a page by page review. Moreover, 835
thousand pages of documents in the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy
libraries have been reviewed, 80 per cent of which were 30 years old or older; of these,
300 thousand pages have been declassified. Id.
Other government agencies also have been working to declassify older records. The
Army, Navy, Air Force, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CIA have all provided
personnel to assist the Archives in its effort, and appear to have made progress in
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The Directive interprets the E.O.'s declassification scheme. It
states initially that material must be declassified once it no longer
fits ·within one of the classification categories described in section
1 of the E.O.72 It next provides that the General Declassification
Schedule should be used if an earlier declassification date cannot be
determined. 78 Finally, the Directive requires each agency to conduct
an annual review of its classified material to determine whether any
of it is "of sufficient historical or other value to warrant preservation ... .'' 74 All such material that is to become declassified during
the year must be segregated, and made available to the public
promptly at the end of the year.75
Because the E.O. and the Directive have outlined the declassification scheme so precisely, there has been little need for agency
elaboration. The only point at which agency regulations in this area
seem to depart from the spirit of the E.O. and the Directive is in
their attitude toward the use of exemptions. Specifically, the Directive provides that if a document is inadvertently not exempted from
the General Declassification Schedule, it is to be considered subject
to the Schedule.76 However, State and Defense Department regulations provide that if the classifier inadvertently fails to exempt a
document, the recipient shall either exempt it himself or return it
to the originator.77
Any potential for abuse of the declassification scheme through the
use of exemptions is mitigated to some extent by the E.O.'s mandatory review provision.78 This section provides that any material
reviewing pre-1946 materials. Id. at 26. For example, the CIA has reviewed approximately 1,000 cubic feet of Office of Strategic Services documents in the possession ot
the Archives, and has declassified 90 per cent of them. Government Secrecy Hearings,
supra note 4, at 106 (testimony of J. Warner, General Counsel, Central Intelligence
Agency). Other agencies have their own review programs. The Atomic Energy Commis,
sion, which began its review in 1971, had reviewed 2.2 million documents and declassified 1.2 million of them by April 1974. ICRC R.El'ORT, supra, at 27. The Department
of Defense has acted to declassify certain items of electronic equipment and to convince
NATO to adopt a system of classification similar to that of the E.O. Government
Secrecy Hearings, supra, at 234 (addendum to statement of D. Cooke, Assistant Secretary
for Administration, Department of Defense). It has also reduced its inventory of top
secret documents by 25 per cent, though this has involved more destruction of docu•
ments than declassification. Id. at 235. The National Aeronautics and Space Administra,
tion in 1973 declassified some 2,000 documents. ICRC REFORT, supra, at 29. The De,
partment of State declassified in bulk 890,000 pages of documents dated 1947. Id,
72. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IIA, 3A C.F.R. 228 (1972).
73. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IIA, 3A C.F.R. 228 (1972).
74. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IIIA, 3A C.F.R. 229-30 (1972),
75. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IIIA, 3A C.F.R. 229-30 (1972). The National
Archives has similar responsibilities regarding material in its custody. NSC Directive,
supra, § IIID, 3A C.F.R. 231 (1972).
76. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IVA, 3A C.F.R. 232-33 (1972).
77. 22 C.F.R. § 9.16(b) (1974) (Department of State); 32 C.F,R. § 159.403-l(d) (1974)
(Department of Defense).
78. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 5(C), 3 C.F.R. 345 (1974).
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exempted from the General Declassification Schedule is subject to
review by the originating department ten years from the date of
origin.79 There are, however, three prerequisites to such review:
(1) A member of the public or another government agency must
request the review; 80 (2) the request must describe the material to
be reviewed with sufficient particularity to enable the originating
unit to identify it; (3) the material must be reasonably easy to find. 81
The Directive delineates "request for review" procedures. It
provides for initial processing of requests 82 and gives the person ask~
ing for review the right to appeal if there is no decision on the
request after sixty days. The appeal initially is heard by an agency
classification committee. 83 The agency unit denying the initial request
79. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 5(C), 3 C.F.R. 345 (1974).
80. It is not clear what happens when a request is received for information that is
less than ten years old. The mandatory review provisions are directed only at material
that is both exempted from the operation of the General Declassification Schedule
and more than ten years old. Review of material less than ten years old, exempted or
not, is not discussed.
Some agency regulations do address this problem. Those of the Atomic Energy
Commission, for example, provide that the Commission will respond "as promptly
as available resources permit" to questions about classified materials less than ten years
old. 10 C.F.R., pt. 9, app. A, § 6 (1974). Although not required to do so by its regulations, the Department of State has in practice adopted the policy of reviewing all
requests, whether or not the documents in question are more than ten years old. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 167 (testimony of Ambassador C. Laise,
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Department of State). The CIA specifically permits classification review of documents "which ••• are more than ten (10)
years old." 32 C.F.R. § 1900.5(b) (1974). By implication, requests for documents more
recently classified will not be considered. The Department of Defense has no regulation
on this subject, and its attitude toward requests for documents not yet ten years old
is unclear.
Requests for review of documents more than 30 years old are referred directly to
the Archivist of the United States. If custody of the documents has been transferred
to the Archives, the Archivist alone is charged with reviewing the documents. If the
originating agency retains custody, the Archivist conducts his review in conjunction
with the agency head. In either case, the documents are to be declassified unless the
agency head certifies in writing that continued protection is essential. NSC Directive,
supra note 14, § IIID, 3A C.F.R. 231 (1972).
81. Exec. Order No. 11652 §§ 5(C)(l)-(3), 3 C.F.R. 345 (1974).
82. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IIIB, 3A C.F.R. 230 (1972). Each agency is
required to desiguate a particular office to which mandatory review requests may be
directed. This office then forwards such requests to the appropriate agency unit for
consideration. The receiving office or the agency unit must acknowledge receipt of the
request in writing immediately and notify the requester of any fees that must be paid.
The agency unit must either render a decision on the request within 30 days or explain
why further time is necessary.
83. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IIIB, 3A C.F.R. 230 (1972). The E.O. requires
that each agency establish a classification committee to oversee agency declassification
procedures. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 7(B)(2), 3 C.F.R. 348 (1974). In addition to hearing
appeals from unit denials of declassification requests, these committees also review
requests that have not been acted on by the appropriate agency unit, NSC Directive,
supra, § IIIB, 3A C.F.R. 230 (1972), review denials of requests _made under section
552(b)(l) of the Freedom of Information Act, NSC Directive, supra, § XB, 3A C.F.R.
240 (1972), prepare quarterly reports for the ICRC on classification review requests,
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must, if possible, explain briefly why the material cannot be declassified84 and, throughout the review process, bears the burden of
showing that continued protection of the material is warranted.Bil
If the agency cannot carry this burden, the material requested is
made available unless it is exempted from disclosure by statute.80
The ICRC has jurisdiction to hear appeals from denials by
agency committees of requests for declassification.87 An appeal is
accepted if, "in the discretion of the Committee, the appeal raises
substantive issues." 88 Denials that are based on a lack of particularity of description in the request or on difficulty of location are
not subject to review.89 Again, the agency bears "the burden of
persuasion." 99 A majority vote of a quorum of the Committee is
needed to declassify a document. 91
f. Sanctions. The E.O. provides sanctions for violations of its
provisions. It requires that persons who classify material unnecessarily must be notified that their actions violate the E.O., and it
states that "repeated abuse of the classification process shall be
grounds for an administrative reprimand." 92 The agency committees
and the ICRC are required to report such violations to the head of
the agency unit concerned "so that corrective steps may be taken." 98
classification abuses, and unauthorized disclosures, NSC Directive, supra, § XC(2), 3A
C.F.R. 240 (1972), and recommend to the agency head "appropriate administrative
actions to correct abuse or violation" of the E.O. NSC Directive, supra, § XD, 3A
C.F.R. 240 (1972),
84. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IIIB, 3A C.F.R. 230 (1972).
85. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IIIE, 3A C.F.R. 231-32 (1972).
86. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § IIIF, 3A C.F.R. 227, 231 (1972). Cf, text at notes
568-610 infra. If material is not properly classified, it cannot be withheld under the
national security exemption of the FOIA. See text at notes 506-35 infra.
87. 32 C.F.R. § 2000.3(e) (1974). All other remedies must be exhausted before the
ICRC will hear an appeal. 32 C.F.R. § 2000.!i(b) (1974). Appeals must be submitted
within 60 days after the request has been denied, must include a statement of the
agency denying the request and should include all correspondence on the matter, 32
C.F.R. § 2000.!i(a) (1974).
88. 32 C.F.R. § 2000.!i(c) (1974). Relevant considerations include the following: (1)
the nature of the documents sought; (2) their relationship to other classified documents;
(3) the likelihood of early public release upon declassification; (4) any disagreement
between agencies regarding proper classification.
89. 32 C.F.R. § 2000.!i(c) (1974).
90. 32 C.F.R. § 2000.!i(e) (1974).
91. 32 C.F.R. § 2000.3 (1974). A quorum for an appeal consists of seven members
of the committee or their designated alternates. The requester must be notified in
writing of the ICRC's decision and, if the appeal is denied, its reasons for the denial,
32 C.F.R. § 2000.5(£) (1974).
92. Exec. Order No. 11652 § I3(A), 3 C.F.R. 349 (1974).
93. Exec. Order No. 11652 § I3(A), 3 C.F.R. 349 (1974). Compare Exec. Order No.
ll652 § I3(B), 3 C.F.R. 350 (1974): "The head of each Department is directed to take
prompt and stringent administrative action against any officer or employee ••• deter•
mined to have been responsible for any release ••• of national security information • , ,
not authorized •••• Where a violation of criminal statutes may be involved, Depart•
ments will refer any such case promptly to the Department of Justice."
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The Directive allows agency committees to recommend penalties as
severe as suspension without pay or removal, or as light as the issuance of warning letters or formal reprimands. 94 Generally, agency
regulations reflect the spirit, if not the exact form, of the E.O. and
the Directive.95

2. The System in Practice
To examine the actual operation of the classification system, it
is useful to divide the discussion into three parts. First, an attempt
will be made to determine the kind of information that is being
classified under the system. Second, the procedural aspects of the
system will be considered. Finally, attention will be given to the
problem of access to classified material.
a. Classification in practice. There is, inherent in any classification system, a certain tension between the government's need for
secrecy, and the public's need for information. On the one hand,
there is no doubt that some government-held information should not
be circulated freely. War plans, descriptions of military techniques,
information regarding the capabilities of certain weapons, and pseudonyms of American covert operatives may all fall into this category.
It also seems reasonable to believe that records of internal debates
on foreign policy matters and confidential information received from
foreign countries should be kept exclusively within the government.
Dissemination of this kind of information might do considerable
damage to this country, while public benefit from the release of
this material would not be great. It is thus appropriate to classify
such items.
On the other hand, effective democratic government requires
public debate of vital issues. Because such debate is possible only if
adequate information is available, any procedure that inhibits the
fl.ow of information potentially interferes with this goal. If the classification system in fact permits the suppression of information that
is needed by the public in order to make informed political choices,
the operation of that system arguably runs counter to the public
interest. Thus, the question that must be addressed is whether information needed by the public and not dangerous to the welfare of
the country is being concealed.
It is obviously not possible for persons outside the government
94. NSC Directive, supra note 14, § XD, 3A C.F.R. 240 (1972).
95. Some agencies make no distinction between penalties for under-classification
or unauthorized disclosure and penalties for excessive classification. E.g., 28 C.F.R.
§ 17.7 (1974) (Justice Department). Others provide different sanctions for the two
offenses in separate regulations. E.g., 22 C.F.R. § 9.63 (1974) (State Department; security violation), 22 C.F.R. § 9.64 (1974) (State Department; over-classification); 32 C.F.R.
§ 159.1400-l(a) (1974) (Defense Department; abuse of the classification process or
negligence regarding the safeguarding of classified information), 32 C.F.R. 159.1400-l(b)
(1974) (Defense Department; unauthorized disclosure).
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to examine a sample of classified information large enough to indicate the kinds of information that are classified. Therefore, this
discussion will focus on two recently revealed instances in which the
executive branch sought to conceal information considered to be
too sensitive for public dissemination. An attempt will be made to
draw some conclusions from these examples about the effectiveness
of the E.O.'s classification policy.
The first instance of executive branch secrecy involves the 1973
bombing of Cambodia by American forces. Early in that year,
Senator Harold Hughes requested a summary of United States air
actions over Cambodia from the Defense Department. 00 The response
indicated that no such actions had occurred prior to May 1970.07 Then,
in July 1973, it was revealed that a former officer of the United
States Air Force had told Senator Hughes that American aircraft
had operated over Cambodia prior to May 1970.98 The officer, who
claimed to have been a participant in the operation, later explained
that he had been ordered to falsify reports to make it appear as
though the raids had been carried out over Vietnam. 00 He added
that it was his understanding that the purpose of the falsification
was to keep knowledge of the bombings from anti-war Congressmen.100
After the officer's statements were made public, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger acknowledged that falsifications had occurred and
defended their use. He argued that such measures were necessary to
prevent compromise of the bombing, in view of its diplomatic sensitivity.101 Allegedly, Cambodia's then Premier, Prince Norodom
Sihanouk, had approved the raids.102 Because Sihanouk could not
have publicly admitted this, disclosure of the American operation
would have obliged him to demand its cessation. American officials
thus thought it necessary to refrain from admitting that the raids
were being conducted.103 Sihanouk himself strongly denied ever
approving the bombings.104
In congressional testimony, the former chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, explained that the military
adopted the falsified reporting system after President Nixon ordered
96. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1973, at 5, col. 1 (city ed.).
97. Id. In that month, American and South Vietnamese troops began military
operations within Cambodia aimed at eliminating North Vietnamese sanctuaries
in that country. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1970, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.).
98. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1973, at I, col. 1 (city ed.).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1973, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.).
102. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1973, at 4, col. 3 (city ed.).
103. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1973, at 36, col. 2 (city ed.).
104. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1973, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.).
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that the bombing be conducted under maximum security.105 Further
investigation by the Senate revealed that, although the false reporting
of the Cambodian bombing ended after the May 1970 ground
operations began, such falsification continued through 1972 with
respect to bombing in northern Laos.106
No sanctions were ever imposed for these falsifications. Indeed,
President Nixon vigorously defended the actions taken, stating that
those "who had any right to know or need to know" had been
informed. 107
Although the method of secrecy employed by the executive branch
in the Cambodian affair involved falsification of data, there is reason
to believe that the same effect could have been achieved through the
use of the classification system. The current E.O. had not been
adopted when the bombing of Cambodia took place. However,
knowledge of the incident became public over a year after the effective date of the E.O. During the ensuing controversy over the affair
there was no suggestion that the procedures of the new E.O. would
have prevented the concealment that occurred, had classification been
used. In fact, President Nixon's apparently strong belief in the need
for secrecy in this case indicates that information concerning the
bombing would not have been revealed, whatever method of concealment had been employed.
Central Intelligence Agency operations in Chile from 1970 to
1973, involving the channeling of funds to various political groups
opposing President Allende,1°8 provide a second example of information kept secret by the executive branch.
The facts about the Chilean operation became public in September 1974, after the press obtained a letter that Congressman
Michael Harrington had sent to the chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee. The letter revealed that CIA Director William
S. Colby admitted in congressional testimony that the CIA had in
fact engaged in covert political activity in Chile.109 In public statements, administration officials had consistently denied this.110
President Ford maintained that the Chilean operation was aimed
at preserving a democratic opposition in Chile and defended the
105. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1973, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.).
106. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1973, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.).
107. Speech before Veterans of Foreign Wars convention, New Orleans, La., Aug.
20, 1973, in N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1973, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.).
108. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1974, at 5, col. 3 (city ed.).
109. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1974, at 3, col. 4 (city ed.).
110. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1974, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.). While it later appeared that
some information bearing generally on the subject had been provided to a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senators familiar with that material insisted that the statements that had been made had been misleading. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 12, 1974, at 5, col. 3 (city ed.).
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government's attempt to keep the activity secret by pointing out
that it would have had no chance of success had it been revealed.111
This, then, is an example of information that is kept secret-is, in
effect, "classified"-solely because a political decision is made that
the underlying activity involved is legitimate, and must be carried
out covertly to be successful. The E.O.'s classification scheme, which
provides the legal basis for the government's secrecy system, apparently does not prevent such a result.
From these examples, two conclusions can be drawn about the
scope of the current classification system and its effectiveness. First,
it is apparent that the system can be used to conceal major American
policy decisions. The bombing of Cambodia involved a decision to
violate neutral territory and the Chilean incident involved a decision
to enhance political opposition to a legal government with which the
United States ostensibly had friendly relations. By keeping information about incidents such as these secret, the public cannot evaluate
effectively the foreign policy of the United States.
Second, it is probably fair to say that despite the contrary language in the E.0.,112 the system does not prevent classification for
political reasons. The strong presidential defense of government
secrecy in both of the above cases indicates that at least some information will be concealed whether or not it falls within the E.O.'s definition113 of properly protected information. And, even accepting the
legitimacy of the initial classification decisions in the Cambodian
and Chilean affairs, it is still apparent that the classification in those
instances was continued after the rationale for concealment no
longer obtained. Information about the Cambodian bombing, originally kept secret to avoid embarrassing Sihanouk, remained classified
long after the United States had stopped taking Sihanouk's needs
into consideration. Likewise, the Chilean activities were concealed
even after the overthrow of Allende made concealment of assistance
to his enemies superfluous. It is thus likely that the classifications
were continued in both cases to avoid embarrassment and potential
political damage to the incumbent administration.
b. The procedure in practice. The analysis of the scope of classification under the E.O. involved drawing inferences from a few published sources. Far more information is available about the workings
of the more technical aspects of the classification system.
Perhaps the most notable achievement of the current E.O. has
been its impact on the distribution of classification authority. As of
December 1973, 17,364 persons were authorized to classify information.U4 Of these, 1,541 persons had Top Secret classification au111. News Conference, Sept. 16, 1974, in N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1974, at 20, col. 4
(city ed.).
112. See text at note 29 supra.
113. See text at note 22 supra.
114. ICRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
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thority,115 and therefore could exempt information from the operation of the General Declassification Schedule. These figures reveal
a 71 per cent reduction in the total number of classifiers from that
authorized by the previous executive order, and a 78 per cent reduction in the number of Top Secret classifiers.116 In addition, 11
agencies that formerly possessed Top Secret classifying authority lost
it under the current system,117 the most notable eliminations being
the Departmen_t of Commerce and the United States Information
Agency. Dramatic cuts affected all other agencies, both in the total
number of classifiers and in the number of Top Secret positions.118
Although the new E.O. has drastically reduced the number of
authorized classifiers, it is possible that there has not been a very
great change in agency classification practices. The Department of
State regulation requiring the originator of a document to classify it
pending final approval by someone with classification authority119
probably reflects the procedure in most agencies. Thus, unless the
authorized classifier regularly second-guesses his subordinates on such
matters, the number of persons who actually assign classifications, as
compared to the number authorized to do so, may well not have
declined by much.
Another aim of the current E.0. is to reduce the number of
documents classified. It is, unfortunately, not possible to determine
precisely whether this goal has been achieved. The ICRC report for
1974 states, however, that "the Committee has been informed by
several agencies that they estimate that there has been a marked
reduction in the number of documents classified this past year. The
[Atomic Energy Commission], for example, shows an 83 per cent
reduction in the number of documents classified Top Secret in 1973.
The [United States Information Agency] estimates that 30 per cent
fewer documents were classified in 1973 than in 1972."120 And the
recent congressional testimony of Ambassador Carol C. Laise, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, also indicates that the
E.O. has been effective in this area:
[D]uring the recent nine-month period, only approximately 16%
of the telegrams sent to the field from the Department were classified, compared to between 35% and 40% of comparable traffic in
periods prior to the Executive order. Only about 20% of the docu115. Id.
116. Id.
117. These are Canal Zone, Civil Aeronautics Board, Civil Service Commission,
Department of Commerce, Export-Import Bank, Federal Maritime Commission, Federal Power Commission, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, United States
Information Agency, National Science Foundation, and Department of Transportation.
Id. at 11-16.
118. See id. at 11-16.
119. See text at note 46 supra.
120. ICRC REPORT, supra note 2, af 21-22.
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ments of historical significance now being recorded in our files are
classified, compared with an estimated 40% to 50% in earlier years. 121
There is thus some evidence that a smaller proportion of executive
branch documents are being classified than was formerly the case.
If the number of persons effectively classifying documents has in
fact remained static, this reduction in classification could be attributable to a stricter adherence to classification criteria, at least
among low-ranking personnel.
Information on the use of exemptions from the General Declassification Schedule is not currently available for the entire
executive branch. However, figures are available for the three
agencies-the CIA, the Defense Department, and the Department
of Justice-that together produce about ninety-five per cent of all
materials classified by the executive branch.122 These figures show
that well over half of the documents being classified by these agencies
are being shielded from automatic disclosure. 128 This rate suggests
that the exemption provisions are being abused.124 The little information available indicates that these agencies seldom apply sanctions
for abuse of the system, however.125
In contrast to the above approach, the State Department has been
relatively restrained in its departures from the General Declassification Schedule. During the first quarter of 1974, the only period for
which figures are available, only 11.4 per cent of its classified docu121. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 171.
122. This estimate is based on statistics in the Table in ICRC REPORT, supra note
2, at 23.
123. Recent congressional testimony indicates that approximately 96 per cent of
the classified documents generated by the CIA are exempted from automatic declassification. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 102. A recent report from the
Department of Defense states that a survey of 75 of its activities revealed that 7 per
cent of the documents generated by the Defense Department were marked for declas•
sification earlier than would have been required by the General Schedule, 42 per cent
were placed under the General Schedule, 42 per cent were exempted, and 7 per cent
were excluded. Id. at 504. ("Exclusion" refers to documents containing information
classified prior to the current system. Id. at 246.) The Department of Justice reports
that between January 1973 and March 1974 87 per cent of the classified documents
it generated were exempted. Id. at 162-63.
124. See text at note 130 infra.
125. I Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Government, and Freedom of Information,
Hearings on S. 858, S. Con. Res. !JO, S.J. Res. 72, S. 1106, S. 1142, S. 1520, S. 1923 and
S. 2073 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm,
on Government Operations and the Subcomms. on Separation of Powers and Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 187 (1973) (3 vols.) [hereinafter 1973 Senate Hearings]. See generally Classification Abuse Reports, in Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 648-68. The
CIA report indicates that the sanction generally imposed for over-classification was
an oral reprimand. Id. at 662-65. In this period, no individual classification abuses
were reported by the Defense Department. Id. at 657-58.
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ments were exempted from automatic declassification.126 Furthermore, the State Department has actively warned offending employees
against classification abuses: Between April 1974, when the Department began to use an automatic data processing system to monitor
abuses, and July 1974, when it dispatched an airgram on the subject
to all of its overseas posts, it issued over 400 warning letters.127 One
of the recipients was an Assistant Secretary of State.128 In view of the
importance to the public of State Department operations, this emphasis on avoiding over-classification is most encouraging. The beneficial effect of the State Department approach is somewhat limited
however, given the fact that it generates only about one per cent of
the classified information held by the executive branch.129
Taken together, the figures on the use of exemptions and the
issuance of warning letters are disturbing. It seems fair to assume
that the General Declassification Schedule was intended to be followed in most cases. Certainly, the language of the section of the E.O.
permitting exemptions from the Schedule130 indicates that exemptions should be invoked only rarely. The widespread use of exemptions by the Defense and Justice Departments, and by the CIA, thus
appears contrary to the intention of the Order. Any suggestion that
the time limits established by the E.O. are unrealistically short,
forcing departures from the General Schedule, seems refuted by the
experience of the State Department. Even allowing for differences in
the character of the information handled by the different agencies,
the great disparity in the use of exemptions between the State De-.
partment and the other agencies may reflect a certain indifference in
the latter organizations toward the problem of over-classification.
This impression is reinforced by the apparent laxity with which these
agencies apply sanctions for classification abuse.
c. Access to classified information. The question of nonexecutive
branch access to information actually involves two separate problems,
access by the Congress and access by the public. Congress must make
certain that it has access to information that, though legitimately
classified, is necessary to its deliberations. The public's interest is
limited to ensuring that information that ought to be freely available
is not classified. The differences between these two problems require
126. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 605 (Department of State,
Answers to Questions Submitted by the Muskie Subcomm., answer to question five).
127. Department of State Airgram, Classification and Declassification of National
Security Information and Material 1, July 18, 1974.
128. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 604 (Department of State,
Answers to Questions Submitted by the Muskie Subcomm., answer to question 3).
129. This figure was calculated from the Table in ICRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
130. Exec. Order No. 11652 § 5(B), 3 C.F.R. 344-45 (1974). See text at notes 67-68
supra.
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that they be discussed separately. Because of the lack of data regarding access to information, it is again necessary to resort to the case
approach.
Since both examples of government secrecy discussed earlier131
involved the problem of congressional access to classified information, they will be drawn upon again at this point. One further incident involving congressional access to classified information, the
"rain-making case," should also be noted.
In the fall of 1971, Senator Claiborne Pell repeatedly and unsuccessfully sought information from the Defense Department concerning rumors that the United States was using weather modification as
a weapon in Indo-China.132 His requests were refused on the grounds
that the information was classified and had already been provided to
the appropriate congressional committees.138
Subsequently, the press obtained the facts Senator Pell sought.184
It was revealed that during 1970 and 1971, the United States had
seeded clouds in areas over the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos in an
effort to impede transportation over the trail and to interfere with
the operation of North Vietnamese anti-aircraft weapons.18 G The
program had aroused considerable opposition within the executive
branch, both because there were doubts as to its effectiveness and
because the idea of using weather as a weapon made a number of
civil servants uneasy.136 Nevertheless, in subsequent congressional
testimony, Defense Department representatives maintained that,
beyond keeping the Armed Services Committees up to date, their
agency had no obligation to inform Congress of these activities.137
Other than ask the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee to discuss the matter with Senator Pell, the Department
representatives did nothing further to meet his request.138 Although
131. See text at notes 96-113 supra.
132. In September 1971, Senator Pell wrote to R. Johnson, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, concerning these rumors. Government Information Hearings, supra note 61, at 3174-75. Senator Pell, Chairman of the Senate
Subcomm. on Oceans and the International Environment, asked for an account of the
use of such techniques. Receiving only an acknowledgement of receipt of his letter,
he again wrote to Johnson in November 1971. Johnson responded with a very general
account of Defense Department weather experiments and did not address Pcll's
specific inquiry regarding military use of cloud-seeding techniques. Id. at 3175-76.
Dissatisfied with Johnson's reply, Senator Pell wrote to Defense Secretary Laird re•
peating his original request. Id. at 3176. Senator Pell received a response written by
Dr. J. Foster, Pentagon Director of Defense, Research, and Engineering, again dcclin•
ing to give Pell the information he sought. Id.
133. Id. at 3176-77.
134. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1972, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.).
135. Id,
136. Id.
137. Government Information Hearings, supra note 61, at 3177-80,
138. Id. at 3177.
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this testimony was given only eight days prior to the effective date
of the current E.O., the representatives did not suggest that the new
classification system would alter Defense Department procedure in
this regard.
In the "rain-making case," Congress was denied knowledge of a
particular method of waging war. In the Cambodian and Chilean
affairs, Congress was deceived as to American policy toward the
countries involved. Yet, it has been suggested that, to ,carry out its
constitutional duties, Congress has need for information that reveals
whether (1) the United States has troops engaged in combat in a
particular area; (2) the United States is financing a particular undertaking; (3) negotiations are taking place with regard to a certain
question, without necessarily revealing the substance of the negotiations; (4) sophisticated intelligence-gathering systems exist; and (5)
there exist agreements calling for commitment of American human
or material resources under certain contingencies.139 And it seems
logical to add that Congress should generally be informed of administration policy with regard to a particular area or subject. Thus,
under these criteria, Congress was denied information that it needed
to perform its duties effectively in these three instances. It would
therefore appear that, at least in some cases, the classification system
hinders the operation of the legislature.
Even in cases where Congress can obtain classified information,
there is still the difficulty of knowing what to ask for. Regulations
permitting agencies to deny information to the GAO, and the
practice of delaying responses to congressional inquiries, are part of
the problem.140 Agency limitations on distribution of classified material, such as the State Department's nodis, exdis, and so on,141 also
reduce the likelihood that anyone in Congress will come to know
that he or she should ask questions.
The three cases above illustrate the irregular methods by which
Congress occasionally does learn of the existence of vital information.
Rumors, reinforced by leaks to the press, triggered Senator Pell's
cloud-seeding inquiries.142 In the Cambodia case, Congress remained
unaware of the secret bombing until a participant in the operation
made the facts known.143 The truth of the Chilean situation was
explained to one congressional committee in closed-session testimony,144 but other committees, with equal responsibilities in the
139. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 78 (Senator Muskie, summarizing previous testimony before his committee).
140. See notes 61, 65-66 supra and accompanying text.
141. See text at notes 54-57 supra.
142. See text at notes 132-34 supra.
143. See text at notes 96-100 supra.
144. See note 110 supra.
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area, remained uninformed until a leak occurred. In the "rainmaking" case, Senator Pell never got the material he sought, and
was obliged to accept a compromise.145 In the other two cases, however, Congress got the information it wanted, once it knew what to
ask for and whom to ask.
The problem of public access to national security information,
unlike that of congressional access, is basically one of avoiding incorrect classification. Achieving this goal requires, first, that decisions to classify be based solely on conclusions that the information
in question cannot safely be made public, and, second, that an adequate means of challenging these decisions be available to the public.
McGeorge Bundy, former Presidential Special Assistant for National Security, has analyzed the kinds of information that would be
classified under a system that was oriented toward public access. He
has suggested that six types of material must be concealed: (1) military
contingency plans; (2) the substance of current diplomatic negotiations; (3) information concerning covert political activity, assuming
such activity is found justifiable; (4) information concerning covert
intelligence gathering; (5) material whose potential for embarrassment
is greater than its power of enlightenment; and (6) material revealing a President's decisional processes.146
In determining whether the current classification system protects
only information meeting these criteria, the three cases discussed
above again serve as useful examples. Some elements of each incident could reasonably have been kept secret from the general public.
The precise techniques used in rain-making, the details of the
bombing operations in Cambodia, and perhaps even the existence of
the Chilean covert operation would fall within one or another of
Bundy's categories. If rain-making is treated as a secret weapon, it
would even be possible to make a case for classification of the
existence of a cloud-seeding capability. But concealing both the
military operations in Cambodia, and the government's support of
active opposition to the Allende regime, is much less defensible.
Democratic government assumes the power of the electorate to
evaluate government policy-making. But voters cannot pass judgment on policies of which they are unaware. The classification system
permitted the executive branch to keep American foreign policy
secret in these instances. This degree of executive discretion seems
excessive.
The E.O.'s mandatory review procedures147 do not appear to be
adequate to correct these problems of over-classification. Although
145.
146.
147.
148.

See text at note 138 supra.
Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 14-16.
See text at notes 78-91 supra.
In 19'73, for example, there were 621 declassification requests made to execu•
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the system has functioned well in some cases,148 its use has not been
general149 and few requests for review have been carried beyond the
initial stage.150 Agencies appear to have acted promptly when they
have acted at all,151 but over one third of the requests received by the
agencies are not acted on at all,1 52 and pending periods for these
requests are often long.153
There are several deficiencies in the structure of the review system
that may account for its inability adequately to protect the public
interest. First, use of the procedure is limited, for the most part, to
documents classified for more than ten years;154 this undoubtedly
live agencies; 306 were granted in full, 85 were granted in part, 80 were denied, and
150 were still pending at year's end. Among the 5 key foreign affairs agencies (CIA,
Departments of Defense and State, National Security Council, and other units of the
Executive Offices of the President), however, the average is not quite as impressive.
These bodies received 588 of the requests and granted 288 in whole and 79 in part;
77 of the denials and 144 of the requests still pending involved these bodies. ICRC
REPORT, supra note 2, at 20.
Information is available in somewhat more detail for the Defense and State Departments. From the date of the promulgation of the E.O. in June 1972 through
April 1974, the Defense Department received 582 requests; 534 were acted on within
that period and information was released in whole or in part in 85 per cent of the
cases. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 209. In 1973 and the first three
months of 1974, the State Department received 312 declassification requests; documents
totalling 28,861 pages were involved. Id. at 167. Seventy-eight per cent of these documents were released, 2.7 per cent were denied, and the remaining 56 requests were
still pending at the end of the period.
149. Agency reports on mandatory review requests for the period from October
1973 to March 1974 indicate that only about 200 individuals and organizations filed
the 500 plus requests received during this period. See Mandatory Declassification
Review Request Reports, in Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 472-500
(CIA), 508-85 (Defense Department), 592-603 (State Department), 669-88 (all other
agencies). Moreover, almost all of these requests came from academic researchers or
from other governmental agencies. Id. Only 9 journalists and news organizations made
use of the system. Id.
~ 150. The agency committees considered only 17 appeals between June 1972 and
April 1974. See Mandatory Declassification Review Request Reports, supra note 149.
As of April 1974, the ICRC itself had received only six appeals from denials of
mandatory review requests. It reversed the agencies involved twice, remanded for a
review that resulted in a partial release once, and affirmed the denials in three cases.
ICRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 42. It is not known how many appeals, if any, the
ICRC has declined to hear in the exercise of its discretion. Nor is it possible to analyze the decisions in the cases that have been heard, as the Committee's sessions are
closed. 32 C.F.R. § 2000.5(e) (1974).
151. Examination of a sample of mandatory review request reports indicates that,
for the period studied, the average interval between submission of a request and final
action on it was between seven and eight weeks. See Mandatory Declassification Review
Request Reports, supra note 149. There were instances of delays of over nine months,
however. See, e.g., id. at 595 (No. 24). The average delay for the Department of State
was more than twice as long as that for all other agencies together. Id. at 592-603.
152. See Mandatory Declassification Review Request Reports, supra note 149.
153. See note 151 supra.
154. See note 79 supra and accompanying text. Only the AEC and the State Department will consider declassification requests involving material more recently classified.
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tends to confine resort to the procedure to persons with an historical
interest in the classified material. Second, the need, in some instances,
to obtain the concurrence of other agencies prior to declassifying
makes declassification review difficult and time consuming.m; Third,
the small size of the ICRC staff, which in May 1974 consisted of the
executive director and one secretary,156 may limit that body's capacity
to hear review appeals.157 Finally, the system does not provide for
review of procedurally based denials of declassification,168 and there
is no extra-agency oversight of these denials.160
From the foregoing, it is clear that the present system does not
adequately solve the problem of public access to government-held
information.
3. Changing the System
The above examination of the functioning of the current classification system reveals that the system permits the executive branch to
retain over-broad discretion in the classification area. While the
danger that this situation poses to the interests of both the Congress
and the public is obvious, the remedy is not. The remedial problem
is exacerbated, in part, by the existing controversy over whether
Congress can lawfully take action in this area. This section will thus
consider first, the legality of legislative reform of the classification
system, and second, the adequacy of recently proposed legislative
changes.
a. The legal foundation of security classification. The security
classification system currently in force was established by executive
order in March 1972.160 The order cites as its legal basis the power
155. This seems to be a particular problem for the Departments of State and Defense. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 167 (testimony of Ambassador
C. Laise), at 209 (testimony of D. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department
of Defense).
156. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 93 (testimony of J. Rhoads,
Archivist of the United States and Acting Chairman of ICRC).
157. Id. at 97-98. One cannot gauge how broadly the ICRC is interpreting its
power to oversee the security classification system. The Acting Chairman of the Committee has acknowledged that the ICRC has thus far not tested its authority to the
fullest. For example, while it has the power to deal with all classification abuses, it
has restricted its focus to improper denials of mandatory review requests. Id.
158. See text at note 89 supra.
159. During the period from October 1973 to March 1974, e.xecutive agencies denied only about one per cent of all requests on procedural grounds, however. Sec
Mandatory Declassification Review Request Reports, supra note 149.
160. Exec. Order No. 11652, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974). Ever since classification authority
was extended to nonmilitary executive agencies, see text at note 7 supra; H.R. REP.
No. 93-221, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973), it has been governed by executive orders,
Executive orders are issued by the President to direct "[f]ederal government officials
or agencies to take some action on particular matters." Comment, Presidential Legislation by Executive Order, 37 CoLo. L, REV. 105, 106 (1964). Since the security classification system prescribes procedures to be followed by federal agencies when dealing
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vested in the President "by the Constitution and the statutes of the
United States."161 In hearings before a House Subcommittee, Assistant Attorney General Ralph E. Erickson amplified this statement
by stating that the E.O. was based on the President's constitutional
powers and duties, rather than on express statutory authority.162
According to Erickson, the order is simply one means by which the
President supervises the employees of the executive branch163 and
ensures that certain laws, such as those concerning espionage and
sabotage, are faithfully executed. Erickson pointed out that Congress
has enacted a number of statutes that assume the existence of a security classification system, although none expressly authorizes one.164
with certain types of information, the use of executive orders to direct the adoption
of these procedures seems to be appropriate.
The legality of an executive order depends on the legality of the action that the
President has ordered. That is, the validity and enforceability of an executive order
is analyzed by referring to the powers conferred on the President by the Constitution
and by statute. The legality of the current E.O. thus turns on the scope of the President's authority to control sensitive information. For a discussion of the various questions raised by presidential legislation through the use of executive orders, see Comment, supra; Comment, Executive Orders and the Development of Presidential Power,
17 VILL. L. REv. 688 (1972).
161. Exec. Order No. 11652, preamble, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974).
162. Government Information Hearings, supra note 61, at 2824-25.
163. Erickson maintained that Article II, section 1 (vesting executive power in the
President), section 2 (making the President Commander-in-Chief of the anhed forces),
and section 3 (requiring the President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed), taken together, require the President to supervise the employees of the executive branch. Government Information Hearings, supra note 61, at 2824.
164. Id. at 2824-25. For example, Erickson referred to the Espionage Acts, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 792-99 (1970), as "alternatively refer[ring] to classified information or mak[ing] it
imperative to establish a classification system in order to enforce them fairly and effectively," and cited United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945), in support of
this statement. In that case the court held that a conviction under the Espionage Acts
for disclosure of information relating to the national defense could not be based on
the collection and transmittal of information lawfully made public. Judge Learned
Hand observed, "The services must be trusted to determine what information may
be broadcast without prejudice to the 'national defense,' and their consent to its dissemination is as much evidenced by what they do not seek to suppress, as by what
they utter." 151 F.2d at 816. It thus appears that information is not subject to the
protection of the Espionage Acts unless the executive has classified it.
Erickson also noted that 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) (1970), prohibiting United States Government employees from communicating to a foreign agent "any information of a
kind which shall have been classified by the President • • • as affecting the security
of the United States," assumes the existence of a classification system. Government
Information Hearings, supra note 61, at 2825.
In addition to the statutes Erickson mentioned, several other statutes appear to
take for granted the existence of a classification system. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 798
(1970) prohibits the willful communication to unauthorized persons of certain types of
"classified information"; classified information is defined as "information which, at the
time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national security, specifically
designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution." Similarly, the President is obliged by 22 U.S.C. § 2394(b) (1970)
to make public all information concerning operations of the Development Loan Fund
"not deemed by him to be incompatible with the security of the United States." And
22 U.S.C. § 2585 (1970), requiring security clearances for personnel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, also assumes the existence of "classified information."
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He thus implied that this legislation indicates congressional recognition of the legitimacy of the executive classification procedures.
The authority of the executive branch to classify information
has not been challenged. Since 1875, the Supreme Court has recognized the President's power to protect information he deems vital to
national security, provided that neither legislation nor a judicial
subpoena restricts his ability to act.166 Most recently, in United States
v. Nixon, 166 the Court was careful to observe that the matter came
before it "[a]bsent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or
sensitive national security secrets . . .." 167 Thus, even as it rejected
President Nixon's claim that the value of preserving the confidentiality of presidential conversations outweighs that of providing evidence essential to a criminal prosecution, the Court deferred, as it
traditionally has, to the President's military and diplomatic duties.168
The question that must be answered, then, is not whether the
executive possesses the authority to classify information, but whether
its authority to do so is exclusive.
Professor Robert G. Dixon, former Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, has argued that the President has exclusive authority in the classification area. In testimony
before the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations,100
Professor Dixon began by citing Justice Stewart's concurring opinion
in New York Times v. United States,170 in which Stewart stated that
"it is the constitutional duty of the Executive-as a matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know
law-through the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations, to protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its
165. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875), in which plaintiff, the admin•
istrator of the estate of an individual who had spied for the federal government
during the Civil War, alleged that the terms of a secret contract between President
Lincoln and the decedent entitled the latter to more money than he had received.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the claim; it reasoned that
the suit could not be allowed, since its prosecution would require disclosure of matters
that the public interest demanded be kept secret.
More recently, in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), in which
the Court refused to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers, Justice Marshall,
concurring, observed, "In these cases, there is no problem concerning the President's
power to classify information as 'secret' or 'top secret'. Congress has specifically recog•
nized Presidential authority • • • to classify documents and information. • • • Nor
is there an issue here regarding the President's power ••• to protect national security
by disciplining employees who disclose information and by taking precautions to pre•
vent leaks." 403 U.S. at 741. See also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953),
acknowledging the existence of a military-secrets evidentiary privilege.
166. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
167. 418 U.S. at 706.
168. 418 U.S. at 710-11. See also text at notes 291-93 infra.
169. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 135-61.
170. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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responsibilities in the fields of international relations and defense." 171
Next, he quoted from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.,172 in which the Supreme Court stated that in foreign affairs,
"with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems,
the President alone has the power to speak or to listen as a representative of the nation."173 Dixon also pointed to Chicago & Southern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,174 where the Court
said that "[t]he President . . . possesses in his own right certain
powers conferred by the Constitution on him as Commander-in-Chief
and as the Nation's organ in foreign affairs," 175 and added that,
acting in these capacities, the President "has available intelligence
services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the
world." 176 Lastly, Dixon noted that John Jay, in The Federalist,
referred approvingly to the President's power to conduct negotiations
in secret.177 Hence, Dixon concluded that the President's exclusive
power to establish a classification system may be inferred from his
article II powers as Commander-in-Chief, and as conductor of the
nation's international relations.178
In general, Dixon did not approve of the idea of congressional
action in the classification area. He asserted that allowing either a
congressional committee or an independent agency to supervise the
information-control program would necessitate a shared administration. Such a sharing, he contended, would violate the separation of
powers principle by inserting nonexecutive authority into areas
where the executive has primary responsibility-national defense and
foreign relations.179 Dixon pointed out that the President's power to
remove officers discharging purely executive functions is constitutionally absolute.180 Accordingly, Dixon reasoned that Congress
could not place beyond the President's authority officers charged with
the purely executive function of classifying documents.181 He found
legislation dealing with classification standards less objectionable,
but, as a practical matter, likely to require interpretation by the
executive branch.182
171. 403 U.S. at 729-30.
172. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
173. 299 U.S. at 319.
174. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
175. 333 U.S. at 109.
176. 333 U.S. at 111.
177. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 0- Jay).
178. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 157.
179. Id. at 151.
180. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) and Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) were cited for this proposition. Id. at 151.
181. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 151-52.
182. Id. at 153.
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With regard to legislation that would allow judicial review of
classification decisions, Dixon cited EPA v. Mink183 for the proposition that congressional power to legislate in the field of information
is limited by executive privilege.184 He pointed out that Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon 186 held
that the Senate Watergate Committee's need for the Watergate tapes
was insufficient to out1veigh the presumption of confidentiality to be
accorded presidential conversations, and argued that, under Nixon v.
Sirica,186 an even stronger showing of congressional need would have
to be made with regard to national security information. Although
he recognized that Nixon v. Sirica held that a claim of national security privilege was reviewable, Dixon nonetheless maintained that
such review could extend only to questions of extreme arbitrariness,
and that a court, lacking expertise, could not substitute its judgment
for that of the executive in this area.187 Thus, Dixon concluded that
congressional power to authorize judicial review of classification
decisions is inherently limited.
Upon closer examination, however, it becomes evident that the
cases relied on by Dixon do not necessarily support his conclusions.
If, as Justice Stewart stated in New York Times, the executive's
classification authority is not "a matter of law as the courts know
law,"188 - then presumably that authority cannot be traced to an
exclusive grant in the Constitution. If this is true, then there would
seem to be no reason why Congress could not legislate on the subject. Moreover, Justice Marshall, in New York Times, makes explicit
reference to Congress' acquiescence in the existence of a security
system.189 This reference indicates that Congress can act in the area.
Dixon's reliance on Curtiss-Wright is also misplaced.100 That
case involved congressional delegation to the President of the authority to determine whether banning United States arms shipments
would contribute to ending a particular Latin American war. The
congressional resolution provided that such sales would constitute
criminal violations upon a presidential finding and proclamation
that ending the weapons sales would in fact aid in restoring peace.
The case in question arose when the Curtiss-Wright Corporation was
convicted of making arms sales after such a proclamation had gone
into effect. Justice Sutherland's disquisition upon the powers of the
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

410 U.S. 73 (19'73).
Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 152.
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Government Secrecy :fiearings, supra note 4, at 152.
403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971).
403 U.S. 741. For text of Justice Marshall's statement, see note 165 supra.
299 U.S. 304 (1936). See text at notes 172-73 supra.
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executive191 thus must be seen in the context of an explicit delegation
of authority by the Congress. It is a weak foundation on which to
base an argument for congressional impotence in the field of foreign
affairs.
Chicago b Southern Air Lines Inc. v. Waterman Steamship
Corp.192 is also not apposite. Petitioner in that case sought review of
the denial of a certification of convenience and necessity for a foreign
air route. The Civil Aeronautics Act193 gives the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) the power to authorize air carriers to use certain
routes. 194 However, CAB rulings on applications by American carriers for foreign routes require the President's approval. The Act
gives the federal circuit courts power to review CAB decisions,195 and
no exemption from review is provided for decisions concerning
routes abroad. The petitioner in Waterman argued for judicial
review of such decisions even though they involve discretionary determinations by the President. The Supreme Court rejected this
contention. But in reach~ng this conclusion, the Court did not, as
Professor Dixon implied, rely solely on the power of the Presidency.
Instead, the opinion pointed out that the President's authority over
the CAB was derived from a pooling of his own foreign affairs
authority and Congress' power over foreign commerce, which it had
delegated to him.196 The Court, to be sure, extensively noted the
practical superiority of presidential over judicial decision-making in
the foreign affairs area. It went on to observe, however, that
even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such
decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political
departments of the government, Executive and Legislative . . . .
They are decisions of a kind for which the judiciary has neither
aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held
to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial
intrusion or inquiry.101
This case does support the notion that the judicial power over foreign affairs is limited. However, it does not support the proposition
that Congress has no role to play in the area.
It cannot be persuasively argued that the executive's power over
national security matters so outweighs that of the Congress that the
latter lacks authority to enact legislation controlling national secu191. See text at note 173 supra.
192. 333 U.S. 103 (1948). See text at notes 174-76 supra.
193. 49 u.s.c. §§ 1301-542 (1970).
194. Civil Aeronautics Act § 401, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1970).
195. Civil Aeronautics Act § 1006, 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1970).
196. 333 U.S. at 109-10.
197. 333 U.S. at Ill {emphasis added).
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rity information, The Constitution vests the President with con•
siderable power relating to foreign affairs and national defense.1118
But the powers granted to Congress in these areas are equally
extensive.199
The courts generally have not agreed with Dixon's claim that
the executive branch has exclusive power in foreign affairs and
natioJ;1al defens.e Il!atters. For example, in Detjen v. Central Lea.ther
Go.•20 0- the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he conduct of the foreign
rehttions of our Govei:nment is committed by the Constitution to
the Executive and Legislative-the 'political' Departments of the
Govem!Ilent, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise
of this power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision, •• ," 20i.
IA EPA v, Mink,202 the Supreme Court again recognized the legitiw.acy of congressional action in these areas. Representative Patsy
Mink brought s.uit under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain
certain documents from. the Environmental Protection Agency
(EJ;>A) concerning the ~971 Amchitka nuclear test. The EPA resil!ted disclos.u.re on several grounds, one of them being that some of
the reqµested documents. were classified, and so came within the
Act's exemption for information "specifically required by Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or
foreign policy."203 The Court held that a showing that these documents were cl.assified under an executive order would satisfy the
EPA's burden of proof on the exemption issue, and thus rejected
198. See note 163 supra.
199. Congress has been given the powers to "provide for the common Defense ••• ,"
U.$. (:o,Nsr. art. I. § 8. cl. 1; "[t]a regulate commerce with foreigu Nations," U.S.
CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; "[t}o define and punish l'ii;acies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas,. and Offense$ against the Law of Nations," U.S. CoNsr, art. I, § 8, cl.
104 "[tJo declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; "(t]o raise and
support Armies ••• ," U.S. CoNsr. :µ-t. I, § 8, cl. 12; "[t]o provide and maintain a
Navy," U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 13; "[t]o make Rules for the Government. and Rcgu•
lation of the land and naval forces," U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 14; and "[t]o provide
for calling forth the Militia to ••• repel Invasions," U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
]:~thennore, tlie Senate's power to advise and consent to treaties and to the appoint•
ment of "Ambassadors, other pubUc Ministers and Consuls ••• ," U.S. CoNsr,
art. II, § 2, also involves participation by the Congress in foreigu affairs.
200. 246 U.S. 297 (1918). This case involved a suit for the value of certain hides
seized in Mexico from a Mexican :a;i.erchant by General Villa's forces while Villa was
senring UQ.q.ei: General Carranza. during the Mexican Civil War. Can-anza's government
was subsequently recoguized by the United States. The Supreme Court held that tho
actions of one sovereign government could not be questioned in the courts of another
and that recognition of a government invests any action it may have taken prior to
recognition with a sovereigu character.
201. 246 U.S. at 302. This statement was addressed to the issue of the locus within
the United States Government of the power to extend diplomatic recoguition,
202. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
203. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(l) (Supp, Feb. 1975).
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the contention that classification alone would not be enough to
bring the material in question within the exemption. The Court
observed that "Congress could certainly have provided that the
Executive Branch adopt new procedures or it could have established
its o·wn procedures-subject only to whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held to impose upon such congressional
ordering.•.. But Exemption 1 does neither.'' 204 In other words,
although Congress has chosen to accept the executive determination
of what should be classified, Congress is not obligated to do so. In
his concurrence in Mink, Justice Stewart emphasized this point:
"[Congress] has built into the Freedom of Information Act an exemption that provides no means to question an Executive decision
to stamp a document 'secret,' however cynical, myopic, or even corrupt that decision might have been .... [I]n enacting § 552(b)(l)
Congress chose ... to decree blind acceptance of Executive fiat." 205
In the face of such language, it is difficult to accept the proposition that "blind acceptance of executive fiat" is the only course
that Congress may lawfully follow. 206 And in fact, the executive
branch has accepted ·without complaint other congressional attempts
to control national security information. For example, the National
Security Act of 1947 provides "[t]hat the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure." 207 If Congress has the authority to impose such a duty on an executive officer, it must possess
some jurisdiction over government information policy. Far from
questioning this assignment of responsibility, representatives of the
CIA have relied on it, arguing against proposed alterations of the
204. 410 U.S. at 83 (dictum).
205. 410 U.S. at 95. The national security exemption of the FOIA has been extensively amended since Mink was decided. See text at notes 221-23, 506-35 infra.
206. Some commentators have read the language of United States v. Nixon, quoted
in the text at note 167 supra, to support the notion of absolute presidential
control of national security information. See, e.g., Symposium: United States v.
Nixon, 22 UCLA L. R.Ev. 4, 26-29, 44, 64, 96, 117-18 (1974) [hereinafter Symposium].
There is good reason, however, for believing that such an interpretation puts too
much emphasis on the quoted passage of the Nixon opinion. In the first place, this
statement fairly could be characterized as dictum, since the matter before the court
did not involve any claim of a national security privilege. Second, the language itself
does not purport to prescribe what the result would be if national security matters
were involved, but instead emphasizes the fact that they were not. To assume that
such language announced a new rule of constitutional law would be somewhat questionable. The peculiar nature of the Nixon case pressured the Justices to ignore their
differences over matters not bearing on the basic issue, see Symposium, supra, at
120-23, so "that one may recognize the circumstances of the case and accordingly,
not regard its every phrase as the last possible word on the subject." Id. at 122-23.
Moreover, Mink represents a consideration of the very point at issue, and so should
be entitled to more weight than Nixon on that ground alone.
207. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, ch. 243, § 102(d)(3), 61
Stat. 498.
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current system on the ground that they would conflict with the
Director's duty under this statute.208
Another example of congressional information control is pro•
vided by the statutory provisions governing atomic energy policy.200
In those sections, Congress defined the term "Restricted Data," 210 and
established regulations covering the dissemination of material com•
ing within that definition.211 Indeed, even the espionage laws212
represent a congressional effort to regulate the disposition of certain
national security materials. Yet, Dixon did not describe these statutes
as encroaching upon an executive preserve.
In short, the argument that the control of national security
information is exclusively an executive function is untenable. Therefore, it is not helpful to defend the executive's position by citing
cases that deal with exclusively executive functions. 218 Similarly,
to argue from cases concerning access to material covered by executive privilege begs the question; 214 while such cases would certainly
be relevant to the matter of congressional access to information
pertaining to activities that are exclusively within the executive
sphere, they are much less relevant when the information is not of
that character. In sum, it appears that Congress has some jurisdiction over foreign affairs and national defense matters, and so
can act to remedy defects in the current classification system.
b. Proposals for change. The current classification system leaves ·
unsolved the distinct problems of congressional access to classified
information and public access to government-held information.210
Any plan to change the current system must address itself to both.
The discussion of the legal authority for the E.O. demonstrated that
Congress may lawfully effect changes in the classification system.216
The difficulty lies in determining what form corrective legislation
should take.
There are certain interests. that must be served by any classification system. Such a system must, of course, take account of the need
for secrecy with regard to some government activity. It must allow
for the Supreme Court's recognition in Mink of the doctrine of
executive privilege.217 It must also attempt to ensure that judgments
208. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 104 (testimony of
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency).
209. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2161-66 (1970).
210. 42 u.s.c. § 2014(y) (1970).
211. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2162, 2163, 2165 (1970).
212. 18 u.s.c. §§ 792-99 (1970).
213. See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
214. See text at notes 185-87 supra.
215. See text at notes 131-59 supra.
216. See text at notes 160-214 supra.
217. See text at note 204 supra.

J. Warner,
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regarding information policy are made by properly informed individuals, as there are often circumstances in which the real sensitivity
of certain information is apparent only to one familiar with the
subject matter of the information.218 The interests of foreign governments that have entrusted the United States with sensitive information must be considered. Finally, the system must be administratively feasible and as inexpensive as possible.
Any new classification system must also include elements that
can remedy the difficulties that mar the current arrangement. First,
it should eliminate needless classifications. This would entail a balancing of the possible detrimental effects of disclosure against its
potential benefits. Second, since one intimately connected with the
activities to be concealed might find it difficult to perform this
balancing objectively, some form of continuing oversight from an
independent review authority is necessary. Such an authority could
guard against bureaucratic overcaution and lessen the danger of
politically motivated classifications. Finally, the new system should
contain an active review element. As things now stand, an incorrect
classification is overturned only if an individual seeks review and
later obtains favorable action in a review proceeding.219 Consequently, information needed by the public but nonetheless classified
may never come to light. It would seem preferable to create a body
within the government with the authority to review all classification
decisions. Such a body would necessarily operate on a spot check
basis. It could correct immediately any improper classifications it
discovered, and thus eliminate, at least in some cases, the delay inherent in the current system. Furthermore, this body could pursue
its discoveries by reviewing all information relating to a particular
subject to ensure proper classification. Finally, a spot check procedure may deter improper classifications by making it more likely
that a particular classification abuse will be discovered. The reviewing body could closely scrutinize agencies with a history of classification abuse.
A system that takes account of these considerations is not likely
to classify information unnecessarily and hence would further the
public's interest. It is more difficult to ensure that Congress can
keep itself abreast of matters that are correctly classified. In general,
it seems clear that Congress can get the right answers when it asks
the right questions. Thus, any device that keeps Congress informed
should be helpful.
It should be noted that the problem of congressional access to
218. For example, intelligence information may reveal more to a trained analyst
than to a layman. See Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 56-57 (testimony
of Dr. R. Cline, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State).
219. See text at notes 67-91 supra.
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classified material cannot be solved by passing a statute that asserts
that Congress has a right to this information or that attempts to
regularize procedures for dealing with situations in which the executive branch refuses to supply information. The congressional right
exists, and cannot be made more explicit. The problem lies in enforcing the right, and enforcement depends upon congressional willingness to be firm in particular cases; a statute cannot supply this
element.220 Moreover, a statute forbidding denial in certain categories may be read to permit the denial of everything else.
Congress took an important first step toward improving the classification system by enacting the Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974.221 These amendments provide that only "properly"
classified material shall be exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.22:i
Further, they empower a court trying an FOIA disclosure suit to conduct an in camera inspection of the material in question to determine if it meets the exemption criterion.228 Thus, Congress has
provided for formal nonexecutive review of the substantive basis 0£
classification decisions.
While this legislation is helpful, it does not address most of the
problems of the current system. The judiciary does not bring to
classification questions the expertise that would give it the selfconfidence to overrule executive determinations in this area. There
will be a strong temptation to avoid reviewing classifications on
"political question" grounds.224 The courts might also avoid the
substantive issue by reading the term "properly classified" to mandate no more than compliance with procedural prerequisites,
although such a reading would clearly violate legislative intent.22G
220. For example, a statute providing that "all departments and establishments
$hall iurnish to the Comptroller General such information • • , as he may , , • require of them," 31 U.S.C. § 54 (1970), has not prevented various agencies from denying
information to the GAO. See notes 61, 65-66 supra and accompanying text,
221. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. Feb. 1975). For the history of the enactment of these
amendments see text at notes 308-33 infra.
222. 5 u.s.c.A. § 552(b)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
223. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp, Feb, 1975). See text at notes 965-88 infra.
224. Federal courts will refuse to hear cases involving "political" questions. Gilligan
v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1963). In Bal,er, the test
for a political question was said to be
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial poli9'. determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibiltty of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate bra11ches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Courts could find that they lack "judicially discoverable and manageable standards"
for resolving executive-public, or executive-congressional, struggles over information,
225. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess, 11-12 (1974) [hereinafter Cor,1fERENCE REPORTJ.
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The amendments also failed to create an active review mechanism.
Finally, they address themselves only to eliminating wrongful classifications; they do not touch the problem of guaranteeing congressional access to correctly classified information.
Legislation introduced in the 93d Congress dealt with other
aspects of this subject.226 As introduced, the bill would have provided a statutory basis for the security classification system. The
bill's main innovation was a nine-member Classification Review
Commission.227 The President would appoint its members, but six
would have to be selected from lists drawn up by the Speaker of
the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate.228 The bill
gave the Commission plenary authority to prescribe governing
regulations229 and institute sanctions for their violation.230 The
Commission was also empowered to investigate charges of improper
classification,231 and the bill gave it subpoena power for this purpose.232 Finally, the bill authorized the Commission to resolve controversies engendered by executive refusals to supply classified information requested by Congress, a congressional committee, or a
subcommittee.233 The Commission's decision in such a case would be
reviewable by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, with an appeal of right to the Supreme Court.234
The bill restricted classification authority to designated agencies,
excluding some that currently possess that power. It also set limits
on the distribution of such authority within agencies.235 The bill
continued the use of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential security
classifications, defining them in terms of "exceptionally grave
damage," "serious damage," and "damage" to the national defense
of the United States.236
226. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
227. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed §§ (f)(l), (2)) (1973).
228. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed § (f)(2)(A)) (1973).
229. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed § (£)(5)) (1973).
230. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed § (d)(5)(C)) (1973).
231. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 {proposed § (f)(6)(H)) (1973).
232. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed § (f)(6)(C)) (1973).
233. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed §§ (g)(1)-(7)) (1973).
234. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed §§ (g)(S)(A), (B)) (1973).
235. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed § (d)(2)(A)) (1973). This section
limits Top Secret authority to the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and
Air Force, the CIA, the Atomic Energy Commission, and offices within the Executive
Office of the President designated by the President. Secret authority is given to the
agencies with Top Secret authority, plus the Departments of Justice, Transportation,
and the Treasury. Confidential authority goes to the agencies with Secret authority,
plus the Department of Commerce and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Although they have national security responsibilities, the United States Information Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are not given any
classification authority.
236. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed § (d)(l)) (1973).
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Under the bill, each grade of classified information would be
downgraded to the next lowest level after twelve months. 237 It provided that only Top Secret information could be exempted from
automatic declassification, and then only if such information (1) was
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; (2) pertained to
cryptography; (3) revealed intelligence sources or methods; or (4) disclosed a "specific defense matter, the continuing protection of which
is of vital importance to the United States ...." 238 Exempt status
could be conferred only by vote of the Commission; the protection
could last up to six years if, at stated intervals, the Commission
voted to continue it.239 Exemption beyond six years would have
been possible only when the President justified the exemption in
·writing and the Commission did not override his or her justification.240
The proposed bill had a number of positive aspects. It affirmed
Congress' authority to set the information policy of the federal
government. It addressed only the classification issue, and hence did
not weaken its effectiveness by attempting to deal with and define
executively privileged information, a category requiring a special
approach.241 And it provided for a genuinely independent reviewing
body that would be able to devote itself solely to matters of classification and thus develop the expertise needed to resolve challenges
to particular classifications.242
237. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed § (e)(2)) (1973).
238. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed § (e)(3)) (1973).
239. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed § (e)(4)(B)) (1973).
240. H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed § (e)(4)(B)) (1973).
241. See text at notes 262-307 infra.
242. There are four possible objections to such a commission, In the first place,
that body will be deeply involved in the work of the executive branch; indeed, it will
promulgate regulations governing important elements of the executive's responsibilities. If the President in fact possesses the authority to prevent the dissemination of
information, then it could be argued that a nonexecutive body cannot be given exclusive control over information policy. The response to this is that Congress has responsibilities in the field of information equal to those of the President. This follows from
Justice White's suggestion in Mink that Congress was not compelled to include in the
national security exemption of the FOIA everything that is classified by the executive,
See text at note 204 supra. If Congress need not accept an executive determination
that release of particular information would damage the nation, it is arguable that
Congress need not leave this determination to the executive at all. Rather, Congress
may make the determination itself or may establish an agency like the Classification
Review Commission as a "necessary and proper" means of meeting its responsibilities.
Of course, the Commission would have no authority over executively privileged materials, as the withholding of these materials does not rest solely on security classification. See text at notes 262-307 infra.
One might also object to the commission on the ground that it may acquire excessive power over information. But this seems unlikely. In the first place, if its function
of arbitrating between Congress and the executive were eliminated, see text at notes
255-57 infra, it could not interfere directly with congressional acquisition of data.
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There were, however, serious flaws in the bill. First, the bill's
provision limiting the President's power to select Commission members by requiring that he choose some members from lists proposed
by particular legislators may have been unconstitutional. The Constitution gives the President the power, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, to "appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.'' 243 By permitting the Speaker of the
House and the President pro tempore of the Senate to limit the
President's choice of members for the Classification Review Commission, the bill in effect vested these two persons with a portion
of the appointment power. This procedure may be justified only on
the theory that, since control of national security information falls
within the jurisdiction of both the executive and legislative
branches,244 each may play a role in selecting the persons supervising
the process. However, it is not clear that Congress can arrogate to
itself a segment of the constitutional power to appoint certain "officers of the United States" merely because such officers_ would be
performing partially legislative duties.
Second, limiting classification to "national defense" matters245
may have invited defiance of the bill. Ongoing diplomatic negotiations, for example, need not have any connection with defense
matters. Yet revealing the substance of such negotiations could occasionally damage the national interest. Bureaucrats dealing with sensitive nonmilitary matters may thus have been forced either to
ignore the "defense" limitation or to interpret "defense" in a way
that did not limit the classification decision. It would be more sensible to have included a classification provision that paralleled the
Moreover, if it attempted to classify too much material, the same mechanisms that
bring facts to light under the current system would work against it.
It can also be argued that such a body may be co-opted and so lose its effectiveness
as a watchdog. This is a risk that must be run; every independent regulatory body
faces such a threat. The mere possibility of co-optation is not sufficient reason to
abandon the idea, however, at least in the absence of a substitute proposal.
Finally, one may contend that the expense of such a body would be prohibitive.
But this need not be the case. The commission would be required to do no more
than write regulations and perform spot checks on classifying agencies. A staff of
three or four hundred would probably suffice for these purposes. The concept of the
Classification Review Commission, in short, seems strong enough to meet the principal objections to it.
243. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
244. See text at notes 160-214 supra.
245. See te.-<t at note 236 supra.
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"national defense or foreign policy" exemption of the Freedom of
Information Act. 246
Third, the bill's limitations on classification authority247 seemed
unrealistic. Agencies that are closely involved in national security
matters, such as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, were
not accorded needed classification authority. And the attempt to
restrict classification authority to persons ranking no lower than
section chief may have proved ineffective. The authorized classifier
may actually do no more than accept the classification assigned by
whoever prepared the document. Indeed, this would have been more
likely to occur under the new bill than under the current system,248
since the bill restricted classification to a higher level than does the
E.O., and hence would have increased the quantity of classifiable
material with which each classifier must deal.
Fourth, the time periods for which classifications are effective240
were shorter than seems prudent. There will be some Top Secret,
Secret and Confidential documents that may safely be disclosed after
thirty-six, twenty-four or twelve months, but there will be others
that cannot. 250 Indeed, this section of the bill seemed to confuse the
problem of improper classification with that of duration of classification. If the classification system is reorganized so that the only
items classified are those that ought to be, then it makes no sense
to limit arbitrarily the protection afforded classified material.
Fifth, the bill's provisions for exempting material from auto•
matic declassification251 were overly restrictive and probably un•
workable. Because the bill assumed that all non-Top Secret material
can be revealed after a specific period of time, it encouraged classifiers to overuse the Top Secret designation. And the bill's exemption
categories were inadequate. For example, the bill eliminated the
E.O.'s exemptions for material supplied in confidence by foreign
governments and material that could place a person in immediate
jeopardy. Yet, these categories are among the most appropriate for
exemption from automatic disclosure.252 Furthermore, the exemption
246. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at notes 506-35 infra.
247. See note 235 supra and accompanying text.
248. See text at notes 46-49 supra.
249. See text at notes 237-40 supra.
250. For example, an analysis of methods of jamming an item of electronic equip•
ment commonly used by our armed forces would not necessarily rate a Top Secret
classification, but would nevertheless require protection for as long as the item was
used by the military.
251. See text at note 238 supra.
252. It may be argued that both types of material actually fit within the bill's
exemption categories. However, while disclosures likely to endanger an individual or
to divulge information supplied by foreigu governments will very often also reveal
"intelligence sources or methods" and thus come within the bill's third exemption,
see text at note 238 supra, it is difficult to believe that this will be true in every case,
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procedure, requiring a Commission vote on each document,258 was
extremely cumbersome. The United States government generates
more than 4 million classified documents a year.254 About half of
these are currently exempted from automatic declassification. It
would be physically impossible for agency heads, the President, and
the Commission to evaluate the need for exemption in 2 million
cases. It may be that the authors of the bill intended to make the
procedure so unwieldy that agencies would not make use of exemptions. But the quantity of material legitimately qualifying for exemption under any system will be relatively large, even if only reports
from CIA operatives, weapons secrets, and cryptographic materials
are considered. The system established by the new bill could not
have handled the number of appropriate requests it could have
been expected to receive.
The final and most serious defect in the proposed bill was the
provision making the Commission and the courts the arbiters of disputes benveen Congress and the President.255 The bill charged the
Commission with resolving such disputes through "weigh[ing] the
constitutional rights and powers of the parties concerned, including
(i) the extent to which such information is necessary to Congress so
that Congress may fully and properly discharge its Constitutional
responsibilities and (ii) the extent to which the disclosure of such
information to Congress would be contrary to the public interest
or would seriously endanger the national defense of the United
States." 256 Thus, the Commission was given the power to determine
what the Congress needs to discharge its duties properly. This is,
in effect, an admission by Congress that its right to information is
limited. If Congress accepted a Commission determination that certain information was not "necessary to Congress," Congress apparently would be conceding that there are categories of information
that it has no right to demand. Surely it is unwise for the Congress
itself to acknowledge limitations on its power in this area.
Furthermore, the establishment of this procedure amounts to
congressional buck-passing. Giving another body the obligation to
adjudicate conflicts over the release of information frees Congress
The only way to be certain that such items would be covered would be to bring them
within the fourth exemption, which extends to "specific defense material[s], the continuing protection of which is of vital importance to the United States." See text at
note 238 supra. But "defense" matters of "vital importance" must be interpreted as
including almost anything relating to national security if all information supplied
by foreign governments or endangering individuals is to be covered by this exemption.
Such an interpretation probably would turn the fourth exemption into a catch-all,
applicable to anything.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See text at note 239 supra.
See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
See text at notes 233-34 supra.
H.R. 12004, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (proposed § (g)(5)(B)) (1973).
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from the responsibility of determining for itself whether the public
interest would be served by the information's release. But Congress
ought not to dodge decisions of this kind. There can be no substitute
for a congressional determination to assert the legislature's right to
information through the use of law-making and fiscal powers, Indeed,
this may be the only constitutional way for Congress to obtain classified information, since the political question doctrine may well
prevent judicial intervention.257
As well as containing several questionable provisions, the bill
failed to consider two important elements of a classification system.
First, it neglected the interests of foreign states that entrust the
United States with their secrets.258 Second, it failed to provide a
method of informing Congress of the existence of information.
For all of these reasons, it is perhaps fortunate that the bill was
not enacted as drafted. A workable classification system could be
launched, however, by enacting the proposed bill shorn of its objectionable features. The bill's major faults would be eliminated by
allowing the Classification Review Commission to regulate the distribution of classification authority and the duration of classified
status. That body should be able to prescribe regulations sufficiently
sophisticated to permit appropriate mixes of authority. It could take
into account differences in the circumstances of different classifiers
and in the natures of the various sorts of classified material, an
approach foreclosed by the bill's simplistic procedures.
But still more legislation would be needed. Ideally, such legislation would provide that (1) except as otherwise stated, all government information is to be made available to the public; (2) information meeting criteria of "sensitivity" established by the Classification Review Commission can be withheld; (3) information relating to certain kinds of activities (for example, agreements to provide
United States resources to foreign states, or the commitment of
American troops to combat) may not be considered "sensitive"; and
(4) Congress will establish procedures for safeguarding information.
Legislation of this kind will provide for publicization of important information. By defining what could be properly withheld
and by specifying what had to be disclosed, the statute might aid
the courts in dealing with the problems they face in declassification
suits. In addition, establishing categories of information required
to be disclosed might effect agency routinization of informationrelease procedures. Currently, the only routines affecting day-to-day
information policy involve concealment by means of classification.
Finally, provision for secure storage facilities should reduce congressional reluctance to ask for classified information, as legislators would
257. Ser: note 224 supra.
258. See note 252 supra.
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have less reason to fear being held responsible for breaches of
security.
While such measures would go far toward preventing wrongful
classification, they are of less use in informing Congress of the existence of properly classified information. One proposed step toward
keeping Congress informed is the rewriting of the CIA's charter to
permit Congress to seek information directly from that agency.259 If
this were done, Congress could avail itself of an intelligence source
of acknowledged accuracy,260 and would have an institutionalized
procedure for information-gathering in contrast to its current reliance on leaks and executive largess. This system would not inform
Congress about the activities of other executive branch agencies, however, and ignorance of these activities often has harmed Congress.
Also, the CIA is an executive agency, and might well obey a presidential order that conflicted with a congressional request. Nevertheless, this modification would increase the amount of information that
Congress automatically and directly receives and would thereby facilitate congressional discovery of appropriate subjects for inquiry.261
In summary, it may be said that the differences between the
two types of access problems call for different solutions. Elimination
of improper classification to increase public access involves, essentially, changes in procedure. Such changes may be instituted in a
fairly straightforward manner. On the other hand, increasing the
flow of information to Congress requires a change in attitude on
the part of members of the legislature. If legislators demonstrate
that they are responsible and determined to enforce their rights, .the
public will support them and the executive is not likely to deceive
them. If, on the other hand, they shy away from the difficulties inherent in obtaining information from a reluctant source, their ignorance will continue no matter what changes in law they effect.
B. Executive Privilege
The doctrine of executive privilege gives the executive branch
the power in certain cases to withhold information from the Congress,
the judiciary, and the public.262 Recognition of executive privilege
259. Government Secrecy Hearings, supra note 4, at 19-23 (testimony of M. Bundy).
260. Id. at 20.
261. Enlargement of congressional staffs and congressional use of data-processing
equipment would also help to achieve this goal.
262. Freedom of Information and Secrecy in Government, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 271 (1958) [hereinafter 1958 Senate Hearings] (Memorandum of the Attorney
General, The Power of the President To Withhold Information from Congress). The
Attorney General argued, "Courts have uniformly held that the President and the
heads of departments have an uncontrolled discretion to withhold the information
and papers in the public interest ••••" Id. at 272. This view was reaffirmed by Attorney General Kleindienst in 1973, when he informed a Senate subcommittee that
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substantially predates the establishment of the classification system,203
and it has been suggested that the doctrine provides the executive
branch ·with a more potent ·withholding power than does that
system..264 Furthermore, executive privilege probably can be invoked
as a defense to a request for information under the Freedom of
Information Act, even if none of that Act's exemptions apply. 200
Thus, this brief examination of the doctrine of executive privilege is
intended both to supplement the preceding section on the classification system, and to serve as an introduction to the discussion of
the FOIA that follows.

I. The Basis of the Privilege
Depending on the circumstances in which the claim of executive
privilege is raised, it can be premised either on the common law
or on the constitutional principle of separation of powers.200 The
common-law privilege is an evidentiary privilege; it can be raised
only in a judicial setting. The constitutionally based executive privilege, on the other hand, may be asserted in a broad range of settings
and has been invoked to deny information to the courts,207 to
Congress,628 and to the public.269
"[t]he doctrine of executive privilege denotes the constitutional authority of the President in his discretion to withhold certain documents or information in his possession
or in the possession of the executive branch from compulsory process of the legislative
or judicial branch of the Government, if he believes disclosure would impair the
proper exercise of his constitutional functions." l 197J Senate Hearings, supra note
125, at 20.
263. Government Information Hearings, supra note 61, at 384 (testimony of W.
Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General).
264. "Related to the doctrine of executive privilege, but by no means co-extensive
with it, is the classification of material in the possession of the executive branch under
the provisions of executive orders •••• But the mere fact of classification by itself, of
course, does not constitute a sufficient basis for withholding information from a committee of Congress ••••" Id. at 359. The doctrine of executive privilege apparently
would allow such withholding.
265. See text at notes 298-306 infra; K. DAVIS, ADMINISI'RATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3A.3
(Supp. 1970).
266. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). The
doctrine of executive privilege has also been said to rest on the constitutional notion of
implied executive powers. "The Constitution does not expressly confer upon the Executive any such privilege •..• [I]he executive authority [is] implicit, rather than
expressed, in the basic charter." Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information
by the Executive, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 421 (1971) (testimony of W. Rehnquist,
Assistant Attorney General) [hereinafter 1971 Senate Hearings].
267. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). For extensive commentaries.on United States v. Nixon, sec Symposium, supra note 206.
268. See, e.g., the following statement of former Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist: "The doctrine of executive privilege, as I understand it, defines the constitutional authority of the President to withhold documents or information in his possession
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While courts270 and commentators271 have long recognized the
common-law evidentiary privilege, the validity of the claimed constitutional privilege has been challenged.272 Advocates of the constitutional doctrine support their position by pointing to past congressional actions that impliedly recognized the doctrine,273 past
presidential refusals to deliver information requested by Congress,274 and past disputes over information that have arisen between
the courts and the executive branch.275 Professor Berger has quesor in the possession of the executive branch from compulsory process of the legislative or judicial branch of the Government." 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 266, at
421. The first unequivocal assertion by a President of this power occurred in 1835,
when Andrew Jackson rejected a request for information made during the confirmation
hearing of one of his nominees. Dorsen &: Shattuck., Executive Privilege, The Congress
and the Courts, 35 Omo Sr. L.J. 1, 12 (1974). In 1954, President Eisenhower ushered
in the modern era of the use of executive privilege, see R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CoNsrlTUTIONAL MYTH 163-208 (1974), by refusing to turn over information
requested by Congress for use in the McCarthy-Stevens investigations. Nixon v. Sirica,
487 F.2d 700, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting).
269, One congressional report states that executive privilege was asserted to deny
reporters access to a federal agency report on a local Kentucky jail and to withhold
from private citizens records of the farm crop support programs. H.R. REP. No. 85-2084, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1960).
270, See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251 (1938); Hurst v. United States, 344 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1965); Carl Zeiss
Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), afjd. sub nom. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
271. See C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 106-13 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2367-79 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); 8 C.
WRIGHT 8: A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2019 (1970).
272, See R. BERGER, supra note 268.
273. One example of congressional recognition of the doctrine of executive privilege
involves the creation of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Continental Congress
had established such a department and had passed a resolution providing that the
department would be headed by a congressionally appointed officer. (This resolution
is quoted at 1 Stat. 28 (1789).) The resolution further specified that this officer was
required to take custody of the books, records, and papers relating to his department,
and that any member of Congress would have access to these materials. In 1789, after
the enactment of the Constitution, the First Congress re-established the Department
of Foreign Affairs. Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 2, I Stat. 28 (1789). Nothing was said
in the new act concerning Congress' right of access to departmental papers, however.
Former Deputy Attorney General Rogers has taken this to mean that "Congress meant
to give no power to the Congress to see secret data in the executive department
against the wishes of the President. That was a power which the Continental Congress
had and which the framers of the Constitution meant for the new Congress, created
by the Constitution, not to have." 1958 Senate Hearings, supra note 262, at 9-10.
274. A list of such refusals can be found in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 732 n.9
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting). The Attorney General
has cited these refusals as support for a constitutionally based privilege, 1958 Senate
Hearings, supra note 262, at 271, as have the dissenting judges in Nixon v. Sirica, 487
F.2d at 731-37 (MacKinnon, J.); 487 F.2d at 778-81 (Wilkey, J.).
275. The cases usually cited are Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), which
defined "the limits at which a court must stop when the head of a department invokes
the privilege that the information sought from him is confidential and cannot be disclose<t," Wolkinson, .])emamls of Congressional Committees for Exe~tive Papers, 10
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tioned whether these precedents establish a constitutional privilege. 276 He points out that in some of the cases, the President
eventually acquiesced in the congressional or judicial demands277
and in other instances the presidential decision to withhold information was made with the express permission of Congress.278 Nevertheless, there are many examples of presidential withholding of
information that remain unaffected by these criticisms270 and firmly
support the existence of a constitutionally based privilege.
2. The Scope of the Privilege
The common-law privilege traditionally has extended to secrets
of state,280 identity of informers,281 and some agency internal-communications.282 The scope of the constitutional privilege appears to
be coextensive with that of the common-law privilege; its boundaries
are imprecise however, since it has been defined by executive use
rather than by judicial theory. Former Attorney General Kleindienst
has claimed that the constitutional privilege applies to information
dealing with foreign relations and military affairs, internal communications between advisers and the President, and investigative reFED. B.J. 103, 224 (1949), and United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (No. 14692d)
(C.C. Va. 1807), in which a federal court issued a subpoena duces tecum directing the
President to produce documents.
276. R. BERGER, supra note 268, at 163-208.
277. Id. at 167-71, 187-91.
278. Id. at 179-81. Professor Berger concludes that instances of presidential withholding of information with the permission of Congress do not support a presidential
right to withhold information without the permission of Congress. However, congressional permission for withholding information can be viewed as a recognition by Congress of a constitutional executive privilege.
279. Even Professor Berger admits that at least one of these presidential actions
was "clearly wrong." Id. at 182.
280. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
281. See, e.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938); In re Quarks &
Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1894) (dictum); Hurst v. United States, 344 F.2d 327, 328
(9th Cir. 1965). It is not clear whether this privilege extends to the informer's statements as well as to his identity. Compare C. McCORMICK, supra note 271, § Ill
(courts are split on the extent of the informer's privilege) with 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 271, § 2374, at 765 (privilege extends only to the informer's identity).
282. 8 J. W1GMORE, supra note 271, § 2378, at 805. The leading case seems to be
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. i966), affd. sub nom.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952
(1967). The parameters of the common-law evidentiary privilege are discussed in C.
McCORMICK, supra note 271, §§ 106-13; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra, §§ 2367-'79; 8 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 271, § 2019; Engel, Introduction: Information Disclosure Policies and Practices of Federal Administrative Agencies, 68 Nw. U. L. REv. 184, 185-87
(1973); and Note, The Doctrine of Executive Privilege Limits Statutory Access to
Information Held Within the Executive Office of the President, 49 TEXAS L. REv. '780,
781-85 (1971). (But note that some of the discussion in this Note is mooted by the
subsequent reversal of Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).)
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ports.283 His statement is the most recent expression of the
executive's view of the scope of the privilege.
.
In order to determine whether a claim of common-law executive
privilege is "appropriate," courts balance the government interest in confidentiality against the public interest in disclosure. 284
The greater the need the seeker has for the information, the more
thorough the court's investigation is of the appropriateness of the
claim.285 And the seeker's chances of prevailing on the privilege
issue depend on whether the action is civil or criminal,286 and
whether the seeker is a prosecutor, a plaintiff or a defendant.287
In determining whether the executive can validly withhold information under a claim of constitutionally based executive privilege,
the courts again appear to focus on the executive's need for confidentiality, the seeker's need for the information withheld, and the
identity of the seeker. Three recent cases involving claims of executive privilege, United States v. Nixon, 288 Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Acivities v. Nixon,289 and Nixon v. Sirica,290
illustrate the judicial reasoning in this area.
United States v. Nixon involved presidential resistance to a subpoena duces tecum requiring the executive to produce certain tape
recordings and documents relating to conversations between President Nixon and his advisers. These materials were needed by the
Justice Department for use in criminal proceedings. The Supreme
Court held that, although communications between high-level executive branch officials are "presumptively" privileged,291 the presumption was rebutted in this case by the public interest in the fair
administration of criminal justice, an interest that could be furthered only by disclosure. 292 In dicta, the Court noted that the
conversations in question were nonmilitary, and implied that the
presumption would be stronger where military matters were concemed.293 Presumably this is true because of the greater need for
executive confidentiality in the military area.
283. 1 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 21-23.
284. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). This is also the procedure
when a constitutional privilege is asserted. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 71112 (1974).
.
285. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). Cf. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting).
286. 8 C. WRIGHT 8: A. MILLER, supra note 271, § 2019, at 156.
287. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973).
288. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
289. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
290. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
291. 418 U.S. at 713.
292. 418 U.S. at 713.
293. 418 U.S. at 683, 710.
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In Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the presidential claim of privilege concerning a similar group of tapes. The
court reasoned that the need of the Senate committee seeking the
tapes was "too attenuated and too tangential to its functions to
permit a judicial judgment that the President is required to comply
with the Committee's subpoena."294 In Nixon v. Sirica,290 an earlier
case brought by the Special Prosecutor for these same materials, the
court had ordered disclosure. The difference in results can be attributed to the different purposes that the two plaintiffs were seeking
to accomplish and to the greater importance that the requested information had for one function than for the other. In Nixon v. Sirica
the court noted that "the Special Prosecutor has made a strong
shmving that the subpoenaed tapes contain evidence peculiarly necessary to the carrying out of" the grand jury's judicial function. 200
In the Select Committee case, the court stated that the Committee
"points to no specific legislative decisions that cannot responsibly
be made without access to materials uniquely contained in the
tapes . . . ."297
3. Executive Privilege and the FOIA

The FOIA provides that upon request, government agencies are
to make available agency records not othenvise specifically exempted
from disclosure by the Act.298 The success of the FOIA in ensuring
public access to information held by the executive branch depends
not only on the provisions of the FOIA itself, but also on the possible constraints on access imposed by the doctrine of executive
privilege.
Certain aspects of the doctrine of executive privilege have been
incorporated into the FOIA exemptions. For example, the first exemption allows the withholding of information "specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy" that is
in fact "properly classified" pursuant to such an order.2 09 This
exemption embodies the privilege for state secrets.800 The fifth
294. 498 F.2d at 733. The court's conclusion was based on the fact that the House
Judiciary Committee already had copies of each of the subpoenaed tapes and the
legislative process did not require the exact text of the oral statements in their original
form. 498 F.2d at 732.
295. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
296. 487 F.2d at 717.
297. 498 F.2d at 733.
298. 5 u.s.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
299. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
300. C. McCORMICK, supra note 271, § 108, at 233; Note, supra note 282, at '186.
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exemption801 incorporates the evidentiary privilege for intra-agency
and inter-agency advisory opinions.802 Finally, the seventh exemption
permits the withholding of "investigatory records compiled for law
enforcement purposes," but only if producing those records would,
inter alia, "disclose the identity of a confidential source . . . ."808
This exemption thus incorporates the evidentiary executive privilege
for identity for informers.
Despite the apparent congressional attempt to exempt from
automatic disclosure information traditionally covered by the privilege, there is still the possibility that the FOIA and the doctrine of
executive privilege will conflict in that material required to be disclosed by the FOIA will be withheld under a claim of executive
privilege. This situation could arise if, for example, a court ordered
the disclosure of a particular piece of national security information
found not to be "properly classifiable" pursuant to executive order.
In such a case, the executive might still claim a right to withhold
the information.804
Whether the doctrine of executive privilege can be used to defeat
a congressionally mandated disclosure depends on the validity of the
doctrine's claimed constitutional foundation. If the doctrine is in
fact purely evidentiary, then the FOIA exemptions can be viewed as
its congressional codification. Any information not covered by the
exemptions would thus not be subject to a claim of executive privilege. If "the doctrine ... is to some degree inherent in the constitutional requirement of separation of powers,"805 however, then
"[s]erious constitutional questions would be presented by a claim
of executive privilege as a defense to a suit under the Freedom of
Information Act ...."806 This is so because the separation of powers
301. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
302. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4496 (U.S. April 28, 1975);
Renegotiation B.d. v. Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp., 43 U.S.L.W. 4502, 4507 (U.S.
April 28, 1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973).
303. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
304. This hYPothetical assumes an executive order that is narrower in scope than
the doctrine of executive privilege. It is probably more realistic to assume that any
executive order dealing with classification would be broadly drawn. See, e.g., Exec.
Order 11652 § l(c). 3 C.F.R. 340 (1974) (classification under a designation of "Confidential" is proper if the information's "unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be
expected to cause damage to. the national security"). If the executive order is in fact
broader in scope than the doctrine of executive privilege, the FOIA would permit
withholding pursuant to the order. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975). That
Act does not provide the public with a means of challenging the order itself.
305. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1071 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
306. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Soucie, two citizens
brought suit under the FOIA to compel the Office of Science and Technology to
release a report evaluating the government's supersonic, transport aircraft program.
The district court held that the doctrine of executive privilege protected the report
fl:om disclosure. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia declined to reach the
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requirement would preclude congressional access to executively
privileged information, and "Congress could not surmount constitutional barriers ... by conferring upon any member of the general
public a right which Congress, neither individually nor collectively,
possesses."307 If, for example, the constitutional doctrine is found to
extend to state secrets, and if a particular piece of information not
properly classifiable is nevertheless found to be a "state secret,"
executive withholding of the information would be permissible
under a claim of executive privilege. Thus, until the constitutional
underpinnings of the doctrine of executive privilege are fully
articulated, and until its precise scope is defined the probable outcome of any clash between the FOIA and the doctrine is unpredictable.

The Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act establishes regular channels
for public access to government information. Enacted in 1966308 in
the belief that, "[i]f government is to be truly of, by, and for the
people, the people must know in detail the activities of government,''309 the FOIA was intended to create a government information
system with a clear presumption in favor of openness; 810 it states
that all "reasonably described" executive branch materials are to be
made available to the public,311 unless specifically exempted by any
of the nine stated exceptions to the Act.812
C.

"constitutional issues" inherent in the executive privilege question, as "the privilege
was not expressly invoked by the Government, and therefore, ••• was not properly
before the court." 448 F.2d at 1071 (footnote omitted),
307. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., concurring),
308. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1970)).
309•. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JumCE, ATIORNEY GENERAL'S l\lE!IIORANDU!II ON
THE PUBLIC INFOR!IIATION SECTION OF THE AollllNISI'RATIVE PROCEDURE ACT Ill (1967)
[hereinafter ATIORNEY GENERAL'S l\lEMORANDUM].
310. See S. REP. No. 89-813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965); H.R. REP. No, 89-1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1966); ArroRNEY GENERAL'S l\lEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at
III.

311. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975). Prior to February 1975, only "identifiable" materials were subject to disclosure under the FOIA. 5 U.S.C, § 552(a)(3) (1970).
The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (Supp. Feb. 1975), provides that an in•
dividual may obtain access to files of which he is the subject, and the Act establishes
access procedures for this purpose. See text at notes 2055-106 infra, It can be argued
that the Privacy Act unintentionally has amended parts of the FOIA. See text at notes
2196-211 infra.
312. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (Supp. Feb. 1975). It does appear, however, that executive
privilege can be invoked by the government to deny a request for information made
under the FOIA. The courts have not yet clearly decided whether the FOIA's exemptions and the doctrine of executive privilege are coterminous, but it has been implied
that they are not. See, e.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971):
"[U]nless the Government on remand makes a valid claim of constitutional privilege,

May-June 1975]

Project

1023

Prior to the enactment of the FOIA, Congress had made several
attempts to guarantee the public availability of government information. The first significant congressional action on the matter was
the enactment in 1946 of section 3 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (AP A).818 Section 3, however, proved to be ineffective.814 Its
major deficiency was that it made records available only "to persons
properly and directly concerned," rather than to the general
public. 815 Moreover, its exemptions for government functions "requiring secrecy in the public interest,"816 and for adjudicatory final
opinions and orders "required for good cause to be held confidential"817 were vague and expansive. Finally, no judicial remedy
was provided for the victims of wrongful nondisclosure.318 Dissatisfaction with section 3 led to various attempts to amend or replace
it.819 Ultimately, section 3 was replaced with the FOIA.820 This new
legislation was intended to reaffirm a generai philosophy of full
disclosure, to eliminate the vague phrases that plagued section 3
of the APA, and to provide for the enforcement of the disclosure
provisions by the judiciary.821
Despite its frequent use by the public,322 commentators criticized
the FOIA for being difficult to interpret,328 vague, and poorly
it will be able to prevent disclosure only by showing that the [document requested]
falls within one or more of the statutory exemptions." See text at notes 262-307 supra.
313. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.
314. S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note
310, at 5-6.
315. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3(c), 60 Stat. 238.
316. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.
317. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3(b), 60 Stat. 238.
318, S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 5.
319. For general discussions of the various congressional attempts to amend section
3, see FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER, PUB. No. 157, FEDERAL PUBLIC RECORDS LAW
DEBATE ll (1966); FREEDor.1 OF INFORMATION CENTER, REP. No. 189, A HisroRY OF THE
FEDERAL RECORDS LAW (1967); SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISfRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OF THE SENATE COMM, ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr SoURCEBOOK:
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CAsES, ARTICLES, s. Doc. No. 93-82, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-10
(1974) [hereinafter SOURCE l3ooK]; Note, Comments on Proposed Amendments to Sec-

tion 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information Bill, 40
NOTRE DAME LAW. 417 (1965).
320. The FOIA became effective on July 4, 1967. Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 4, 81 Stat. 56.
321. S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 3.
322. In the first four years following the enactment of the FOIA, 112 cases were
filed under it. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER, REPORT No. 280, How THE COURTS
HAVE HELD 2 (1972). l3y May 1973 the government had lost roughly half of the 200 cases
argued under the Act. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER, REPORT No. 318, TESTING
THE FOi Acr 1 (1974). The 1974 FOIA source book discussed 88 FOIA opinions and
listed another 84 FOIA cases being handled by the Civil Division of the Department
of Justice as of January 1, 1974. SOURCE ]3ooK, supra note 319, at 116, 184.
323. For example, courts have had difficulty interpreting the investigatory files
exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
See text at notes 749-75 infra.
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drafted.324 Little legislative action was taken in response to these
criticisms in the years immediately following the FOIA's enact~
ment.825 However, after extensive hearings by its Subcommittee on
Inconsistencies in the congressional reports on the FOIA have contributed to the
interpretation problems by making difficult any determination of legislative intent.
SOURCE BooK, supra note 319, at 8-9. The House report (H.R. REP. No. 89-149'1, supra
note 310) is more detailed than the Senate report (5. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310)
and is more inclined to limit the disclosure provisions. See K. DAVIS, supra note 265,
§ 3A.2 (Supp. 19'10); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 6'10, 6'13 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("[I'hc
House report] is characteristically broader and goes beyond the express terms of the
statute"). When the reports conflict, most courts prefer to follow the Senate report. See,
e.g., Hawkes v. IRS, 46'1 F.2d '18'1, '194 (6th Cir. 19'12); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 6'10,
673 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 106'1, 1077 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Tax
Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (D.D.C. 19'13), modified in part,
505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Stokes v. Hodgson, 34'1 F. Supp. 13'11, 13'13 (N.D. Ga.
1972), affd. sub nom. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973); Benson v. GSA,
289 F. Supp. 590, 595 0,V.D. Wash. 1968). It is argued that since the Senate report
was before each house when the Act was passed, while the House report was not
written until after the Senate had considered and passed its version of the bill, the
Senate report is the more authoritative. K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.2, at 11'1 (Supp.
1970); Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments-1971, 19'12 Dmra L.J. 115,
147; Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
150, 153 (1969).
Two other possible interpretive sources of the FOIA deserve mention, These arc
the 1967 memorandum issued by the Attorney General's Office, advising executive
agencies of their obligations under the new law, ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM,
supra note 309, and the agency regulations promulgated to enforce the mandates of
the Act. See generally Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments-1970, 1971
DUKE L.J. 149, 166-71; Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEO. L.J. 18, 47-49 (1967); Comment, The 1966 Freedom of Informa•
tion Act-Early Judicial Interpretations, 44 WASH, L. REv. 641, 680-85 (1969). Both
of these sources appear to be of limited value, however. The memorandum frequently
follows the more restrictive House report in its resolution of statutory ambiguities
and sometimes does not even , discuss or note a conflicting Senate report provision,
See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp. '196,
801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[t]he analysis of
exemption (2) by the Attorney General fails to discuss the Senate Report"), See also
Note, The Investigative Files Exemption to the FOIA: The D.C. Circuit Abandons
Bristol-Myers, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 869, 873 (1974). Furthermore, commentators
have suggested that the memorandum is agency-biased. K. DAVIS, supra note 265,
§ 3A.l, at 115 (Supp. 1970) ("reflects the viewpoint of the agencies, all of whom opposed
the enactment"); Note, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 869, supra, at 873 n.29 ('self-serving'').
The agency regulations are also likely to be nonobjective and hence should not be
relied on heavily in interpreting the FOIA. But see Washington Research Project,
Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 247 (D.C. Cir. 19'14), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S.
May 12, 1975); Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd,, 482 F.2d '110, '116
(D.C. Cir. 1973), revd. on other grounds, 43 U.S.L.W. 4502 (U.S. April 28, 1975).
324. See Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information Act, 84 YALE L.J. 741, '145 (1975); K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § BA.I (Supp.
1970); Note, 56 GEo. L.J. 18, supra note 323, at 52.
325. In the 90th Congress, the only action taken was the enactment of Pub.
L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 250 (1967), which "incorporate[d) into title 5 of the United States
Code, without substantive change, the provisions of Public Law 89-48'1 [the original
FOIA] ••••" 5. REP. No. 90-248, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (196'1). No other bills were
introduced regarding the FOIA, although two committee reports compiled agency
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Foreign Operations and Government Information,826 the House
Committee on Government Operations published a report in 1972
that criticized the drafting of the Act.827 The report was particularly
critical of the frequent withholding of records found not to be
"identifiable," of agency delay in responding to requests and in filing responsive pleadings in FOIA lawsuits, of the lack of agency
reporting to Congress, and of agency misuse of the Act's exemptions. 828 The movement to rectify such deficiencies culminated in
the congressional approval of seventeen amendments to the FOIA
in early October 1974.829 President Ford vetoed the amendments on
October 17, 1974,830 but Congress overrode the veto in November
1974.831 The amendments became effective on February 19, 1975.382
This section will survey and discuss the administration of the
FOIA. The requirements of government disclosure and the permissible exemptions from disclosure will be examined. The procedural
aspects of the FOIA and its provisions for judicial enforcement will
also be considered. Finally, an attempt will be made to analyze two
problems that courts have faced in FOIA actions: whether a court
may exercise its equity powers to order that information be withregulations implementing the FOIA: SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GoVERNMENT INFORMATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 90TH CONG., 2D
SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (COMPILATION AND ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENTAL
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING 5 u.s.c. 552) (Comm. Print 1968); SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG.,
2D SES>., THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (TEN-MONTHS REVIEW) (Comm. Print 1968).
No bills regarding the implementation of the FOIA were introduced in the
91st Congress; however, the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure submitted a questionnaire concerning implementation of the FOIA to nearly
all federal agencies, requesting copies of their FOIA regulations and decisions and
detailed accounts of their public information policies. S. REP. No. 91-1221, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-3 (1970). The results of this effort were never published. Id.
326. U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-Administration and
Operation of the Freedom of Information Act, Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 4-6 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 House Hearings].
327. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972).
The report also found that the Act was poorly administered; it criticized the inadequacy of agency regulations and records of requests, the lack of advisory leadership,
agency failure to use public information officials, the insufficient orientation of agency
employees, and the excessive fees charged by the agencies for search and reproduction.
Id. at 9-10.
328. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 327, at 10-11.
329. 120 CONG. REc. S17,971-72 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1974); 120 CONG. REC. Hl0,001-09
(daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974). See generally H.R. REP. No. 93--876, 93d Cong., 2d Ses.,. (1974);
S. REP. No. 9~4, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); CONFERENCE REPoKr, supra note 225.
330. 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 1318 (1974).
331. 120 CONG. REc. S19,806-23 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974).
332. "The amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the ninetieth day
beginning after the date of enactment of this Act." Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-502, § 4, 88 Stat. 1561.
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held, and whether the Act's exemption provisions are mandatory or
permissive.333

I. The Definition of "Agency"
The disclosure requirements of the FOIA apply to "each [government] agency.'' 334 The FOIA is in fact a section of the APA; 330 the
AP A defines an agency as "each authority of the Government of
the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency ... .''336 The original FOIA simply incorporated this definition.337 The 1974 FOIA Amendments have expanded on it: for the purposes of the FOIA, the term "agency"
now expressly includes executive departments, military departments,
government corporations, government controlled corporations, and
independent regulatory agencies.838 Thus, the traditional notion of
333. For other extensive analyses of the FOIA see K. DAVIS, supra note 265, §§ 3A.0l.34 (Supp. 1970); Katz, Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 48 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1261 (1970); Koch, The Freedom of Information Act:
Suggestions for Making Information Available to the Public, 32 Mn. L, REV. 189
(1972); Kramer & Weinberg, The Freedom of Information Act, 63 GEO. L.J. 49 (1974);
Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agendes, 5 HARV, C1v. RIGHTS•
Cxv. Lm. L. R.Ev. 1 (1970); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year As•
sessment, 74 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 895 (1974); Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1974, 1975 DUKE L.J. 416; Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1973, 1974 DUKE L.J. 251; Note, Developments Under the
Freedom of Information Act-1972, 1973 DUKE L.J. 178; Project, 1972 DUKE L.J. 115,
supra note 323, at 136-58; Project, 1971 DUKE L.J. 149, supra note 323, at 164-93; Note,
The Freedom of Information Act-The Parameters of the Exceptions, 62 GEo, L.J.
177 (1973); Note, 38 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 150, supra note 323; Note, Scope of Disclosure
of Internal Revenue Communications and Information Files Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 8 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 329 (1975).
334. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
335. 5 u.s.c. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5362, 7521 (1970).
336. Administrative Procedure Act § 2(a), 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970). Congress, the
federal courts, and the governments of United States territories and the District of
Columbia are expressly excluded from the APA definition. 5 U.S.C. § 55l(l)(A)·(D)
(1970). See text at notes 356-64 infra.
337. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 4,
338. The amendments provide: "For the purposes of this section, the term 'agency'
as defined in section 551(1) of this title includes any executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other
establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the E.xecutive
Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(e)
(Supp. Feb. 1975).
The conference report and the House report suggest that the St. Lawrence Seaway
Development Corporation, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, the TVA and
the Intra-American Foundation are government corporations. CONFERENCE REronT,
supra note 225, at 14; H.R. REP. No. 93-876, supra note 329, at 8. The Senate originally
proposed that the United States Postal Service be expressly included in the statutory
definition. S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 33. The Conference report noted that
the Postal Service, although not explicitly mentioned in the amendment, is within its
scope. CONFERENCE R.El'oRT, supra, at 14.
There is an interesting contradiction in the House and conference reports with
respect to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. The House report states that "[t]he
term 'Government controlled corporation,' as used in this subsection, would include a
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an agency as a government authority engaged in adjudication or
rule-making,889 a significant concept for most of the AP A, is rejected
for the disclosure provisions of the FOIA.
The amended definition of agency has not yet been interpreted
by the courts, so it is difficult to determine what its impact will be.
Several FOIA cases, decided by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia before the 1974 Amendments became effective, dealt
with the problem of applying the APA definition of agency. In
Soucie v. David,840 the court found that the Office of Science and
Technology (OST) was an agency because it was charged with the
responsibility of independently evaluating various federal programs
and did not merely advise and assist the President. The court stated
that although "the statutory definition of 'agency' is not entirely
clear, ... the APA apparently confers agency status on any administrative unit with substantial independent authority in the exercise
of specific questions . . . . By virtue of its independent function of
evaluating federal programs, the OST must be regarded as an agency
subject to the AP A and the Freedom of Information Act."841
Several years later, in Washington Research Project, Inc. v.
HEW,842 the court distinguished Soucie on its facts and held that
the initial project review groups (IRGs) for National Institute of
Mental Health research grants were not agencies: "Unlike the OST,
the IRGs do confine themselves to making recommendations . . . .
The IRGs act as consultants with the [National Advisory Mental
Health Council]; their members are strictly forbidden from communicating their groups' recommendations to applicants."848 The
court said that in deciding whether a government unit is an agency,
"[t]he important consideration is whether it has any authority in
law to make decisions."844
In Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation
Board,345 decided by the District of Columbia court of appeals after
Soucie but before Washington Research, the application of the AP A
corporation which is not owned by the Federal Government, such as the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
(CPB)." H.R. REP. No. 93-876, supra, at 8-9 (emphasis original). The conference report,
on the other hand, states that the conferees "do not intend to include corporations
which receive appropriated funds but are neither chartered by the Federal Government
nor controlled by it, such as the Corporation for Public Broadcasting." CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra, at 14-15.
339. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 1.01 (1958).
340. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
341. 448 F.2d at 1075.
342. 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. May 12, 1975).
343. 504 F.2d at 247.
344. 504 F.2d at 248.
345. 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1974), revd. on other grounds, 43 U.S.L.W. 4502 (U.S.
April 28, 1975).
,
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definition of agency was considered at some length. The court held
that a regional renegotiation board, considered wholly apart from
the National Renegotiation Board, is an agency.346 Although some
of the regional board's decisions were subject to de novo review by
the National Board, the court held that the regional boards "serve
as a discrete, decision-producing layer in the renegotiation process." 847
On appeal, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide this
question, but did comment on the issue in a footnote. 848 The Court
agreed with the circuit court's conclusion that the regional board
should have agency status because it has the power to issue "orders."
The Court recognized, however, that the regional board has this
final decision-making authority in only one class of cases that it
handles; it noted that the circuit court never considered the possibility that the regional board might thus be an agency only for the
purpose of these cases. This comment implies that agency status in
the future may be based not on whether the unit "has any authority
in law to make decisions," 349 but rather on whether it has the
authority to make the particular type of decision with which a case
is concerned. Any interpretation of the definition of agency that
narrows its scope would be unfortunate, however, as it would limit
the number of situations in which the FOIA would apply; the 1974
amendment to the definition850 indicates that Congress intended
that the Act be broadly applied.
Whether the President is an agency for the purposes of the FOIA
is still unclear. In Soucie, the court found it unnecessary to determine whether the original FOIA, which applied to every "organizational unit in the executive branch,"351 applied to the President.852
However, by suggesting that a presidential advisory group would not
be an agency,353 the court implied that the Chief Executive himself
is not subject to the disclosure provisions of the Act. Although, as
a result of the 1974 amendments, the FOIA now expressly provides
that any "establishment in the executive branch of the Government
(including the Executive Office of the President)" is an agency,864 the
346. 482 F.2d at 710.
347. 482 F.2d at 715. The regional boards have their own investigating and ne•
gotiating personnel with whom private contractors must deal. The boards make formal
recommendations to the National 13oard in some cases, and issue final decisions in
others. 482 F.2d at 713-15.
348. Renegotiation 13d. v. Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp., 43 U.S.L.W. 4502, 4508
n.25 (U.S. April 28, 1975).
349. Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HE.W, 504 F.2d 238, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. May 12, 1975) (emphasis added).
350. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(e) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at notes 338-39 supra.
351. A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 4.
352. 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
353. 448 F.2d at 1075.
354. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(e) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
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conference report implies, in a manner similar to that of the Soucie
court, that the FOIA does not apply to the President: "The term
[Executive Office of the President] is not to be interpreted as including the President's immediate personal staff or units in the
Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the
President."355
The AP A definition of agency, incorporated in the FOIA, expressly excludes Congress, the federal courts, and the governments
of the territories and the District of Columbia.356 These exceptions,
retained by the 1974 amendment,357 have given rise to some interpretative difficulties. For example, in Cook v. Willingham 358 the
Tenth Circuit relied on the federal court exclusion in refusing to
compel a prison warden to give a prisoner a copy of his presentence
report. The report had been compiled for use by the sentencing court
and was alleged to be under its exclusive control. The circuit court
reasoned that since the sentencing court (a federal district court) was
not an agency, the report was not an agency report and thus did not
have to be disclosed.859
I£ the prison is an agency, however, the Cook case is difficult to
reconcile with the language of the FOIA. The statute does not use
the term "agency report"; in 1968, when the Cook case was decided,
it merely required an agency to turn over "identifiable records" on
request. 300 Ordinarily, an agency should not be excused from disclosure merely because the records it possesses were not prepared by
its staff. Perhaps the Cook case can be explained on the basis of the
pre-sentence report's primary purpose; the report was prepared for
and used by the sentencing court, and the prison was only an incidental possessor. However, this case is not significantly different from
a case where an agency prepares and retains a report at the request of
a nonagency. In the latter situation, the courts uniformly hold that
the report must be disclosed.361
Although no court has yet considered the matter, the GAO, the
"watch dog" agency that ensures that congressionally appropriated
funds are properly spent, has promulgated regulations relying on the
fact that the FOIA definition of agency excludes Congress. Although
the GAO professes to have a policy on disclosure that reflects the
FOIA, its regulations state that the FOIA does not directly apply,
355. CoNFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 15.
356. 5 U.S.C. § 55l(l)(A)-(D) (1970).
357. CONFERENCE ~ORT, supra note 225, at 14.
358. 400 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1967).
359. 400 F.2d at 886.
360. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
361. E.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076 (D.D.C. 1971) (report of the Office of
Science and Technology prepared at the request of the President held to be an agency
record).
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and that its policy does not confer "on any member of the public a
right under the Act of access to or information from the [GAO]
records." 362 This interpretation of the applicability of the FOIA is
hard to justify, however, since all other congressionally created
agencies are considered to be within the scope of the Act.803 Furthermore, the GAO regulation conflicts with the basic policy of the
Act-that the people have a right to know in detail the activities
of government.364

2. The Disclosure Requirements
a. Publication in the Federal Register. Section 552(a)(l) of the
FOIA requires each agency to publish certain information in the
Federal Register "for the guidance of the public." 365 The Federal
Register is a magazine published daily, Monday through Friday, by
the Office of the Federal Register under the authority of the Federal
Register Act366 and the regulations of the Administrative Committee
of the Federal Register. 367 Compilations of the information required
to be published in the Federal Register can normally be found in the
Code of Federal Regulations, a special edition of the Federal
Register,368 but, for the purposes of the FOIA, publication in the
Code is not a substitute for publication in the Federal Register.800
There has been little controversy over the publication requirements
of the FOIA; when they were enacted complaints were "more on the
side of too much publication rather than too little."870
Four categories of information are required to be published in
362. 4 C.F.R. § 81.1 (1974). Information on small grain program abuses was denied
by the GAO to one neivspaper on the ground that, as an agency of Congress, the FOIA
did not apply. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER, REPORT No. 303, THE FOI Ac::r AND
THE MEDIA 4 (1973).
363. See Note, 56 GEO. L.J. 18, supra note 323.
364. See text at notes 308-12 supra •.
365. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l) (1970).
366. 44 u.s.c. §§ 1501-11 (1970).
367. 1 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-22.7 (1974).
368. 1 C.F.R. §§ 8.1-.9 (1974).
369. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 7. However, section
552(a)(l) does provide for inrorporation by reference in the Federal Register when the
information in question is "reasonably available to the class of persons affected
thereby" and the Director of the Federal Register approves of such incorporation.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l) (1970). Inrorporation of mere summaries of agency material is not
sufficient. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUI>r, supra, at 12-13.
370. S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 6.
One of the few cases in which an agency's failure to publish information has been
challenged is still pending. In National Wildlife Fedn. v. Brinegar, Civil No. 1269-73
(D.D.C., filed June 25, 1973), plaintiff demanded that, pursuant to section 552(a)(l)(B)
of the FOIA, the Federal Highway Administration publish its statements of policies
and procedures in the Federal Register. These documents were already available to
the public, and the agency argued that it was making a good faith effort to organize
them for publication. Interview with Richard Wolf, Institute for Public Interest Representation, in Washington, D.C., July 31, 1974.
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the Federal Register. First, agencies are required by section 552(a)
(l)(A) to publish descriptions of their "central and field organization" and the methods by which the public can obtain agency information and decisions. This organizational material will also appear
in a special edition of the Federal Register called the United States
Government Organization Manual. 871 The requirement that agencies
publish the "places at which, the employees ... from whom, and the
methods whereby, the public can obtain information" 872 implies that
they have the power to create appropriate procedures for disclosure.
Second, section 552(a)(l)(B) requires the publication of "statements of the general course and method by which [agency] functions
are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available." This provision requires agencies to explain their functions and responsibilities,
putting particular emphasis on their adjudicatory and rule-making
functions. The Attorney General has maintained that "the criterion
for publication [under section 552(a)(I)(B)] is whether the particular
'course and method' is of concern to the public. For example, procurement and other public contract functions and, in some cases,
surplus property disposal functions, are matters in which members of
the public have an interest, whereas information concerning other
proprietary functions usually would not be useful to the public."378
It is hoped that this interpretation of section 552(a)(l)(B) will not be
followed, however. Allowing agencies to determine for themselves
that there is a lack of public interest in a matter could lead to abuse.
Moreover, section 3 of the old AP A granted broad discretion to the
agencies to determine the public interest;874 the FOIA was intended
to correct this "defect." 875 Clearly some agency proprietary functions
will be so limited in scope that they will not require specific comment, but the presumption should be in favor of publication.
Third, section 552(a)(l)(C) requires publication of "rules of
procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at which
forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents
of all papers, reports, or examinations."876 Rules of procedure, as
defined in administrative law, spell out the requirements of an
agency's practice for rule-making and adjudicative hearings. 877 If an
agency does not have any formalized rules of procedure, it must
371. E.g., 1 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-.2 (1973).
372. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)(A) (1970).
373. AlTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 8.
374. See text at note 316 supra.
375. See text at notes 320-21 supra.
376. This provision attempts to eliminate unnecessary publication by requiring
that "descriptions of forms" be published, rather than the forms themselves. S. REP.
No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 10.
377. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 6.01 (1958).
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create and publish them. If an agency has not published its rules, the
enforcement of an agency regulation may be enjoined.878
Finally, section 552(a)(l)(D) requires publication of "substantive
rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability
formulated and adopted by the agency." The first clause of this
subsection requires the publication of rules adopted by an agency
pursuant to law-making power delegated to it by the legislature;
substantive rules are, in effect, administrative statutes. For example,
eligibility requirements promulgated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
for general assistance benefits have been held to be within this
clause.379 Although rules regulating rates will often not be of "general applicability," 380 they should be published if the rates are of
interest to a broad spectrum of the public.881
The second clause of this subsection requires the publication
of interpretative rules, rules issued by an agency to guide its staff
and regulated parties in interpreting the agency's statutory mandate.
For example, Selective Service directives that tell Service officers what
policies to consider in issuing civilian work orders for conscientious
objectors have been held to be within the scope of this clause.882 It
has been argued that the rules, policies, and interpretations expressed
in agency adjudicatory proceedings, as opposed to agency rule-making
proceedings,383 are not "general" or "of general applicability" because they are directed only to the parties in the proceedings.881
However, to the extent that these rules, policies, and interpretations
constitute agency "case law" that will influence other members of
the public, there is no reason why the adjudicatory context should
exempt them from the publication requirement. 386
Section 552(a)(l) contains a sanction for the violation of any of
its four subsections. It provides that "[e]xcept to the extent that a
378. See, e.g., W.G. Cooley Transfer & Storage Corp. v. Froehlke, 480 F,2d 498 (4th
Cir. 1973). But see ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at IO.
379. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
380. See S. REP. No. 88-1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1964).
381. Cf. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S l\fEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 11.
382. Piercy v. Tarr, 343 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. Cal. 1972): Gardiner v. Tarr, 341 F.
Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1972).
383. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1969).
384. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at IO. This position has
been adopted by some agencies. E.g., 14 C.F.R. § 1206.200(b)(ii) (1973) (NASA); 31
C.F.R. § 1.3(c) (1973) (Office of the Secretary of the Treasury).
385. Publication of all agency decisions, however, may not be feasible. K. DAVIS,
supra note 265, § 3A.7, at 125-26 (Supp. 1970). Considerable difficulties may be encountered in separating adjudications of general interest from adjudications of unique
questions. A "sensible compromise" suggested by one commentator is the publication
of summaries of important decisions similar to the abstracts and headnotes preceding
reports of judicial decisions. Note, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 895, supra note 333, at 900-01
(1974).
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person has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof, a person
may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely
affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal Register
and not so published." This sanction prevents an agency from imposing obligations on private individuals pursuant to unpublished
rules or regulations that were required to be published under one of
the above subsections.386 It also prevents an agency from depriving a
person of benefits granted by an improperly unpublished rule.387
However, if a private party adversely affected by unpublished material has had "actual and timely notice" of the contents of the
material, he or she cannot seek protection under the sanction.888
This exception is justified by the basic purpose of the Act; the FOIA
was intended to provide access to information for uninformed
persons affected by agency activities.889
•
It is possible for a court to mitigate the strength of this sanction
by refusing to acknowledge that an individual has been "adversely
affected" by the unpublished material, or by affording the unpublished material interpretative weight in its decision. For example,
in Hogg v. United States,390 the Sixth Circuit held that a taxpayer
was not adversely affected by an unpublished order issued by the
United States Attorney General. The order provided that a United
States Attorney must file a notice of appeal in a federal case at the
end of the applicable period for filing appeals, even if the Department of Justice has not notified the Attorney that an appeal should
be taken. The taxpayer in Hogg had been successful in the lower
court; subsequently, the United States Attorney filed an appeal
pursuant to this order. The circuit court stated that "[a]ny delay
incident to the ultimate payment of the judgment in favor of the
taxpayer which might result from the dismissal of an appeal or from
an affirmance would be compensated for by the payment of interest
at the rate of six percent per annum," 391 and it refused to recognize
potential reversal as an adverse effect of the order. However, if notice
of appeal had not been filed pursuant to the order, the taxpayer
would have been assured of victory. In Thomas v. County Office Committee,392 a federal district court used definitional material found in
an unpublished handbook to interpret "demand" in the Agricultural
Act of 1970.
386. E.g., Dairylea Cooperative, Inc. v. Butz, 504 F.2d 80, 84 n.8 (2d Cir. 1974);
Percy v. Brennan, 384 F. Supp. 800, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
387. ATI'ORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 12.
388. Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289, 295 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
389. See text at notes 309-10, 320-21 supra.
390. 428 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
391. 428 F.2d at 280.
392. 324 F. Supp. 1271 (S.D. Tex.), reaffd. in supplemental opinion, 327 F. Supp.
1244 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
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Both of these cases illustrate the methods by which a court can
reduce the effectiveness of the "adversely affected" sanction, thereby
reducing an agency's incentive to publish specific types of information.
Perhaps these courts narrowly read the section 552(a)(l) sanction
because of the breadth of sections 552(a)(2) and (a)(3); most agency
information not covered by the publication requirements of (a)(l)
will have to be made available for public inspection under (a)(2) and
(a)(3).aoa
b. Public inspection. Section 552(a)(2) of the FOIA requires
that three categories of information be made available for public
inspection and copying, unless the materials are published and
offered for sale. The first category, "(a)(2)(A) information," is composed of "final opinions, including concurring and dissenting
opinions, as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases."
Agencies often make use of trial-type proceedings for deciding disputed questions of fact, determining policy in a precise factual setting, and ordering compliance with specific laws and regulations. 304
All final agency opinions and all agency orders that result from the
adjudicative process must be made available for public inspection.
In some cases, the question whether an opinion must be made
available under (a)(2)(A) will depend on whether the particular unit
issuing the opinion is an agency for the purposes of the FOIA.300 The
test for agency status has been whether the particular unit has the
authority to make decisions, rather than just recommendations.300
Even if an opinion was issued by an agency, however, it must constitute a "final" agency decision in order to come within (a)(2)(A). In
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck b Company,897 the Supreme Court suggested that in deciding whether requested documents are final
opinions, "an understanding of the function of the documents ...
in the context of the administrative process which generated them"
is "[c]rucial to the decision" of the case.308 To be disclosable under
(a)(2)(A), each document must represent the "final disposition" of a
matter, rather than the predecisional communication that merely
recommends some course of agency action. 300
393. See text at notes 394-495 infra.
394. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 8 (1958).
395. See text at notes 334-64 supra. E.g., Washington Research Project, Inc. v.
HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. May 12,
1975).
396. See Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. May 12, 1975); Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp. v.
Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973), reod. on other grounds, 43 U.S.L.W.
4502 (U.S. April 28, 1975); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); text at
notes 334-64 supra.
397. 43 U.S.L.W. 4491 (U.S. April 28; 1975).
398. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4493. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp,,
43 U.S.L.W. 4502, 4503 (U.S. April 28, 1975).
399. 43 U .S.L.W. at 4496-500. The question whether an agency opinion is "final"
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If an agency record is an "order" rather than an "opinion," there
is no need to determine whether it is final because (a)(2)(A) requires
disclosure of all "orders, made in the adjudication of cases."400 It is
often difficult to distinguish between an order and an opinion,
however.401 One interpretive source of the FOIA, the Attorney General's Memorandum,402 states that "a statement of principles and
reasoning may be set forth in an 'opinion' issued with an order, and
the 'order' itself is merely a summary statement of the agency's final
action in the adjudication of a case."403 The Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia, however, in American Mail Line, Ltd. v.
Gulick,404 indicated that an adjudicatory disposition cast in the form
of an order may require the publication of material on which the
order is expressly based.405 The memorandum that the court ordered
disclosed as part of the "order" in Gulick, could arguably be considered an opinion under the Attorney General's, definition. The
distinction between an order and an opinion becomes crucial if the
statement at issue is not "final." If the statement is an opinion, it
need not be disclosed; if the statement is part of an order, it must be
disclosed.
The second category of information that must be made available
under (a)(2), "(a)(2)(B) information," includes "those statements of
policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency
and are not published in the Federal Register." This category includes policy statements that are not "general" and interpretations
that are not "of general applicability," which, therefore, are not
covered by the section 552(a)(l) publication requirements.406
The Internal Revenue Service sought to protect its private letter
rulings407 and technical advice memoranda408 from the provisions of
(a)(2)(B) by arguing that these materials are not "adopted by the
agency" because they are not relied on as precedent by the Service.409
becomes crucial in cases where the agency claims that the opinion is exempt from
disclosure under the inter- and intra-agency memoranda exemption of the Act: the
Court in Sears held that this latter exemption can never apply to "final" agency
opinions. 43 U.SL.W. at 4498. See text at notes 673-85 infra.
400. American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
401. An order is often incorporated in an opinion. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 265,
§ 16.13, at 485 (1958) ("A typical opinion of a regulatory agency contains a syllabus,
findings of fact, discussion of questions of law and policy resembling a reasoned opinion of an appellate court, and the order entered").
402. For a discussion of the interpretive value of the Memorandum see note 323
supra.
403. A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 18.
404. 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
405. 411 F.2d at 702.
406. See text at notes 379-85 supra.
407. 26 C.F.R. § 601.20l(a)(2) (1974).
408. 26 C.F.R. § 601.105(b)(5) (1974).
409. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1303 (D.D.C. 1973), modified in part, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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The Service found support for its position in the House report on
the FOIA410 Both the letter rulings and the memoranda interpret
the tax laws in the context of specific facts; the former are sent to
taxpayers and the latter to Internal Revenue Service district directors.411 In Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Internal Revenue Seroice,412
the federal district court held that (a)(2)(B) was applicable to both
communications; the express language of the provision was to be
given primacy over the contradictory statements of the House
report.413
The district court in Tax Analysts did accept the precedentialnonprecedential distinction advanced by the Service, however. The
court found that although letter rulings were never cited in later
interpretations, many still qualified as precedents because they were
filed for use as reference material.414 While the court wisely discarded
citation by the Service as the standard for determining precedent,416
its approach ultimately makes the application of (a)(2)(B) depend
on whether the Service files material in the "routine alphabetical
file," to be disposed of after four years, or in the "reference file," to
be preserved for possible later use. 416 The Tax Analysts approach
may thus serve to induce agencies to create nonreference files in
order to avoid disclosure.417
The third category of material to be made available under (a)(2) is
described in subsection (a)(2)(C) as "administrative staff manuals and
instructions to staff that affect a member of the public." The distinction made in (a)(2)(C) between "administrative" and "nonadminis410. "[A]n agency may not be required to make available for public inspection and
copying any advisory interpretation on a specific set of facts which is requested by
and addressed to a particular person, provided that such interpretation is not cited
or relied upon by any officer or employee of the agency as a precedent in the dispo•
sition of other cases." H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 7. This position
was also adopted by the ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 16.
411. 26 C.F.R. § 601.20l(a)(2) (1974) (private letter rulings); 26 C.F.R. § 601.105(b)(5)
(1974) (technical advice memos).
412. 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), modified in part, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
413. 362 F. Supp. 1304-05. On appeal, the circuit court held that the technical
advice memoranda were exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Sec Note, 8
U. MICH. J. L. REF. 329, supra note 333, at 334-36.
414. 362 F. Supp. at 1305-06. Cf. National Prison Project of the ACLU Foundation,
Inc. v. Sigler, 390 F. Supp. 789 (D.D.C. 1975).
415. 362 F. Supp. at 1306.
416. 362 F. Supp. at 1305.
417. The distinction benveen precedential and nonprecedential materials may be
useful, however, in distinguishing benveen interpretations "of general applicability"
that must be published under section 552(a)(l)(D) and those interpretations that must
be made available under (a)(2)(B). See K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.9, at 130 (Supp.
1970). Davis suggests that (a)(2)(B) be amended to make it clear that agency statements and interpretations need not be precedents and need not be the end product
of administration. K. DAVIS, supra, § 3A.33, at 178 (Supp. 1970).
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ttative" staff manuals is explained in the Senate report on the FOIA:
"The limitation of the staff manuals and instructions affecting the
public which must be made available to the public to those which
pertain to administrative matters rather than to law enforcement
matters protects the traditional confidential nature of instructions
to Government personnel prosecuting violations of law in court,
while permitting a public examination of the basis for administrative
action." 418 While the dichotomy between "administrative matters"
and "law enforcement matters" has been criticized,419 it generally has
been accepted by the courts.420 Two circuits, however, have narrowed
the scope of law enforcement matters to include only information
that, if known to the public, would significantly impede the enforcement process.421 Such an impediment exists "only when information
is made available which allows persons simultaneously to violate
the law and avoid detection."422 Thus, portions of a Bureau of
Customs manual instructing agents on the planning and operation
of a "stakeout" are excluded from (a)(2)(C) because their effectiveness would be materially impeded by disclosure.423
If disclosure of manual information encourages compliance with
the law, rather than noncompliance, (a)(2)(C) requires disclosure.
Generally, disclosure of agency inspection procedures and enforcement standards will encourage compliance with the law, and therefore this information must be made available to the public. For example, portions of the Internal Revenue Service Manual dealing with
418. S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 2. See Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787,
795 (6th Cir. 1972), afjd. after remand, 507 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1974):
Law enforcement is the process by which a society secures compliance with its
duly adopted rules. Enforcement is adversely affected only when information is
made available which allows persons simultaneously to violate the law and to
avoid detection. Information which merely enables an individual to conform his
actions to an agency's understanding of the law applied by that agency does not
impede law enforcement and is not excluded from compulsory disclosure under
(a)(2)(C).
Far from impeding the goals of law enforcement, in fact, the disclosure of
information clarifying an agency's substantive or procedural law serves the very
goals of enforcement by encouraging knowledgeable and voluntary compliance
with the law • • • • Materials providing such information are administrative in
character and clearly discloseable under (a)(2)(C).
(Emphasis original).
419. K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.12, at 136-37 (Supp. 1970); Comment, 1974
DUKE L.J. 251, supra note 333, at 280-84.
420. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699, 701 (5th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d
787, 795 (6th Cir. 1972), afjd. after remand, 507 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1974); United States
v. lmbrunone, 379 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
421. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699, 701 (5th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d
787, 795 (6th Cir. 1972), afjd. after remand, 507 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1974).
422. Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 795 (6th Cir. 1972), afjd. after remand, 507 F.2d
481 (6th Cir. 1974) (emphasis original). See Note, 8 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 329, supra
note 333, at 336-37.
423. Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
424. Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 795 (6th Cir. 1972), afjd. on remand, 507 F.2d
481 (6th Cir. 1974).
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the examination of returns and the interrogation of taxpayers424 and
training manuals for Occupational Safety and Health Administration
officers425 have been held to fall within (a)(2)(C). Thus, the statement
in the House report that "guidelines for the staff in auditing or inspection procedures" are not covered by (a)(2)(C) 426 appears not to
be authoritative.
Subsection (a)(2)(C) also covers "instructions to staff." This apparently refers to the same type of information as is compiled in staff
manuals, and the law enforcement exemption similarly should apply.
For (a)(2)(C) to apply, the "instructions" must be mandatory, and
not merely suggestions.427
All materials within the three (a)(2) categories must be made
publicly available. Procedures that detail the avenues of public access
to (a)(2) information must be established, and agencies may be
ordered to modify their procedures if they entail excessive delay or
complexity.428 Information from the larger agencies can best be
made available through public reading rooms.420 If (a)(2) materials
are promptly published and copies are offered for sale, they will be
considered publicly available, but the supplemental maintenance of a
public reading room has been recommended. 430
Subsection (a)(2) also requires that the public be permitted to
copy available materials.431 This subsection does not expressly provide for charging the public a fee for copying, or for the service of
providing (a)(2) documents in specie, but the practice would seem to
be allowed, subject to the constraints of section 552(a)(4) of the
FOIA.4s2
All subsection (a)(2) information issued after July 4, 1967, must
be indexed, and the indexes, for the most part, must be published:
"Each agency also shall maintain and make available for public
inspection and copying current indexes providing identifying information for the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after July 4, 1967, and required by this paragraph [(a)(2)] to
be made available o~ published."433 This subsection, in conformity
425. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699, 701 (5th Cir. 1973).
426. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 7.
427. Sears, Roebuck &: Co. v. NLRB, 346 F. Supp. 751, 753 (D.D.C.), rcvd. on other
grounds, 473 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 950 (1974).
428. Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. May 12, 1975).
429. E.g., 4 C.F.R. § 81.5 (1974) (General Accounting Office); IO C.F.R. § 9.7 (1974)
(Atomic Energy Commission); 14 C.F.R. § 310.4 (1973) (Civil Aeronautics Board).
430. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 18.
431. S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 76 ("the right to copy these matters
is supplemental to the right to inspect and makes the later right more meaningfu1'1,
432. See text at notes 847-99 infra.
433. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
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with typical agency practice, permits agencies to maintain a number
of different indexes covering different types of material. 484
"[T]o provide greater accessibility to each agency's index," 485
and to "encourage agencies to maintain their indexes in a current
manner," 486 the 1974 FOIA Amendments added a requirement that
indexes be published at least quarterly.487 Publication by commercial
firms is considered sufficient.438 The quarterly publication requirement can also be met by the publication of supplements, rather than
completely new indexes.439 Furthermore, the Senate report suggests
that for agencies such as the Railroad Retirement Board and the
Small Business Administration, lack of sufficient public interest
would permit publication by "photocopy reproduction" rather than
by printing and mass distribution.440 If quarterly publication is considered by an agency to be unnecessary and impractical, the agency
must publish an order in the Federal Register increasing the publication interval or serving notice of its intention not to publish at
all. 441 The sale of published indexes is permitted but not required,
and copies of unpublished indexes must be provided at a price not
to exceed "the direct cost of duplication." 442 The published index
requirement is intended to permit greater public access to government information through the use of indexes located in institutions
and libraries.448
Only (a)(2) materials issued after the effective date of the FOIA
must be indexed. However, in Irons v. Gottschalk444 the plaintiff
persuaded the court to order disclosure under section 552(a)(3) of
currently existing indexes of the Patent Office for 175 volumes of
manuscript decisions from 1853 to 1954. The court ordered the
agency to bind the indexes into the front of each volume despite the
fact that it was estimated that it would take $300 and two man-days
to reproduce the 3,744 pages in question.445 Thus, the prospective
nature of the (a)(2) index requirement should not cause an information seeker to neglect the possibility of requesting the disclosure of
indexes to materials issued before 1967.
434. See Irons v. Gottschalk, 369 F. Supp. 403, 409 (D.D.C. 1974) (Patent Office
sufficiently compiled with the indexing requirement by compiling five separate indexes).
435. S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 8.
436. Id.
437. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
438. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 7; H.R. REP. No. 93-876, supra note
329, at 5; S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 9.
439. S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 8-9.
440. Id. at 8.
441. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
442. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
443. S. REP.- No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 8.
444. 369 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1974).
445. 369 F. Supp. at 405.
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One problem with the index requirement is that statements of
policy and interpretation that have been published in the Federal
Register are not covered by (a)(2) and therefore need not be indexed.
Unless agencies voluntarily integrate this published material into
their indexes of unpublished information, the agency indexes of
statements of policy and interpretation will be incomplete.
-The burden placed on agencies by the index requirement is
significant. For example, several agencies issue millions of orders
yearly, which frequently state only whether a request has been granted
or denied.446 All of these orders must be indexed. If (a)(2) material
is not indexed it may only be used by an agency as precedent if the
party affected "has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof." 447
The Attorney General's Memorandum advises agencies to use actual
notice whenever practical to protect against possible defects in publication and indexing.4 4B
There is one general exception to the availability requirements
of section 552(a)(2): "To the extent required to prevent a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, an agency may delete
identifying details when it makes available or publishes an opinion,
statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction."440
This provision generally allows agencies to delete names and addresses from (a)(2) materials.450 If a name, even though deleted, can
be associated with a document through other identifying details,
those details must also be deleted to protect individual privacy.401
The agency may delete only the minimum amount of information
necessary to protect privacy, however. 452
The failure to include "orders" in the privacy exception to section 552(a)(2) implies that an agency cannot prevent the disclosure
of identifying details in ultimate agency directives. The definition
of an order becomes crucial, therefore, in determining the scope of
this exception. If an order is only "a summary of the agency's final
action,"453 it ordinarily will contain no details beyond the private
446. K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § M.14, at 140 (Supp. 1970).
447. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(ii) (1970). This sanction is similar to that provided in section 552(a)(l). See text at notes 386-89 supra.
448. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 22.
449. 5 U.S.C. § 555(a)(2) (1970).
450. Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73,
78 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929, 937
(D.D.C. 1973), afjd. in part and revd. in part on other grounds, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. May 12, 1975).
451. Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929, 937 (D.D.C,
1973), afjd. in part and revd. in part on other grounds, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. May 12, 1975).
452. Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929, 937 (D.D.C.
1973), afjd. in part and revd. fa part on other grounds, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. May 12, 1975). Cf. text at notes 501-05 infra.
453. See ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 18.
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party's name and address, and the agency's final judgment. Under
this definition, any discussion of the factual circumstances and reasoning behind an order will be an opinion and appropriate deletions
from the opinion to protect individual privacy could be made. If,
however, a private party's name is revealed in an order, there may be
a substantial number of identifying details in the opinion accompanying the order that would have to be deleted. It would thus be
better to allow the deletion of names and addresses from orders as
well as from opinions, so that opinions could be disclosed in full. At
least one case, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board,454 has taken this position. Since ninety per cent of the
renegotiation board's determinations were made by order without
opinion, the court reasoned that the statutory purpose of concealing
personal identity required the deletion of identifying details from
the Board's orders.
If information is deleted from (a)(2) material, "in each case the
justification for the deletion [must] be explained fully in ·writing."455
Most agency explanations, however, are merely perfunctory. For
example, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare uses the
following preamble: "Names of parties and certain other identifying
details have been removed [and fictitious names substituted] in order
to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy
of the individuals involved."456
c. Disclosure of records upon request. Section 552(a)(3) of the
FOIA currently provides that "[e]xcept with respect to records made
available under [sections 552(a)(l) and (a)(2),] each agency, upon any
request for records which (A) reasonably describes such records and
(B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time,
place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the
records promptly available to any person."457 Because this section
provides for disclosure to "any person," it has been held that the Act
precludes consideration of the private interest or motivation of the
party seeking relief. 458 For the purposes of the Act, a "person" is
454. 425 F.2d 578, 580 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
455. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970).
456. 45 C.F.R. § 5.16 (1973).
457. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
458. Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787,
790 n.3 (6th Cir. 1972); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Kreindler
v. Department of the Navy, 363 F. Supp. 611, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See H.R. REP. No.
92-1419, supra note 327, at 76-77. Cf. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 n.24 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
Prior to the enactment of the FOIA, records were available only "to persons properly and directly concerned." See text at notes 313-15 supra. The FOIA specifically
abrogated any such limitation by providing that nonexempt records shall be available
to "any person." See H.R. REP. No. 89--1497, supra note 310, at 1, 8; S. REP. No.
89--813, supra note 310, at 5.
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defined as "an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
public or private organization other than an agency." 4t1o One court
has held that a foreign government or instrumentality is a "public
or private organization" within this definition. 460
Section (a)(3) provides that agency "records" shall be disclosed.
Agency regulations commonly define the term "record" to include
punch cards, magnetic tapes, microfilm, sound recordings, maps,
photographs, slides, and motion pictures.461 Tangible objects, equipment, and vehicles are not records. Thus, a physician and a pathology professor were unsuccessful in using (a)(3) to obtain a rifle,
ammunition, clothing, bullets and metal fragments, all connected
·with the assassination of President Kennedy.462
In order to obtain information under (a)(3), the records sought
must exist and be in the possession of an agency; 468 a person cannot
obtain future records.464 Agencies are not required to calculate rates,
proportions or trends, or to make comparisons from items in their
files,465 but they may be required to aggregate existing separate
indexes.466 Agencies may not be compelled to ·write opinions in cases
in which they would not otherwise be required to do so; the FOIA
only mandates disclosure of documents that the law requires the
agency to prepare or that the agency has decided for its own reasons
to create.467 It has also been argued that the records requested must
bear some relation to the function of the agency to which the request
is made.468 Agencies tend to refer requests to the agency that has
primary responsibility for the records requested.46 0
459. 5 u.s.c. § 551(2) (1970).
460. Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 776 (D.D.C. 1974).
461. E.g., 45 C.F.R. § 5.5(a) (1974) (HEW); 14 C.F.R. § 1206.101 (1974) (NASA).
462. Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971), afjd. on other
grounds, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972).
463. Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130, 137 (D. Kan. 1971), affd. on other
grounds, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972). Sec 4 C.F.R. § 81,3(b)
(1974) (GAO).
464. Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 294 F. Supp. 803, 805 (N.D. Ill.), affd,, 418
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969). However, once records are made, subsection (a)(3) requires
the agency to make them "promptly available." At least one district court has held
that this requirement mandates the release of records "at the earliest possible time
they are completed • • • .'' Packer v. Kleindienst, Civil No. 1988-72, mem. op, at 4
(D.D.C., July 8, 1974).
465. See 14 C.F.R. § 1206.202 (1974) (NASA); 45 C.F.R. § 5.15 (HEW).
466. E.g., 4 C.F.R. § 81.3(b) (1974) (GAO); 7 C.F.R. § 1.4(d) (1974) (Department of
Agriculture).
467. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 43 U.SL.W. 4491, 4500 (U.S. April 28, 197!i).
468. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
469. E.g., 6 C.F.R. § 102.6 (1974) (requests for records in the possession of the
Cost of Living Council should be submitted to the agency from which they originated);
7 C.F.R. § 1.5(c) (1974) (Department of Agriculture will refer requests to agency pri•
marily responsible); 10 C.F.R. § 9.5(b) (1974) (AEC will refer requests to agency with
primary and exclusive responsibility).
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Agencies must engage in an adequate search for information that
is requested. 470 At least one court has refused to scrutinize the adequacy of a search where the request for information was nonspecific.
In Exxon Corp. v. FTC471 the plaintiff made a blanket request for
all communications during a three and a half year period between
the FTC and any member of Congress, or any other agency, on the
subject of petroleum. The Secretary of the FTC filed an affidavit
stating that a thorough search had been made, and that all requested
records had been located and reported. The plaintiff questioned the
adequacy of the search and requested affidavits of personal knowledge
from each individual participating in the search. The court held
that, under the circumstances, the affidavit of the Secretary was sufficient to prove that the FTC had recovered all identifiable records
of the kind requested: "It would be unreasonable to allow Exxon
the extended discovery it wants when it has caused the Commission
to search every nook and cranny; its discovery is aimed not at ascertaining whether identified records have been produced, but whether
there exist additional records which might be specifically identified
by Exxon." 472
The original version of section 552(a)(3) provided that "each
agency, on request for identifiable records ... shall make the records
promptly available ...." 473 The 1974 FOIA amendments eliminated
the "identifiable records" clause and substituted a requirement that
the request "reasonably describe" the materials sought.474 Although
this amendment indicates congressional dissatisfaction with narrow
judicial interpretations of identifiability,475 it was not intended to
change the basic identifiability standard.476 That standard requires
that requests contain reasonable descriptions that will enable government employees to locate the records sought.477 The courts generally have held that the difficulty the agency will have in locating
the materials is not to be considered.478 A description that does not
470. Exxon Corp. v. ITC, 384 F. Supp. 755 (D.D.C. 1974).
471. 384 F. Supp. 755 (D.D.C. 1974).
472. 384 F. Supp. at 760.
473. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975)
(emphasis added).
474. See text at note 457 supra.
475. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 327, at 83.
476. S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 10. The test under the "identifiable
records" language also required that the request give a reasonable description of the
records. See, e.g., Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122, 125 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
43 U.S.L.W. 3683 ijune 30, 1975); National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. FCC, 479
F.2d 183, 190-91 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bristol-Myers Co. v. ITC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). See 5 C.F.R. § 294.107 (1974) (Civil Service Commission); 7 C.F.R. § 295.6(b)
(1974) (Food and Nutrition Service); 7 C.F.R. § 900.510(a) (1974) (Agricultural Marketing Service).
,
477. See note 476 supra.
478. Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122, 126 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.SL.W.
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provide the agency with a starting point for locating the requested
materials is inadequate, however. For example, in Long v. IRS,470 a
request for all IRS files relating to plaintiff's business was held to
be too vague; it did not provide the Service with enough details
to enable its employees to begin their search.
At least one court has held that an excessively broad request does
not meet the identifiability standard. In Irons v. Schuyler4 80 the
plaintiff requested "all unpublished manuscript decisions of the Patent Office" ;481 these records had been acquired over more than 100
years and apparently numbered in the thousands. The court held
that the plaintiff's "sweeping, indiscriminate request" was too broad
to be identifiable.4B2
Some agency regulations state flatly that blanket or generalized
requests will not be honored.483 NASA will not honor requests
phrased in terms of "the entire file" or "all matters relating to."484
Other regulations seek to deny generalized requests on the ground
of administrative inconvenience. The United States Customs Service,
for example, will recognize requests for all records of a category only
if the collection of those records will not unduly burden or interfere
with the agency's operations.485 Regulations such as these, however,
are not justifiable in view of (a)(3)'s legislative history.480 A request
for "all" records of a certain class should not be considered overbroad if the class itself is specifically defined. 487 Thus, the Court of
3683 Oune 30, 1975); National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. FCC, 479 F,2d 183 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Frankel v. SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), revd, on other grounds,
460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F.
Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1970), afjd. on other grounds, 444 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
479. 339 F. Supp. 1266 (W.D. Wash. 1971).
480. 465 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972). The Senate report
accompanying the 1974 bill asserts that the amendments do not affect the holding
of this case. S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 10.
481. 465 F.2d at 610.
482. 465 F.2d at 612-13.
483. E.g., 4 C.F.R. § 303.6(b) (1974) (Cost Accounting Standards Board).
484. 14 C.F.R. § 1206.602 (1974).
485. 19 C.F.R. § 103.2(d) (1974). If the categorical request does unduly burden the
agency, agency personnel will confer with the requester in an attempt to reduce the
request to manageable proportions. For similar agency regulations see 14 C.F.R,
§ 310.6(b) (1974) (CAB); 13 C.F.R. § 102.4(d)(2) (1974) (Small Business Administration},
486. See S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 8; H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra
note 310, at 9 ("The persons requesting records must provide a reasonable descrip•
tion enabling Government employees to locate the requested material, but the identification requirement must not be used as a method for withholding" (emphasis
added)).
487. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) permits discovery requests by category if described "with
reasonable particularity." Discovery standards may serve as guidelines in determining
identifiability. S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 2; AnoRNEY GENERAL'S MEMO•
RANDUM, supra note 309, at 24. See also Frankel v. SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675 (S.D,N.Y.
1971), revd. on other grounds, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972)
(broadness defense rejected},
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Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Sears v. Gottschalk,488 disagreed
with the district court's finding that, in a request for "all [existing]
abandoned United States patent applications ... '[a]ll' is not sufficiently descriptive." 489 The circuit court held that, although the
plaintiff's request was far-reaching, it was sufficiently specific to
enable the agency to locate the requested records.490 The "categorical
nature of the request" did not make the records unidentifiable.491
An agency cannot allege that records are unidentifiable if it in
fact knows what records are sought. If an agency statement specifically refers to a certain class of materials, a request that refers to
the class will sufficiently identify the materials.492 In Bristol-Myers
Co. v. FTC,493 for example, a request for disclosure of the items
referred to in an FTC announcement that a new rule was based on
"extensive staff investigations, . . . accumulated experience and
available studies and reports,'' 494 was held to be adequate. Even if
an agency has not expressly referred to particular supporting documents in the announcement of a rule, there is still a "presumption
that the agency [will] be able to produce [those] documents at least
until the validity of its rule [has] been finally adjudicated in the
courts.''495

3. The Exemptions
Subsection 552(b) of the FOIA contains nine exemptions from the
general disclosure mandates of subsection (a). These exemptions
represent the areas in which Congress has determined that the reasons
for withholding information outweigh the advantages of disclosing
it. 490 Thus, Congress has decided that the general public interest in
disclosure is outweighed by an individual interest in privacy,497 a
business interest in commercial confidentiality,498 and a government
488. 502 F.2d 122 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Nov. 14,
1974) (No. 74-584).
489. 357 F. Supp. 1327, 1328 (E.D. Va. 1973).
490. 502 F.2d at 125.
491. 502 F.2d at 125-26.
492. Cf., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4500 (U.S. April 28,
1975), where the Supreme Court held that if an agency expressly chooses to incorporate by reference a document that would have been protected under exemption five
in what would otherwise be a final opinion, the document must be disclosed unless
it falls within some other exemption.
493. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
494. 424 F.2d at 937.
495. National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 193 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
496. Congress performed a similar balancing in the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a
(Supp. Feb. 1975). For a discussion of that act see text at notes 1966-2214 infra.
497. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(6) (1970).
498. 5 u.s.c. §§ 552{b)(4), (8), (9) (1970).
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interest in efficient operations and national security.499 The exemp•
tion scheme was designed to preclude judicial or agency balancing
of public and private interests in deciding whether an exemption
applies.500 Thus, the issue in FOIA cases is typically only whether
the information requested is covered by an exemption.
The 1974 amendments to the FOIA require that agencies and
courts follow a two-step analysis in determining whether requested
information is exempt. They provide that "any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of those portions which are
exempt ...." 501 The Senate report makes it clear that the language
of this provision was intended to authorize not only the deletion
of whole sections of materials but also the deletion of names or
other identifying characteristics.502 The provision functions as a
codification of present judicial interpretation of the 1967 Act. 003
Pursuant to it, a requested document must first be examined to see
whether it is protected by an exemption. If it is not exempt, the
whole document must be released. If it is exempt, then the courts
and the agencies must determine whether deletion of identifying
details or subsections would eliminate the exemption problem and
allow the remaining material to be released. 004 The agencies are
499. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(b)(l), (7) (Supp. Feb. 1975); 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(2), (5) (1970),
500. It is the purpose of the present bill to ••• establish a general philosophy
of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated
statutory language and to provide a court procedure by which citizens and the
press may obtain information wrongfully withheld. It is important and necessary
that the present void be filled. It is essential that agency personnel, and the
courts as well, be given definitive guidelines in setting information policies.
S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 3 (emphasis added). See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497,
supra note 310, at 6; Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 n.10, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also K. DAVIS, supra note
265, § 3A.29, at 171 (Supp. 1970).
A balancing technique has been applied by the courts in exemption six cases,
however. The language of that exemption, which protects the extraordinarily sensitive
interest of personal privacy, mandates a determination whether there is "a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970) (emphasis added),
Courts that have balanced interests in exemption six cases have recognized that the
exemption "must ••• be viewed as an exception to the general thrust of the Act,"
Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See text at notes '100-44
infra.
501. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
502. S. REP: No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 31-32. The conference committee
adopted the Senate provision. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 13.
503. S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 31-32 (dting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 89, 91 (1973); Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 5'18,
580 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
See, e.g., Tax Analysts &: Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp, 1298, 1308 (D.D.C. 1973),
modified in part, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); cf. Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 384 F. Supp.
755, 763 (D.D.C. 1974) (dictum).
5@. Several exemption four cases have formulated tests for determining when to
delete identifying details. See, e.g., Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109, 113
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (deletions should be made · "if the information in an opinion or
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required to undertake this separation themselves, subject to an in
camera review by a court.505
a. National security information. Exemption one allows agencies
to withhold materials that are "(A) specifically authorized under
criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact
properly classified pursuant to such Executive order."506 This exemption was intended to clarify the pre-FOIA law that allowed agencies
to withhold information "in the public interest."507
Prior to its amendment in 1974, exemption one covered all
matters "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret
in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy.''508 In EPA v.
Mink, the Supreme Court held that the sole issue for judicial review
under the unamended exemption was whether the documents
sought had in fact been classified pursuant to an executive order.509
If an agency met its burden of proof on this purely factual issue,
nondisclosure would be justified. In Mink, this burden was met by
an affidavit of the Under Secretary of State, stating that the documents in question were properly classified.510 The Mink decision
severely limited the scope of judicial revi~w in exemption one cases.
order is independently confidential''); National Cable Television Assn. v. FCC, 479
F.2d 183, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (deletions should be made to protect "only that information which cannot be rendered sufficiently anonymous by deletion of the filing
party's name and other identifying information"); Pacific Architects &: Engrs., Inc. v.
Renegotiation Bd., 505 F.2d 383, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (focusing on "the extent to
which [the possible adverse effects of disclosure] could be reduced or eliminated by
nondisclosure of the identity of the person submitting the information in dispute'').
For a discussion of exemption four see text at notes 611-47 infra. Cf. the exemption
five cases discussed in the text at notes 664-72 infra. ·
505. S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 32. See text at notes 965-88 infra. Even
before the 1974 amendments, a number of courts used in camera review to segregate
exempt from nonexempt materials. See, e.g., National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v.
FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109,
113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Tax Analysts &: Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (D.D.C.
1973), modified in part, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Legal Aid Soc. v. Shultz, 349
F. Supp. 771, 777 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
506. 5 u.s.c.A. § 552(b)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
507. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946). See text at
notes 313-21 supra.
The congressional reports accompanying the 1967 version of the FOIA do not
discuss exemption one in detail. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 9-10;
s. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 8. The ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM,
supra note 309, is also uninformative. See id. at 30.
508. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1970).
509. 410 U.S. 73, 74 (1973).
There was some question whether the language of the exemption required that
there be a "specific" executive order covering each document sought to be withheld,
410 U.S. at 96-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting); but the Court held that one order covering broad categories of information was sufficient for the purposes of the exemption.
410 U.S. at 83. Congress apparently affirmed this interpretation when it amended the
exemption in 1974. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
510. 410 U.S. at 84.
•
.
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Procedural defects in classification could be remedied easily by the
agencies so as to meet the "pursuant to" test, and substantive decisions to classify material could not be challenged.m Furthermore,
Mink explicitly rejected the notion that a court could conduct an
in camera inspection of exemption one materials in order to separate
nonsecret portions of classified records and order their disclosure.'a 2
Thus, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, exemption one "provid[ed] no means to question an Executive decision to stamp a
document 'secret,' however cynical, myopic, or even corrupt that
decision might have been." 513
Congress, dissatisfied with the Mink rule, amended exemption
one in 1974.514 The exemption now covers only agency records that
"are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order."litli
The conference report accompanying the 1974 amendments states
that the proper classification language refers to "both procedural
and substantive criteria contained in such Executive order." 610
Congress also enacted a new section of the FOIA in 1974 that expressly provides for in camera inspection of withheld material at
the discretion of the trial court.517
511. Mink apparently overruled a prior line of cases which had held that a dis•
trict court could determine whether the classification of a document was arbitrary or
capricious. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1079 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1971): Epstein v.
Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970).
In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973), the court suggested that Minh
does not preclude a court from rejecting an arbitrary classification. 478 F.2d at 51.
This exception is not discussed in the Mink opinion, however. For yet another inter•
pretation of the Mink rule see Wolfe v. Froehlke, 358 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (D.D.C.
1973), affd., 510 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (implying that a court may be able to look
beyond a procedurally proper classification if "fraud or subterfuge" is alleged).
512. 410 U.S. at 81. For a discussion of in camera review under the FOIA see the
text at notes 965-88 infra; for a discussion of separating exempt from nonexempt
materials under the FOIA see the text at notes 501-05 supra.
513. 410 U.S. at 95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
514. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 1, 88 Stat, 1561, amending 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(l) (1970) (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b){l) (Supp. Feb. 1975)).
515. The exemption also requires that the records be "authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy ••••" 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b){l) (Supp. Feb. 1975) (emphasis added),
The current executive order, however, mandates secrecy "in the interest of the national defense or foreign relations of the United States (hereinafter collectively termed
'national security')." Exec. Order No. 11652, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974) (emphasis added).
"Foreign relations" may be a broader category than "foreign policy," see H.R. REP.
No. 93-221, supra note 160, at 62-63, and "national security" may encompass matters
unrelated to the national defense or foreign policy-for example, domestic surveillance
of civil rights leaders, antiwar groups, and students. See id. at 85-86, Exemption
under (b)(l) should be justified only if the information in question relates to foreign policy or the national defense, For criticism of the language of Executive Order
No. 11652, see id. at 61·66, 102,
516. CoNFERENCE R.EPoRT, supra note 225, at 12 (emphasis added).
51'/. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2, 88 Stat. 1561, amending 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970) (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975)). See
text at notes 965-88 infra.
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These provisions have expanded the judicial role i11; (b)(l) cases
beyond that envisioned by the dissenting Justices in Mink. The
documents at issue in Mink had been classified pursuant to Executive Order 10501.518 That order provided that "[t]he classification
of a file or group of physically connected documents [should] be at
least as high as that of the most highly classified document therein," 519
and that a single document should bear one classification that was
"at least as high as that of its highest classified component." 520
Justices Brennan521 and Douglas522 would have permitted in camera
inspection of the documents by the district court only to avoid this
system of "classification by association." They argued that the district court should have been able to separate nonsensitive materials
from sensitive materials so as to order the disclosure of the former;
they would not have permitted the court substantively to challenge
classification decisions. The 1974 amendments, however, apparently
permit in camera inspection for the purpose of reviewing the substantive merits of classification decisions. 523 Thus, under these new
provisions, a court can order the disclosure of records judged "sensitive" by agency officials. Moreover, because the FOIA provides
for de novo review of agency decisions to withhold information,524
a district court need not defer to an agency determination to classify
material,525 and the burden will be on the agency to justify the
classification.526
President Ford objected to the de novo review provision, citing
it as one of the reasons for his.veto of the 1974 FOIA amendments. 527
In his veto message, he stated: "I am prepared to accept those aspects
of the provision which would enable courts to inspect classified docu518. 3 C.F.R. 979 (1949-53 Comp.).
519. 3 C.F.R. 980 (1949-53 Comp.).
520. 3 C.F.R. 980 (1949-53 Comp.).
521. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 99-100 (1973).
522. 410 U.S. at 109.
523. When Congress amended the FOIA in 1974, the kind of limited in camera
inspection advocated by the dissenting Justices in Mink was, in effect, no longer
necessary. Executive Order 10501 had been replaced by a new order, providing that
documents "to the extent practicable, be so marked as to indicate which portions are
classified, at what level, and which portions are not classified in order to facilitate
excerpting and other use." Exec. Order 11652 § 4(A), 3 C.F.R. 343 (1974). Thus, under
this new order, agencies themselves must separate nonsensitive from sensitive materials.
524. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at notes 962-64 infra.
525. But see CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 12: "[T]he conferees recognize
that the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy
matters have unique insights into what adverse affects might occur as a result of
public disclosure of a particular classified record. Accordingly, the conferees ·expect
that Federal courts, in making de novo determinations in section 552(b)(l) cases ..•
will accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the
classified status of the disputed record."
526. Id. at 9.
527. Cf. text at notes 330-32 supra.
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ments and review the justification for their classification. However,
the courts should not be forced to make what amounts to the initial
classification decision in sensitive and complex areas where they have
no particular expertise."528 He proposed that the following proviso
be added to (b)(l): "Provided: That for matters described in [section
552(b)(l)] above, a court has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
withholding agency records and to order the production of any
agency records to the complainant unless it finds that there is a
reasonable basis to support the classification pursuant to such Executive order.'' 529 The President thus conceded that there is a role
for judicial review of classification decisions, but sought to shift
the burden of proof. He would have allowed the courts to strike
down only unreasonable and arbitrary classifications.
Although the President's proposal was contained, in substance,
in the original versions of the amending bill,680 and is common in
other areas of administrative law,681 it was rejected by Congress.
The amending bill was passed over the presidental veto.632 Apparently, Senator Muskie prevailed in his argument that a reasonableness standard "would force judges to conduct the proceedings ...
in such a way that the presumption of validity for a classification
marking would be overwhelming."633
The struggle over the (b)(l) exemption in 1974 is symptomatic
of the continuing constitutional struggle between the executive and
Congress for domination in the areas of national defense and foreign
policy. 534 The executive traditionally has had significant freedom in
these areas, and Congress, spurred to action by revelations of executive abuse of authority, is attempting to curtail that freedom.636
Exemption one represents such an effort.
528. 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Docs. 1318 (1974).
529. Letter from President Ford to Representative Carl Albert, Oct. 25, 1974, at
3-5 (proposing amendments to the FOIA) [hereinafter Ford Amendments].
530. H.R. REP. No. 93-876, supra note 329, at 7; S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note
329, at 16. The pertinent part of the proposed Senate bill read:
If there has been filed in the record an affidavit by the head of the agency certifying that he has personally examined the documents withheld and has determined after such examination that they should be withheld under the criteria
established by a statute or Executive order referred to in subsection (b)(l) of this
section, the Court shall sustain such withholding unless, following its in camera
examination, it finds the withholding is without a reasonable basis under such
criteria.
S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § (b)(2) (1974) in S. REP. No. 93-854, supra, at 37. In one
of the few changes made on the floor of the Senate, this provision was stricken from
the final Senate bill. 120 CONG. REc. S9328 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
531. See 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 30.05 (1958).
532. See text at notes 330-32 supra.
533. 120 CONG. REc. S9,319 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
534. For example, it has been proposed that Congress create a statutory classification system. H.R. REP. No. 93-221, supra note 160, at 94-99, 103. See text at notes
215-61 supra.
535. See generally H.R. Doc. No. 90-298, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).

May-June 1975]

Project

1051

b. Personnel rules. Exemption two of the FOIA protects matters
that are "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices
of an agency." 536 The House537 and Senate538 reports accompanying
the Act reveal congressional disagreement as to the scope of .the
exemption; the cases construing it reflect this conflict.
The reports of the hearings on the House bill indicate that the
members of the House Subcommittee on Government Information
intended that the exemption be construed to cover agency operating
rules and manuals of procedure. 539 One witness at those hearings
pointed out to the Subcommittee that the wording of the exemption
would have to be changed to ensure such a construction. 540 The
House, however, did not amend the section; instead, it adopted the
Senate version of the bill.541 The House report states that the exemption applies to "[o]perating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for Government investigators or examiners" 542 but does not
cover matters of internal agency management such as "employee
relations and working conditions and routine administrative
procedures." 543
The Senate's interpretation of exemption two is quite different
from that of the House. The Senate report states that the exemption
"relates only to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency. Examples of these may be rules as to personnel's use of
parking facilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements of policy
as to sick leave, and the like." 544 The Senate, therefore, intended the
exemption to apply to only those routine employer-employee rules
that the House assumed should be disclosed. Conversely, the Senate
assumed that any person would be entitled to access to agency operating rules and manuals of procedure, while the House intended
that those items be exempt.
The Attorney General's Memorandum adopted the House interpretation of the exemption and argued that the Senate's construction
would negate the effectiveness of several agency functions:
An agency cannot bargain effectively for the acquisition of lands
536. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(2) (1970).
537. H.R. REP. No. 89--1497, supra note 310, at IO.
538. S. REP. No. 89--813, supra note 310, at 8.
539. 3 Federal Public Records Law, Hearings on H.R. 5012-21, 5377, 5046, 5520,
5583, 6172, 6739, 7010, and 7161 Before the Subcomm. on Government Information
of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 29-30
(1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings].
540. Id. at 29-30 {testimony of N. Schlei, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, Department of Justice).
541. 113 CoNG. REc. 8109, 14,056 (1967).
542. H.R. REP. No. 89--1497, supra note 310, at IO.
543. Id.
544. S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 8.
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or services or the disposition of surplus facilities if its instructions
to its negotiators and its offers to prospective sellers or buyers are
not kept confidential. Similarly, an agency must keep secret the
circumstances under which it will conduct unannounced inspections
or spot audits of supervised transactions to determine compliance
with regulatory requirements. The moment such operations become
predictable, their usefulness is destroyed. 64°
Courts have been confronted with two principal issues in exemption two cases. The first issue is whether the Senate or the House
interpretation of the exemption should be followed. The second
issue is whether, assuming the Senate approach is taken, those matters alluded to in the Attorney General's Memorandum must be
disclosed.
The majority of cases that have considered this exemption has
adopted the Senate interpretation. Most of these cases, however,
did not involve the kind of information that the House report and
the Attorney General's Memorandum expressly intended to protect
from disclosure. For example, in a suit by a consumer's group to
obtain the results of a hearing aid testing program conducted by the
Veterans Administration,646 the court held that exemption two was
inapplicable since the material sought did not apply to personnel
matters.647 The court acknowledged both the House and Senate
reports as well as the Attorney General's Memorandum, but adopted
the Senate's interpretation on the ground that its report was the
only one considered by both houses of Congress.648 The case, however, did not involve information that, if revealed, would interfere
with the agency's regulatory function.
Similarly, Stokes v. Hodgson 649 dealt with a demand for the
disclosure of training manuals and aids of the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA). The manuals contained discussions of:
. . . the structure of OSHA, the legal framework in which OSHA
operates, the obligations and rights of employers and employees
under OSHA, the specific duties of compliance inspectors and the
best methods for carrying out these duties, the detailed health and
safety standards of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
the proper emphasis to be placed on different types of health and
545. ATl'ORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 31. See generally id.
at 30-31.
546. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admn., 301 F, Supp. 796
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (1971). See Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp.
871 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968), affd,,
415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969).
547. 301 F. Supp. at 801.
548: 301 F. Supp. at 801.
549. 347 F. Supp. 1371 (N.D. Ga. 1972), affd. sub nom. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F,2d
699 (5th Cir. 1973),
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safety violations, and the proper methods to assess penalties for
health and safety violations.55 0
The district court discussed the conflict in the House and Senate
reports and concluded that the Senate's version was more consistent
with the plain meaning of the statute.551 Exemption two was interpreted to exempt only "general intra-agency housekeeping rules and
practices such as those related to work schedules, office assignment,
parking facilities, leaves of absence and the like." 552 In affirming the
decision on appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that the Senate's interpretation of the exemption was the better one.553
The Senate's interpretation of exemption two is consistent with
the stated purpose of the FOIA to provide greater access to information654 and thus has become the interpretation most widely adopted
by the courts. The House report and the Attorney General's Memorandum expressed the fear that such a narrow interpretation of the
exemption would force the disclosure of information that must be
kept secret in order to enforce efficiently agency regulations. This
fear, however, can be dispelled by judicial construction of the
exemption.
A distinction has been drawn between administrative staff manuals, which must be released, and law enforcement manuals, which
need not be released,555 in court decisions interpreting section
552(a)(2)(C) of the Act.556 This distinction could be applied in
exemption two cases. The issues whether a document is covered by
(a)(2)(C) and whether it is protected by exemption two have generally arisen in the same cases,557 and at least one court has applied
exemption twn to protect law enforcement manuals. In Cuneo v.
Laird,558 the court held that a Defense Contract Audit Agency manual containing instructions to the auditor concerning the items to
be audited, the thoroughness of the audit, and the frequency of the
550. 347 F. Supp. at 1373.
551. 347 F. Supp. at 1374.
552. 347 F. Supp. at 1373.
553. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1973).
554. See text at notes 308-12 supra
555. See text at notes 418-27 supra.
556. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (1970) provides: "Each agency, in accordance with
published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying ••• administrative staff manuals ••• that affect a member of the public .•••"
557. See, e.g., Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972); Polymers v. NLRB, 414
F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1010 (1970); Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F.
Supp. 1371 (N.D. Ga. 1972), afjd. sub nom. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir.
1973); Tietze v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 610 (S.D. Tex. 1972); City of Concord v.
Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
558. 338 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1972), remanded sub nom. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484
F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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audit was exempt under (b)(2).559 The court felt that forcing disclosure of this information would allow a contractor to claim unallowable costs in areas not likely to be audited, and otherwise to
frustrate the purpose of the audit. 660 Its decision to protect the
material from disclosure was based on its conclusion, as a matter of
law, that the manual fell within the (b)(2) exemption. On appeal,661
the plaintiff dropped his request for those portions of the manual
denied disclosure by the district court, and the government conceded that if the manual contained administrative material,662 that
material would have to be disclosed.563 Thus, neither the (b)(2) exemption nor the administrative /law enforcement dichotomy was discussed.564
One problem in applying the administrative/law enforcement
distinction to exemption two is that, on its face, the law enforcement manual exception applies only to (a)(2)(C) requirements for
public inspection. It is not clear if it applies to the publication and
disclosure requirements of (a)(l) or (a)(3). Some courts have read
the law enforcement manual exception into these other subsections,665 but the literal language of the FOIA makes such an implication difficult to justify. The optimal solution to this problem
would be to move the law enforcement manual exception into subsection (b), thereby making it applicable to all of the disclosure
requirements of subsection (a).566
If the Senate's narrow interpretation of exemption two is generally adopted, and if subsection (a)(2) of the Act is interpreted to
cover law enforcement manuals, there may be no need for exemption
two. It could be argued in support of retaining (b)(2) that, since
the information it exempts is not of interest to the public because
it relates only to matters of concern between agencies and their
employees,561 agencies should not have to be harassed by requests
559. 338 F. Supp. at 506.
560. 338 F. Supp. at 506.
561. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
562. See Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 795 (6th Cir. 1972); quoted in note 418 supra.
563. 484 F.2d at 1089-90.
564. The case was remanded for a determination of which sections of the manual
would have to be disclosed. 484 F.2d at 1092.
565. See, e.g., United States v. Imbrunone, 379 F. Supp. 256, 261 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
566. Such an exception could contain limitations similar to those included in the
recent amendment to exemption seven, the investigatory records exemption. See text
at note 745 infra.
567. But cf. Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3445 (Feb. 18, 1975) (No. 74-489), where the plaintiffs sought
disclosure of certain Air Force Academy disciplinary files. The circuit court found that
"case summaries of Honor and Ethics Code adjudications clearly fall outside [exemption
two's] ambit. Such summaries have a substantial potential for public interest outside
the Government." 495 F.2d at 265.
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for insignificant information. On the other hand, there will probably
be few requests for (b)(2) information if (b)(2) is interpreted narrowly, and the disclosure of such information when requested will
not interfere with agency functions. Mere administrative convenience is not an important enough interest to outweigh the value of
public access to information. The elimination of the (b)(2) exemption
would thus further the basic policy behind the FOIA without sacrificing any substantial governmental interest.
c. Other statutes. Exemption three applies to matters that are
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute."568 Neither the
House report nor the Senate report comments extensively on this
section. The Senate report merely restates the section,569 while the
House report adds that "[t]here are nearly 100 statutes or parts of
statutes which restrict public access to specific Government records.
These would not be modified by the public records provision of
[the FOIA]."570 The Attorney General's Memorandum expands on
the brief statement in the House Report:
The reference to "nearly 100 statutes" apparently was inserted in the
House report in reliance upon a survey conducted by the Administrative Conference of the United States in 1962. This survey concluded that there were somewhat less than 100 statutory provisions
which specifically exempt from disclosure, prohibit disclosure except
as authorized by law, provide for disclosure only as authorized by
law, or othenvise protect from disclosure. The reference therefore
indicates an intention to preserve whatever protection is afforded
under other statutes, whatever their terms.5 71
The Memorandum then lists a number of statutes that, in the
Attorney General's opinion, will protect certain matters from disclosure.572
568. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
569. S. REP. No. 89--813, supra note 310, at 9.
570. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 10.
571. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 31-32. Many courts
have refused to accept the Attorney General's interpretation of exemption three.
See, e.g., Cutler v. CAB, 375 F. Supp. 722, 723 n.1 (D.D.C. 1974): "The Attorney General's Memorandum ••• indicated that Congress had been relying upon a 1962 survey
by the Administrative Conference of the United States, but the Conference has since
announced that no such survey was ever conducted. Memorandum to Staff Attorneys
by John V. Cushman, Executive Director, Administrative Conference of the United
States, March 15, 1974." But see FAA v. Robertson, 43 U.SL.W. 4833, 4837 (U.S. June
24, 1975) (citing the quoted portion of the Memorandum).
572. Id. at 32. The statutes listed are 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970), see text at notes
573-80 infra; 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1970), see text at notes 585-89 and note 585 infra; 42
U.S.C. § 2000~ (1970), which prescribes criminal penalties for disclosure of any
information received by the EEOC pursuant to its authority under this section of the
code; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161-66 (1970), controlling atomic energy information; 43 U.S.C.
§ 1398 (1970), providing that information received "on a confidential basis" from
witnesses before the Public Land Law Review Commission shall not be made public; 44
U.S.C. § 397 (1965), as amended, 44 U.S.C. § 2101-10 (1970), providing that the National
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The greatest problem that courts have faced in exemption three
cases has been how to interpret the word "specifically.'' Does it
require that a statute identify with particularity every document
that is exempt, or is it enough that the statute empowers an agency
head to determine what documents shall be withheld?
The Attorney General's Memorandum cited 18 U.S.C. § 1905
as one statute that would exempt documents pursuant to (b)(3).073
Section 1905 provides a fine or imprisonment for any employee of
the United States government who "publishes, divulges, discloses
or mal<.es known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by
law any information coming to him in the course of his employment . . . ." 574 A significant number of cases, however, have concluded (sometimes in dicta) that section 1905 does not specifically
exempt any information, and hence does not protect material from
disclosure under exemption three. 57 For example, one court found
that "unlike other statutes which specifically define the range of
disclosable information ... section 1905 merely creates a criminal
sanction for the release of 'confidential information.' Since this type
of information is already protected from disclosure under the Act
by exemption four, section 1905 should not be read to expand this
exemption, especially because the Act requires that the exemptions
be narrowly construed." 576 Similarly, in twu cases involving requests
for disclosure of SEC documents, the courts rejected SEC attempts
to use the (b)(3) exemption and 18 U.S.C. § 1905. In M.A. Shapiro &
Co., Inc. v. SEC,511 the court stated that exemption three did not
relate "to a statute that generally prohibits all disclosures of confi-

°

Archivist shall restrict access to materials held by him to the same extent that access
was restricted by law while the material was in the hands of an agency; and 50 U.S.C.
§ 403g (1970), which exempts from disclosure documents relating to the CIA's "or•
ganization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed
by the Agency."
573. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 32.
574. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970). For the full text of this statute see note 1082 infra.
575. See, e.g., Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, Civil No. 73--1930, slip op.
at 8 (D.C. Cir. March 10, 1975); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769,
776 (D.D.C. 1974); Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321, 1323-24 (D.D.C. 1973), revd. on
other grounds sub nom. Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1974); Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
v. Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp. 796, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436
F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
576. Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580 n,5
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (Grumman I), on remand 325 F. Supp. 1146 (D.D.C. 1971), affd., 482
F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Grumman II), revd., 43 U.S.L.W. 4502 (U.S. April 28, 1975).
Only Grumman I dealt with the exemption three issue. See Robertson v. Butterfield,
498 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1974), revd. sub nom. FAA v. Robertson, 43 U.S.L.W. 4833
(U.S. June 24, 1975), where the court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 1905 "does not fall within
the ambit of Exemption (3)." 498 F.2d 1033 n.6.
577. 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).
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dential information,'' 578 and in Frankel v. SEC,579 the court pointed
out that permitting material to be exempted by (b)(3) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905 begged the initial question of the confidentiality of the
material.680
One other statute that has been held not to satisfy the (b)(3)
exemption is 38 U.S.C. § 216(a), which directs the Veterans Administration to conduct research in the field of "prosthesis, prosthetic
appliances, orthopedic appliances and sensory devices." 581 In an
action to compel the VA to disclose the results of its hearing aid
testing program,682 the VA relied, in part, on exemption three and
section 216(a)(2). The latter section provides: "In order that the
unique investigative materials and research data in the possession
of the Government may result in improved prosthetic appliances
for all disabled persons, the Administrator may make available to
any person the results of his research.'' 583 The court in this case
summarily rejected the VA's argument, holding that the statute did
not "specifically" exempt the materials sought.584 Indeed, this statute
authorizes the disclosure of information.
Several statutes that mandate against the disclosure of narrowly
defined materials have been held to protect those materials from
disclosure under exemption three. For example, federal income tax
returns, and the information contained in those returns, are protected by statute from disclosure to the public.585 In Tax Analysts
and Advocates v. IRS, 586 the court held that technical advice memoranda, which are "prepared in response to an inquiry by a District
Director as to the treatment of a specific set of facts relating to a
tax return filed by a named taxpayer involving either an audit or
578. 339 F. Supp. at 470.
579. 336 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), revd. on other grounds, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
580. 336 F. Supp. at 678-79.
581. 38 U.S.C. § 216(a)(l) (1970).
582. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp. 796
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
583. 38 U.S.C. § 216(a)(2) (1970).
584. 301 F. Supp. at 802.
585. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 6103(a) provides: "Returns made with respect to
taxes • • • shall constitute public records; but, except as hereinafter provided in this
section, they shall be open to inspection only upon order of the President and under
rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate and approved by the
President." Additionally, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7213(a)(l) states in part: "It shall
be unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States • • • to make known
in any manner whatever not provided by law to any person the amount or source of
income, profits, losses, expenditures, or any particular thereof, set forth or disclosed
in any income return, or to permit any income return or copy thereof ••• to be seen
or examined by any person except as provided by law • • • ."
586. 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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in connection with the taxpayer's claim for refund or credit of
taxes,'' 687 were exempt from disclosure under (b)(3).088 The court
implicitly accepted the fact that the statutes concerned satisfied the
specificity requirement of (b)(3) and focused instead on whether the
information sought fell within the scope of those statutes.r;so
Another narrowly drawn statute that has been held to protect
information under exemption three is 35 U.S.C. § 122, providing
for the confidentiality of patent applications.u0° In Misegades &
Douglas v. Schuyler, 691 the court interpreted the term "patent application" in section 122 to include a form used by the Patent Office
for processing patents, and held that such forms were protected
from disclosure under exemption three. In a later case, Sears v.
Gottschalk,592 the court interpreted section 122 to include abandoned
patent applications and denied disclosure on the basis of exemption
three.
Courts have reached conflicting results with respect to other
statutes that purport to protect information from disclosure. For
example, 42 U.S.C. § 1306693 exempts from dislosure any materials
"obtained at any time by the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, or the Secretary of Labor ... in the course of discharging
their respective duties under this chapter."694 In a suit by the California Attorney General to compel disclosure of HEW reports concerning the performance of nursing homes receiving federal aid,606
the court held that when a statute such as 42 U.S.C. § 1306 allows an
agency head to determine by regulations whether certain information should be available, exemption three will prevent the disclosure of such information: "It appears to us that when Congress
used the word 'specifically' it was requiring no more than that the
exemption be found in the words of the statute rather than the
implication of it .... We think the words of Section 1306 . . . are
587. 505 F.2d at 355.
588. 505 F.2d at 355. The court also held that certain letter rulings were not
encompassed by either section 6103 or section 7213 and so should be disclosed. 505
F.2d at 354-55. See Note, 8 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 329, supra note 333, at 334-36, 341,
589. The Sixth Circuit recently took the same approach in Fruehauf Corp. v. IRS,
43 U.SL.W. 2530 Oune 9, 1975), as did the district court in B &: C Tire Co., Inc. v.
IRS, 376 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
590. This statute provides: "Applications for patents shall be kept in confidence
by the Patent Office and no information concerning the same given without authority
of the applicant or owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of any Act of
Congress or in such special circumstances as may be determined by the Commissioner."
591. 328 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Va. 1971), appeal dismissed, 456 F.2d 255 (4tl1 Cir. 1972).
592. 357 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Va. 1973), afjd., 502 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1974), petition
for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1974) (No. 74-584).
593. 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
594. 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1970).
595. California v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1974).
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words allowing the Secretary to relax the absolute prohibition
established by Congress." 596
Several other courts, however, have rejected agency arguments
based on exemption three and section 1306. In a case concerning
the same reports as those sought by the state of Califomia,597 the
Third Circuit ordered disclosure. The court stated: "We agree, as
did the district court, that the exempting statute must prescribe
som~ basis upon which the Secretary is to decide. Otherwise, there
would be no escape from the unacceptable conclusion that the
word 'specifically' as used in section 552(b)(3), is surplusage." 598 In
Schechter v. Weinberger, 599 in which the plaintiff sought disclosure
of certain Medicare reports, the court also rejected an agency argument based on exemption three and section 1306, stating that "[r]ead
as a whole, section 1306 vests complete, uncharted discretion with
respect to disclosure in the Secretary rather than being a specific
exemption by statute." 600 The above cases demonstrate that courts
generally have construed exemption three so as to effectuate the
FOIA's policy of providing greater public access to government
information.601 Thus, they have attempted to distinguish between
statutes that specifically define materials to be withheld and statutes
that only broadly mandate withholding. In its recent decision in
FAA v. Robertson,602 however, the Supreme Court has indicated
that this approach to exemption three is incorrect.
The plaintiffs in Robertson brought suit under the FOIA to
compel the disclosure of reports compiled by the FAA concerning
the operating performance of commercial airlines. The FAA refused
to tum over the reports, claiming that the documents were protected by 49 U.S.C. § 1504, which permits any person to object to
the public disclosure of information contained in "any application,
report, or document filed pursuant to ~e provisions of [the Civil
596. 505 F.2d at 768. This opinion affirmed California v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp.
733 (N.D. Cal. 1972), where the court stated, "Certainly § 1306 does not itself single
out for nondisclosure any specified documents, as does, for examp1e, 26 U.S.C. § 6103.
But § 1306 is considerably more specific than 18 U.S.C. § 1905, which only forbids
the disclosure of certain information when disclosure is not othenvise authorized by
law." 351 F. Supp. at 735. See K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.18, at 146 (Supp. 1970).
597. Stretch v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1974).
598. 495 F.2d at 640.
599. 506 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
600. 506 F.2d at 1277. See Dellums v. HEW, Civil No. 181-72 (D.D.C., July 11,
1973) quoted in Schechter v. Weinberger, 506 F.2d at 1277: "[Section 1306] does not
specifically exempt the documents sought from disclosure, but rather is a blanket
exclusion on disclosure of all files, records and reports compiled under the Social
Security Act. That blanket exemption is in direct contravention of the liberal disclosure requirement of the Freedom of Information Act, and cannot qualify as a
specific exemption within the meaning of the Act."
601. See text at notes 308-12 supra.
602. 43 U.S.L.W. 4833 (U.S. June 24, 1975).
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Aeronautics Act] or of information obtained by the [Civil Aeronautics] Board or the Administrator [of the FAA] pursuant to the
provisions of [the Act]" and provides that upon receipt of such an
objection, the Board or the Administrator can withhold the information when "in their judgment, the disclosure of such information
would adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest of the public." The district court held that
the plaintiffs were entitled to the reports "as a matter of la;w"003
and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed that part of
the lower court's order relating to exemption three, 004 after concluding that "the public interest standard of [49 U.S.C. § 1504] is
not a specific exemption by statute within the meaning of Exemption (3) ...." 605 The Supreme Court reversed. 000 Stating that "the
relevant portions of . • . exemption [three] are unclear and
ambiguous," 607 the Court went on to find evidence in the legislative
history of the exemption indicating that 15 U.S.C. § 1504 is properly
·within its scope.008 Although the Court could have stopped there,000
it did not. In an apparent attempt to guide the lower courts in
interpreting exemption three, the Court implied that it would be
incorrect to distinguish between specific and nonspecific statutes
for the purpose of the exemption:
The respondents can prevail only if the [FOIA] is to be read as
repealing by implication all existing statutes "which restrict public
access to specific public records." [H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. IO (1966)]. The term "specific" as there used cannot
603. 43 U.S.L.W. 4835 (quoting from the unreported district court opinion).
604. Robertson v. Butterfield, 498 F.2d 1031, 1036 (1974). The circuit court remanded
the case for consideration whether exemption seven applied to the reports in question.
605. 498 F.2d at 1036. Accord, Cutler v. CAB, 375 F. Supp. 722, 724 (D.D.C, 1974).
Contra, Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 918 (1972).
606. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4837.
607. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4836.
608. The legislative history revealed that "when the Civil Aeronautics Board
brought [15 U.S.C. § 1504] to the attention of both the House and Senate Hearings
of 1965, and expressed the agency interpretation that the provision was encompassed
within Exemption 3, no question was raised or challenge made to the agency view of
the impact of that exemption." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4836-37 (footnote omitted).
609. The Court in Robertson could have distinguished 49 U.S.C. § 1504 from other
statutes allowing the withholding of information either by focusing solely on the
fact that the statute was brought to the attention of the legislature during the hearings
on exemption three, see note 608 supra, or by finding that the statute's provision of a
standard for withholding information, see text following note 602 supra, sufficiently
restricted agency discretion so as to render 49 U.S.C. § 1504 "specific" within the mean•
ing of the exemption. See Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972). The Court did not so distinguish this statute,
however. In fact the Court characterized the discretion granted to the FAA under 49
U.S.C. § 1504 as "broad" in "both nature and scope." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4837.
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be read as meaning that [exemption three] applies only to documents
specified, i.e., by naming them precisely or by describing the category
in which they fall. To require this interpretation would be to ask
of Congress a virtually impossible task. Such a construction would
also imply that Congress had undertaken to reassess every delegation
of authority to withhold information which it had made before the
passage of [the FOIA]-a task which the legislative history shows it
clearly did not undertake. 610

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Robertson, one could
have said with assurance that nonspecific statutes, such as those exempting from disclosure all information received by an agency, or
those granting an agency uncontrolled discretion to withhold information, would not be found to fall within the scope of exemption
three. The Robertson opinion appears to shift the judicial inquiry
in exemption three cases from the question whether a statute is
specific to the narrower question whether a statute in fact mandates
the withholding of information. To the extent that this shift frustrates the full disclosure policy of the FOIA, it is unfortunate.
d. Trade secrets. Section 552(b)(4) of the FOIA exempts "trade
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential." 611 The language of this
exemption provides little guidance for determining its scope.612 The
legislative history of the exemption indicates that its basic purpose
is to protect business confidentiality.613 Although its language and
610. 43 U.SL.W. at 4837. An even stronger statement to this effect was made by
the concurring Justices in Robertson: "As matters now stand, when an agency asserts
a right to withhold information based on a specific statute of the kind described in
Exemption 3, 'the only question to be determined in a district court's de novo inquiry
is the factual existence of such a statute, regardless of how unwise, self-protective, or
inadvertent the enactment might be.' Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 95 n.[•] (concurring opinion).'' 43 U.SL.W. at 4838 (footnote omitted).
611. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
612. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 32. See also Note, Public
Disclosure of Confidential Business Information Under the Freedom of Information
Act: Toward a More Objective Standard, 60 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 109, 112-13 (1974); 88
HARV. L. R.Ev. 470, 472-73 (1974). Compare K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.19, at 146
(Supp. 1970).
613. See S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9:
This exception is necessary to protect the confidentiality of information which
is obtained by the Government through questionnaires or other inquiries, but
which would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom
it was obtained. This would include business sales statistics, inventories, customer
lists, and manufacturing processes. It would also include information customarily
subject to the doctor-patient, lawyer-client, lender-borrower, and other such privileges. Specifically it would include any commercial, technical, and financial data,
submitted by an applicant or a borrower to a lending agency in connection with
any loan application or loan,
See also H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 10:
This exemption would assure the confidentiality of information obtained by
the Government through questionnaires or through material submitted and disclosures made in procedures such as the mediation of labor-management controversies. It exempts such material if it would not customarily be made public by
the person from whom it was obtained by the Government. The exemption would

1062

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 73:971

legislative history would permit exemption four to apply to a wide
range of information,614 the courts have generally limited its application.616
The awkward language of the exemption has made it difficult
for courts to determine the general categories of information that
the exemption covers.616 For example, there was an initial controversy over whether noncommercial information was protected from
disclosure by exemption four. 617 Now, however, courts generally
include business sales statistics, inventories, customer lists, scientific or manufactur•
ing processes or developments, and negotiation positions or requirements in the
case of labor-management mediations. It would include information customarily
subject to the doctor-patient, lawyer-client, or lender-bonower privileges such as
technical or financial data submitted by an applicant to a Government lending or
loan guarantee agency. It would also include information which is given to an
agency in confidence, since a citizen must be able to confide in his Government,
Moreover, where the Government has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose
documents or information which it receives, it should be able to honor such obligations.
Concern about the harmful effects that disclosure of some types of business information
could have upon the competitive position of a supplier was expressed in the hearings
on the FOIA. For example, a company applying for a Small Business Administration
loan would not want its possibly shaky financial position revealed. Hearings on S, 1666
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm,
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 101-02 (1963) (remarks of Senator Burdick)
[hereinafter 196!} Senate Hearings].
614. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp, 796,
801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). See H.R. REP. No,
89-1497, supra note 310, at IO.
615. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (limiting the cxemp•
tion to commercial information); National Parks &: Conservation Assn, v. Morton, 498
F.2d 765, 768-70 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (limiting "confidential" to information whose dis•
closure would adversely affect competitive position or government acquisition of in•
formation); text at notes 616-18, 635-38 infra; H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note ll27,
~~

.

616. See, e.g., Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D,P.R.
1967), where the court found that exemption four "deals with documents, given by
persons to government agencies, which are of a privileged or confidential nature," and
held that NLRB investigatory records were protected from disclosure by the exemption,
The court" did not even consider whether these records were commercial or financial,
but exempted them simply because they were of a "confidential nature."
In pointing out the procedural and structural defects of this exemption, the At•
torney General listed several possible interpretations: "The exemption can be read,
for example, as covering three kinds of matters: i.e., 'matters that are [a] trade secrets
and [b] commercial or financial information obtained from any person and [c] privileged or confidential.' ••• Alternatively, clause [c] can be read as modifying clause (b].
Or, from a strictly grammatical standpoint, it could be argued that all three clauses
have to be satisfied for the exemption to apply.'' ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM,
supra note 309, at 32. See also K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.19, at 146 (Supp. 1970).
617. The Attorney General concluded that because "Congress neither intended to
exempt all commercial and financial information on the one hand, nor to require
disclosure of all other privileged or confidential information on the other," ATIORNEY
GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 34, the exemption's protection should
extend to all "information given in confidence.'' Id. at 32. The examples of protected
information provided in the legislative reports support the Attorney General's interpretation. "[The exemption] would include business sales statistics, inventories, customer
lists, and manufacturing processes. It would also include information customarily sub-
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accept the following interpretation of the exemption: "[T]his section
exempts only (1) trade secrets and (2) information which is (a)
commercial or financial, (b) obtained from a person, and (c) privileged or confidential. The exemption given by Congress does not
apply to information which does not satisfy the three requirements
stated in the statute." 618
·
The first category of information protected by exemption four,
trade secrets, has been the least controversial. The courts and the
agencies were familiar with this category of confidential information619 and, therefore, general agreement on the meaning and application of the term was easily reached. 620
ject to doctor-patient, lawyer-client, lender-borrower, and other such privileges."
S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9. The House Report uses identical language.
H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at IO. However, these reports are not determinative of this issue because they do not reflect the addition of the words "commercial
or financial" to the language of the original bill. See Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp. 796, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed,
436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
618. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971), quoting Consumers Union
of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Application of this test has resulted in protecting several items. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc.
v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698,709 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (documents submitted to the FTC concerning
a proposed merger); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, Civil No. 118-74-A (E.D.
Va. April 2, 1974) (affirmative action reports filed by employer); Sears v. Gottschalk,
357 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd., 502 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1974), petition for
cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1974) (No. 74-584) (patent applications). But
see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1974), which
found that such affirmative action reports were not protected by exemption four because they did not meet the "confidential" test.
Under this test, other items have been held not to fall within the scope of the exemption. See, e.g., Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 244-45
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3601 (U.S. May 12, 1975) (scientific "research
designs" submitted as part of grant application not covered because not commercial
or confidential); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (lists of names
and addresses not covered because not financial or commercial, and probably not confidential); Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(statements by government witnesses in investigation of an airplane crash not covered
because not commercial or financial); Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 370 F.
Supp. 738, 741 (N.D. Iowa 1974) (statements by government witnesses in the investigation of an airplane crash not covered because not obtained from a person, since witnesses were government officials); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 471
(D.D.C. 1972) (information collected by the SEC on off-board trading not covered because not confidential); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admn., 381
F. Supp. 796, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (results of hearing aid tests conducted at VA hospitals
not covered because not obtained from a person).
619. The standard legal definition of "trade secret" accepted in FOIA cases is "an
unpatented, secret, commercially valuable plan, appliance, formula, or process, which
is used for the making, preparing, compounding, treating, or processing of articles or
materials which are trade commodities." United States ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen
Prods. Co. v. United States Tariff Commn., 6 F.2d 491, 495 (C.A.D.C. 1925), revd. on
other grounds, 274 U.S. 106 (1927). See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d
1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
620. See, e.g., Sears v. Gottschalk, 357 F. Supp. 1327, 1329 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd.,
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The scope of the second category of information protected by
the exemption, information that is "commercial or financial,'' "obtained from a person," and "privileged or confidential," has proved
to be more difficult to define.
The phrase "obtained from a person" has generally been interpreted to mean that the information in question must have come
from a source outside the govemment.621 Thus, information generated within an agency must be disclosed regardless of its confidential or commercial nature622 and regardless of whether it -was
subsequently transferred to a second agency. 628 This rule could
operate harshly on a person who is the subject of agency-generated
information. Thus, it has been suggested that the exemption be
amended to allow the courts more flexibility in this area. 624
Financial or commercial information that has been obtained
from a person must also be "privileged or confidential" to fall
within the scope of exemption four. The legislative history indicates
that "privileged" refers to the traditional common-law privileges.62 ii
If this is all that "privileged" was intended to mean, however, its
inclusion in the exemption appears to have been unnecessary. Infor502 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.SL.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec. 12,
1974) (No. 74-584).
621. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp. 796,
803 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971); Grumman Aircraft
Engr. Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Grumman I), Cf. GSA
v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969). This interpretation is consistent with the
APA's definition of "person": "'Person' includes an individual, partnership, corpora•
tion, association, or public or private organization other than an agency." 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(2) (1970). See text at notes 459-60 supra.
The original bill used the language "obtained from the public" rather than "obtained from a person." S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 1-2. Consumers Union
of the United States v. Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), suggested
that this change was not intended to include agency personnel. But cf. ATIORNEY GEN•
ERAL's MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 34.
622. Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171, 1174 (D.D.C. 1973) (boarddeveloped unilateral orders determining excess profits not exempt); Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738, 741 (N.D. Iowa 1974) (statements by agency
officials who were witnesses to an airplane crash not e.xempt). Cf. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp. 796, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1969) (data from hearing aid tests were not exempt
because they were generated by the agency and were not confidential).
623. A corollary to this rule would be that if an agency receives information from
sources outside the government, that information should be found to meet the "obtained from a person" requirement regardless of future transfers between agencies.
Cf. Note, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 895, supra note 333, at 952.
624. See id. at 953.
625. s. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 89-149'1, supra note
310, at 10; cf. K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.20, at 153-55 (Supp. 1970). Executive·
privilege may also be included under this language. See text at notes 262-807 supra.
Any material covered by executive privilege presumably would also be protected by
exemption one (national security), see text at notes 506-35 supra, or by exemption three
(other statutes). See text at notes 568-610 supra.
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mation traditionally protected by the doctor-patient privilege, for
example, will not be commercial or :financial in nature and hence
will not be covered by exemption four. Furthermore, this information is protected under exemption six, which provides for the
withholding of medical files. 626 Information protected by the other
privileges, such as the lawyer-client privilege627 or the lenderborrower privilege, would be exempted from disclosure under (b)(4)
anyway because of its "confidential" nature. Not surprisingly, the
meaning of "privileged" has not been litigated in the courts.628
In contrast, the meaning of the term "confidential" has been
extensively litigated. Courts originally found material confidential
if it was of the type " 'which would customarily not be released
to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.' " 629 This
test, based on language in the Senate and House reports,630 had two
major defects. First, it allowed for a subjective determination of
confidentiality. At least one court suggested that the test could be
met if the supplier of information claimed that it was confidential.631
Applying a subjective test, however, would be contrary to both the
legislative history of exemption four 632 and the full disclosure policy
of the FOIA.633 Second, the test did not allow courts to consider
626. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970). See text at notes 700-44 infra.
627. See generally K.. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.20, at 154 (Supp. 1970). Davis
points out that "the government through its lawyers seldom serves private clients," id.,
and seems to assume that the privilege can only apply to private client contact.
628. See, e.g., GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969) (appraisal reports
which might conceivably be "privileged" were only evaluated as confidential).
629. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971), quoting S. REP.
No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9. See, e.g., Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109,
113 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Tax Analysts &: Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1307
(D.D.C. 1973), modified in part, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); M.A. Schapiro &: Co. v.
SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 471 (D.D.C. 1973); cf. GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881-82 (9th
Cir. 1969).
630. See S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note
310, at IO.
631. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 701, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Cf.
Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash. 1968), affd., 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th
Cir. 1969); ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 34. See generally
Note, supra note 612, at 113-22.
Most courts, however, agree that the test was "objective." See, e.g., National Parks
&: Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1974); M.A. Schapiro &: Co.
v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 471 (D.D.C. 1971).
632. The Senate report refers to material "which wonld customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained." S. REP. No. 89-813,
supra note 310, at 9 (emphasis added). The House report contains similar language.
See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at IO. This language seems to indicate a
more general test than whether a particular supplier objects to a particular release
of information.
633. To further the Act's purpose of broad disclosure, "a bare claim of confidentiality" should not be sufficient. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). Cf. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d
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the substance of disputed information to determine if its release
would be contrary to the purpose of the exemption. Unless the disclosure of certain information would violate one of the interests
that exemption four seeks to protect, the information should not be
found to fall within the scope of the exemption. 684
·
Because it was dissatisfied with the above test, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in National Parks & Conservation
Association v. Morton, 685 established a new standard for defining
"confidential" based on an analysis of the legislative purpose underlying the exemption. The court concluded that the exemption was
created to protect the efficient operation of government686 and the
interests of the people supplying information to the government031
and formulated the following test: "Commercial or financial matter
is 'confidential' for purposes of [exemption four] if disclosure of
the information is likely to have either of the following effects:
(1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was
obtained." 638 Although, by incorporating the purposes of exemption
four, this new test for confidentiality remedies one of the problems
1363 (2d Cir. 1971), where the court expressed fears that an agency would be able to
render nonconfidential information exempt by transferring it to an agency that prom•
ised to keep it confidential. Although there is language in the House report to support
the contention that such a promise is enough to find information confidential, see H.R,
REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 10, courts have rejected this argument because
"[t]o allow a promise of confidentiality to control would enable the agency to render
meaningless the statutory scheme." Tax Analys~ &: Advocates v, IRS, ll62 F, Supp.
1298, 1307 (D.D.C. 1973), modified in part, 505 F.2d ll50 (D.C. Cir, 19'14). See Petkas v.
Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1339-40 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Sears, Roebuck &: Co. v. GSA, ll84 F. Supp. 996, 1003-04 (D.D.C. 1974); Legal
Aid Soc. v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771, 7'16 (N.D. Cal. 19'12); K. DAVIS, supra note 265,
§ 3A.22, at 164 (Supp. 1970); Comment, supra note 333, at 266. Cf, Robles v. EPA, 484
F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying a similar rule to exemption six cases). But sec
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp. 796, 803
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
634. But see text at notes 496-500 supra.
635. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For general discussions of this ca~e sec 88
HARv. L. REv. 470 (1974); Note, 1975 DUKE L.J. 416, supra note 333, at 422•44,
636. 498 F.2d at 767. Other governmental interests are also served by exemption
four, For example, the exemption encourages people to give certain kinds of information to the government and thus enables the government to make informed decisions.
National Parks &: Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 76'1 (D.C. Cir. 19'14);
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 19'11). It also furthers the government's
interest in obtaining the best work possible from governmental contractors. If data
from government contracts were routinely disclosed to the public, fewer companies
might be willing to do government work, preferring to avoid exposure of their trade
secrets and competitive positions. Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171, 1175
(D.D.C. 1973).
637. 498 F.2d at 767.
638. 498 F.2d at 770.
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of the old test,639 it leaves the other problem unsolved: subjective
factors may still be used to determine ,vhether a particular piece
of information is confidential.
Information will be found to be confidential under the first
alternative of the National Parks test if the government can show
that disclosing the information would hinder its ability to obtain
information necessary for its efficient operation.640 The courts have
held that the government cannot make such a showing, and hence
the first alternative cannot be satisfied, if there is a law requiring
persons to relinquish the information in question to the government,641 or if the government has at some point agreed to disclose
the information.642
Subjective factors could enter into the determination of confidentiality under this first alternative in either of two ways. First,
an information supplier's request for confidentiality may be viewed
by the courts as evidence of an unwillingness to give information
to the government without the assurance of confidentiality. Therefore, such requests may be used to find that the government's ability
to obtain data will be impaired if the information in question is
disclosed. Second, it is possible that agencies will be able to make
an "impairment" showing, and thus satisfy this first alternative,
by meeting the old test for confidentiality.643 The fact that information "would customarily not be released to the public" may be
viewed as evidence that a person would be unwilling to give the
information to the government if it would not be kept confidential.
Thus, to the extent that subjective factors enter into the determination of what information "would customarily not be released," 644
they would also enter into the determination whether the government's ability to obtain information will be impaired.
639. See text at note 634 supra.
640. National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir.
1974): "Unless persons having necessary information can be assured that it will remain
confidential, they may decline to cooperate with officials and the ability of the Government to make intelligent, well informed decisions will be impaired."
641. See National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 771 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 776-77 (D.D.C. 1974);
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
642. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1005 (D.D.C. 1974); Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
_
643. The court in National Parks indicated that, while meeting the olq confidentiality test might not be sufficient to exempt information under exemption four,
National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
the old test might still be used in conjunction with the new test. 498 F.2d at 767.
Later cases have also taken this position. See Pacific Architects & Engrs., Inc. v. Renegotiation Bd., 505 F.2d 383, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887,
889 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d
73, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Shultz, 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974).
644. See text at note 629 supra.
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In order to avoid the potential use of a subjective standard to
determine whether information can be withheld under exemption
four, it is suggested that courts not consider the government's interest in obtaining information in exemption four cases. If Congress
determines that the government needs certain data, it can enact
specific legislation requiring people to relinquish that information
to the government, thus ensuring that the government's access to
information will not be impaired if the material is disclosed to the
public.645 If Congress does not deem information sufficiently necessary to the efficient operation of the government to warrant such a
statute, then there is little reason for courts to be concerned if the
government's ability to obtain this information is impaired. Because
Congress is probably best able to determine the needs of government
agencies and because Congress can easily protect those needs, it
seems that the courts will better achieve the goals of the FOIA and
exemption four by ignoring this interest and focusing instead on the
second alternative definition of "confidential" suggested in National
Parks.
"Confidentiality" will be found under this second alternative
if substantial harm to the information supplier's competitive position
will result from the information's disclosure. The characterization of
the supplier's interest in terms of harm to its competitive position is
appealing because it narrows the court's inquiry. Although it is possible to conclude from the legislative history of exemption four that
the exemption was intended to extend to all information that businesses might customarily find confidential,646 the National Parks court
was justified in resolving ambiguities as to congressional intent narrowly and concluding that only the supplier's competitive position
should be protected, since the basic purpose of the Act is to encourage disclosure. 647 There is nothing in the legislative history of the
exemption that supports the conclusion that Congress intended to
protect only "substantial" competitive harm, however, and the court
failed to provide an explanation for this further narrowing of the
exemption. This language is appropriate to the extent that it eliminates frivolous claims of competitive harm and requires the government or the supplier to prove specific harm, rather than relying on
a general assertion of possible adverse competitive effects. The one
drawback of requiring proof of "substantial competitive harm" is
that it may result in protracted litigation. If the issues become too
complex, a requester may be discouraged from seeking court review
of an agency decision to withhold information. Thus, there is a
645. Cf. text at note 641 supra,
646. See S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra
note 310, at 10.
647. See text at notes 308-12 supra.
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danger that the second alternative of National Parks test may ultimately discourage disclosure.
Another problem with this second alternative is that by its
terms it applies only to the person from whom the information was
obtained. It is possible that the subject of the information will not
be the same person as the supplier. No case has yet had to consider
this issue. Although Congress does not seem to have thought of this
possibility, it would seem that it intended to protect the competitive
position of the subject of the information even if he is not the
supplier.
Finally, if competitive harm would result from the disclosure of
information, the courts and the agencies should consider the possibility of deleting identifying details so that the harm to the competitor will be eliminated and the remaining material can be
disclosed.
Despite its failings, the National Parks test is a major advance
toward improving determinations whether information should
be released to the public. The most important contribution of this
test is its use of interest analysis. It is imperative that this aspect of
the test be retained by the courts.
e. Inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda. The fifth FOIA
exemption protects "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency." 648 The language of exemption
five is broad enough to encompass all government writings.649 The

u.s.c. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
649. See Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption for IntraAgency Memoranda, 86 H.ARv. L. REv. 1047, 1048-49 (1973). The House and Senate
reports indicated that some limitation on the exemption was necessary to avoid "indiscriminate administrative secrecy." S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9. The
Senate report states:
It was pointed out in the comments of many of the agencies that it would be
impossible to have any frank discussion of legal or policy matters in writing if
all such writings were to be subjected to public scrutiny. It was argued, and with
merit, that efficiency of Government would be greatly hampered if, with respect
to legal and policy matters, all Government agencies were prematurely forced to
"operate in a fishbowl." The committee is convinced of the merits of this general
proposition, but it has attempted to delimit the exception as narrowly as consistent with efficient Government operation.
Id.
The House report comments:
Agency witnesses argued that a full and frank exchange of opinions would be
impossible if all internal communications were made public. They contended, and
with merit, that advice from staff assistants and the exchange of ideas among
agency personnel would not be completely frank if they were forced to "operate
in a fishbowl." Moreover, a Government agency cannot always operate effectively
if it is required to disclose documents or information which it has received or
generated before it completes the process of awarding a contract or issuing an
order, decision or regulation. This clause is intended to exempt from disclosure
this and other information and records wherever necessary without, at the same
time, permitting indiscriminate administrative secrecy. S. 1160 exempts from disclosure material "which would not be available by law to a private party in litigation with the agency." Thus, any internal memorandums which would routinely
648. 5
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legislative history of the exemption indicates that it was enacted to
preserve the "efficiency of Government" operations0 u0 by protecting
the "full and frank exchange of opinions" 651 within and between
agencies and by preventing premature disclosure of documents.6112
The courts have narrowly construed the language of this exemption
by developing criteria for its application that are consistent with the
exemption's purpose.653
If the words "memorandums or letters" were interpreted literally,
exemption five would be, in some respects, too narrow. This language appears to exclude documented communications that are not
in ,vriting, such as tapes or computer-stored data. 0u4 Although no
court has considered this issue, it is likely that the form of a communication will not be considered determinative. Instead, the courts
will look at the substance of the communication to determine
whether it should be disclosed in light of the interests sought to be
protected by exemption five. 655
The scope of the words "inter-agency or intra-agency" is also
unclear. 656 The Supreme Court has emphasized that both kinds of
memoranda may be exempt.6G7 If a document is of the kind "which
be disclosed to a private party through the discovery process in litigation with
the agency would be available to the general public.
H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 10. See generally Katz, supra note 333, at
1272-77 (1970); Koch, supra note 333, at 210-15 (1972); Note, '14 CoLUM, L. REv. 895,
supra note 333, at 936-43; Note, 86 HARV, L. R.Ev. 1047, supra; Comment, The Free•
dom of Information Act and Its Internal Memoranda Exemption: Time for a Prac•
tical Approach, 27 Sw. L.J. 806 (1973).
650. S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9.
651. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 10. See S. REP. No, 89-813, supra
note 310, at 9.
652. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 10. See A1TORNEY GENERAL'S MEMO•
RANDUM, supra note 309, at 35, in which the Attorney General argued for the pro•
tection of "documents where premature disclosure would harm the authorized and
appropriate purpose for which they are being used." See also S. REP. No, 89-813,
supra note 310, at 9.
653. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4496-97 (U.S.
April 28, 1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. '13, 85 (1973).
654. The Senate report refers only to "writings." S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note
310, at 9.
655. Cf. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
824 (1970). The exemption "does not authorize an agency to throw a protective blanket
over all information by casting it in the form of an internal memorandum." 424 F.2d
at 939.
656. This language could be interpreted to exclude communications from Congress,
state or local governments. Koch, supra note 333, at 214 n.96, Professor Davis concluded
that, although Congress did not intend to exclude congressional-agency communications
from the operation of exemption five, such an exclusion wonld be beneficial. K. DAVIS,
supra note 265, § 3A.21, at 156 (Supp. 1970). But cf. Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 384 F. Supp.
755, 763 (D.D.C. 1974), where the court examined congressional communications to an
agency in terms of exemption seven as part of an "informant's privilege,"
657. Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp., 43 U.S.L.W. 4502, 4508
(U.S. April 28, 1975).
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would not be available by law to a party . . . in litigation with the
agency" 658 and if the purposes of exemption five would best be
served by ·withholding the document, it should be exempt whether
it is used exclusively within an agency or given to another agency.
Courts have interpreted "inter-agency or intra-agency" memoranda
to include memoranda of outside consultants who are temporarily
performing the roles of agency officials or employees.61i9 Because the
consultants' communications are similar to agency memoranda in
these situations, the same policy reasons for protecting against disclosure apply. 66° Courts should not interpret exemption five to apply
to the communications of all agency consultants, however. There is
a difference benveen consultants whose recommendations are integrated into the agency deliberative process, where free discussion
of ideas is thought to be essential, and interested parties who are
trying to influence agency decisions. Communications of this latter
group should not be beyond public scrutiny. 661
By far the most difficult language to interpret in this exemption
is the modifying clause, "which would not be available by law to a
party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." Congress
chose to limit this exemption through application of discovery principles because of the similarity benveen the purposes of the discovery
defense of "governmental privilege" and the purposes of exemption
five. 662 It is clear, however, that discovery principles are to be applied
658. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
659. E.g., Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 246 (D.D. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.SL.W. 3601 (U.S. May 12, 1975); Wu v. National Endowment
for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973);
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
660. See, e.g., Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973). The reports at issue in Wu had been prepared
by experts in Chinese history to help the Endowment evaluate Professor Wu's request
for a grant. Since the Endowment could not possibly maintain a large staff of experts
on all subjects, these outside experts were temporarily performing the functions of
agency personnel. See text at note 661 infra.
661. See Note, 86 HARv. L. R.Ev., supra note 649, at 1064-66. The author of that
Note also argues that exemption five sbould not be extended to cover the communications of outside consultants who may be biased. Extending the protection of exemption five to these communications would, for example, encourage secrecy between
agency•regulated companies and the government.
662. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 43 U.SL.W. 4491, 4496 (U.S. April 28, 1975);
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-89 (1973). A leading discovery case stated that the policy
behind the governmental privilege seeks to promote "open, frank discussion between
subordinate and chief concerning administrative action." Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See Freeman v. Seligson,
405 F.2d 1326, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1968); H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at IO;
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 36. The exemption also protects
"the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges generally available to all litigants." NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 43 U.SL.W. 4491, 4496-97 (U.S. April 28, 1975).
The scope of this protection is uncertain, but it seems to be an application of the
exemption's protection of pre-decisional and recommendatory materials. See text at
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in exemption five cases "by way of rough analogies,'' 663 with the
emphasis on furthering the purposes of the FOIA and the exemption.
In formulating a standard to restrict the potential breadth of
exemption five, most courts have relied upon the established discovery practice of releasing factual material to private parties who
are in litigation with the government. 664 These courts thus order the
disclosure of factual materials, but permit the withholding of materials that reflect the "deliberative or policy-making processes" 00G of
agencies.666 The Supreme Court endorsed this standard in EPA v.
notes 673-89 infra. The protection of "privileged" material is discussed in conjunction
with exemption four. See text at notes 625-28 supra.
663. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973). Some courts have interpreted the exemp•
tion to require a literal application of the discovery provisions in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (FED, R. Civ. P. 26-37), For instance, the Ninth Circuit found that
"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) is sufficiently broad to entitle discovery of the
records in question, and ordered disclosure of the records under the FOIA," GSA v.
Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969). See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438
F.2d 1349, 1358-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1971); Anchorage Bldg, Trades
Council v. HUD, 384 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (D. Alas. 1974); EEOC v. Los Alamos Constrs,,
Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (D.N.M. 1974); Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871, 873-75 (W.D.
Wash. 1972); Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738, '139-41 (N,D,
Iowa 1974).
Because different purposes are served by the civil procedure rules and exemption
five, and because the rules have their own requirements, this interpretation is unsatisfactory. For example, different discovery rules apply depending on whether the party
from whom the information is sought is a prosecutor, a civil plaintiff, or a defendant,
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 n.13 (1973). Exemption five does not explain how the
government is to be treated. 410 U.S. at 86. In addition, the exemption is phrased in
terms of "a party." This indicates that the question is not whether the information
would be released in discovery proceedings to this particular applicant, but rather
whether it is of a type that would be routinely released to any party. NLRB v. Scars,
Roebuck 8c Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4496 n.16 (U.S. April 28, 1975); Sterling Drug, Inc.
v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Anchorage Bldg. Trade Council v. HUD,
384 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (D. Alas. 1974) (dictum); Note, 74 CoLUllI. L. R.Ev. 895, supra
note 333, at 942-43; H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 10; K. DAVIS, supra
note 265, § 3A.21, at 158 (Supp. 1970). But cf. Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489
F.2d 1195, 1203 n,15 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Moreover, a person requesting discovery must show
that the information sought is "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action • , • ," FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). See also Comment, supra note 649, at 812, The
FOIA, on the other hand, provides that records are to be disclosed to "any person."
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (Supp, Feb, 1975), See
text at note 458 supra. Many of the courts that applied the discovery rules literally
to exemption five claims have considered the need of the person requesting the information. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F,2d 1349, 1358-59 (2d Cir,
1971). The relationship between discovery and the FOIA in general is discussed in
the text at notes 1098-104 infra,
664. See EPA v, Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-88 (1973).
665. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973).
666. Under this rule the following materials have been considered "factual": parts
of a report on the development of the SST (Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077-'18
(D.C. Cir. 1971)), parts of an Air Force report on a plane crash (Brockway v. Depart•
ment of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738, 741-42 (N.D. Iowa 1974)), the raw scores
and scoring scheme from VA tests on hearing aids (Consumers Union of United States,
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Mink, 667 by pointing to the legislative history of exemption five, which
specifically refers to the factual-deliberative distinction.668 Because
fine distinctions betvveen fact and policy must be made under this
standard, it has been important for the courts to know the exact
contents of the disputed material. Thus, in camera inspection of
material is a frequently used technique in exemption five cases.669
In order to release the maximum amount of information, the courts
have isolated the factual material contained in a document unless
that material was "inextricably intertwined"670 with deliberative
Inc. v. Veter.µis Admn., 301 F. Supp. 796, 805-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed,
436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971)), "medical and scientific data" used by the Administrator
of the EPA (Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973)), FBI memoranda recounting brief contacts "for purely informational purposes" with a Congressman (Koch
v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 317 (D.D.C. 1974)), an IRS manual and
statistical report (Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871, 873-74 (W.D. Wash. 1972)), and an
FHA appraisal report (Tennessee Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th
Cir. 1972)).
Materials declared "deliberative," and thus protected by exemption five, include
an Army report on Mylai (Aspin v. Department of Defense, 348 F. Supp. 1081, 1082
(D.D.C. 1972), afld., 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973)), staff memoranda on cases that had
been heard by the FPC (International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1348, 1358-59 (2d
Cir. 1971)), an evaluation of a research grant application (Wu v. National Endowment
for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1972)), a report containing recommendations for revision of federal automotive safety standards (Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp.
1321, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1973), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Dillow v. Brinegar, 494
F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.SL.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 29, 1974)), legal
advice and staff recommendations to the AEC concerning a proposed nuclear reactor
(Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. AEC, 380 F.
Supp. 630 (N.D. Ind. 1974)), and some parts of an Air Force crash report (Brockway
v. Department of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738, 742 (N.D. Iowa 1974)).
667. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
668. 410 U.S. at 89-90.
669. See, e.g., National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 755, 764 (D.D.C. 1974); Rabbitt v. Department
of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065, 1068 (D.D.C. 1974); Porter County Chapter of
the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. AEC, 380 F. Supp. 630 (N.D. Ind. 1974);
Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313 (D.D.C. 1974); Kreindler v. Department of the Navy, 363 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS,
362 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (D.D.C. 1973), modified in part, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1970), afld., 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971).
See also Comment, In Camera Inspection Under the Freedom of Information Act,
41 U. Cm. L. REv. 557, 575-79 (1974). The 1974 amendments to the FOIA have explicitly authorized the use of in camera inspection. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(b) (Supp.
Feb. 1975). Since the policy of protecting governmental confidentiality is somewhat
impaired by an in camera inspection, the Supreme Court has cautioned against excessive use of such inspections: "Plainly, in some situations, in camera inspection will
be necessary and appropriate. But it need not be automatic. An agency should be
given the opportunity, by means of detailed affidavits or oral testimony, to establish
to the satisfaction of the District Court that the documents sought fall clearly beyond
the range of material that would be available to a private party in litigation with the
agency." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 (1973). See text at notes 965-88 infra.
670. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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material.671 The 1974 amendments to the FOIA codified this
practice.672
The problem ·with the factual-deliberative standard is that it
sometimes results in an unnecessary withholding of information.
Some courts have tried to design a standard that would allow the
disclosure of more material without violating the purposes of exemption five.
The Supreme Court has recently taken a new approach in exemption five cases by distinguishing "between predecisional memoranda
prepared in order to assist an agency decision-maker in arriving at
his decision, which are exempt from disclosure, and post-decisional
memoranda setting forth the reasons for an agency decision already
made, which are not." 673 In NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,674 the
Court held that memoranda prepared by the General Counsel of
the NLRB explaining his decision not to file complaints constituted
"final opinions" and were not protected by exemption five. 67 1l In
Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.,616 the
Court allowed the withholding of regional renegotiation board
reports since these reports were merely recommendations, subject to
further consideration by the National Renegotiation Board, 677
The opinions in these two cases illustrate the relationship benveen exemption five and the FOIA's requirement that "final
opinions"678 and "statements of policy" 670 be made available for
671. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1973). The Supreme
Court has approved the disclosure "of purely factual material appearing in • • •
documents in a form that is severable without compromising the private remainder
of the documents." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 (1973). See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d
1067, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
In Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court
found factual material to be "inextricably intertwined with the policy-making process"
in memoranda that contained no specific recommendations. "Virtually all of the factual
material" was already known by the plaintiffs, so that disclosure would reveal only
"which facts were deemed significant by the [FBI]," thus illuminating the policy•
making and deliberative processes of the Bureau. 376 F. Supp. at 317. See also Exxon
Corp. v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 755, 764 (D.D.C. 1974) (denying disclosure of factual material not severable from opinion).
672. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at notes 501-05 supra; CONFER•
ENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 13; S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 31-32.
673. Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp., 43 U.S.L.W. 4502, 4507
(U.S. April 28, 1975). See NLRB v. Scars, Roebuck & Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4497 (U.S.
April 28, 1975), and cases cited therein.
674. 43 U.SL.W. 4491 (U.S. April 28, 1975).
675. 43 U.SL.W. at 4496. These memoranda represented final dispositions since
each was "an unreviewable rejection of the charge filed by the private party." 43
U.S.L.W. at 4498. Memoranda that directed the agency to file complaints, on the
other hand, were held to be covered by the exemption's protection of an attorney's
work privilege. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4500.
676. 43 U.SL.W. 4502 (U.S. April 28, 1975).
677. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4507.
678. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1970). See text at notes 394-405 supra.
679. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B) (1970). See text at notes 406-17 supra.
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public inspection. The first case to make a distinction between preand post-decisional memoranda was American Mail Line, Ltd. v.
Gulick.680 That case involved a memorandum that was cited and
quoted in a decision by the Maritime Subsidy Board. The court held
that because it explicitly and publicly incorporated the memorandum,
the agency could not withhold it on the basis of exemption five. It had
become part of the final agency opinion.681 Subsequent opinions have
recognized that memoranda that reflect policy already made should
be released either as final opinions or as records not exempt under
(b)(5).682 In Sears and Grumman, the Supreme Court made it clear
that exemption five can never apply to " 'final opinions' " and
" 'final dispositions' of matters by an agency." 683 It is important to
note, however, that there may well be documents that are not "final
opinions," which do not fall under the protection of exemption
five. 684 These documents should of course be released.685
The most important contribution of Sears and Grumman to
the interpretation of exemption five may be the approach the Court
used to decide the issues before it. In both cases, the Court conducted a very careful investigation into the contents and use of the
requested documents686 and analyzed the reasons and purposes
behind the exemption.687 The Court explicitly recognized that the
680. 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
681. "If the Maritime Subsidy Board did not want to expose its staff's memorandum to public scrutiny it should not have stated publicly in its April 11 ruling that
its action was based upon that memorandum, giving no other reasons or basis for
its action. When it chose this course of action ••• the memorandum lost its intraagency status and became a public record ••••" 411 F.2d at 703.
682. See, e.g., Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 815, 818 &: n.12 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Vaughn v. Rosen,
383 F. Supp. 1049, 1053-54 (D.D.C. 1974); Tax Analysts &: Advocates v. IRS, 362 F.
Supp. 1298, 1302 ·(D.D.C. 1973), modified in part on other grounds, 505 F.2d 350
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (IRS letter rulings held to be "interpretations adopted by the agency").
But cf. Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (policy recommendations lose their protected status only in "special circumstances" such as those
present in Gulick). See also Note, 74 CotUM. L. R.Ev. 895, supra note 333, at 938-41;
Comment, 1974 DUKE L.J. 251, supra note 333, at 272-74; Note, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1047,
supra note 649, at 1057-63; Comment, supra note 649, at 816-20; Note, 8 U. MICH.
J. L. REF. 329, supra note 333, at 335, 344-46 (1975).
683. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4498 (U.S. April 28, 1975);
Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp., 43 U.S.L.W. 4502, 4507 n.21 (U.S.
April 28, 1975).
684. Cf. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4.491, 4498 n.21 (U.S. April 28,
1975).
685. Compare text at notes 691-95 &: 1098-104 infra.
686. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck&: Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4493-94 (U.S. April 28, 1975);
Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp., 43 U.S.L.W. 4502, 4503-05 (U.S.
April 28, 1975).
·
687. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4496-500 (U.S. April 28,
1975); Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp., 43 U.S.L.W. 4502, 4507-09
(U.S. April 28, 1975). Although the Supreme Court in Grumman reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeals, 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the Court did not take issue
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free exchange of ideas within an agency would not be impaired by
the release of "communications with respect to the decision occurring
after the decision is finally reached" 688 and stated that "the public is
vitally concerned with the reasons which did supply the basis for an
agency policy actually adopted. These reasons, if expressed within
the agency, constitute the 'working law' of the agency ...." 680
It is important in deciding FOIA questions in general, and exemp•
tion five questions in particular, for courts to base decisions on the
purposes of the legislation, rather than to apply rules mechanically.
Indeed, the pre- and post-decisional standard used by the Supreme
Court in these cases could be broadened to include documents that
indicate the basis of an agency decision, whether or not they reflect
agency policy deliberations, without compromising the purposes of
exemption five. No court has accepted a "basis of decision" standard,
however. 690
In Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Train, 691 the court held that a
summary of evidence presented at public hearings was protected
from disclosure by exemption five. 692 The summary was prepared
by EPA staff members to assist the Administrator of the EPA in
deciding whether to ban DDT. The court reasoned that one of the
exemption's purposes was "to protect not simply deliberative material, but also the deliberative process of agencies," 693 and that "[t]o
probe the summaries of record evidence would be the same as
with the lower court's distinction between decisional and pre-decisional documents
nor with that court's analysis of the policies behind the exemption.
688. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 43 U.SL.W. 4491, 4497 (U.S. April 28, 1975).
Compare 43 U.SL.W. at 4500 ("The probability that an agency employee will be inhibited from freely advising a decisionmaker for fear that his advice, if adopted, will
become public is slight") (emphasis original), with Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Air•
craft Engr. Corp., 43 U.SL.W. 4502, 4507 (April 28, 1975) ("The • • • [r]eports are
thus precisely the kind of predicisional deliberative advice • • • which must remain
uninhibited and thus undisclosed, in order to supply maximum assistance to the Board
in reaching its decision").
689. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4497 (U.S. April 28, 1975),
See 43 U.SL.W. at 4498; Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Engr. Corp., 43
U.SL.W. 4502, 4507 (U.S. April 28, 1975) ("absent indication that its reasoning has
been adopted, there is little public interest in disclosure of a Report. • • • Indeed,
release of the Regional Board's reports on the theory that they express the reasons
for the Board's decision would, in those cases in which the Board had other reasons
for its decision, be affirmatively misleading").
690. But cf. Pacific Architects &: Engrs., Inc. v. Renegotiation Bd., 505 F.2d 383, 386
(D.C. Cir. 1974), where the court, remanding for evidence on whether a document was
the sole basis for an agency decision, said, "We do not mean to intimate that a finding
that the [material requested) is the sole basis for decision requires disclosure pro
tanto but only that a contrary finding greatly strengthens the Board's case for non•
disclosure." See also Washington Research, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 248 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.SL.W. 3601 (U.S. May 12, 1975).
691. 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
692. 491 F.2d at 67-68.
693. 491 F.2d at 71,
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probing the decision-making process itself."694 The factual summary
at issue in this case did not reflect agency policy, but it did indicate
the basis for the agency's decision. If such factual summaries are
released, the public and the courts will be better able to evaluate
agency decisions.
Providing the public with a means of scrutinizing agency actions
and procedures is the basic purpose of the FOIA; there is no reason
to sacrifice the benefits to be gained from disclosure in an instance
where releasing information would not violate the purposes of
exemption five. Since, by hypothesis, an agency will no longer be in
the process of making a decision, disclosing information concerning
the basis for an agency decision will not involve the premature disclosure of ideas. And agency personnel are not likely to hesitate to
exchange ideas because those ideas may be disclosed to the public if
adopted. The satisfaction of having one's own recommendations
accepted ·will usually override any fears of public disclosure. 695
Moreover, in a case in which a court is convinced that disclosing
information would render persons more hesitant to give frank
opinions in the future, 696 an effort could be made to delete identifying details from the disputed materials.697 If such deletion would not
protect the individual staff member or consultant, then the information should be withheld to ensure that agencies are able to maintain the free exchange of ideas necessary for efficient government
and to protect the individuals from personal attack.
The proposed "basis standard" will best accomplish the FOIA
goal of maximum possible disclosure. There is substantial value in
disclosing agency policies because without such disclosure agencies
694. 491 F.2d at 68. Moreover, the court felt that, since all of the facts were in
the public record of the hearings, all that would be revealed by disclosure of the
summary would be the "evaluation and selection of certain facts." 491 F.2d at 70.
695. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck 8: Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4500 (U.S. April 28,
1975), quoted in note 688 supra; Note, 86 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1047, supra note 649, at
1060-61; Comment, supra note 649, at 834.
696. An example of one case in which this was true is Wu v. National Endowment
for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973), The
Endowment used outside consultants in evaluating the merits of a research grant application submitted by Professor Wu. On the basis of recommendations by these consultants, the Endowment denied Wu research funds, 460 F.2d at 1031, and Wu brought
suit under the FOIA to obtain the recommendations. The Endowment argued that
they would lose the valuable services of these outside consultants if an applicant was
able to identify them: "[I]t is vital for the Endowment that their recommendations
not be available to applicants; ouly then can reviewers be free to state their true
opinion of an application without regard to the feelings of the applicant." 460 F.2d
at 1032 (quoting the affidavit of an Endowment official). The court agreed with the
Endowment and refused to order disclosure of the consultants' reports because "advice, recommendations, opinions, and other subjective material are protected." 460 F.2d
at 1032. Wu's subsequent attempt to sue the unknown consultants for libel, see Wu
v. Keeney, 384 F. Supp. 1161 (D.D.C. 1974), evidences the wisdom of the Fifth Circuit's
decision.
697, See text at notes 501-()5 supra.
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will be beyond the review of the courts, the Congress, and the public
and will be able to develop a body of "secret law." 698 Although the
courts could adopt this test without waiting for congressional action,
the confused case law indicates a need for statutory amendment. The
cryptic modifying clause relating to discovery provides little aid to
the courts for interpreting exemption five. Because of "the inevitable
temptation of a governmental litigant to give [this exemption] an
expansive interpretation in relation to the particular records in
issue" 699 and the FOIA's emphasis on disclosure, this exemption
should be both written and construed narrowly.
f. Personnel and medical files. Exemption six provides for the
withholding of "personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy." 700 This exemption attempts to protect effec698. One of the important goals of the FOIA was to prevent the application of
"secret law" to unknowing citizens. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck&: Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491,
4498 (U.S. April 28 1975); Note, 86 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1047, supra note 649, at 1058;
Comment, supra note 649, at 816. See S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 7: H,R,
REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 7; Sterling Drug, Inc. v. ITC, 450 F.2d 698, 708
(D.C. Cir. 1971); K. DAVIS, supra note 265, §§ M.11, 3A,21 (Supp. 1970),
699. Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
700. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970). The Senate report explained this exemption as
follows:
Such agencies as the Veterans Administration, Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, Selective Service, etc., have great quantities of files, the confidentiality
of which has been maintained by agency rule but without statutory authority.
There is a consensus that these files should not be opened to the public, and the
committee decided upon a general exemption rather than a number of specific
statutory authorizations for various agencies. It is believed that the scope of the
exemption is held within bounds by the use of the limitation of a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
The phrase "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" enunciates a
policy that will involve a balancing of interests between the/rotection of an indivfdual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, an the preservation of
the public's right to governmental information. The application of this policy
should lend itself particularly to those Government agencies where persons are
required to submit vast amounts of personal data usually for limited purposes.
For example, health, welfare, and selective service records are highly personal to
the person involved, yet facts concerning the award of a pension or benefit should
be disclosed to the public.
S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note
310, at 11: "The exemption is ••• intended to cover detailed Government records
on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual and not the
facts concerning the award of a pension or benefit or the compilation of unidentified
statistical information from personal records." (footnote omitted); ATrORNEY GENERAL'S
MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 36-37; K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.22, at 162-64
(Supp. 1970); Note, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 895, supra note 333, at 953-56; Note, Invasion
of Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act: Getman v. NLRB, 40 GEO, WASH,
L. REv. 527 (1972); 6 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 215 (1974).
There has been surprisingly little litigation involving exemption six. Three cases
have concluded that the exemption doesn't apply: Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th
Cir. 1973); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971): Rabbitt v. Department of
the Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (required disclosure in part). Four
cases have denied disclosure pursuant to the exemption: Vaughn v. Rosen, 383 F,
Supp. 1049 (D.D.C. 1974); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974);
Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 418 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969); Ditlow v. Shultz,
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tively an individual's right to privacy701 within a statutory scheme
that encourages disclosure.702
The scope of the protection provided by exemption six will
depend upon the resolution of three basic ambiguities in its language. First, it is unclear what kinds of materials should be considered "personnel and medical files and similar files." The committee reports indicate that Congress intended all types of confidential
information about citizens to be protected by the exemption.703
Accordingly, the word "files" should not be limited to an "orderly
collection of papers,'' 704 but should include any documented personal
379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974). Three exemption six cases have been remanded to the
district court for further consideration: Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of
Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495
F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.SL.W. 3451 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (No. 74--489);
Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
701. Recent legislation, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (Supp. Feb. 1975),
and judicial decisions, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973), evidence society's
concern for the protection of privacy. Unfortunately, there are no clear guidelines for
defining the scope of this interest. The extent of the constitutional right to privacy
is as yet unsettled. See text at notes 1789-915 infra. The common-law right to privacy,
as defined by contemporary views within the community, see text at notes 1579-92
infra, does provide the agencies and the courts with some standards to evaluate the
seriousness of an alleged invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Rose v. Department of the Air
Force, 495 F.2d 261, 267 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.SL.W. 3451 (U.S. Feb. 18,
1975) (No. 74--489), an FOIA case where the court used Prosser on Torts to determine
what constituted an invasion of privacy. See Note, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 527, supra
note 700, at 539. As is argued in the text at notes 1601-25 infra, however, the tort
standard for invasion of privacy may not be sufficient to protect citizens from government disclosure.
702. Deleting identifying details has been used by at least one court as a means
of disclosing information without invading individual privacy. See Rose v. Department
of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 268 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3451
(U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (No. 74--489) ("We think it highly likely that the combined skills
of court and Agency, applied to the summaries, will yield edited documents sufficient
for the purpose sought and sufficient as well to safeguard affected persons in their
legitimate claims of privacy" (footnotes omitted)).
Support for deleting identifying details can be found in the language of H.R. REP.
No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 11: "The exemption is also intended to cover detailed
Government records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that
individual • • ." (emphasis added). Deletion of details is mandated by section 552
(a)(2). See text at notes 449-56 supra.
The courts have generally not found in camera inspection to be necessary in exemption six cases, since the general content of the requested information is usually
clear, and more detailed inspection is not necessary to determine the effect of any disclosure. See Comment, supra note 669, at 571-72 &: n.105. It is not necessary, for instance, for a court to read a list of names and addresses in order to decide whether
its release would be an invasion of privacy. But see Rabbitt v. Department of the Air
Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (in camera inspection of medical
files required).
703. S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note
310, at 11. See note 700 supra.
704. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 945 (2d ed. 1960). "File" is defined
as "a collection of cards or papers usu. arranged or classified" in W.EBSTER's THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICI"IONAAY 849 (1971).
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information that the government may have in its possession.700 The
phrase "similar files" should cover any material having "the same
characteristics of confidentiality that ordinarily attach to information in medical or personnel files; that is, to such extent as they contain 'intimate details' of a 'highly personal nature,' they [should be]
·within the umbrella of the exemption." 706 Using this interpretation,
the courts have considered disparate kinds of records, such as lists
of names and addresses,707 Air Force Academy disciplinary files, 708
information on housing discrimination,700 EPA reports on radioactivity,710 and filled-out customs declaration forms, 711 to be "similar
files. " 712
Second, it is possible to construe the language of exemption six
to protect personnel and medical files whether or not their disclosure
would be a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." With
little guidance from the committee reports, the courts have assumed
that they must consider the seriousness of the invasion of privacy in
all exemption six cases.718
Finally, courts have had difficulty interpreting the phrase "clearly
unwarranted invasion of privacy." Some courts have found that the
"clearly unwarranted" language requires application of a balancing
approach.714 Other courts have found the language to require only
an investigation into the seriousness of the privacy invasion.716
705. See Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir. 1973); Rural Housing Alliance
v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Amendments to change
this wording have been proposed but never passed. See H.R. 5425, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 327, at 84. One court has used this
wording to deny the applicability of the exemption: "[T)he scope of subsection 6
which relates solely to 'files' cannot be stretched to cover witnesses' statements."
Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
706. Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir. 1973), quoting S. REP, No. 89-813,
supra note 310, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at II.
707. See Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974); Getman v.
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 418 F.2d 155
(7th Cir. 1969).
708. See Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (No. 74-489).
709. See Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C,
Cir. 1974).
710. See Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
7II. See Ditlow v. Shultz, 379 F. Supp. 326, 329 (D.D.C. 1974).
712. Most exemption six cases have involved "similar files." Medical files were at
issue in Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
and personnel files (Civil Service Commission reports and evaluations) in Vaughn v.
Rosen, 383 F. Supp. 1049, 1051 (D.D.C. 1974).
713. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 383 F. Supp. 1049, 1054-55 (D.D.C. 1974) (personnel
files); Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp. 1065, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(medical files). See also Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973); Note, 74
CoLUM. L. REv. 895, supra note 333, at 953.
714. See Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974); Rural Housing
Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Getman v.
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The courts in Getman v. NLRB 716 and Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v.
IRS,717 held that "[e]xemption (6) necessarily requires the court to
balance a public interest purpose for disclosure of personal information against the potential invasion of individual privacy.'' 718 Both
of these cases concerned requests for lists of names and addresses. In
Getman, the lists were requested by two law professors who needed
to contact employees eligible to vote in certain representation elections in order to complete a study concerning NLRB voting regulations. 719 The court ordered disclosure after finding that the invasion
of privacy was "very minimal" and that the study potentially could
be of considerable public benefit.720 In contrast, the requester in
Wine Hobby wanted the information for "private commercial exploitation."721 The court refused to release the information "[i]n
light of [the] failure by Wine Hobby to assert ·a public interest
purpose for disclosure . • . even though the invasion of privacy in
this case [was] not as serious as that considered by the court in other
cases.'' 722
The Getman court suggested in a footnote that "a court's decision to grant disclosure under Exemption (6) carries with it an
implicit limitation that the information, once disclosed, be used only
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Vaughn v. Rosen, 383 F. Supp. 1049,
1055 (D.D.C. 1974); Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp 1065, 1070
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
In performing the balancing, the courts have considered such factors as whether
there may be an invasion of privacy, the nature of the privacy invaded, the extent
of the invasion, the public interest that would be served by disclosure, whether the
interest could be satisfied without the requested material, see Getman v. NLRB, 450
F.2d 670, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974), whether the material is available elsewhere,
see Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 78 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Ditlow v. Shultz, 379 F. Supp. 326, 331-32 (D.D.C. 1974), promises of confidentiality, see Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973), and whether the affected
individual is willing to give permission to release the information. See Rural Housing
Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 82-83 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
715. See, e.g., Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.SL.W.
3451 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (No. 74-489). This approach is advocated in Note, 40 GEO.
WASH, L. R.Ev. 527, supra note 700.
716. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
717. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
718. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 n.24, quoted in Wine Hobby USA, Inc.
v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 1974). This interpretation of the exemption is
supported by the congressional reports, which indicate that Congress contemplated a
balancing of individual privacy interests and the public's right to know. See S. REP.
No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 11;
note 700 supra.
719. 450 F.2d at 671-72.
720. 450 F.2d at 677.
721. 502 F.2d at 137.
722. 502 F.2d at 137.
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by the requesting party and for the public interest purpose upon
which the balancing was based." 723 This limited disclosure requirement is contrary to the general rule in FOIA cases that release of
information to one requester mandates release of the information to
the general public.724 Furthermore, imposing such a requirement
presents enforcement problems. 726 The limitation is appealing, however, because it may allow for accommodation of both the individual's interest in privacy and the public's interest in disclosure. 720
Further and more serious problems arise in applying this balancing approach. As the Getman court recognized, the provision in the
FOIA that requires disclosure to "any person" 727 is "in unavoidable
conflict with the explicit balancing requirement of Exemption
(6)."728 The court in Wine Hobby attempted to reconcile this conflict by arguing that the "any person" provision only applied to nonexempt information and was inapplicable when determining whether
material was within an exemption.729 This argument is fallacious
because the "any person" provision was specifically intended to
prevent agency discretion when deciding whether an exemption
applied.730 The conflict will be alleviated to some extent if the courts
723. 450 F.2d at 677 n.24. Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp.
1065, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), is the only other case in which a court using the balancing approach has ordered disclosure. It did not discuss the question whether dis•
closure should be limited or general. Courts that have used the balancing test to
deny disclosure have not had to face this issue. See Rural Housing Alliance v. Depart•
ment of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (remanding to the district court);
Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974); Vaughn v. Rosen, 383
F. Supp. 1049 (D.D.C. 1974); Ditlow v. Shultz, 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974). Since
these courts did consider the requesters' purposes, they may have assumed that disclosure, if ordered, would be limited.
724. The Act provides that records are to be disclosed to "any person." 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552 (a)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at note 458 supra; K. DAVIS, supra note 265,
§ 3A.4 (Supp. 1970).
725. Note, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 527, supra note 700, at 539. Someone, either
court or agency, must supervise the use of records to make sure the limitations placed
on disclosure are not violated. Courts may have to use detailed orders and contempt
citations to enforce the limitations.
726. For example, the purposes of the professors in Getman were served by lim•
ited disclosure, with only minimal effect on the union members. General publication
of the lists could have had more serious consequences, ranging from unwanted mail
and callers to annoying and possibly illegal pressures concerning the elections.
727. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at note 458 supra; ArroRNEY
GENERAL'S l\!EMORANDUM, supra note 309, at I; S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310 at
5-6.
728. 450 F.2d at 677 n.24. The court felt that the explicit language of exemption
six required balancing and added, "In view of the Act's basic purpose to limit dis•
cretion and encourage disclosure, we believe that Exemption (6) should be treated as
unique, and that equitable discretion should not be imported into any of the other
exemptions." 450 F.2d at 674 n.10.
729. 502 F.2d at 136.
730. See text at note 500 supra; Note, 40 GEO, WASH. L, REv., supra note 700,
at534-35.
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follow Getman and Wine Hobby781 and focus on the public benefit
of the proposed use of the information rather than on the requester's
specific purposes and needs.
Another problem with the balancing approach is that by balancing interests in exemption six cases, less protection may be given to
an individual's right to privacy than is given to the interests protected by the other exemptions. The disclosure of some information
may result in a serious invasion of privacy; under the balancing
approach, the courts nevertheless may release the information because there is an overriding public benefit. The public benefit of
disclosure is not considered in determining the applicability of any
of the other eight exemptions. For example, if a law professor needed
confidential financial information concerning large corporations732
to complete a study of the effectiveness of the SEC, the SEC could
withhold the information pursuant to exemption four without considering the public benefit that might result from such a study. It
is true that if the exemptions are considered permissive rather than
mandatory,738 the SEC could exercise its discretionary power and
balance the public interest in disclosure against the potential competitive harm to the corporations; however, the presumption
should be in favor of withholding the information and the requester
should have to demonstrate an extraordinary public interest before
the exempt information is released. 734 The balancing approach suggested by Getman and Wine Hobby does not seem to involve such a
strong presumption against disclosure.
The other interpretation of exemption six is illustrated by Robles
v. EPA,785 where the Fourth Circuit held that the "clearly unwarranted" clause required only an investigation of the seriousness of
the invasion of privacy rather than a balancing of the intrusion on
the individual against the public benefit that would result from
disclosure.786 The court believed that the "any person" language in
731. Both courts considered the particular purposes of the requester only to decide
what public benefits would be gained from disclosure. See text at notes 719-22 supra.
See also Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Vaughn v. Rosen, 383 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (D.D.C. 1974); Note, 62 GEo. L.J.
177, supra note 333, at 198 n.152 (1973).
732. Corporations are not afforded protection against an invasion of "personal
privacy." See K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.22, at 163-64 (Supp. 1970) ("I think 'personal privacy' always relates to individual''). But see ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 36-37, arguing that corporations might be protected because
the APA defines "person" to include a corporation. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1970).
733. See text at notes 1141-55 infra.
734. See text at notes 1156-59 infra.
735. 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
736. 484 F.2d at 846-47. Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. granted, 43 U.SL.W. 3451 (Feb. 18, 1975) (No. 74-489) also seemed to
interpret "clearly unwarranted" as requiring only an "investigation into the nature
of the privacy interest invaded and the extent of the proposed invasion." 495 F.2d at
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section 552(a)(3) of the FOIA precluded consideration of the "need
of the public" or the "interest of the plaintiffs" in deciding whether
to release information.737 The requester in Robles was seeking the
results of an EPA study of the radiation levels in homes that were
located near a uranium processing plant.738 The court concluded that
the intrusion on the homeovmers' privacy would not be serious if
these results were disclosed because the homeowners had not objected when this information previously had been released to state
agencies and other unspecified parties.789
The major problem with this interpretation of "clearly umvarranted" is that it permits disclosure even if that disclosure provides
no public benefit or results in public harm. Without balancing, for
example, the list of names and addresses requested by the plaintiff in
Wine Hobby probably would have been released because the court
admitted that disclosing the list would result in only a minor invasion of privacy.740
Thus, neither judicial interpretation of exemption six sufficiently
protects an individual's right to privacy. When interpreting this
exemption, the agencies and the courts are left to decide whether it
is better to risk serious invasions of privacy when a public benefit is
demonstrated or to risk minor invasions of privacy when there is no
public benefit.
266. The court never discussed the requester's reasons for wanting the information in
deciding whether the invasion of privacy was "clearly unwarranted." However, in
discussing the appropriate use of agency discretion to withhold nonexempt information
in situations where disclosure would damage the public interest, the court extensively
quoted Getman's balancing discussion. 495 F.2d at 269-70. This is a misuse of the
Getman rationale, however, because Getman was dealing with discretionary balancing
in a case where public benefit would be gained from disclosure. There is language
at the end of the Rose opinion that indicates that the court might have balanced
the public benefit from disclosure against the invasion of privacy if it had found the
invasion "clearly unwarranted." 495 F.2d at 270. The court did not have to take this
step because it remanded the case to the district court to determine if it was possible
to remove identifying details. The two-step analysis suggested in Rose of first finding
all the conditions of exemption six met and then balancing, is similar to finding
exemption six to be permissive. See text at notes 1152-59 infra. Rose was noted in 6
U. TOLEDO L. R.Ev. 215 (1974).
737. 484 F.2d at 846-47. See also K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.4, at 120-21 (Supp.
1970).
738. 484 F.2d at 844.
739. 484 F.2d at 846-47.
740. Thus, the exemption would not protect individuals from minor invasions
of privacy by commercial, political, or criminal organizations because the lack of public
interest would be irrelevant to the application of the exemption. For example, a union
member might not want his name placed on a political party's mailing list, or a highbracket taxpayer might not want his name on a public list. If release of a list of names
and addresses is only a minor invasion of privacy, these people would have no protection under a no-balancing approach. Although the sale or rental of mailing lists by
the government is prohibited by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(n) (Supp. Feb.
1975), this provision does not apply to FOIA requests for such lists. See text at notes
2124-28 infra.
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The legislative history seems to support use of the balancing
approach; 741 however, there is no evidence that Congress considered
the implications of its choice. The best solution to this dilemma is
for Congress to strike the words "clearly unwarranted." 742 The
agencies and courts will still have the difficult task of determining
when an invasion of privacy is likely to result from disclosure, and
the protection given to information under exemption six could be
undermined by limiting the scope of the privacy interest. However,
the cases indicate that the courts are sensitive to the concept of personal privacy and are willing to recognize unlikely but possible
harms that may result from a disclosure of information.743 If this
trend in the cases continues, the amended exemption would prevent
even minor invasions of privacy. Public benefit would only become
relevant if the exemption was considered permissive and a strict
balancing test was applied. 744 Although this proposal would broaden
the scope·of exemption six, and thus is contrary to the narrow language and construction of the other exemptions, the special protection the right to privacy has been accorded in other areas of the law
demonstrates the need to accord this interest special protection under
theFOIA.
g. Investigatory records. Exemption seven currently provides for
the withholding of
" ... investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such records would
741. See note 718 supra.
742. There is some indication in the legislative history of the 1974 amendments
that this proposal may be well received by both the Congress and the President. Cf.
note 8ll infra and accompanying text. The amended version of exemption seven protects from disclosure investigatory records that would "constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. Feb. 1975). The word
"clearly" was omitted from this language in order to provide greater protection for
privacy. See note 8ll infra. Compare Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir.
1971). President Ford has also indicated a desire to protect privacy within the scheme
of the FOIA. See the letter from President Ford to Senator Kennedy concerning
exemption seven amendments, in 120 CONG. REc. Sl7,829 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1974):
I am • • • concerned that an individual's right to privacy would not be appropriately protected by requiring the disclosure of information contained in an
investigatory file about him unless the invasion of individual privacy is clearly
unwarranted. Although I intend to take action shortly to address more comprehensively my concerns with encroachments upon individual privacy, I believe now
is the time to preclude the Freedom of Information Act from disclosing information harmful to the privacy of individuals. I urge that you strike the words
"clearly unwarranted" from the provision.
(Emphasis original.)
743. See, e.g., Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973) (the court, in discussing the radioactivity reports at issue, speculated that their release "might even reduce
marriage possibilities of the occupants'?; Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133,
137 (3d Cir. 1974) (the court feared that disclosure of the mailing lists would involve
"[d]isclosure of ••• facts concerning the home and private activities within it," including "the family status" of the individual).
744. See text at notes 1141-59 infra.
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(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of
a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity
of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a
criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only
by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and
procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel. 745
This version of the seventh exemption was enacted as part of the
1974 amendments to the FOIA.746 Several members of Congress felt
strongly that "the courts have, in narrowly and mechanically interpreting the seventh exemption, strayed from the requirements and
spirit of the Freedom of Information Act." 747 By specifically listing
the categories of interests that the exemption is designed to protect,
Congress presumably intended that the government be required to
show, on the facts of each case, that these interests would be harmed
by disclosure. 748
As originally enacted, the seventh exemption provided for the
nondisclosure of "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than
an agency." 749 This exemption was the subject of much litigation
745. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
746. The only other exemption revised by the amendments was exemption one,
dealing with national security information. See text at notes 506-35 supra. The amendments generally concentrated on improving the FOIA's access procedures. See S. REP.
No. 93-854, supra note 329, at l; H.R. REP. No. 93-876, supra note 329, at 2.
747. 120 CONG, REc. S9331 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
Senator Kennedy also commented: "A series of recent cases in the District of Columbia
bas applied the seventh exemption of the act woodenly and mechanically and, I believe, in direct contravention of congressional intent when we passed that law in
1966." Id.
748. See id. at S9330 (remarks of Senator Hart).
749. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. Feb,
1975). The proviso "except to the extent available by law to a party other than an
agency" was largely ignored by the courts in applying this exemption. This clause has
been interpreted to give a party defendant in an action for a violation of a federal
regulatory statute the same discovery rights to obtain investigatory files as are available
to persons charged with the violation of federal criminal laws. The defendant would,
for example, have the right given to criminal defendants by the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (1970), to examine relevant statements of government witnesses who have
testified on direct examination. See, e.g., Clement Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp.
540, 542 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding &: Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp.
708, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591, 593.94
(D.P.R. 1967). The clause conld be read to allow disclosure of investigatory files only
to parties litigating before an agency. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note
309, at 38. Such an interpretation would effectively defeat the attempt by Congress to
make the standing issue immaterial in FOIA cases. See Note, 74 CoLUM, L. REv. 895,
supra note 333, at 947-48.
Other courts have interpreted the phrase to be merely a "savings clause," designed
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and commentary,750 but several major problems concerning its application were either unresolved or resolved in a manner inconsistent
with the basic purposes of the FOIA.751 Because of the uncertainty
as to the proper application of the exemption, some agencies were
able to use it to withhold information that should have been disclosed.752
The courts relied heavily on the legislative history of the original
exemption in attempting to ascertain its scope, since its language
gave them little guidance.753 The Senate report refers to two of the
to ensure that the FOIA did not abrogate the rights of parties under other legislation
providing for access to information during litigation. See, e.g., Anchorage Bldg. Trades
Council v. HUD, 384 F. Supp. 1236, 1240-41 (D. Alas. 1974); B &: C Tire Co. v. IRS,
376 F. Supp. 708, 713-14 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D.
Del. 1972), affd., 479 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973). See also Koch, supra note 333, at 206.
Litigants in FOIA actions have argued that the phrase means that a party litigant
in an action or proceeding not involving an agency can obtain investigatory files information to the extent that applicable rules of discovery, such as the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, would make such information available if the agency were a party.
See, e.g., Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1203 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). Contra, Anchorage Bldg. Trades Council v. HUD,
384 F. Supp. 1236, 1240-41 (D. Alas. 1974). See K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.24, at
165 (Supp. 1970); 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 93, 105 n.88 (1972).
These different views have not been reconciled by the courts. See generally Katz,
supra note 333, at 1282-84; Koch, supra, at 206; Note, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 895, supra, at
947-48; Note, 62 GEO, L.J. 177, supra note 333, at,199-200; Note, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
869, supra note 323, at 870 n.10; 51 TEXAS L. REv. 119, 125-27 (1972).
750. See K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.23 (Supp. 1970); Katz, supra note 333, at
1277-84; Koch, supra note 333, at 206-11; Kramer&: Weinberg, supra note 333, at 64-67;
Project, 1972 DUKE L.J. 115, supra note 323, at 154-58; Project, 1971 Dmm L.J. 149,
supra note 323, at 180-84; Note, 74 COLUM, L. REv. 895, supra note 333, at 943-48;
Note, 1975 DUKE L.J. 416, supra note 333, at 449-55; Comment, 1974 DUKE L.J. 251,
supra note 333, at 274-80; Note, 1973 DUKE L.J. 178, supra note 333, at 200-05; Note,
62 GEO, L.J. 177, supra note 333, at 199-305; Note, 56 GEO, L.J. 18, supra note 323, at
47-50 (1967); Note, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 150, supra note 323, at 158-59; Note, The
Freedom of Information Act: Shredding the Paper Curtain, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 694,
721-22 (1973); Note, 8 U. M1cH. J. L. REF. 329, supra note 333, at 346-49; 47 TuL. L. REv.
1136 (1973); 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 921 (1972); 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 93 (1972); 85
HARV. L. REv. 861 (1972); 51 TEXAS L. REv. 119 (1972); 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 570 (1969).
751. See 120 CONG. REc. S9331 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (statement of Senator
Kennedy), quoted in the text at note 747 supra.
752. See Nader, supra note 333, at 5-7; H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 327, at
84, where the committee expressed its displeasure with the operation of the FOIA and
recommended that section 552(b)(7) be amended; note 802 infra. See also H.R. REP.
No. 92-1419, supra, at 11, 28, 70; Fellmeth, The Freedom of Information Act and the
Federal Trade Commission: A Study in Malfeasance, 4 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. Lm. L.
REV. 345, 361-66 (1969).
753. See, e.g., Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1971);
Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 23 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d
935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). The courts have focused on the
House and Senate reports. The House report states: "This exemption covers investigatory files related to enforcement of all kinds of laws, labor and securities laws as well as
criminal laws. This would include files prepared in connection with related Government litigation and adjudicative proceedings. [Exemption seven] is not intended to give
a private party indirectly any earlier or greater access to investigatory files than he
would have directly in such litigation or proceedings." H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra
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purposes of the exemption: 764 to prevent the premature disclosure
of information that "could harm the Government's case in court," 76 "
and to allow the government to "keep confidential certain material,
such as the investigatory files of the Federal Bureau of Investiga"
tion." 766 The courts generally have taken these two purposes into
account in attempting to solve the interpretative problems that have
arisen in exemption seven cases767 and have concluded that the
note 310, at 11. In its general discussion of the exemptions, the report comments, "Some
of the specific categories cover information necessary to protect the national security;
others cover material such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation files which arc not
now protected by law." Id. at 2.
The Senate report also discusses the exemption. In directly commenting on it, the
report states: "Exemption No. 7 deals with 'investigatory files compiled for law en•
forcement purposes.' These are the files prepared by Government agencies to prosecute law violators. Their disclosure of such files, except to the extent they are available
by law to a private party, could harm the Government's case in court." S. REP. No.
89-813, supra note 310, at 9. In its introduction, the report states: "It is also necessary
for the very operation of our Government to allow it to keep confidential certain
material such as the investigatory files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation." Id, at
3. See also ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 37-38,
For discussion of the legislative history of section 552(b)(7), see K. DAVIS, supra note
265, § 3A.23 (Supp. 1970); Note, 42 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 869, supra note 333, at 872-75;
Note, 38 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 150, supra note 333, at 158-59,
754, For a discussion of other possiqle purposes, see text at notes 786-88 infra,
755. S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9.
756. Id. at 3. The reference to the FBI in both reports, see note 753 supra, has led
some people to suggest that the FOIA was not intended to affect the FBI's files in any
manner. See The Freedom of Information Act, Hearings on H.R. 5425 and H.R. 4960
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong,, 1st
Sess. 152 (1973) (testimony of R. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, Department of Justice) [hereinafter 1973 House Hearings]. There is no lan•
guage in the Act itself that indicates that the FBI is to be treated differently from
any other agency. The reference to the FBI probably was included for either, or both,
of two reasons: because the FBI is the agency most commonly associated with investigations or to protect expressly the "informer's privilege." See Katz, supra note 333, at
1281; Note, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 869, supra note 323, at 874-75, 886-87, But cf. Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1199-200 (D.C. Cir, 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 993 (1974), where the court noted that it was "not discussing any problem
except that of compelled disclosure of Federal Bureau of Investigation investigatory
files compiled for law enforcement purposes.'' (footnote omitted),
757. See, e.g., Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 23 (4th Cir. 1971) (premature disclosure); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D,C, Cir. 1970) (premature disclosure); Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821, 824 n,l (5th Cir. 1971)
{confidential materials).
The courts have considered two categories of information to be confidential materials. First, they have assumed that the identity of informants is protected from
disclosure by the exemption. See, e.g., Center for Natl. Policy Review on Race &: Urban
Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir, 1974); Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813,
817-18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972), Second, they have held that the
exemption allows agencies to withold investigative techniques and procedures. See,
e.g., Center for Natl. Policy Review on Race &: Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F,2d
370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 409
U.S. 889 (1972),
It has been argued that the need to protect the identities of informers is no longer
present when the agency has subpoena power to compel testimony or statutory authority
to compel the transmittal of information, See Note, 42 GEO, WASH, L. R.Ev. 869, supra
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words "compiled for law enforcement purposes" indicate that the
exemption should apply to all law enforcement proceedings, whether
criminal, civil or administrative.768 The commentators have agreed
with this interpretation759 despite the fact that it is based on the less
authoritative House report.760 The amended version of exemption
seven retains this language, and there is no indication in the conference report that Congress intended to alter the courts' construction. 761
One recent case, Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture,762 in reviewing a request for reports of investigations into
governmental housing discrimination, examined another aspect of
the phrase "compiled for law enforcement purposes." The court
focused on the issue whether the reports were compiled for direct
law enforcement purposes or as part of the Department of Agriculture's general oversight of its employees:
We think "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes" must be given the same meaning, or a meaning to achieve
the same result, whether the subject of the files is a government
note 323, at 878 n.56; 51 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 119, 123 (1972). However, while there is arguably no need for cooperation when the agency can compel the disclosure of information,
confidentiality is still needed to encourage persons to come forward with initial reports
of law violations. The power to compel testimony is of no use if the agency does not
know of the underlying violation.
758. See, e.g., Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore, 508 F.2d
945, 949 (4th Cir. 1974); Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498
F.2d 73, 81 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Center for Natl. Policy Review on Race &: Urban
Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Anchorage Bldg. Trades
Council v. HUD, 384 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (D. Alas. 1974); B &: C Tire Co., Inc. v. IRS,
376 F. Supp. 708, 713 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 593 (D. Del.
1972), affd., 479 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.,
288 F. Supp. 708, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745, 747
(D.D.C. 1968), affd, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); Clement
Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540, 542 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v.
Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
759. K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.23, at 164 (Supp. 1970); Katz, supra note 333, at
1277; Note, 62 GEO, L.J. 177, supra note 333, at 199 n.155; Note, 56 GEO. L.J. 18, supra
note 323, at 47, Note, 42 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 869; supra note 323, at 874-75; Note, 38
GEO, WASH, L. R.Ev, 150, supra note 323, at 158-59.
760. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 11, quoted in the text at note
753 supra. The Senate Report refers to "files prepared by Government agencies to
prosecute law violators." S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 9.
761. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 12-13. In discussing clause (D) of the
amended exemption, the report mentions that it applies to "every case where the
investigatory records sought were compiled for law enforcement purposes-either civil
or criminal in nature ••• .'' Id. at 13. Further, when Senator Hart introduced the
amendment to this exemption on the Senate floor, he defended it by saying that "the
'law enforcement' exemption has been broadly construed to include any investigation
by a government agency of a federally funded or monitored activity. The courts only
require that the investigation might result in some government 'sanction' such as a
cutoff of funds-and not necessarily a prosecution.'' 120 CoNG. R.Ec. S9337 (daily ed.
May 30, 1974).
762. 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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employee or an ordinary private citizen . . . . For the purpose of
analyzing the application of exemption 7 in the instant and similar
cases, it is therefore necessary to distinguish two types of files relating
. to government employees: (1) government surveillance or oversight
of the performance of duties of its employees; (2) investigations
which focus directly on specifically alleged illegal acts, illegal acts
of particular identified officials, acts which could, if proved, result in
civil or criminal sanctions.763
The court concluded that the investigatory files exemption applies to
the government's investigation of its own employees if that investigation was made "as to an identifiable possible violation of law.'' 764
The term "investigatory files" raised two problems under the
original exemption seven, only one of which was resolved by its
amendment. The first problem was whether the exemption of all
"files" allowed an agency to withhold nonexempt materials by commingling them with exempt materials in a single file. 760 Several
courts rejected agency arguments to this effect and held that the inclusion of otherwise available information in an investigatory file
would not protect that information from disclosure.70 Congress has
attempted to resolve this problem by changing "investigatory files"
to "investigatory records.'' 767
The second problem was, and still is, whether this language
requires that an agency actually conduct an "investigation.'' 768 Few
courts have considered this issue directly. 769 In Center for National

°

763. 498 F.2d at 81.
764. 498 F.2d at 82. See Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 315 (D.D.C.
1974) (investigatory files may be withheld "if law enforcement was a significant aspect
of the investigation for which they were compiled").
765. See K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.24, at 165 (Supp. 1970); H.R. REP. No. 921419, supra note 310, at 84. It could further be argued that the term "files" might be
too narrow, since if strictly applied it could exclude investigatory information stored
other than in "files," such as on computer tapes. Cf. text at notes 654-55 &: 704-05 supra.
766. See, e.g., Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 429 n.l (4th Cir.), cert,
denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176,
1179 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
767. Speaking in favor of this amendment on the Senate floor, Senator Kennedy
quoted a report of the Bar of the City of New York that favored use of the term
"records," so that "disclosable material is not exempted merely by being placed in an
investigatory file." 120 CoNG. REc. S9332 (daily ed. May 30, 1974). See also 2 1973
Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 149 (statement of J. Miller, Chairman, Administra•
tive Law Section, American Bar Association).
The new amendments also resolve the comingling problem by requiring the
separation and disclosure of the nonexempt portions of requested material. 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552(b) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at notes 501-05 supra.
768. See K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.23, at 165 ("[I)nvestigations arc often for
multiple purposes, for purposes that change as the investigations proceed, and for
purposes that are never clarified').
769. For example, the court in Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agricul•
ture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974), said that a separation of the issues of whether a
file was "investigatory" and whether it was "compiled for law enforcement purposes"
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Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v. W einberger,770 the court
first determined that the files were compiled for law enforcement purposes771 and then discussed whether files involving agency review of
segregation and discrimination in northern public schools were "investigatory."772 The plaintiff sought disclosure of the files and claimed
that HEW was "engaged merely in administering federal aid programs, and that the documents in question [were] ancillary to that
task rather than investigatory in nature." 773 The court said that
[t]here is no clear distinction benveen investigative reports and material that, despite occasionally alerting the administrator to violations of the law, is acquired essentially as a matter of routine. What
is clear, however, 'is that where the inquiry departs from the routine
and focuses with special intensity upon a particular party, an investigation is under way. . . . This is the kind of special scrutiny that
goes beyond general administration and is properly characterized as
an "investigation.''774
The court recognized that the two elements of the exemption, "investigatory files" and "compiled for law enforcement purposes,"
obviously fuse and interact.775 In applying the exemption, however,
the courts should consider the requirements of each phrase separately.
The 1974 FOIA amendments encourage the courts to perform a
careful evaluation of the nature of "investigatory records" by authorizing in camera review of the requested materials.776 Even without statutory authorization, a number of courts concluded that in
camera review was necessary in exemption seven cases.777 Now that
was not necessary, and dealt with the tlvo issues together. 498 F.2d at 81 n.47. But see
Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the court found that the
files were not "investigatory."
770. 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
771. 502 F.2d at 373.
772. 502 F.2d at 373-74.
773. 502 F.2d at 373. The court recognized that if this characterization were correct,
then the material would not be protected under the exemption.
774. 502 F.2d at 373-74.
775. 502 F.2d at 374.
776. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at notes 965-88 infra.
777. For example, in Cowles Communications, Inc., v. Department of Justice, 325
F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971), the district court refused to accept the government's
affidavit as conclusive of the fact that certain records in the Office of the Director of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service were investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes. The court said: "I think the Government should not be allowed
to file an affidavit stating that conclusion and by so doing foreclose any other determination of the fact." 325 F. Supp. at 727. See, e.g., Evans v.-Department of Transp.,
446 F.2d 821, 823 (5th Cir. 1971); Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 371 F. Supp. 370, 374
(D.D.C. 1973); Stem v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316, 1319 (D.D.C. 1973). See generally
Note, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 869, supra note 323, at 880-84.
Some other courts failed to order in camera review of requested documents and
relied on the affidavits of the government agency to decide that the documents were
within the exemption. See, e.g., Aspin v. Department of Defense,,491 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C.
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such review is expressly permitted, the courts should be encouraged
to make full use of it in considering investigatory files problems. The
amended version of exemption seven is so detailed that an affidavit
from an agency stating that the requested materials fall within the
exemption should not be conclusive of the legal issues presented.778
The most controversial problem in cases under the original
exemption seven arose only after the courts had determined that the
requested materials were investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes. The issue then was whether such materials were
automatically exempt, or whether the courts also had to determine
that the purposes of the exemption would be best served by nondisclosure.
The early cases concerning investigatory files did look to the purposes of exemption seven, but sometimes construed them very
narrowly. For example, in Bristol-Myers Company v. FTG,770 the
district court had dismissed the FOIA complaint and ruled that the
material requested fell within the investigatory files exemption.780
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, stating that the exemption did not apply unless there was a sufficiently imminent, concrete
possibility of enforcement proceedings.781 The court recognized only
one purpose of the exemption, that of preventing the premature
disclosure of the government's case.782 If the FTC contemplated no
further enforcement proceedings against the plaintiff, this purpose
would be satisfied and disclosure would be proper.783
Cir. 1973); Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C, Cir, 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). See also Note, 42 GEO, WASH, L. REv. 869, supra, at 884-90,
Cf. Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974);
Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 318 (D.D.C. 1974), where the court
did not make an in camera revieiv, but based its decision "upon the apparent investigatory nature of the files, rather than of the individual documents within them , , ."
(emphasis original).
778. Cf. Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F, Supp. 726,
727 (N.D. Cal. 1971), quoted in the text at note 777 supra; Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d
820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
779. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
780. 284 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1968). See 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 570 (1969).
781. 424 F.2d at 939-40. The plaintiff sought documents from the FTC relevant to a
rule-making proceeding initiated by the FTC on the basis of staff investigations. The
particular complaint for which these investigations were performed had been withdrawn more than two years before this rule-making procedure began. 424 F.2d at 939,
782. 424 F.2d at 939 ("The exemption prevents a litigant from using the statute
to achieve indirectly 'any earlier or greater access to investigatory files than he would
have directly' '').
783. Bristol-Myers was one of the first cases to consider whether files that at one
time were investigatory and compiled for law enforcement purposes remain exempt
after it is clear that an actual law enforcement proceeding will not occur. Two distinct
judicial lines of reasoning developed on this issue. Some cases followed or agreed with
Bristol-Myers. See, e.g., Black v. Sheraton Corp., 371 F. Supp. 97, 102 (D.D.C. 1974);
Stem v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (D.D.C. 1973); Legal Aid Soc. v, Shultz,
349 F. Supp. 771, 777 (N.D. Cal. 1972): Philadelphia NC"l'lspapers, Inc., v. HUD, 843 F.

May-June 1975]

Project

1093

While the court was correct in ascertaining one purpose of the
exemption,784 it ignored the other purposes. One other purpose,
clearly discernible from the legislative history, is the protection of
confidential information-both the identity of informants and the
nature of investigatory techniques and procedures.785 A third possible purpose is the protection of the privacy of those investigated.786
A fourth possible purpose is the protection of the investigated person's right to a fair trial, free from prejudicial pretrial influences.787
Supp. 1176, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1972); M.A. Schapiro &: Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 470
(D.D.C. 1972); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding &: Drydock. Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 711-12
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972), is illustrative of cases reaching the opposite oonclusion. That oourt held that exemption seven
applied even after the termination of the investigation and enforcement proceeding
for which the documents were oompiled, because of the need to protect the confidentiality of informers and investigative techniques. 460 F.2d at 817-18. See 47 TUL. L. REv.
1136 (1973); 41 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 93 (1972); 51 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 119 (1972). Accord,
Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Evans v. Department of
Transp., 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Cowles
Communications, Inc., v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726, 727 (N.D. Cal.
1971). Cf. Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 498 F.2d 1195, 1202-03 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). See text at notes 797-801 infra. See generally Note,
74 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 895, supra note 333, at 945-47; Note, 62 GEO. L.J. 177, supra note
333, at 200-05; Note, 42 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 869, supra note 323, at 875-80. For a discussion of proposed legislation in earlier sessions of Congress, see 47 TUL. L. REv. 1136,
1137-38 (1973).
The 1974 amendment to exemption seven rejects the Bristol-Myers rule that the
exemption cannot apply if no enforcement proceeding is pending. It also rejects the
approach of the Frankel court, which did not consider whether in that case, investigative techniques not generally known would in fact have been divulged. 460 F.2d at
817-18, 820. The amended exemption requires the courts to determine on the facts of
the particular case that disclosure would actually bring about one of the listed harmful
results, which include interfering with enforcement proceedings and disclosing investigative techniques or procedures. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. Feb. 1975). The legislative history does indicate that "enforcement proceeding" refers only to "a concrete
prospective law enforcement proceeding." 120 CoNG. R.Ec. S9330 (daily ed. May 30,
1974) (remarks of Senator Hart).
784. See text at note 755 supra.
785. See text at note 756 supra.
786. See Center for Natl. Policy Review on Race &: Urban Issues v. Weinberger,
502 F.2d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 41 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 93, 96-97 (1972). But see
Sears, Roebuck &: Co. v. General Servs. Admn., 384 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (D.D.C. 1974),
stay dissolved, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974). ("[E]xemption (b)(7) is clearly designed
to protect interests of the government only'). The inclusion of a privacy clause in the
amendment of the exemption supports the Center for National Review court's reading
of the original purpose. See text at note 811 infra.
787. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
where HUD claimed that the disclosure of the names of certain appraisers, who had
allegedly appraised dilapidated homes far in excess of their actual value, would subject
the potential defendants to the risk of prejudicial pretrial publicity. 343 F. Supp. at
1179. The court, while not ruling out the possibility that the exemption was designed
to serve that purpose, held that, under the facts of the case before it, the claims of
possible prejudicial publicity were too speculative. 343 F. Supp. at 1182. Again, the
inclusion of a clause protecting this right in the 1974 amendment supports HUD's
argument. See text at note 810 infra.
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Finally, the exemption might have been designed to increase administrative efficiency by protecting against the disclosure of enforcement records, since such disclosure might discourage voluntary
compliance with the law.788 By failing to consider these possible
purposes, the court gave inadequate protection to the legitimate
interests of the government and the public.
Other courts that considered the purposes of exemption seven
did recognize the various purposes it sought to achieve. For example,
the court in Wellford v. Hardin789 properly applied the exemption.
In Wellford, the plaintiff sought disclosure of copies of all of the
letters of warning issued since 1965 by the Department of Agriculture to any nonfederally inspected meat or poultry processor suspected of being in interstate commerce, and disclosure of information concerning the dete!}tion and ultimate disposition of meat and
poultry products. The district court ordered disclosure,700 and the
Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court of appeals noted that the information sought by the plaintiff was already in the hands of the parties
against whom the law was being enforced.701 The government, therefore, needed no protection against the premature disclosure of its
case.792 The court thus went on to examine the government's claim
that the purpose of protecting confidential materials would be defeated by disclosure. Since the parties to the enforcement proceedings
already had the requested information, and since disclosure would
reveal neither confidential investigatory techniques nor the identity
of informers, confidentiality provided no reason for withholding.703
The court refused to accept the government's claim that the exemption was designed to increase administrative efficiency by protecting
against the disclosure of enforcement records. 704 Finally, the court
dismissed the government's argument "that the seventh exemption
was intended to protect not only the investigator, but also the investigated."795 The approach used by the court in Wellford, that of first
788. See Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir. 1971). See generally text at
notes 808-14 infra.
789. 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971). See 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 921 (1972); 85 HARV. L.
R.Ev. 861 (1972).
790. 315 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1970).
791. 444 F.2d at 23-24.
792. 444 F.2d at 23-24. See Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 175, 178 (D. Md. 1970);
Sears, Roebuck &: Co. v. General Servs. Admn., 384 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (D.D.C.),
stay dissolved, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321, 1325
(D.D.C. 1973), revd. sub. nom_. Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 974 (1974); Legal Aid Soc. v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771, 777 (N.D. Cal. 1972). But
see Green v. Kleindienst, 378 F. Supp. 1397, 1401-02 (D.D.C. 1974).
793. 444 F.2d at 24. See Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore,
508 F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1974).
794. 444 F.2d at 24.
795. 444 F.2d at 24. The government argued that the public disclosure of informa,
tion in investigatory files could constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. The
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discerning the purposes of the exemption and then examining the
facts to see if disclosure would defeat those purposes, exemplifies the
approach contemplated by Congress when it enacted the seventh
exemption.706 •
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia797
has taken an approach diametrically opposed to that of the Wellford court. The District of Columbia court has not considered
whether the purposes of the exemption would be furthered by nondisclosure in the particular case. Instead, it has given careful consideration to the questions whether the files were "compiled for law enforcement purposes" and whether they were "investigatory" in
nature. 708 This is determined by an examination of "how and under
what circumstances the files were compiled."799 If the files fall within
these two categories, then the court's duty is "at an end,"800 and the
files are automatically exempt.801
court responded by citing the congressional balancing of interests and stated that it
was required to defer to the congressional decision. 444 F.2d at 24-25. See Cowles
Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726, 727 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
The court also addressed the issue whether the disclosure of the information would
be a violation of the due process clause. The government argued that disclosure of
the warning letters was analogous to posting an individual's name in liquor stores
as one to whom alcohol was not to be sold, in that both occurred without notice or
hearing. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). The court rejected this
analogy. 444 F.2d at 25. But see 85 HARV. L. REv. 861, 866-70 (1972).
796. Cf. note 807 infra.
Not all courts that have said they were considering the purposes of the exemption
have actually done so properly. For example, although the court in Frankel v. SEC,
460 F.2d 813, 817-18 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972), noted several
purposes, the court failed to examine the particular facts of the case to determine
whether these purposes would be served by nondisclosure. The majority rejected the
dissent's proposal that the court use in camera review to ascertain if any actual harm
would result from disclosure. 460 F.2d at 818, 820 (Oakes, J. dissenting). The court
thus apparently missed the point that the SEC had already revealed the names of its
witnesses, 460 F.2d at 818 n.3, so that no harm was threatened with respect to the disclosure of informers. See Note, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 869, supra note 323, at 877; 51
TEXAS L. REv. 119, 123-24 (1972).
797. See Center for Natl. Policy Review on Race &: Urban Issues v. Weinberger,
502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); cf. Rural Housing Alliance v. Department
of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d
24 (D.C. Cir. 1973). For further discussion of these last two cases, see note 801 infra.
See generally Note, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 869, supra note 323.
798. See, e.g., Center for Natl. Policy Review on Race&: Urban Issues v. Weinberger,
502 F.2d 370, 372-74 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Weisberg v. Department of Justice 489 F.2d 1195,
1197-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). See text at notes 758-78 supra.
799. Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
800. Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
801. This new approach was announced in Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489
F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974). The plaintiff in Weisberg
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The amendment of exemption seven was intended by Congress
to overrule the approach of the District of Columbia court.802 It had
sought disclosure of certain materials gathered by the FBI during its investigation
of the assassination of President Kennedy. The court held that "the desired materials
were part of the investigatory files compiled by the FBI for law enforcement purposes,
and, as such, are exempt from the disclosure sought to be compelled." 489 F.2d at 1197.
The court did not discuss whether any of the purposes of the exemption would be
defeated by disclosure, see Note, 42 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 869, supra note 323, at 886-87,
and made it clear that it was not necessary to do so. 489 F.2d at 1202-03. However,
after announcing that records meeting the two statutory qualifications are automatically
exempt, the court did in fact bolster its argument with references to the purposes
and legislative history of exemption seven. 489 F.2d at 1198.
The Weisberg approach was followed in Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974), and in Center for Natl. Policy Review on
Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Congress and
the commentators have also included Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24
(D.C. Cir. 1973), in the line of cases that follow Weisberg. See 120 CONG. REc. S9336
(daily ed. May 30, 1974); 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 869, supra note 323, at 870•71, 887-89
(1974). While Aspin does cite the rule announced in Weisberg, 491 F.2d at 27, it
discusses the purposes of exemption seven at some length in rejecting the need for a
concrete prospective enforcement proceeding. See 491 F.2d at 28-30. Although the
court "note[d] also that ••• Weisberg ••• is consistent with our decision in this case,"
491 F.2d at 30, it can certainly be argued that Aspin docs not strictly follow the
Weisberg rule.
The same argument can be made concerning Rural Housing Alliance v. Department
of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court remanded this case for re•
evaluation of the exemption seven claim in light of its decisions in both Weisberg
and Aspin. After stating the Weisberg test, however, the court discussed A.spin as
providing "a more detailed analysis of exemption 7." 498 F.2d at 79-80. It said that
"[i]n Aspin the purposes of exemption 7 were identified •••• These purposes compelled us there to conclude that the termination of enforcement proceedings was not
a cause for withdrawal of exemption 7 protection." 498 F.2d at 80. See also Exxon
Corp. v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 755, 761-63 (D.D.C. 1974). These cases may indicate that the
"new approach" of the D.C. Circuit was not as clearly defined as Congress feared, See
notes 802-07 infra and accompanying text.
802. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 12, which states that section 552
(b)(7) was amended to "clarify congressional intent disapproving certain court interpretations which have tended to expand the scope of agency authority to withhold
certain 'investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes' "; 120 CONG. REc.
S9336 (daily ed. May 30, 1974):
[Mr. Kennedy.] I should like to ask the Senator from Michigan a couple of qucs•
tions.
Does the Senator's amendment in effect override the court decisions in the
court of appeals on Weisberg against the United States, Aspin against Department
of Defense; Ditlow against Brinegar; and National Center against Wcmbcrgcr?
As I understand it, the holdings in those particular cases are of the greatest
concern to the Senator from Michigan. As I interpret it, the impact and effect
of his amendment would be to override those particular decisions. Is that not
correct?
Mr. Hart. The Senator from Michigan [sic] is correct. That is its purpose.
That was the purpose of Congress in 1966, we thought, when we enacted this.
Until about 9 or 12 months ago, the courts consistently had approached it on a
balancing basis, which is exactly what this amendment seeks to do.
The need for amendment of exemption seven had been suggested as early as 1972.
See H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 310, at 71, noting that it "is accurate to state
in a summary fashion, that the courts have been generally reluctant to order the
disclosure of Government information falling within • • • exemption (b)(7)." The
report recommended several changes in the language of the exemption to direct the
courts' attention to the purposes of the exemption when faced with a request for
disclosure. See id. at 84.
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not been included in either the bill proposed to the House803 or that
proposed to the Senate,804 but was introduced on the floor of the
Senate by Senator Hart.805 The Senator commented on the recent
restrictive interpretation of the exemption806 and stated that his
amendment was intended to force the courts to require the government to show on the facts of each particular case that the stated
interests would be harmed by disclosure.so 7
The exemption as amended lists six categories of interests that it
is designed to protect, and authorizes the withholding of investigatory
records to the extent necessary to protect those interests.sos Thus,
In NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4500-01 (U.S. April 28, 1975),
the Supreme Court declined to decide the exemption seven claim, but commented
in dicta on the 1974 amendment to the section: "The legislative history clearly indicates that Congress disapproves of those cases • • • which relieve the Government
of the obligation to show that disclosure of a particular investigatory file would contravene the purposes of Exemption 7." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4501.
803. H.R. 12471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
804. S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The Senate committee explained: "The
substance of the exemptions contained in the Freedom of Information Act thus
remains unchanged by S. 2543, although by leaving it unchanged the committee is
implying acceptance of neither agency objections to the specific changes proposed in
the bills being considered, nor judidal dedsions which unduly constrict the application of the Act." S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 7 (emphasis added). Senator
Kennedy stated that the committee had considered the amendments before the District of Columbia cases were decided. 120 CONG. R.Ec. S9330-31 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
It appears that there also was a political reason for not submitting an amended
version of exemption seven to the committee. Senator Kennedy, the sponsor of the
amendments, feared that the conservative forces on the committee would view substantive amendments to the exemptions unfavorably and that if they were introduced,
the bill might never get out of the committee. Telephone interview with Thomas
Susman, Assistant Counsel, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, D.C., Sept. 5, 1974.
805. 120 CONG. R.Ec. S9329 (daily ed. May 30, 1974). The amendment, as originally
introduced by Senator Hart, provided:
Section 552(b)(7) is amended to read as follows: "Investigatory records compiled
for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such
records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person
of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication or constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (C) disclose the identity of an informer, or (D) disclose investigative techniques and procedures."
Id.
806. "[R]ecently, the courts have interpreted the seventh exception to the Freedom
of Information Act to be applied whenever an agency can show that the document
sought is an investigatory file compiled for law enforcement purposes-a stone wall
at that point. The court would have the exemption applied without the need of
the agency to show why the disclosure of the particular document should not be
made." Id.
807. See id. at S9331 (remarks of Senator Kennedy); id. at S9329-30 (remarks of
Senator Hart): "That [the approach of the D.C. Circuit], we suggest, is not consistent
with the intent of Congress when it passed this basic act in 1966. Then, as now, we
recognized the need for law enforcement agencies to be able to keep their records
and files confidential where a disclosure would interfere with any one of a number
of specific interests, each of which is set forth in the amendment that a number of
us are offering." (Emphasis added.)
808. 5 u.s.c.A. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
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nondisclosure is appropriate when disclosure would "interfere with
enforcement proceedings,"800 or "deprive a person of a right to a
fair trial or an impartial adjudication,''810 or "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," 811 or reveal "the identity
of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a
criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only
by the confidential source,'' 812 or reveal "investigative techniques and
procedures," 813 or "endanger the life or physical safety of law en809. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(A) (Supp. Feb. 1975). Senator Hart commented:
This would apply whenever the Government's case in court-a concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding-would be harmed by the premature release of
evidence or information not in the possession of known or potential defendants,
This would apply also where the agency could show that the disclosure of the
information would substantially harm such proceedings by impeding any necessary investigation before the proceeding. In determining whether or nor the infor•
mation to be released will interfere with a law enforcement proceeding it is only
relevant to make such determination in the context of the particular enforcement
proceeding.
120 CONG. R.Ec. S9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
810. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See 120 CONG. R.Ec. S9330 (daily
ed. May 30, 1974). Cf. note 787 supra and accompanying text.
8ll. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b){7)(C) (Supp. Feb. 1975). Senator Hart's amendment originally provided that disclosure would be inappropriate if it would "constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." See note 805 supra, The Senator's
comments made it clear that he intended this language to be interpreted as it had
been in exemption six cases. See 120 CoNG. R.Ec. S9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974). The
conference committee deleted the word "clearly," see CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
225, at 12, in an attempt to provide the public with a greater degree of protection than
that provided by the language and case law of the sixth exemption. Cf. 120 CONG,
R.Ec. S17,829-30 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1974). The conference committee also added that
they wished to make it "clear that disclosure of information about a person to tliat
person does not constitute an invasion of his privacy." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 225, at 13.
812. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(D) (Supp. Feb. 1975). Senator Hart's original amendment simply provided that information could be withheld when publication would
"disclose the identity of an informer." See note 805 supra. The conferees substituted
the term "confidential source" to make it "clear that the identity of a person other
than a paid informer may be protected if the person provided information under an
express assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances from which such an assurance
could be reasonably inferred." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 13, The conference report describes this provision as follows:
Under this category, in every case where the investigatory records sought were
compiled for law enforcement purposes-either civil or criminal in nature-the
agency can withhold the names, addresses, and other information that would
reveal the identity of a confidential source who furnished the information, However, where the records are compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority,
all of the information furnished only by a confidential source may be withheld
if the information was compiled in the course of a criminal investigation, In
addition, where the records are compiled by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, all of the information furnished only
by a confidential source may also be withheld.
Id. (emphasis original). See also 120 CONG. R.Ec. S9332-36 (daily ed. May 30, 1974)
(remarks of Senator Hruska).
·
813. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(E) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 225, at 12-13: "[The exemption] should not be interpreted to include routine
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forcement personnel." 814 In applying the amended exemption seven,
the courts should be guided by the approach taken by the court in
Wellford .v. Hardin 815 and use in camera review to examine closely
the requested information to determine if it was compiled for law
enforcement purposes, if it was compiled as the result of an investigation, and if disclosure would harm any of the specifically listed
interests.
Although President Ford agreed with the basic need for revision
of exemption seven,816 he had two major objections to the amendment passed by Congress.817 These objections were among the reasons
techniques and procedures already well known to the public, such as ballistics tests,
fingerprinting, and other scientific tests or commonly known techniques. Nor is this
e.xemption intended to include records falling within the scope of subsection 552(a)(2)
of the Freedom of Information law, such as administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public." In commenting on this provision,
Senator Hart added, "It would not generally apply to techniques of questioning witnesses." 120 CoNG. R.Ec. S9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974).
814. 5 U.S.C.A. § 5o2(b)(7)(F) (Supp. Feb. 1975). This clause was added by the
conference committee. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 12.
815. 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971). See text at notes 789-96 supra. "Until a year ago
the courts looked to the reasons for the seventh exemption before allowing the withholding of documents. That approach is in keeping with the intent of Congress and
by this amendment we wish to reinstall it as the basis for access to information." 120
.CONG. R.Ec. S9330 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Senator Hart).
816. Ford Amendments, supra note 529, at 8.
817. The President also raised a third objection to the amendment: He felt that
it was impracticable to require law enforcement agencies to devote their efforts "to
a paragraph-by-paragraph screening of their files." Ford Amendments, supra note 529,
at 9. Such screening is required by another amended section of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552(b) (Supp. Feb. 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970), which provides that
"any reasonably segregable portion of a record" be disclosed to requesters "after
deletions of the portions which are exempt." See text at notes 501-05 supra. The
President admitted that this consideration did not justify the categorical exemption
of all investigatory files, Ford Amendments, supra, at 8, but argued that it should
not be ignored. He proposed that an agency head be allowed to make a case-by-case
finding of impracticability on the basis of various factors reviewable by the courts
and sought to add the following proviso to the end of section 552(b)(7}:
Provided: That where the agency head, after considering the results of a preliminary examination of the files involved in the request, personally finds, in
light of (1) the number of documents covered by the request, (2) the proportion
of such documents which consist of reports by Federal or State investigative
agents or from confidential sources, and (3) the availability of personnel of the
type needed to make the required review· and examination, that application
of the foregoing tests on a record-by-record basis would be impracticable, the
agency may apply such tests to the investigatory file as a whole or to reasonably segregable portions thereof; except that this provision shall not be ~pplied
to files which the agency has reason to believe contain records which are not
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, nor shall it protect
from disclosure any records which, as a result of the preliminary examination
or for any other reason, do not require further significant review or examination.
Id. at 6-7. The concerns of the President for the practical problems faced by an
agency in attempting to establish the need for nondisclosure are understandable.
However, the problem of balancing various interests was directly faced and resolved
by Congress in favor of disclosure. Congress recognized the possibility that agencies
will have difficulty finding the time to examine files and thus provided for the extension of time limits if necessary. See text at notes 900-38 infra. This time extension
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that he gave for vetoing the FOIA amendments. 818 The President
first objected to the stringent showing of harmful effect that agencies
must make to justify nondisclosure. He argued that, in most cases, an
agency could not establish that disclosure "would" cause one of the
particular harms listed in the amendment. 819 He proposed that nondisclosure ~e allowed upon demonstration of a "substantial possibility" that disclosure would harm one of the interests listed.820 The
President had not raised this objection in his earlier negotiations
with the conference committee,821 and Congress rejected this proposal by overriding his veto.s22
The President's second objection concerned the limited protection of confidential sources afforded by the amended exemption. 823
The conference committee had expanded this protection to allow
nondisclosure of the identity of a confidential source in both civil
and criminal proceedings.824 As enacted, the exemption also permits
withholding confidential information obtained either by a criminal
law enforcement agency conducting a criminal investigation, or by
an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, provided that the information was secured solely from a confidential source.825 This protection was not extended, however, to
civil law enforcement agencies or to civil investigations. 826 The President objected to this limitation on the ground that several agencies
perform important civil law-enforcement functions and that these
functions often lead to criminal investigations. The President proposed that this protection be extended to cover confidential information gathered in criminal investigations carried out by civil, as well
as criminal, law enforcement agencies.827
was designed, at least in part, to provide relief from the burdens created by large
requests. See 120 CONG, REc. HI0,865 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974) (remarks of Representative Moorhead).
818. See 10 WEEKLY COIIIP. OF PRFS. Docs, 1318 (Oct. 17, 1974); Ford Amendments,
supra note 529, at 6-9.
819. Ford Amendments, supra note 529, at 8.
820. Ford Amendments, supra note 529, at 6, 8. The President referred to another
reason for establishing a more lenient standard. He argued that since exemption seven
protects important individual interests, all efforts should be made to assure that the
interests are protected. Changing the required degree of proof would provide a
greater measure of protection for these interests. See Ford Amendments, supra, at 8;
120 CONG. REc. Sl9,814 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974).
821. See 120 CoNG, REc. Sl7,829 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1974) (letter from President Ford
to Senator Kennedy, Aug. 20, 1974).
822. See text at notes 329-32 supra.
823. Ford Amendments, supra note 529, at 8.
824. See CONFERE~CE REPORT, supra note 225, at 13, quoted in note 812 supra.
825. See note 812 supra and accompanying text. See also 120 CONG, REc. Sl7,829-30
(daily ed. Oct. I, 1974) (letter from Senator Kennedy and Representative Moorhead
to President Ford, Sept. 23, 1974).
826. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 13, quoted in note 812 supra.
827. Ford Amendments, supra note 529, at 6, 8.
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Although Congress, in overriding the President's veto, rejected
this proposal, it is worthy of more serious consideration. It appears
that Congress consciously made the decision not to extend the added
protection of confidential sources to civil law-enforcement agencies
or to civil investigations, but there is no explanation for this decision
in the legislative history,828 and it may prove to have been unwise.
First, as the President argued in vetoing the amendments, investigations by civil law-enforcement agencies can often lead to criminal
investigations and prosecutions, and the same protection of information received from confidential sources may be needed. Second, the
need for the complete protection of confidential sources may be as
important in civil investigations as it is in criminal investigations,
because a confidential source may be equally critical to the success
of each. Congress should thus consider extending the protection of
exemption seven to all law enforcement agencies conducting either
civil or criminal investigations.
h. Financial institution reports. Exemption eight covers information "contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions."829 This exemption was designed to protect financial institutions from any adverse consequences that might result from the
disclosure of information collected by the government's regulatory
agencies.830 It appears to be a continuation and extension of the prior
828. The language of exemption seven was analyzed in CONFERENCE REl'oRT, supra
note 225, at 13; 120 CONG. R.Ec. S19,812, S19,815, S19,818-19 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974).
There is no explanation for the decision to limit the protection of confidential information to criminal and national security investigations.
829. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1970). See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.24
(Supp. 1970); Bennett, The Freedom of Information Act, Is It a Clear Public Records Law?, 34 BROOKLYN L. REv. 72, 77 (1967); Note, 62 GEo. L.J. 177, supra note 333,
at 205-06; Note, 56 GEO. L.J. 18, supra note 333, at 50-51; Note, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
694, supra note 750, at 722.
830. S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 10; H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note
310, at 11. The Senate report states; "Exemption No. 8 is directed specifically to
insuring the security of our financial institutions by making available only to the
Government agencies responsible for the regulation or supervision of such institutions
the examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for
the use of such agencies." S. REF. No. 89-813, supra, at 10. The House report comments: "This exemption is designed to insure the security and integrity of financial
institutions, for the sensitive details collected by Government agencies which regulate
these institutions could, if indiscriminately disclosed, cause great harm.'' H.R. REF.
No. 89-1497, supra, at 11. See also ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309,
at 38:
An earlier version of exemption (4) protected trade secrets, but made no mention
of financial information and would not have protected information developed by
agency investigators and examiners, as distinguished from information "obtained
from the public.'' Exemption (4) as enacted, however, covers commercial and fi.
nancial information •••• Exemption (8) emphasizes the intention of the revision
to protect information relating to financial institutions which may be prepared
for or used by any agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of such
institutions.
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case law that had established the custom of keeping reports of bank
examiners confidential in order to ensure the security and integrity
of financial institutions.831 Professor Davis is extremely critical of
the exemption.832 In his view, it will only increase the tendencies
of financial institutions to maintain "systems of secret facts, secret
law, and secret policy." 833
Several commentators have noted that the fourth exemption,
which protects certain "commercial or financial information," 834
makes this exemption superfl.uous.835 The Attorney General's Memorandum concludes that the purpose of the exemption is to emphasize the congressional intent to protect such information.886
There has been only one reported case dealing extensively with
this exemption. In M. A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC,831 the plaintiff
brought an action under the FOIA to compel the disclosure of an
SEC staff study of off-board trading problems and of all transcripts
made and documents received during the study. The court held
that the "study and its related transcripts and documents, initiated
and gathered fo~ the express purpose of changing trading rules and
related practices of national securities exchanges, does not fit within
the exception . . . ." 838 The court also noted that the possibility of
harm to the integrity of any securities exchanges or broker-dealers
could be precluded by the deletion of all identifying material before
disclosure.839
This eighth exemption is probably of little importance because
831. See, e.g., Bank of America Natl. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100,
103 (D.C. Cir. 1939). Professor Davis, in commenting on Bank of America, concluded
that the "case shows that at least in some circumstances a court may without statutory assistance require that information in the possession of an adminisrative agency
be kept confidential." I K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3.13, at 229 (1958). See Bennett,
supra note 829, at 77.
832. See K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.24 (Supp. 1970).
833. Id. at 166. Professor Davis noted that this exemption "is • • • in keeping
with banking tradition, although that tradition rests heavily on facts of a former day
such as uninsured bank accounts and runs on banks. The law is clear, but I still
wish the lobbyists for the banking agencies had been less effective." Id.
834. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970). See text at notes 6ll-47 supra.
835. See Note, 62 GEo. L.J. 177, supra note 333, at 205 n.197; Note, 56 GEO, L.J.
18, supra note 323, at 50. The courts have been quite strict in interpreting exemption
four, however, and it is possible that some information protected under exemption
eight might not fall within exemption four. Under exemption four, the courts have
required that the information be either privileged or confidential, but have narrowly
defined the latter category; information is "confidential" if its disclosure will harm
the competitive position of the supplier or the government's ability to obtain information. See text at notes 635-38 supra. It is conceivable that not all of the informa•
tion exempted by section eight would meet these criteria.
836. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 38.
837. 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972). See Note, 62 GEo. L.J. 177, supra note 333,
at 205-06. See also Farmers Natl. Bank v. Camp, 345 F. Supp. 622, 627-28 (D. Md. 1971).
838. 339 F. Supp. at 470.
839. 339 F. Supp. at 470.
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of the fourth exemption, and the prospects of a substantial amount
of litigation arising under it are few.
,
i. Information concerning wells. Exemption nine protects "geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells." 840 The purpose of this exemption is to assure that
geological data filed with government agencies by private oil companies, which arguably might not be covered by the fourth exemption,841 will be protected from disclosure.842 Oil companies are re:.
quired to file oil and gas findings with federal agencies if they wish
to lease government-owned land, and Congress felt that the disclosure
of this information would give speculators an unfair advantage.843
There have been no reported cases under exemption ·nine. The
FPC relied on the exemption to deny a request by Ralph Nader for
American Gas Association reports and reports prepared by the FPC
concerning a survey of the natural gas reserves in the country.844
840. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(9) (1970). See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3.A.25
(Supp. 1970); Bennett, supra note 829, at 77; Dobkin, The Release of GovernmentOwned Technical Data Under the Freedom of Information Law: Between Scylla and
Charybdis, 14 VILL. L. R.Ev. 74 (1968); Note, 62 GEo. L.J. 177, supra note 333, at 206;
Note, 56 GEO. L.J. 18, supra note 323, at 51 (1967); Note, 47 ST. JoHN's L. R.Ev. 694,
supra note 750, at 723.
841. "It should be noted that, although the information involved in exemption (9)
might not be a 'trade secret' within the meaning of the earlier version of exemption
(4), it would seem to constitute commercial and financial information covered by the
present exemption (4) •••• The addition of exemption (9) is helpful in explaining
the intention of the statute with respect to such information." AnoRNEY GENERAL'S
MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 39. The new, narrower interpretation of exemption
four, see text at notes 635-38, may make this "helpful" addition more important.
Compare note 835 supra and accompanying text.
842. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 11. The Senate report, S. REP. No.
89-813, supra note 310, did not comment on this exemption. The House report stated:
This category was added after witnesses testified that geological maps based on
explorations by private oil companies were not covered by the "trade secrets"
provisions of present laws. Details of oil and gas findings must be filed with Federal agencies by companies which want to lease Government-owned land. Current
regulations of the Bureau of Land Management prohibit disclosure of these details only if the disclosure "would be prejudicial to the interests of the Government" (43 CFR, pt. 2). Witnesses contended that disclosure of the seismic reports
and other exploratory findings of oil companies would give speculators an unfair
advantage over the companies which spent millions of dollars in exploration.
H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra, at 11.
843. See note 842 supra, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497. Commentat(?rs have been
unenthusiastic about the value of this exemption. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra note
265, § 3A.25, at 166 (Supp. 1970) ("I am inclined to believe that the present regulation of the Bureau of Land Management is preferable to what Congress has enacted. Instead of exempting the records from required disclosure, the regulation makes
them available unless their disclosure 'would be prejudicial to the interests of the
Government'"); Bennett, supra note 829, at 77 ("Without disputing the wisdom of
the decision to withhold this type of information, it would appear that this constitutes
restricting availability, rather than liberalizing availability of public records").
844. 6 1972 House Hearings, supra note 326, at 1970-72 (letter from Ralph Nader
&: David Calfee to John Nassikas, Chairman, Federal Power Commission, Feb. 28, 1972).
Mr. Nader contended that the exemption was desigued to protect the data and maps,
not the estimates of reserves derived from that information. Id. at 1971.
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The FPC refused to disclose the reports on the ground that the
exemption's goal of protecting seismic data and geological maps
would be defeated if the reserve estimates were released. It argued
that "a competitor's sole interest in seeing such data (seismic data
and maps) from his counterpart's wells would in all probability
center upon his desire to know or determine the end figure for
reserves. If the latter information is disclosed, it becomes a meaningless gesture to withhold the former." 845 The position of the FPC
in this situation seems unnecessarily narrow since the purpose of
the exemption is to protect oil company data from speculators, not
from other oil companies.
The ninth exemption is superfluous846 and little used. It is unlikely that a significant amount of litigation will arise under it.

4. The Procedural Requirements
a. User fees. Section 552(a)(4) of the FOIA was completely redrafted by Congress in 1974 in order to reduce the cost of obtaining
requested records,847 strengthen the Act's judicial enforcement
process,848 and make agency officials more responsive to FOIA requests.849 The changes reflect congressional belief that the "primary
obstacles to the [1967] Act's faithful implementation by the executive branch have been procedural rather than substantive."850 The
fervor of congressional efforts to improve the Act's administration
was demonstrated by Congress' complete rebuff of President Ford's
veto. 851 President Ford was concerned, among other things, about
the impracticability of some of the procedural changes.852
845. Id. at 1972-74 (letter from Kenneth F. Plumb, Secretary, Federal Power Commission, to Ralph Nader 8.: David Calfee, May 24, 1972), Mr. Plumb also wrote that
"[e]ven if one acknowledges, as you have argued, that this exemption from disclosure
is aimed at safeguarding underlying seismic data and geological maps, it is precisely
this kind of information which is critical in arriving at the reserves estimates whlcl1
you argue are not protected from the disclosure requirements." Id. at 1973,
846. See Note, 62 GEo. L.J. 1'77, supra note 333, at 206 n.201; Note, 56 GEo, L.J.
18, supra note 323, at 51. Cf. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 39,
847. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
848. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(a)(4)(B)·(E) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
849. 5 u.s.c.A. § 552(a)(4)(F) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
850. S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 1. After holding hearings in 1972 on
the implementation of the FOIA, the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
and Government Information identified six major problem areas, all related to pro•
cedural, rather than substantive, aspects of the law. For a summary of these problem
areas see H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 327, at 8.
851. The FOIA amendments passed the House over the President's veto by a margin of 371 to 31. 120 CoNG. R.Ec. HI0,875 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974); N.Y. Times,
Nov. 21, 1974, at 19, col. 1 (late city ed.). The Senate passed the amendments by a
margin of 65 to 27. 120 CONG, R.Ec. Sl9,823 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1974); N.Y. Times
Nov. 22, 1974, at 21, cols. 3-4 (late city ed.).
852. See IO WEEKLY CoMl'. OF PRES. Docs. 1318 (1974); Ford Amendments, supra
note 529, at 3-5; N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1974, at 16, col. 3 (late city ed.).
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Subsection (a)(4)(A) was enacted to remedy several problems
connected with user fees-fees charged by agencies to search for,
screen, and copy requested information. Search fees reflect the cost
of finding the requested documents; screening fees reflect the cost
of having trained analysts segregate and exclude the exempt portions
of those documents.858 Under the provisions of (a)(4)(A), each
agency must specify a uniform schedule of fees, limited to "reasonable standard charges for document search and duplication and provid[ing] for recovery of only the direct costs of such search and
duplication."854 The subsection further provides that the agency may
waive or reduce its fees "in the public interest." 855
Under the 1967 Act, agencies were only required to publish
"rules stating ... fees to the extent authorized by statute." 856 This
provision was commonly understood to refer to 31 U.S.C. § 483a,
which provides that "each Federal agency is authorized by regulation
... to prescribe therefor such fee ... as [it] shall determine . . .
to be fair and equitable taking into consideration direct and indirect
cost to the Government, value to the recipient, public policy or
interest served, and other pertinent facts ...." 857 This statute vested
agency officials with substantial discretion to determine fee policies,
without specific guidance as to its use.
Several problems arose under the 1967 FOIA due to the lack of
substantive directives on the assessment of user fees. The first problem was that, although 31 U.S.C. § 483a provided for consideration
of public policy interests, most agencies attempted to recover the
full costs of fulfilling FOIA requests. A 1959 Bureau of the Budget
circular, for example, suggested that
[w]here a service ... provides special benefits to an identifiable recipient above and beyond those which accrue to the public at large,
a charge should be imposed to recover the full cost to the Federal
Government of rendering that service. For example, a special benefit
will be considered to accrue and a charge should be imposed when
a Government-rendered service . . . [i]s performed at the request of
the recipient and is above and beyond the services regularly received
by other members of the same industry or group, or of the general
public ....858
853. See text at notes 496-505 supra.
854. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
855. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
856. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
857. This statute was held to apply to FOIA cases in Reinoehl v. Hershey, 426
F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1970), and Diapulse Corp. of America v. FDA, 500 F.2d 75 (2d
Cir. 1974).
858. U.S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, CmcULAR A-25, § 3(a)(l), Sept. 23, 1959 [hereinafter CIRCULAR A-25), reprinted in 3 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 468-70.
(In 1970 "all functions vested by law • • • in the Bureau of the Budget" were transferred to the President, Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, § 101, 84 Stat. 2085 (1970),
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This position was also adopted in the Attorney General's Memorandum, which states that "an appropriate fee should be required
for searching as well as a fee for copying. Such fees should include
indirect costs, such as the cost to the agency of the services of the
Government employee who searches for, reproduces, certifies, or
authenticates in some manner copies of requested documents." 8G0
In 1971, the Administrative Conference of the United States
recommended that agencies waive user fees in appropriate circumstances,860 but the policy of the Bureau of the Budget circular and
the Attorney General's Memorandum found favor in practice. As
late as 1973, only three of thirty-six agencies surveyed had regulations providing for fee diminution or waiver for individual FOIA
information requests that serve a public interest or policy.861 The
general refusal to waive costs for private parties seeking information
in the public interest was particularly harsh in view of the policy
of some agencies to provide free information to their regulatory
subjects.862
The present (a)(4)(A) attempts to solve the waiver problem by
providing that "[d]ocuments shall be furnished without charge or
and the Bureau was redesignated the Office of Management and Budget. Id, § 102.)
This circular and 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1970) provide the bases for agency FOIA user-fee
regulations. 5 1972 House Hearings, supra note 326, at 1381-83 (report of the Freedom
of Information Fee Committee).
859. A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 26.
860. 2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF nm UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS: RECOMMENDATION 71-2: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (May 7, 1971) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION 71-2].
This Recommendation was originally referred to as Recommendation No. 24 and is
often referred to as such in the various congressional hearings. The Administrative
Conference, however, adopted a new system of numbering in December 1972 and
redesignated No. 24 at 71-2. Id. at III·IV.
861. See I 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 205 (table of agency fees as
of March 1, 1973).
A regulation providing for fee waivers was promulgated in 1972 by the Department
of Transportation:
Documents may be furnished without charge or at a reduced charge, if the Di•
rector of Public Affairs, or the head of the operating administration concerned,
as the case may be, determines that waiver or reduction of the fee is in the
public interest, because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public. Examples of requests that may fall within
this paragraph are reasonable requests from groups engaged in a nonprofit activity designed for the public safety, health, or welfare; schools; and students
engaged in study in the field of transportation.
49 C.F.R. § 7.87(CJ. In practice, this regulation seems to be working well. As one user
stated, "This is a very simple regulation that is in effect and is being used I understand quite successfully by the DOT." 3 1973 Senate Hearings, supra, at 390 (statement of R. Plesser, Center for the Study of Responsive Law).
862. A representative of the Center for Study of Responsive Law noted: "We have
received frequent complaints from citizens who have been charged search fees and
xeroxing costs for information which an agency made freely available to its regulatory clients." 2 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 103 (statement of H. Wellford).
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at a reduced charge where the agency determines that waiver or
reduction of the fee is in the public interest because furnishing the
information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general
public."863 This language serves nvo useful purposes: First, it formally directs agencies to be sensitive to fee waiver situations if the
public interest is involved and requires them to promulgate regulations to that effect.864 Second, it provides a basis for judicial review
of agency waiver determinations.865
The second user fee problem that arose under the 1967 Act was
that the actual fees charged were sometimes unreasonably high. Since
user fees are paid into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts,866
there is no direct economic incentive for agencies to charge high
fees. There is, however, an incentive to charge high fees to discourage information seekers. The Attorney General's Memorandum
suggested that "[c]harging fees may also discourage frivolous requests, especially for large quantities of records the production of
which would uselessly occupy agency personnel to the detriment of
the proper performance of other agency functions as well as its
863. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A) (Supp. Feb. 1975). Cf. R.EcoMMENDATION 71-2, supra
note 860.
864. Some indication of congressional intent regarding the meaning of the term
"public interest" is provided by the legislative history of (a)(4)(A). The original Senate
version of this provision read, in part, "[User] fees shall ordinarily not be charged
whenever-(i) the person requesting the records is an indigent individual; (ii) such
fees would amount, in the aggregate, for a request or series of related requests, to
less than $3; (iii) the records requested are not found; or (iv) the records located
are determined by the agency to be exempt from disclosure under subsection (b)."
S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § l(b)(2) (1974). The conference report gave the following
explanation for deleting the above language: "By eliminating the list of specific categories, the conferees do not intend to imply that agencies should actually charge fees
in those categories. Rather, they felt, such matters are properly the subject for individual agency determination in regulations implementing the Freedom of Information
law." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 8.
865. Thus far, no court has been asked to review an agency application of waiver
regulations. But cf. Diapulse Corp. of America v. FDA, 500 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1974)
(reviewing the question whether screening fees are legally permitted under FDA and
HEW regulations). To the extent that an agency determination whether a fee waiver
is justified involves questions of fact, the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" review
standard, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970), will apply. Cf. Citizens To Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-16 (1971); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF .ADMINISI"RATIVE ACTION 181-82 (1965).
866. 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1970). It has been suggested that
agencies should be permitted to retain fees that are collected in connection with
furnishing records. At present, all such fees must be paid into the United States
Treasury • • • and, as a result, some agencies have used the lack of adequate
funds and personnel as justification for failure to respond promptly to requests
for information. The Freedom of Information Act should be amended to provide
that fees collected for copying and furnishing records be retained by the agency,
in a special fund, to defray the costs of complying with the statute.
5 1972 House Hearings, supra note 326, at 1436 (statement of the Section of Administrative Law of the American Bar Association). The Senate committee rejected this
proposal, however, stating that it "could unduly encourage the charging of excessive
fees by agencies, effectively taxing public access even more." S. REP. No. 93--854, supra
note 329, at 12.
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service in filling legitimate requests for records." 867 Of course, "full
cost" fees also may discourage legitimate requests. Moreover, the
FOIA does not permit inquiry into the interests of the requester
in determining whether disclosure is warranted; 868 setting fees to
discourage even "frivolous" requests would seem to violate this policy by allowing agencies to judge the relative value of requests. The
great variance in the fees charged by different agencies for essentially
similar tasks is evidence that agencies did in fact set rates that reflected their judgments on the type and nature of claims that should
be discouraged. For example, copying fees ranged from five cents to
fifty cents per page, and search fees varied from three to seven
dollars an hour.869
Some agencies required that fees for searching and screening
large numbers of documents be prepaid. The Department of Agriculture required prepayments of $85,000 and $91,840 for two information requests made to its pesticide division. 870 The FDA required
a Ralph Nader consumer action group to prepay $20,000 before
beginning a search for the documents requested by the group; the
FDA would not guarantee that any documents would be disclosed,
nor would it guarantee that part of the fee would be returned in
the event that some of the requested documents fell within the
FOIA exemptions.871 A New York Times writer described the prepayment procedure as "research roulette" after prepaying almost
$200 for some newspaper clippings.872 Charges were also made that
agencies were "commingling" or "contaminating" disclosable records
with materials exempt from disclosure, thereby increasing searching
and screening charges for those seeking the disclosure of the nonexempt documents. 873
Corrective action on the fee size problem was initiated by
administrative officials. In 1971, the Administrative Conference
recommended that fees for copying documents "be uniform and
not exceed the going commercial rate, even where such a charge
would not cover all costs incurred by particular agencies," 874 that
867. A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 26-7.
868. See note 458 supra and accompanying text.
869. 1 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 204 (fee tables); 1973 House
Hearings, supra note 756, at 92 (fee tables); 2 1973 Senate Hearings, supra, at 102-03

(testimony of H. Wellford, Center for the Study of Responsive Law). While the fee
tables indicate that the copying fee for the Selective Service System was one dollar
per page, this fee apparently included some costs of search as well.
870. 2 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 103 (testimony of H. Wellford,
Center for the Study of Responsive Law).
871. 1 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 203-04 (testimony of R. Plesscr,
Center for the Study of Responsive Law).
872. Id. at 160 (testimony of H. Bancroft, Executive Vice-President, N.Y. Times,
quoting M. Frankel, Washington Bureau Chief, N.Y. Times).
873. See Nader, supra note 333, at 9-10.
874. RECOMMENDATION 71-2, supra note 860, § (c).

May-June 1975]

Project

1109

no fee be charged for a routine search, and that, as a rule, no
fee be charged for screening exempt records. 875 This recommendation
prompted the Office of Management and Budget to send a memorandum to the heads of all the executive agencies urging them to
review their fee schedules. It stated, "Fees should not be established at an excessive level for the purpose of deterring requests for
copies of records." 876 The memorandum did influence nine or more
agencies to reduce substantially their reproduction charges.877
Furthermore, several agencies complied with another of the Conference's recommendations and did not charge a fee for routine
searches. 878 However, the reductions were not universal and few
agencies were willing to eliminate the burdensome screening fees. 879
Revised section 552(a)(4) seeks to remedy the fee size problem
with two directives. First, each agency must "promulgate regulations,
pursuant to notice and receipt of public comment, specifying a uniform schedule of fees applicable to all constituent units of such
agency." 880 This provision invokes the rule-making procedures of
section 4 of the AP A881 for agency fee determinations. Thus, general
notice of fee determination proceedings must be published in the
Federal Register; the time, place, nature, and subject of the proceeding must be included in the notice.882 Interested persons must
also be given the opportunity to submit their views on the fees in
controversy.883 Failure to publish notice of the proceedings or to
be receptive to public comment on proposed rules will render the
fees uncollectible.884
875. Id.
876. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Department and Agencies, May 2, 1972, reprinted
in 5 1972 House Hearings, supra note 326, at 1391.
877. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 756, at 281-82 (testimony of A. Scalia, Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States).
878. See, e.g., regulations of the following agencies: Department of Justice, 28 C.F.R.
§ 16.9(b) (1974) (no charge for first quarter-hour); Federal Maritime Commission, 46
C.F.R. § 503.43(c) (1974) (no charge for first half-hour); NASA, 14 C.F.R. § 1206.700
(1974) (no charge for first quarter-hour).
879. The Department of Justice was a leader among the agencies in revising its
own regulations to bring them into line with RECOMMENDATION 71-2. 1973 House
Hearings, supra note 756, at 282 (testimony of A. Scalia, Chairman, Administrative
Conference of the United States). However, its revised regulations still provide that
a fee may be charged for the screening of documents, where a "broad request" requires a "substantial amount of time." 28 C.F.R. § 16.9(b)(7) (1974).
880. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
881. 5 u.s.c. § 553 (1970).
882. 5 u.s.c. § 553(b) (1970).
883. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
884. Failure to publish notice of a proposed rule-making renders the proposed
rule ineffective until the proper procedure is followed. See Lewis-Mota v. Secretary
of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972); Waguer Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d
1013, 1020-21 (3d Cir. 1972); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744-46 (3d Cir. 1969).
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Second, fees must be "limited to reasonable standard charges for
document search and duplication and provide for recovery of only
the direct costs of such search and duplication."880 The amendment
follows one of the Conference's recommendations and eliminates
charges for screening documents; 886 however, it rejected the suggestion that routine search fees be eliminated.887
The elimination of screening fees should discourage agency use
of the "commingling" or "contamination" technique. 888 Costs can
no longer be run up by integrating exempt and nonexempt documents so as to require extensive screening time by paid specialists.
It may be argued, however, that this elimination unduly burdens
agencies by not allo-wing them to recover their legitimate screening
costs, which may be substantial if the number of documents requested is large. Thus, it may be thought that a preferred solution
would be to allow the recovery of screening fees with a provision
for waiver in the public interest. Reliance would then be placed on
judicial review to remedy the charging of unreasonable fees.
Congress apparently felt that the "contamination" problem was
severe enough, and the power of judicial review was limited enough,
to justify an irrebuttable presumption that screening fees are unreasonable.880 It may also have hoped that the elimination would
encourage agencies to develop more efficient screening, recording,
and indexing systems to offset some of the cost burden.
But cf. United States v. Elof Hansson, Inc., 296 F.2d 779, 781-82 (C.C.P.A.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1960) (where all interested parties had actual notice of the
rule-making and where objection to lack of notice was not timely, the rule was cffec•
tive).
885. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
886. Although the amended section 552(a)(4)(A) does not expressly mention screening charges, the conference report clearly indicates that the congressional intent was
not to permit such charges: "[E]ach agency [is] required to issue its own regulations
for the recovery of only the direct costs of search and duplication-not including
examination or review of records ••••" CONFERENCE REPoRT, supra note 225, at 8
(emphasis added).
887. See text at note 875 supra. The amendment also failed to adopt another
Conference recommendation-the suggestion that copying fees be uniform for all
agencies. See text at note 874 supra. The Senate bill would have empowered 0MB
to promulgate uniform fees, see S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § l(b)(l) (1974), but the
provision was dropped in conference.
Although the lack of a uniform fee schedule for copying means that some agencies
may be able to charge more than what the uniform fee would be, it also means that
some agencies can charge less. For example, the EEOC is able to maintain its five•
cents per copy rate, see 29 C.F.R. § 1610.17(a) (1974), and NASA can continue to
charge only seven-cents per copy for nontechnical documents. See 14 C.F.R. § 1206.700
(b) (1974).
888. See text at note 873 supra.
889. Thus, even when President Ford, after his veto, proposed a provision that
would allow the agencies to recover some of the costs incurred in servicing particularly burdensome requests by permitting screening fees to be charged if the cost exceeded $100, see Ford Amendments, supra note 529, at 4, Congress refused to modify
the amendments.
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It is arguable that agencies may retain inefficient indexing and
storage systems to increase search fees and that search fees also
should be eliminated. Search fees may be distinguished from screening fees, however, in the ability of courts to review their reasonableness. Screening fees will depend on the nature and subject matter
of the documents sought. Some agencies may be forced to take more
care in their screening than others, and some documents within any
agency will require more attention than others. Thus, it is hard to
determine, on the basis of screening fees charged for past requests,
what screening fees are reasonable for present requests. Search fees,
however, are based on relatively simple tasks and should be directly
proportional to the number of documents sought. Accordingly, Congress apparently felt that the assessment of search fees involves little
risk of abuse.
The language of the amendment in providing for the recovery
of "direct costs," 800 rather than for the recovery of "full costs" as
provided in 31 U.S.C. § 483a and the Bureau of the Budget circular,891 may indicate that the amendment contemplates the recovery
of a smaller category of expenses than~ _did these other directives.
The legislative history does not indicate what may be included as
"direct costs." In view of the "full cost"~tradition, seen above in the
fees charged by agencies under the 1967 FOIA,892 Congress probably
intended that "direct costs" be narrowly defined. For example, the
fee for copies made on a machine that is used only incidentally
for FOIA activities should be limited to the marginal costs of those
copies and should not include an allocation of the machine's capital
cost.893
An agency's assessment of FOIA user fees will be subject to
judicial scrutiny.894 For an agency to compute its fees, it must make
fundamental decisions as to the definition of "direct costs" and
"search expense." To the extent that an agency, in defining these
terms, will be interpreting the langua~e of the FOIA, the court
890. By linking copy fees to the "direct costs~ ~f reproduction, the fees are likely
to vary among the agencies notwithstanding the use of uniform criteria, because of
the differences in costs among the agencie~. See SoURCEBOOK, supra note 319, at 339.
891. See text at notes 856-58 supra.
892. See text at notes 858-59 supra.
893. In determining which costs should be included in user charges under the
original FOIA, the Attorney General suggested that "the services of the Government
employee who searches for, reproduces, certifies, or authenticates" should be considered "indirect costs" and should be included. AnoRNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM,
supra note 309, at 26. Thus, these and similar costs were probably not intended to
be included within the meaning of the term "direct costs."
894. In reviewing such an assessment under the original FOIA, the Second Circuit
stated: "[A]n attempt to condition [disclosure of records] upon payment of unlawful
fees would be the sort of improper withholding of material that 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)
gives the district courts jurisdiction to enjoin." Diapulse Corp. of America v. FDA,
500 F.2d 75, 78 (1974).

1112

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 73:971

would seem to be able to exercise broad de novo review of these
agency interpretations.895 In some cases, the review standard has
been narrowed to whether the agency decision has a "warrant in the
record and a reasonable basis in law" 896 so as to give deference to
agency expertise.891 However, it is difficult to argue that agencies
concerned with the implementation of federal communications acts,
for example, have unassailable cost accounting expertise.BOB I£ agencies have properly interpreted the statute, their fact findings on the
actual costs incurred by individual requesters are subject to review
under the more limited "arbitrary and capricious" standard.Boo
b. Time limits. Congress created section 552(a)(6) in 1974 to
rectify the problem of dilatory agency responses to FOIA requests.
The provision requires that agencies determine within ten days
whether to comply with a disclosure request, and that agencies determine all appeals from their initial nondisclosure decisions within
'twenty days. 900 Time extensions of up to ten days are permitted in
defined "unusual circumstances." 001 I£ an agency fails to respond
895. "To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action,"
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). Thus, in Diapulse Corp. of America v. FDA, 500 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.
1974), the court stated that "[s]ince the issue ••• is whether the proposed fees were
legally authorized, there is no need for the agency to develop a detailed factual record
for purposes of decision, nor is there any area for the exercise of discretion." 500 F.2d
at 78. See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970); 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 265,
§ 30.06 (1958).
896. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
897. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill (1944); Gray v. Powell,
314 U.S. 402 (1941); Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of
Statutes, 3 VAND. L. R.Ev. 470 (1950); 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 30.05 (1958).
898. Cf. Diapulse Corp. of America v. FDA, 500 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[O]n
this legal question of authorization, agency expertise is of little help to a reviewing
court').
899. The "arbitrary, capricious ••• abuse of discretion" standard of 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2){A) (1970), is generally applied to an agency's fact findings, in informal rule•
making. In some cases, however, a broader standard of review has been applied. Thus,
in United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972), an FCC rule, promulgated
pursuant to informal "notice-and-comment" rule-making, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), was
subject to the standard whether it was "supported by substantial evidence that it will
promote the public interest." 406 U.S. at 671. See generally Verkuil, Judicial Review
of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. R.Ev. 185 (1974).
900. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6){A) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
901. "[U]nusual circumstances" means, but only to the extent reasonably neccs•
sary to the proper processing of the particular request(i) the need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities
or other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request;
(ii) the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous
amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request, or
(iii) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable
speed, with another agency having a substantial interest in the determination of
the request or among two or more components of the agency having substantial
subject-matter interest therein.
5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
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within the applicable time limits, a requester may seek judicial
enforcement.902 In such a case, a court is authorized to retain jurisdiction and allow the agency additional time to meet the request
"[i]f the government can show exceptional circumstances exist and
that the agency is exercising due diligence in responding to the
request...." 903 If an agency determines that it should disclose the
requested documents, "the records shall be made promptly available
to such person making such request." 904
Under the 1967 Act, there were no specific deadlines for agency
compliance with FOIA requests. 905 The lack of deadlines resulted
in long time delays for decisions on requests. 906 In early 1972, a
special task force created by the Congressional Research Service of
the Library of Congress conducted a study of the implementation
of the FOIA.907 It found that the average time for an agency response
to an initial request was thirty-three days and that the average time
for an agency decision on appeal was fifty days. 908
These delays significantly hindered the successful use of the
FOIA by several groups of requesters. For example, a representative
of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union told
a Senate subcommittee that the union had made efforts to obtain
Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards regarding
902. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(C) (Supp. Feb. 1975) provides: "Any person making a
request to any agency for records .•• shall be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to such request if the agency fails to comply with the
applicable time limit provisions of this paragraph." Once administrative remedies have
been exhausted, a requester may seek judicial relief. See notes 954-61 infra and accompanying text.
903. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(C) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
904. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(C) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
905. See generally Gianella, Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom of
Information Act: A Proposal for Uniform Regulations, 23 AD. L. R.Ev. 217, 243-52

(1971).
906. Id. at 223.
907. Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, The Administration
of the Freedom of Information Act, in 4 1972 Rouse Hearings, supra note 326, at
1333-43 [hereinafter Library of Congress Study].
908. Id. at 1337. The data were based on a survey taken between July 4, 1967, and
July 4, 1971.
.
There is evidence that much longer delays occasionally occur. For example, the
ACLU requested records pertaining to new parole board criteria from the U.S. Parole
Board. It had to wait two months before the Board sent notification of its decision
not to comply with the request. After the ACLU threatened to sue, and another 1:1\l'enty
days had passed, the Board reconsidered its intial denial. 2 1973 Senate Hearings,
supra note 125, at 53 (statement of J. Shattuck, Staff Counsel, ACLU). In August 1972,
the Center for the Study of Responsive Law submitted a request to the Department
of Justice for information concerning the business-review proceedings of the Antitrust
Division. The Center realized that these records had been withheld in the past and
wanted to obtain a denial so that this policy of withholding could be challenged in
court. Even though published regulations of the Justice Department specifically stated
that the information requested was confidential, it took six months to get a final
agency denial. 1973 Rouse Hearings, supra note 756, at 334 (statement of R. Plesser).
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occupational exposure to toxic chemicals and records of violations
of those standards in plants where union members were employed.DOD
He stressed the fact that the union needed the information promptly,
so that immediate action could be taken, if necessary, to safeguard
employees' health.910 The media's obvious need to obtain information
quickly was also frustrated by agency delays; it has been suggested
that the delays were a major reason for the media's failure to make
use of the Act effectively.911
In response to these problems, the Administrative Conference
of the United States in 1971 recommended establishing an FOIA
response-time deadline of ten days.D12 By 1974, a few agencies had
incorporated time limits in their regulations.D18 Most agencies, however, continued to object to any attempt to legislate specific time
limits.914 The reaction of the Department of Justice is typical:
[A] rigid requirement for a quick answer where time does not permit
the examination of the records in question, any needed consultation
·with concerned agencies and knowledgeable personnel, or a resolution of legal and policy doubts, will in our judgment tend to
result in denials. Denial will be seen as the safe and cautious thing
909. 2 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 70-71 (statement of A. Mazzocchi,
Citizenship-Legislative Director).
910. Id.
911. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 327, at 8; Arnold, The New Rules on
Freedom of Information, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1975, § 4, at 16, col. 1 ("The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press in Washington estimates that there were only a
half a dozen or so major press attempts to get information through the provisions
of the old act"). See also 1973 House Hearings, supra note 756, at 46 (statement of C,
Black, Editor, Philadelphia Inquirer), 48 (testimony of R. Smyser, Editor, The Oak
Ridger). The FOIA has recently proved to be a useful tool for investigative journalists,
however. Clark, supra note 324, at 750-51. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, at 1,
col. I (AEC release of documents relating to nuclear reactor safety hazards obtained
through threats of FOIA suits).
912. R.EcoMMENDATION 71-2, supra note 860, § (B)(4).
913. E.g., Department of Justice, 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.5, 16.7 (1974) (10 days on initial
determinations, 20 days on appeals); Department of Labor, 29 C.F.R. §§ 70.47, 70.51
(1974) (15 days on initial determinations, 30 days on appeals). While no statistics on
the effectiveness of these time limits are available, representatives of the Department
of Justice and the Federal Energy Administration indicated that the appeals and
initial deadlines were being met in roughly half the cases. Interview with Robert
Saloschin, Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, Department of Justice, in
Washington, D.C., Nov. 4, 1974; Interview with Charles Snowden, Information Officer,
Federal Energy Administration, in Washington, D.C., Nov. 21, 1974. This suggests
that the average response time is now less than the Library of Congress Study data
indicate. See text at note 908 supra. Although a comprehensive study to update this
data was scheduled to have begun in early 1974, see Department of Justice, Interagency
Symposium on Improved Administration of the Freedom of Information Act 109-16
(Nov. 29, 1973) [hereinafter Interagency Symposium], it was never undertaken. Interview with Robert Saloschin, supra.
914. See generally 1973 House Hearings, supra note 756, at 365-411 (collection of
agency comments on H.R. 5425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which contained a ten-day
limit for the initial agency determination and a twenty-day limit for the agency decision on appeal).
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to do, on the theory that if a mistake is made in denying it can be
easily rectified on appeal . . . whereas a mistake in granting access
would be irremediable.915
Because most agencies did not, on their own, adopt time limits in
their regulations, Congress was forced to codify such limits in 1974.
President Ford specifically objected to section 552(a)(6) in vetoing the 1974 FOIA amendments.916 He argued that the time restrictions were impracticable: "Because of the large number of documents often requested, their decentralized location and the
importance of other agency business it would often be impossible
to comply with requests in the time allotted." 917 The President's
proposed time limit provision would have allowed an agency thirty
days for the initial determination and a single fifteen-day extension.
Additionally, he proposed that an agency could petition the district
court for "such further extension or extensions as may be needed,"
to be granted if the court is persuaded the agency is proceeding with
due diligence.918 His arguments were apparently unpersuasive, for
Congress passed the bill over his veto without comment on these
proposals.919
In view of the agencies' stated dislike of time deadlines, the
effectiveness of section (a)(6) will depend on both how the agencies
use the time extension provision and how the courts apply the Act's
enforcement machinery. The amended FOIA permits agencies to
take a ten-day extension only in special cases. As the conference
committee stated, "This 10-day extension may be invoked by the
agency only once--either during initial review of the request or
during appellate review." 020 If an agency does not take action within
this time, the requester is permitted to bring suit, but the court,
upon a showing that exceptional circumstances exist and that the
agency is exercising due diligence in responding to the request, may
allow the agency to take additional. time.921 Thus, despite the rigid
ten- and twenty-day deadlines, (a)(6) permits some measure of courtsupervised flexibility.
The 1974 House bill had not included a provision for extension
915. Id. at 174 (answers to written questions submitted by the House Subcomm.
on Foreign Operations and Government Information).
916. "[T]he ten days afforded an agency to determine whether to furnish a requested
document and the twenty days afforded for determinations on appeal are, despite the
provision concerning unusual circumstances, simply unrealistic in some cases. It is
essential that additional latitude be provided." IO WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Docs. 1318
(1974).
917. Ford Amendments, supra note 529, at 5.
918. Id. at 3-4.
919. See note 851 supra.
920. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 11.
921. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(C) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
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of the ten- and twenty-day periods,922 but the conference committee,
in drafting the final version of the 1974 amendments, accepted the
more liberal provision of the Senate bill.923 The Administrative Law
Section of the American Bar Association had pointed out the defect
in the House proposal: "By failing to provide any grounds for obtaining an extension of time, [it] could well tend to force the agencies to deny a request that might have been granted had more time
for deliberation been allowed." 924 The factors favoring some explicit
provision for a time extension in special circumstances are particularly compelling in the case of a large agency like the Department
of Defense. A spokesman for that Department stated that a provision
that failed to provide for any time extensions would be
totally impracticable in a large organization with multiple facilities .... The millions of records in the custody of the Department
of Defense are stored in a multitude of worldwide locations, where
records requested under the Freedom of Information Act are interspersed in common files with other records. Requested records are,
therefore, difficult to retrieve and evaluate for releasibility, and
obviously no determination can be made and conveyed to the
requester pending that retrieval. 920
The major weakness of section 552(a)(6) is that its enforcement
mechanism is not designed to ensure that requesters receive prompt
action on their requests. If the applicable time periods expire before the agency acts, the statute declares that the requester is deemed
to have exhausted his administrative remedies and so may pursue
his request in the courts.926 But, for example, if an agency waits
ten days before denying a request, the requester appeals, and the
agency then improperly takes thirty days to respond to the appeal,
rather than t1venty,927 the requester will have been forced to wait
thirty days before filing suit, and may have to wait up to an addi922. See H.R. 12471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § l(c) (1974).
923. See S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § l(c) (1974).
924. 197J House Hearings, supra note 756, at 314 (statement of J. Miller, Jr.,
Chairman, Section of Administrative Law, American Bar Association). The Administrative Conference of the United States agreed with this assessment: "[Mandatory deadlines] would, in our view, impose an undersirable rigidity on the system and, most
important, would probably tend to encourage a fairly rapid and unsympathetic disposition." Interagency Symposium, supra note 913, at 124 (statement of R. Berg, Executive Secretary).
925. Letter from J. Fred Buzhardt, Office of General Counsel, to Chet Holifield,
Chairman, House Comm. on Government Operations, May 7, 1973, in 197J House
Hearings, supra note 756, at 368.
926. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(C) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See note 902 supra.
927. Section 552(a)(6) carefully defines the circumstances in which a ten-day time
extension may be taken. See note 901 supra. If an agency takes such an extension in
other than the defined circumstances, it presumably has violated the time limits and
thus triggered the judicial enforcement provision.
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tional thirty days for an answer to his complaint.928 Further delay
may result from the time required for a trial and a judicial decision.929
Only the potential assessment of attorney fees under subsection
552(a)(4)(E)030 or the potential of Civil Service Commission (CSC)
action under subsection 552(a)(4)(F) 931 serve to deter such dilatory
conduct.
Whether agencies will take unnecessary delays is difficult to
predict. It may be that, in order to prevent abuses, the 1974 amendments should have included some sort of damages provision. Damages
could be assessed at a specified per diem rate, escalating according
to the length of the delay. 932 The penalty should not depend on a
showing of actual damage to the requester. One of the themes of
the FOIA is that information should be available to "any person,"
regardless of his ability to show a "need to know." 933 If the requester
is not required to make this showing before invoking the FOIA, he
should not be forced to demonstrate that the nondisclosure caused
him economic injury before he is allowed to invoke sanctions against
a dilatory agency.
In resolving the problem of administrative delay under the FOIA,
Congress tried to accommodate both the interests served by requiring
rigid deadlines and those served by allowing agencies to determine
carefully whether disclosure is warranted. Permitting judicial review upon expiration of the time limits offers flexibility to an agency
with a legitimate need for more time and provides a requester with
a process for impartial review of an agency delay. The weakness of
the provision is the delay that is now inherent in invoking judicial
review. If this delay becomes a serious problem, Congress should
consider adopting more rigid time limits or assessing a per diem
statutory penalty for unjustifiable agency delay.
There is one final problem with (a)(6): while the section imposes time deadlines for the determination whether to comply with
a request, it does not provide time deadlines for the actual disclosure
of the records sought, once the request has been granted.934 It states
928. See text at note 997 infra.
929. See text at notes 1008-13 infra.
930. See text at notes 1016-71 infra, Even if a requester's complaint was mooted
by an agency decision to disclose the documents, an award of attorney fees may still
be possible. See text at notes 1027-29 infra.
931. See text at notes 1072-97 infra.
932. The suggestion was made during the congressional hearings that assessing a
penalty of $100 per day against agencies that wrongfully delay disclosure would speed
up agency processes and encourage a more favorable agency response. 5 1972 House
Hearings, supra note 326, at 1432 (testimony of B. Fensterwald, Jr.).
933. See note 458 supra and accompanying text.
934. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 756, at 276-77 (statement of A. Scalin,
Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States). Thus, even in cases involv-
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only that "[u]pon any determination by an agency to comply with a
request for records, the records shall be made promptly available to
such person making such request." 935 Ironically, the "promptly available" standard is identical to the language in the provision of the
original FOIA that led to the long response-delays discussed above. 030
Judicial enforcement is available, with the potential sanctions of the
assessment of attorney fees 937 and CSC disciplinary action, 938 but the
time required for judicial action effectively nullifies its use in this
area. Congress should establish specific time limits, with or without
a damage sanction, to encourage agencies promptly to turn over
nonexempt records to requesters.
c. Reports to Congress. Section 552(d) provides:
On or before March I of each calendar year, each agency shall submit
a report covering the preceding calendar year to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and President of the Senate for referral
to the appropriate committees of the Congress. The report shall
include(!) the number of determinations made by such agency not to
comply with requests for records made to such agency under subsection (a) and the reasons for each such determination;
(2) the number of appeals made by persons under subsection
(a)(6), the result of such appeals, and the reason for the action upon
each appeal that results in a denial of information;
(3) the names and titles or positions of each person responsible
for the denial of records requested under this section, and the
number of instances of participation for each;
(4) the results of each proceeding conducted pursuant to subsection (a)(4)(F), including a report of the disciplinary action taken
against the officer or employee who was primarily responsible for
improperly withholding records or an explanation of why disciplinary action was not taken;
(5) a copy of every rule made by such agency regarding this section;
(6) a copy of the fee schedule and the total amount of fees collected by the agency for making records available under this
section; and
(7) such other information as indicates efforts to administer fully
this section.
ing standard types of records where the agency can locate the records easily and give
an immediate determination whether to disclose them, the actual disclosure could be
delayed. For example, the FCC regulations require that "[a]ll formal and informal
complaints against common carriers filed under ••. this chapter, all documents filed
in connection therewith, and all communications related thereto" shall be "routinely
available for inspection" in the regional offices. 47 C.F.R. § 0.455(c)(l3) (1974), If sucl1
records were requested, the Commission could make an immediate decision whether
to disclose the records and yet delay the actual disclosure for several days or longer,
935.
936.
937.
938.

5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(C) (Supp. 'Feb. 1975).
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970),

5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(E) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(F) (Supp. Feb. 1975),
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The Attorney General shall submit an annual report on or before
March I of each calendar year which shall include for the prior
calendar year a listing of the number of cases arising under this
section, the exemption involved in each case, the disposition of such
case, and the cost, fees, and penalties assessed under subsections
(a)(4)(E), (F), and (G). Such report shall also include a description
of the efforts undertaken by the Department of Justice to encourage
agency compliance with this section.939
In order to ensure that it was receiving full and adequate information on the operation of the FOIA, so that it could properly
exercise its legislative oversight function, Congress included this
section in the 1974 FOIA amendments, requiring the agencies and
the Attorney General to file annual reports. This provision was included in response to the statements of several witnesses at the
Senate hearings, who believed that "a primary problem with agency
compliance with the FOIA is the absence of significant continuing
pressures towards liberal disclosure of information." 940 An earlier
congressional report had concluded that "no changes in law and no
directives from agency heads ·will necessarily convince any secrecyminded bureaucrat that public records are public property. Only
day-to-day watchfulness by the Congress and the administration
leaders can guarantee the freedom of government information
which is the keystone of a democratic society.'' 941 The congressional
reports on this provision make it clear that Congress intends to
utilize the annual reports to ensure that its intent is effectuated by
the agencies.942
·
939. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(d) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
940. S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 32. The new provisions also impose an
implicit duty on the Attorney General and the Department of Justice to encourage
agency compliance. S. REP. No. 93-854, supra, at 33.
941. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 327, at 9.
942. The Senate report comments in part:
Periodically, but irregularly, over the past six years the Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure has asked for reports by agencies on denials
of information under the FOIA. (E.g., The Freedom of Information Act: Ten
Months Review, Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure,
May 1968). The committee believes that the collection and analysis of these reports, providing the occasion for the Congress to identify recalcitrant agencies,
recurring misinterpretations of the mandates of the FOIA, and undue delays can
go a long way toward encouraging adherence to the Act. The committee thus
concludes that reporting should be regularized.
S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 32-33. The House report states:
These annual reports should detail the information necessary for adequate
Congressional oversight of freedom of information activities. They would also
include the number of each agency's determinations to deny information, the
number of appeals, the action on appeals with the reasons for each determination,
and a copy of all rules and regulations affecting this section. Also, to be included
is a statement of fees collected under this section, plus other matter regarding
information activities indicative of the agency's efforts under this Act.
H.R. REP. No. 93-876, supra note 329, at 8. The conference committee report explains
the differences between the original House and Senate bills and adds some insight on
the provision:
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5. Judicial Enforcement
a. Judicial review. Subsection (a)(4)(B) provides the basis for
judicial review of an agency's decision to withhold records. The
subsection gives courts jurisdiction "to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency
records improperly withheld from the complainant." 043
Prior to 1974, the FOIA's judicial review provision was incorporated in subsection (a)(3),044 so that it was unclear whether it was
meant to apply when information was wrongfully withheld under
subsections (a)(l) or (a)(2). However, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia found:
[I]f the agency refuses to comply with paragraphs (1) or (2) it is then
subject to suit under the processes spelled out in paragraph (3) [now
paragraph (4)]. The only viable interpretation of this paragraph is
that the judicial process is available to compel the disclosure of
agency records not made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) as
well as the agency records referred to in paragraph (3). Congressional
intent (although not spelled out directly an}"vhere) seems to have
been that judicial review would be available for a violation of any
part of the Act, not merely for subsection (3).94G
The House bill provided that each agency submit an annual report, on or
before March 1 of each calendar year, to the Speaker of the House and the Pres•
ident of the Senate, for referral to the appropriate committees of the Congress,
Such report shall include statistical information on the number of agency determinations to withhold information requested under the Freedom of Information
law; the reasons for such withholding; the number of appeals of such adverse
determinations with the result and reasons for each; a copy of every rule made
by the agency in connection with this law; a copy of the agency fee schedule with
the total amount of fees collected by the agency during the year; and other information indicating efforts to properly administer the Freedom of Information
law.
The Senate amendment contained similar provisions and added two requirements not contained in the House bill, (I) that each agency report list those
officials responsible for each denial of records and the numbers of cases in which
each participated during the year and (2) that the Attorney General also submit
a separate annual report on or before March 1 of each calendar year listing the
number of cases arising under the Freedom of Information law, the exemption
involved in each such case, the disposition of the case, and the costs, fees, and
penalties assessed under the law. The Attorney General's report shall also include a description of Justice Department efforts to encourage agency compliance
with the law.
The conference substitute incorporates the major provisions of the House
bill and two Senate amendments. With respect to the annual reporting by each
agency of the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the
denial of records requested under the Freedom of Information law and the number of instances of participation for each, the conferees wish to make clear that
such listing include those persons responsible for the original determination to
deny the information requested in each case as well as all other agency employees
or officials who were responsible for determinations at subsequent stages in the
decision.
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 13-14.
943. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
944. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (19'10), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(a)(3), (4) (Supp.
Feb. 1975).
945. American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 701 (1969) (emphasis original;
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Congressional intent seems to have been made clear by the 1974
amendments, which moved the judicial review provision into subsection (a)(4). In spite of the fact that (a)(l) and (a)(2) include their
o-wn sanction provisions,946 the conclusion that (a)(4)'s judicial
processes must also apply to those subsections seems compelling; 947
otherwise the statute would create a right without a remedy by denying the public an effective means to compel compliance with its
provisions.948
Parties seeking a judicial disclosure order may file a complaint
in "the district court of the United States in the district in which
the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or
in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of
Columbia ...." 949 One problem that may arise is that a claimant
must bring the proper agency into the case. Ordinarily, the agency
in possession of the desired documents is easily ascertainable.
Some agencies, however, are created pursuant to executive order
with limited life spans. Thus, FOIA suits against the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,950
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,951 and the
President's National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence952 were held to have abated when those agencies had filed
their final reports and terminated without successors. In one case,953
the termination did not occur until after the complaint had been
filed. The nonexistence of the defendant agency deprived the plainfootnote omitted). See Irons v. Schuyler, 321 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1970), afjd. on other
grounds, 465 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972) (ordering the
United States Patent Office to produce and disclose an (a)(2) index); National Prison
Project of the ACLU Foundation, Inc. v. Sigler, 390 F. Supp. 789 (D.D.C. 1975). Professor Davis agrees with this interpretation and argues that even if section 552(a)(4)
could not be applied to enforce sections 552(a)(l) and (2), the courts could enforce
these sections through the exercise of their general equity jurisdiction and through
the general provisions of the APA on judicial review, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). K.
DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.10 (Supp. 1970). Cf. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft
Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1974).
946. See text at notes 386-89 &: 447 supra.
947. Professor Davis has interpreted the Attorney General's Memorandum as
implicitly acquiescing in this conclusion, at least with respect to section 552(a)(2). See
K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.10 (Supp. 1970).
948. See American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 701 (1969).
949. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975). The original provision, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3) (1970), established venue in the same places, except that it provided no
independent basis of venue for the District of Columbia. In amending the FOIA to
establish concurrent jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, the Senate Judiciary
Committee noted that over one third of the reported FOIA cases had been brought
in the District of Columbia, thus vesting the D.C. district courts with substantial
expertise in this area of law. S. REP. No. 93--854, supra note 329, at 12-13.
950. Skolnick v. Parsons, 397 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1968).
951. Skolnick v. Kerner, 435 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1970).
952. Skolnick v. Campbell, 454 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1971).
953. Skolnick v. Kerner, 435 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1970).
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tiffs of disclosure in these cases, despite the fact that the records sought
must still have been in the hands of some branch of the government.
Even if a requester has filed a complaint against the appropriate
agency, the suit may be summarily dismissed if he has not exhausted
his administrative remedies. 954 Generally, an FOIA claimant whose
request is denied by an agency must appeal the initial determination
within the agency, usually within a specified time, 955 as a condition
of exhausting his administrative remedies: "When agency action is
subject to appeal to higher administrative authority, the administrative remedy obviously has not been exhausted until the higher
authority has acted." 956 This doctrine, however, is subject to various
954. The Supreme Court, in McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969), stating
that "[t]he doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in
the jurisprudence of administrative law," 395 U.S. at 193, articulated the policies
underlying the doctrine:
A primary purpose is, of course, the avoidance of premature interruption of the
administrative process •.•• [S]ince agency decisions are frequently of a discre•
tionary nature or frequently require expertise, the agency should be given the
first chance to exercise that discretion or to apply that expertise. And of course
it is generally more efficient for the administrative process to go fonvard without
interruption than it is to permit the parties to seek aid from the courts at various
intermediate stages.
395 U.S. at 193-94. For a general discussion and compilation of cases on this doctrine,
see 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 265, §§ 20.01-.10 (1958, Supp. 1970).
955. See, e.g., 6 C.F.R. § 102.41 (1974) (Cost of Living Council; 30 days); 4 C.F.R.
§ 303.9 (1975) (Cost Accounting Standards Board; 7 days),
956. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 20.08, at 104 (1958). See Tuchinsky v. Selective
Service Sys., 418 F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1969) ("In the event of an adverse decision
denying plaintiff the information, he can appeal to the appeal board, and finally seek
the administrative review of the national director • • • • Only by this method is the
administrative process exhausted and the judicial process available for suit'); Clark,
supra note 324, at 749-50. Cf. Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Dd., 415 U.S.
1 (1974).
,
It has been suggested that the agency appeal step be eliminated in order to secure
more rapid disclosure. 1 197:J Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 211 (testimony of
R. Nader); 2 197:J Senate Hearings, supra, at 59 (testimony of P. Schuck, Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc.), 164 (testimony of R. Plesser). The FTC has instituted
a one-step process, see 16 C.F.R. § 4.11 (1974), that reportedly works faster than the
typical two-tiered procedure. See 2 197:J Senate Hearings, §upra, at 164 (statement of
R. Plesser).
It is difficult to evaluate the efficacy of the agency appeal process in the absence
of more recent and complete data than is currently available. A Library of Congress
study of requests during a four-year period (1967-1971) found that 37 of 296 (12 per
cent) agency appeals during tile period were reversed on appeal and that another 42
(14 per cent) were reversed in part on appeal. See Library of Congress Study, supra
note 907, at 1338-39. In July 1973 the Department of Justice promulgated an order,
28 C.F.R. § 50.9(a) (1974), requiring that the Department be consulted before agencies
make final denials and stating that the Department will not defend an agency in an
FOIA suit unless there has been such consultation. See text at note 1003 infra. A study
of agency consultations with the Department of Justice's FOI Committee between Sept,
I, 1973, and Feb. 28, 1974, indicates that the Committee recommended total or partial
disclosure in 30 percent of the cases on which it was consulted. M. Goldberg, The Im•
pact of tlie Recommendations of the Department of Justice's Freedom of Information
Committee: An Empirical Study, June 28, 1974, at 10 (unpublished report, on file with
the Michigan Law Review). Its advice is followed by the agencies in virtually all cases.
Id. at 17. Although it is difficult to draw conclusions on ilie basis of this rather sketchy
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exceptions.957 Thus, in Diapulse Corp. of America v. FDA,958 the
Second Circuit prevented the FDA from assessing a screening fee
for an information request, despite the fact that no administrative
appeal from the initial agency determination was taken. The court
stated that "on the facts of this particular case exhaustion of administrative remedies was not necessary." 050 A particularly important
exception to the general rule of exhaustion was created by the 1974
amendments to the FOIA: they set strict time limits for agency responses to requests and provide that a claimant is deemed to have
exhausted his administrative remedies when those limits have expired.000 This provision prevents the agencies from delaying requests
for long periods of time and later arguing in court that the administrative process had not yet run its course.961
data, it appears that about 30 per cent of initial denials are reversed, in whole or in
part, on appeal. The chief benefit of the intra-agency appeal in these cases is that a requester can obtain the desired information without the costs and delays of litigation.
Cf. text at notes 1280-89 infra. However, it appears that in the majority of cases the
intra-agency appeal does not affect the outcome and results only in an added delay
in the review process. Under section 552(a)(6)(A)(ii) of the amended FOIA, this delay
may be as long as 20 days; if a 10-day extension under section 552(a)(6)(B) is taken.
the delay may be as long as 30 days. See text at notes 900-01 supra.
One possible alternative to the current procedure would be to make the agency
appeal optional. A requester who is denied information at the initial agency level
would have the choice of seeking judicial review immediately or avoiding the immediate costs of litigation by pursuing the administrative appeal. If the agency is bypassed,
the agency could still reconsider its initial decision before actively defending the suit.
If such an optional procedure is implemented, the requester should probably not be
awarded attorney fees pursuant to section 552(a)(4)(E) in cases where the agency
reverses its initial determination before defending the suit, since such costs could have
been avoided by taking the agency appeal.
957. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); K. DAVIS, supra note 265,
§§ 20.01-.10 (1958, Supp. 1970); Layton & Fine, The Draft and Exhaustion of Adminis-

trative Remedies, 56 GEo. L.J. 315, 322-28 (1967).
958. 500 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1974).
959. 500 F.2d at 78. In reaching this conclusion, the court examined the purposes
of the exhaustion doctrine and concluded that there be no "premature interruption
of the administrative process" nor would judicial review at this stage interfere with
the exercise of the agency's expertise since the issue in the case was the purely legal
question of authorization. Cf. note 895 supra. However, the decision not to require
exhaustion in this case may be of limited precedential value for most FOIA cases. It
appears that the FDA has a three-step of review process: First, the FDA makes the
initial determination. Second, the Commissioner of the FDA reviews this initial determination. Finally, the Assistant Secretary of HEW for Public Affairs must concur in
any decision on review to deny a request for information. 45 C.F.R. § 5.82 (1974). The
court indicated that although the second step was not exhausted, the Commissioner had
supported the initial determination. The court concluded from this fact that "[t]here is
no chance ••• that the FDA will correct any possible error." 500 F.2d at 78. The court
did not require the final step to be exhausted, partly because that step was first
created while the requests were being processed, and "[i]t seemed likely that neither
of the parties were aware of the amendments ••••" 500 F.2d at 78.
960. See note 902 supra and accompanying text.
961. Note that one of the commonly recognized exceptions to the exhaustion requirement is when existing administrative remedies are inadequate. See K. DAVIS, supra
note 265, § 20.07 (1958, Supp. 1970). Long delay in agency proceedings may be sufficient
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Once an FOIA case is accepted, the Act directs the court to
make a de novo determination whether the agency is improperly
withholding agency records. 962 The court may independently judge
both the legal and factual issues in the case; thus, it may evaluate
for itself the merits of withholding particular documents. 963 The
burden of proof is explicitly placed on the agencies to sustain their
withholding of the requested documents. 964
b. In camera inspections. Courts have frequently utilized in
camera inspections-inspections in the privacy of the judge's chambers-of requested material in order to determine whether the material falls under the protection of one of the FOIA exemptions. 000
The original FOIA did not explicitly mandate the in camera inspection procedure, and, in EPA v. Mink, 966 the Supreme Court held
that it should not be used in national security (exemption one)
cases. The 1974 FOIA amendments have effectively overruled the
Mink holding by including a new subsection, (a)(4)(B), that provides,
"[T]he court ... may examine the contents of ... agency records
in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof
shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection
(b) of this section ...." 967 This subsection thus permits, but does
not require, courts to use the procedure in all FOIA cases.
There is an important advantage to be gained from the general
use of in camera inspections. Complicated and delicate judgments
to invoke the "inadequacy" exception. See, e.g., Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston,
295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961); Sunshine Publishing Co. v. Summerfield, 184 F. Supp.
767 (D.D.C. 1960). See generally Note, Judidal Acceleration of the Administrative
Process: The Right to Relief from Unduly Protracted Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 574
(1963).
962. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975), formerly 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
963. See S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 8: "That the proceeding must be
de novo is essential in order that the ultimate decision as to the propriety of the
agency's action is made by the court and prevent it from becoming meaningless judicial
sanctioning of agency discretion"; 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 29.10 (1958). Several
state open-records laws include similar provisions. See statutes cited in note 1268 infra.
964. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975), formerly 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
965. See, e.g., Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir, 1974),
cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975) (No. 74-489) (exemption sh.:);
Cutler v. CAB, 375 F. Supp. 722 (D.D.C. 1974) (exemption four); Stern v. Richardson,
367 F. Supp. 1316, 1318 (D.D.C. 1973) (exemptions two, five, and seven). See also
Comment, supra note 669.
966. 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973).
967. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975) (emphasis added). In his veto
message to Congress, President Ford made it clear that he objected to giving courts
unfettered discretion to use the in camera inspection procedure in exemption one
cases. See Ford Amendments, supra note 529, at 2, He proposed that a proviso be added
to exemption one, stating in part that "[t]he court may examine [classified] records
in camera only if it is necessary, after consideration by the court of all other attendant
material, in order to determine whether such classification is proper." Id. at I (empha•
sis added). Congress rejected the proposal and passed the amendments over his veto,
See text at notes 329-32 supra.

May-June 1975]

Project

1125

often must be made in deciding whether material· is exempt or
whether deletions should be made from records ordered to be disclosed. An actual inspection of the material in question may often
be necessary to allow the judge to look behind an agency claim that
an exemption applies. Without such a procedure, the court would
be forced to defer to the agency's judgment in many cases. There
are, however, some disadvantages associated with the procedure.
First, secret judicial proceedings run counter to constitutional and
traditional notions of the judicial process.968 Second, an essential
due process safeguard is absent, since the in camera process is nonadversarial and hence does not give one of the litigants full access
to crucial facts. 969 Third, no record, which can serve as a basis for
appeal or as precedent, is produced by the process. Finally, in camera
inspection of a great mass of documents without the help of an adversarial sharpening of the issues may place a great burden on judicial
time and energy.970
Under the amended version of the Act, the courts will be faced
with balancing these advantages and disadvantages in order to decide
whether to employ the in camera procedure. Some circumstances
may justify forgoing the in camera procedure in favor of other
verification procedures. The conference report suggests that the
use of alternative procedures be routinely considered: "Before
the court orders in camera inspection, the Government should be
given the opportunity to establish by means of testimony or detailed
affidavits that the documents are clearly exempt from disclosure." 971
Admittedly, these alternative procedures may place strong reliance
on agency judgments, but that may be justifiable in certain cases.
For example, some of the exemptions involve fairly clear-cut criteria,
capable of verification by procedures that do not require a detailed
investigation of the actual contents of the documents in question. 972
Exemptions three (information exempted by other statutes),973 eight
(reports of financial institutions),974 and nine (information concerning wells) 975 require only data on whether the named concerns,
typically of an easily identifiable character, are mentioned in the
documents. Affidavits from government officials in possession of the
documents may be sufficient to verify this, and the disadvantages
968. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("the right to speedy and public trial") (emphasis
added).
969. See Comment, supra note 669, at 559 n.19.
970. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977

(1974).
971.
972.
973.
974.
975.

CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 9.
See Comment, supra note 669, at 566-81.
See text at notes 568-610 supra.
See text at notes 829-39 supra.
See text at notes 840-46 supra.
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of the in camera procedure could thus be avoided. If an exemption's
criteria are vague, as in exemption one (national security interests),976 or if the agency might have a strong self-interest in withholding, as in exemption five (agency memoranda),077 and two (personnel rules) 978 cases, in camera inspection should be used, because
sole reliance on the judgment of government employees becomes
more questionable. Furthermore, where the material is of a highly
sensitive nature and secrecy is an overriding concern, as in exemption
one cases, alternative procedures could be instituted to protect confidentiality. For example, the court could allow affidavits from government employees or the submission of a representative document
for court inspection to serve as evidence of the material's status under
the exemption.979
Once it is determined that an in camera inspection should be
conducted, courts must adopt procedures to minimize its disadvantages. In one recent case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
suggested, in a paragraph in a slip opinion, that counsel may participate in an in camera inspection.080 This procedure would allow
for adversarial issue-sharpening, and it would give nongovernment
parties access to the disputed information; however, it would seriously affect the secrecy of the in camera process. Upon a special
motion by the government and a rehearing, this paragraph was
deleted from the published opinion.981 Thus, it seems unlikely that
participation by counsel in in camera hearings will be readily accepted in the near future.
The leading case on in camera procedure is Vaughn v. Rosen,
decided in 1973 by the District of Columbia circuit court. 082 Here
the court squarely faced the problems presented by in camera inspection and recommended several procedures to eliminate some
of the disadvantages of the process: a detailed analysis by the government of the materials at issue and its reasons for withholding them,
976. See text at notes 506-35 supra.
977. See text at notes 648-99 supra.
978. See text at notes 536-67 supra.
979. The use of such procedures in exemption one cases would give practical effect
to President Ford's proposal. See note 967 supra.
980. Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, No. 73-1771, slip. op.
at 19 (D.C. Cir. June 3, 1974) (reported at 498 F.2d 73). The paragraph stated: "We
refer RHA's suggestions of counsel's participation in in camera inspection to the
District Judge on remand. Such participation by counsel may be allowed by the Dis•
trict Judge in his discretion, under appropriate protective orders, if he finds such
participation necessary to his comprehension of the arguments and thus to a fair and
correct resolution of the case."
981. Interview with Richard Wolf, Institute for Public Interest Representation, in
Washington, D.C., July 31, 1974.
982. 484 F.2d 820, on remand, 383 F. Supp. 1049 (D.D.C. 1974). See Comment,
Vaughn v. Rosen: Toward True Freedom of Information, 122 U. PA. L, R.Ev. 731
(1974); 87 HARV. L. R.Ev. 854 (1974).
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to prevent government agencies from hiding behind conclusory and
generalized allegations of exemptions; 983 a system to separate and
index materials, to allow for partial disclosure of large documents
or files and to limit the practice of overburdening the court with
large quantities of documents; 984 and the possible use of a master to
assist the adversary process by examining and evaluating the documents for the trial judge.985 Although these procedures place a
heavy burden on government agencies, the court justified its recommendations on the basis of the FOIA's statement that "the burden
is on the agency to sustain its action [of withholding agency
records]." 986 The Vaughn procedures have been followed in a few
cases,987 but it is still too early to assess their effect. The case suggests
that the judicial system ·will have to gradually build up a set of
rules to determine when and how the in camera procedure should be
employed in the enforcement of the FOIA.988 The task will not be
an easy one.
c. Stays of related agency proceedings. Several FOIA plaintiffs
have ·sought to use the courts' equitable powers to enjoin ongoing
agency proceedings pending the final resolution of an FOIA disclosure suit. In Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co.,989
the plaintiffs sought the disclosure of specified Renegotiation Board
records and a preliminary injunction against further Board proceedings. The Board argued that Congress, by specifying the reme983. 484 F.2d at 826.
984. 484 F.2d at 827.
985. 484 F.2d at 828. Appointment of a master may pose problems under FED. R.
C1v. P. 53(b), which requires "exceptional circumstances" for this procedure. Comment, supra note 669, at 561 n.33; 87 HARV. L. REv. 854 (1974).
986. 484 F.2d at 823, citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
Note that, on remand, the district court in Vaughn declined to use the recommended procedures on the ground that they would be too expensive. 383 F. Supp.
1049, 1052 (D.D.C. 1974). Instead, the agency submitted "representative" documents
for in camera inspection, and the court based its decision on those. This is not an
indication that the D.C. Circuit has abandoned the Vaughn procedure, however.
In a later case, the court again remanded for use of these procedures. See Pacific
Architects &: Engrs., Inc. v. Renegotiation Bd., 505 F.2d 383, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
987. See Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 316 (D.D.C. 1974); Cutler
v. CAB, 375 F. Supp. 722, 724 (D.D.C. 1974); Stem v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316,
1318 n.3 (D.D.C. 1973). But cf. Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 755, 761 (D.D.C.
1974) ("Vaughn did not lay down a per se rule to be applied to every Freedom of
Information Act case •••• [I]t is within the court's discretion to determine whether
a particular in camera submission requires an indCf, and, if so, the degree of specificity required"); Note, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 869, supra note 323, at 889 (arguing
that Vaughn has not been applied in exemption seven cases).
988. Compare Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon,
J., concurring), with Comment, supra note 982, and 87 HARV. L. REv. 854 (1974).
989. 415 U.S. 1 (1974). See generally Note, 1975 DUKE L.J. 416, supra note 333, at
418-24.

1128

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 73:971

dies available to a complainant under the FOIA, meant to preclude
courts from exercising their traditional equitable powers to enjoin
an ongoing agency proceeding. 000 The Supreme Court, after studying
the legislative history behind the FOIA, concluded that the express
remedies of (a)(4) were not exclusive; Congress had not deprived
the courts of their equitable power to order other injunctive relief. 091
However, the Court held that injunctive interference was improper,
at least with respect to renegotiation proceedings: "The nature of
the renegotiation process mandates this result, and, were it otherwise, the effect would be that renegotiation, and its aims, would be
supplanted and defeated by an FOIA suit." 992
Other courts, dealing directly with the issue, have been reluctant
to stay administrative proceedings and have demanded that the
plaintiff show a danger of irreparable harm if such relief is not
granted. One court, for example, while recognizing that the courts
have jurisdiction to enjoin agency proceedings pending resolution
of an FOIA claim, refused to enjoin an NLRB proceeding because
there was no "cogent showing" that the plaintiff, the complainant
in an unfair labor practice charge before the NLRB, would suffer
irreparable injury from the nonavailability of certain NLRB documents.993 The court stated:
It may be that Sears will be held entitled to the documents under
the Information Act, and it may be that its possession of those documents will be a convenience, indeed a significant help, in its litigating
stance. But those considerations are of a different order from the
kind of irreparable injury required to interrupt an administrative
proceeding. Should Sears' claim to the memoranda be upheld on
appeal and should it appear that there was significant adverse impact
on Sears in the unfair labor practice charge proceedings because it
was denied timely disclosure, an appropriate remedy can be fashioned
by the Board, or by the court of appeals with jurisdiction of the
petition for review or enforcement in the event the Board issues
an order. 994
Similarly, John Lennon was denied a motion for an order enjoining
various officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
from further proceedings regarding his deportation. 990 He sought
the disclosure of INS information and records while his appeal from
a deportation order was pending before the Board of Immigration
990. 415 U.S. at 17.
991. 415 U.S. at 17-20.
992. 415 U.S. at 20.
993. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 91, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert, denied,
415 U.S. 950 (1974). See also United Telephone Co. v. FCC, 375 F. Supp. 992 (M.D.
Pa. 1974).
994. 473 F.2d at 93 (footnote omitted).
995. Lennon v. Richardson, 378 F. Supp. 39 (1974).
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Appeals. The court held that he had not demonstrated irreparable
injury:
The information and records sought have been held to be irrelevant
as a matter of law by the Im.migration Judge. If that ruling is proper,
there is no basis for an injunction to permit plaintiff to obtain these
records to introduce in that proceeding. If it is improper, either the
Board or the Court of Appeals may reverse with appropriate directions to the Immigration Judge to receive and consider such proof.
Thus plaintiff will have his review and be protected against improper
deportation during its course.9 96
d. Expediting FOIA litigation. Subsections (a)(4)(C) and (D)
seek to expedite the litigation process in FOIA cases. Subsection (a)
(4)(C) requires the defendant in an FOIA suit to plead to a complaint within thirty days after service of the complaint unless "the
court otherwise directs for good cause shown." 997 Subsection (a)(4)(D)
tells the district courts and courts of appeals that "[e]xcept as to
cases the court considers of greater importance, proceedings before
the district court, as authorized by [subsection (a)(4)], and appeals
therefrom, take precedence on the docket over all other cases and
shall be assigned for hearing and trial or for argument at the earliest
practicable date and expedited in every way." 998
Subsection (a)(4)(C), enacted in 1974, supersedes, for the purposes
of FOIA litigation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a), which
allows the United States sixty days to answer a complaint after it
has been served.999 Federal Rule 6(b) allows time extensions at the
discretion of the court "for cause shown" if such extensions are
requested before the expiration of the original sixty-day period.1000
The Department of Justice opposed shortening the sixty-day period
because of the government's size and complexity:
The federal government is larger and more complex, and bears more
crucial public interest responsibilities, than any other litigant. It
needs more time to develop and check its positions, especially if they
may affect agencies other than the one sued. And yet unlike a large
corporation it cannot readily hire more Ia-wyers to meet a sudden
influx of litigation. A 20-day rule would increase the incidence of
positions that would later be reformulated, causing unnecessary
996. 378 F. Supp. at 42 (footnotes omitted).
997. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(C) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
998. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(D) (Supp. Feb. 1975). The only significant difference
between this provision and 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970) is the addition of the clause
"and appeals therefrom" in the amended version.
999. "The United States or an officer or agency thereof shall serve an answer to
the complaint or to a cross-claim, or a reply to a counterclaim, within 60 days after
the service upon the United States attorney of the pleading in which the claim is
asserted." FED. R. Crv. P. 12(a).
1000. FED. R. Crv. P. 6(b)(l).
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.work for both sides and for the court, and providing ample illustrations of the adage that "haste makes waste."1° 01
The Justice Department also argued that, because cases filed outside
Washington, D.C. would be handled by local United States Attorneys who might not be familiar ·with FOIA law, the sixty-day period
was necessary to ensure adequate time for consultation with attorneys
of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice who have substantial expertise in FOIA law.1002
The persuasiveness of the Justice Department's position is materially weakened, however, upon consideration of the current practice of agency and Justice Department administrative coordination.
In July 1973, the Justice Department effected a requirement that it
be consulted before final agency denials: "No civil action against
a federal agency under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
[§]552, shall be defended by the Civil Division, the Tax Division,
or any other part of the Department of Justice unless the Department's Freedom of Information Committee has been consulted by
the agency [before final agency denial].'' 1003 Since the Justice Department must be consulted at the final agency-denial stage, the Department will have notice, prior to the filing of the complaint, of the
documents that were withheld and the reasons for the withholding.
Thus, since the legal questions raised by the agency's final denial
will have been analyzed before the complaint is received, the government's legal position should be clear enough to permit responsive
pleadings to be drafted within the time limit.
The thirty-day reduction in the time period for filing responsive
pleadings probably will have only a minimal effect on litigation
delays. For example, if it were assumed that the Government would
always take thirty days to answer, reduction of less than fifteen per
cent in total litigation time might be expected.1004 The effect of the
provision could be further minimized if courts liberally construe the
"good cause shown" requirement for extensions of the thirty-day
period. Under the sixty-day rule,1005 extensions permitted by Federal
1001. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 756, at 124 (statement of R. Dixon, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice).
1002. Id. See also 4 1972 House Hearings, supra note 326, at 1195-96 (testimony
of R. Erickson and R. Saloschin, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice).
1003. 28 C.F.R. § 50.9(a) (1974). See note 956 supra.
1004. In a survey of 33 FOIA cases filed in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia from 1967 to 1971, the average number of days before a
responsive pleading was filed was 68. Survey by William A. Dobrovir in 5 1972 House
Hearings, supra note 326, at 1398 [hereinafter Dobrovir Survey]. If, under the amended
FOIA, agencies waited an average of 20 days to file responsive pleadings, the reduction
would be an average of 28 days per case, or considerably over 50 per cent. However,
since the surveyed cases took an average of 294 days to decide, the reduction in total
litigation time may be less than 15 per cent. Id.
1005. See text at note 999 supra.
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Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) "for cause shown" have been routinely
granted. One survey of FOIA cases found that the average time before a responsive pleading is filed is sixty-eight days, and in five of
the thirty-one cases considered responsive pleadings were not filed
for over one hundred days.1006 If the standards for time extensions
contained in (a)(4)(C) and Rule 6(b) are similarly interpreted, extensions also will be frequently granted under the FOIA provision.
Subsection (a)(4)(D), the docket priority provision, may not be
any more successful than the responsive pleading provision in eliminating litigation delays. This subsection was originally enacted as
part of section 552(a)(3) of the 1967 FOIA. The 1974 amendments
enlarged its scope to cover appeals as well as initial decisions, and
renumbered it.1007
One survey of FOIA litigation time has been conducted.1008 It
found that the average time for final judicial determinations of
FOIA cases in the District Court for the District of Columbia is
294 days.1000 The median time interval between :filing and disposition for civil cases terminated in all federal district courts between
July I, 1972, and June 30, 1973, was 300 days.101° For civil cases in
which the United States was a party, the median time interval was
150 days.1011 Due to their aggregate nature, drawing conclusions
from a comparison of these statistics is fraught with hazards, but they
do suggest that FOIA litigation is roughly as time consuming as
other civil litigation. It is clear, however, that the courts are capable
of acting with great dispatch in FOIA cases when they determine
that prompt action is necessary. For example, at the trial level,
EPA v. Mink1012 was decided in 16 days.1013
Under subsection (a)(4)(D), appeals from FOIA cases also are to
be expedited. 1014 There is no data on the length of time FOIA courts
have taken to decide appeals. Again, it is unlikely that the 1974
provision ·will be more effective in expediting appeals than was the
original provision in expediting trials.1015
1006. See Dobrovir Survey, supra note 1004.
1007. See note 998 supra.
1008. See Dobrovir Survey, supra note 1004.
1009. Id.
1010. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 264 (1972) (Table C-5).
1011. Id. at 268 (Table C-5a).
1012. 410 U.S. 72 (1972) (dist. ct. opinion unreported).
1012. The complaint was filed on Aug. 11, 1971, and was answered on Aug. 22,
1971. The case was decided four days later on Aug. 27. See Dobrovir Survey, supra·
note 1004.
1014. See note 998 supra.
1015. Representative Moorhead offered the following assessment of the effectiveness
of the statutory mandate contained in the original FOIA: "While the Freedom of
Information Act instructs the courts to give priority to litigation brought under it,
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The weakness of the priority provision lies, perhaps, in its generality. The courts are directed to hear FOIA cases before "all cases,"
"except as to cases the court considers of greater importance."
Although the congressional policy of prompt resolution of FOIA
disclosure suits is clear from the language of the provision, the provision's lack of specific standards allows courts to continue exercising
their routine practices in ordering their dockets. If the mandate to
expedite is to be effective, more specific directions on case priority
will be necessary. Congress may have been reluctant to do this because it feared jeopardizing the separate integrity of the nation's
judicial system by unduly interfering with its internal administration.
e. Attorney fees. Subsection 552(a)(4)(E) provides: "The court
may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and
other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this
section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed." 1010
The provision is designed both to encourage citizens to exercise their
rights under the FOIA and to deter agencies from unnecessarily
withholding information. Prior to the addition of this subsection in
1974, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 barred the federal courts from exercising
their equitable discretion to award attorney fees in FOIA cases.1017
it is apparent that the speedy determination of suits for information access is not
being fulfilled despite clear Congressional intent." 5 1972 House Hearings, supra note
326, at 1376.
1016. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(E) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1017. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) provides: "Except as othenvise specified by statute,
a judgment for costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title but not including
the fees and expenses of attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party in any
civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or official of the
United States acting in his official capacity ••••" Thus, in the absence of a specific
statute to the contrary, attorney fees cannot be assessed against the United States.
See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4561, 4570 (U.S.
May 12, 1975); Pyramid Lakes Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 499 F.2d 1095, 1096
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Citizens Comm. for the Columbia River v. Callaway, 494 F.2d 124, 126
(9th Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1332 (1st
Cir. 1973); Cassata v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 445 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1971).
See also J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J 54.75[3.-2], at 1588 (2d ed. 1974). But see
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4561, 4576 n.9 (U.S. May 12,
1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting): "The statute, construed in light of the rule against implied restrictions on equity jurisdiction, may not foreclose attorneys' fee awards against
the United States in all cases. Section 2412 states that the ordinary recoverable costs shall
not include attorneys' fees; it may be read not to bar fee awards, over and above ordinary taxable costs, when equity demands." For a similar argnment, see King & Plater,
The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 41 TENN,
L. REv. 27, 88 (1973).
Court costs, as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1970), may be assessed against the
United States pursuant to the express terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970). FED. R. C1v. P,
54(d) states that costs ordinarily "shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party,"
but limits the assessment of costs "against the United States, its officers and agencies
• • • only to the extent permitted by law." It has been suggested that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 (1970) would not even permit attorneys' docket fees, as provided in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1923{a) (1970), to be awarded against the United States in the absence of a specific
statute so providing. See 6 J. MooRE, supra, ,r 54,75(3.-2], at 1558·59. However, the
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Since the ultimate enforcement of the FOIA depends upon the
initiation of litigation by persons whose information requests are
denied, the ability to litigate, or to pose a credible litigation threat,
is clearly essential to the full utilization of the rights conferred by
the Act. Not all requesters seek information that is commercially
valuable to them, however, and some may not be able to afford the
costs of judicial review in the absence of some sort of attorney
fee provision. FOIA litigation is expensive. It has been estimated
that "[e]ven the simplest of freedom of information cases will incur
legal expenses well in excess' of $1,000."1018 These costs are "hardly
conducive to [litigation by] the private individual or public interest
group that needs the information but will receive no financial gain
as a result of obtaining it." 1019 For example, the media, and most
notably the newspapers, have been deterred from seeking judicial
review of denied information requests by the expense of litigating
FOIA suits.1020 Private citizens, for the most part, have also been
unable to bear the burden of litigation costs: "Litigation . . . is a
luxury few citizens can afford."1021 Moreover, it has been suggested
Supreme Court in Alyeska recently indicated that attorney fees under section 1923
may be awarded against the United States. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4570.
The original FOIA included no provision permitting the award of attorney fees
in FOIA cases. Although an early bill, S. 1666, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), which
passed the Senate in 1964, ll0 CONG. R.Ec. 1708 (1964), contained a provision for the
discretionary award of attorney fees against the United States in FOIA cases, no
action was taken by the House on this bill. See Note, supra note 319, at 440.
1018. 1 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 211 (testimony of R. Nader); 2
1973 Senate Hearings, supra, at 102 (testimony of H. Wellford, Center for the Study
of Responsive Law). Similarly, one attorney estimated that the attorney fees in sev•
eral FOIA cases he had litigated would have been "in the neighborhood of $60,000
or $70,000" if they had been calculated at the regular rates of a leading Washington
law firm. Id. at ll5 (statement of W. Dobrovir).
1019. I 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 211 (testimony of R. Nader).
1020. "An overriding factor in the failure of our segment of the Press to use the
existing Act is the expense connected with litigating FOI matters in the courts once
an agency has decided against making information available. This is probably the
most undermining aspect of the existing law and severely limits the use of the FOI
Act by all media, but especially smaller sized newspapers." 2 1973 Senate Hearings,
supra note 125, at 34 (statement of National Newspaper Association). Cf. I 1973 Senate Hearings, supra, at 170; 2 1973 Senate Hearings, supra, at 24.
1021. 2 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 102 (testimony of H. Wellford,
Center for the Study of Responsive Law). As one observer has stated: "Judicial review
is more realistically available to agency clientele than to most researchers. There is
usually a tangible benefit in compelling disclosure to a party in an agency proceeding.
Hence, the possibility of court action by a disappointed member of an agency's clientele is far greater than that of action by a disappointed private citizen engaged in
research." Koch, supra note 333, at 196. See also 2 1973 Senate Hearings, supra, at
42 (testimony of J. Shattuck, Staff Counsel, ACLU); Giannella, supra note 905, at 225.
Unfortunately, there is no recent data on the implementation of the FOIA with
which to verify these observations. A 1972 Library of Congress Study, supra note 907,
indicates that 640 of 1503 (43 per cent) final agency denials made between July
4, 1967, and July 4, 1971, were made to corporations and private law firms. Id. Of
40 lawsuits brought under the FOIA between July 1967 and March 1969, 37 (92
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that, under the 1967 Act, agencies discriminated against those
requesters who posed a weak litigation threat.1022 Those who could
credibly threaten litigation, on the other hand, appeared to be more
successful in obtaining disclosure. One requester, seeking information from the CAB, waited for a response for six months. He decided
to litigate and three days after filing suit the information was handdelivered to his office.1023 One veteran of several FOIA suits has
commented:
Often the mere threat of legal action makes information available
which originally had been denied. The government's fear of being
sued is understandable, because the courts, for the most part, have
interpreted the Act liberally. Of 99 cases decided by the courts
between 1967 and 1971, the government's refusal to release information was sustained in only 23 cases.1024
Another result of the infrequency of litigation under the 1967
FOIA was that some agencies felt unconstrained by case law in their
disclosure determinations. Thus, agencies have refused requests
for documents identical in nature to those previously ordered
released.1025 Since few unsuccessful requesters could overcome the
barrier of the high costs of a suit, agencies were able to deny
information requests without risking court enforcement. Even if
requesters did sue and win, agencies were not penalized for taking
legally indefensible positions.
Subsection (a)(4)(E) was enacted to alleviate these problems. The
provision, if invoked, makes it less costly for requesters to pursue
successful judicial enforcement of the provisions of the FOIA and
per cent) involved actions by corporations or private parties seeking information re•
lating to personal claims or benefits. Nader, supra note 333, at 13. These figures
suggest that a large percentage of corporations and other private interests can afford
to challenge agency denials.
1022. Such allegations are difficult to document. See Koch, supra note 333, at 19697. An example of discriminatory information treatment is demonstrated by the difficulty that a Nader group had in obtaining disclosure of a CAB report on the causes
and handling of customer complaints received by the airlines industry. The study
had already been made available to the airlines. Disclosure "was denied on the specious reasoning that [the report] 'mentions names of airlines,' gives numbers of com•
plaints received by some of the airlines and was compiled from the records of the
airlines regulated by the CAB. In addition, [it was denied] both because 'secrecy was
necessary to protect complainants from harassment and retaliation by the airlines,'
and because the CAB feared that the findings might be competitively detrimental to
the deficient airlines ••••" Nader, supra note 333, at 13 (emphasis original).
1023. 5 1972 House Hearings, supra note 326, at 1414 (testimony of B. Kass).
1024. 2 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 102 (testimony of H. Wellford,
Center for the Study of Responsive Law).
1025. 1 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 206-07 (testimony of R. Nader).
Similar problems have arisen concerning FrC administration staff manuals, id., and
USDA correspondence and surveys. 2 1973 Senate Hearings, supra, at 62-63 (statement
of P. Schuck, Consumers Union of United States, Inc.). See 120 CONG. REC. S9314
(daily ed. May 30, 1974) (statement of Senator Kennedy).
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effectively penalizes agencies that have incorrectly refused to disclose
requested information.1026 This penalty, and the increased likelihood
of judicial review, should deter agencies from arbitrarily denying
requests.
There are three conditions to an award of "reasonable" attorney
fees under (a)(4)(E): 1027 the attorneys' fees and costs have to be incurred in "any case under this section"; the complainant must "substantially" prevail; and the court must be convinced that the assessment of attorney fees is appropriate.
"[A]ny case under this section" refers to section 552 of the AP A,
the FOIA.1028 Attorney fees may be awarded in cases reviewing_ the
1026. But cf. Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 201, 224 (1973) (stating that the effect of an award of attorney fees against the
government is to make the entire public share in the costs of the prevailing party's
litigation).
1027. The fees awarded must also be "reasonable," but this requirement does not
appear to pose significant problems. The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY,
D.R. 2-106(B), lists several factors that should guide the court in its calculation of
a "reasonable" fee, once it deems the award appropriate:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(2) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Similar factors were applied in determining a fee award in Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp.
1311 (D.D.C. 1973).
As Judge Skelly Wright has stated: "The first purpose of an award of fees is to
make the client whole." Wilderness Soc. v. Morton, 495. F.2d 1026, 1037 (D.C. Cir.
1974), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc.,
43 U.S.L.W. 4561 (U.S. May 12, 1975). Thus, where there is an agreement between
attorney and client regarding fees, it would seem that this agreement should be the
starting point in the calculation. It would probably contravene public policy to base
an award on an "unreasonable" fee agreement, however.
See Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311, 1319 (D.D.C. 1973). ("It is ingrained in the
policy of determining reasonable attorney's fees, that an attorney is entitled to no
more than a reasonable fee, no matter what fee is specified in the contract").
In some cases, the amount of the fee award need not be limited to the amount
actually paid or owed the attorney. For example, in Wilderness Society, successful
counsel were salaried employees of a public interest organization. The lower court's
award was based on the market value, not the actual costs, of their services. 495
F.2d at 1037. See Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 607 (5th Cir. 1974); Clark v.
American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1970), affd., 437 F.2d 959 (5th
Cir. 1971).
1028. The requirement of a "case under this section" should not be read to permit
a fee award only in cases in which a final verdict is reached after trial. Under the
common-fund doctrine, see text at notes 1046-50 infra, it is accepted that judgment
after trial is not a prerequisite to a fee award, since such a requirement might discourage prompt settlements. 6 J. MooRE, supra note 1017, 1J 54.77[2]. See Levine v.
Bradlee, 378 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1967); Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d
107 (2d Cir. 1964); Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1959); Milstein v.
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agency's determination whether disclosure is warranted and in cases
where a requester is seeking to enforce the time limit and fee mandates of (a)(4).1029 However, cases that incidentally deal with the
FOIA were probably not meant to be included in (a)(4)(E). For
example, an agency employee "arbitrarily or capriciously" withholding information may be investigated and disciplined by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC).1030 If the employee seeks review of
the CSC findings under section 706 of the APA, he should not be
granted attorney fees if he prevails.1031
The plaintiff must "substantially prevail" if he is to recover
attorney fees. The House bill would have permitted these fees to be
assessed against the United States "in any case . . . in which the
United States ... has not prevailed."1032 The language of the current
provision originated in the Senate bill. 1033 While the conference
report noted the difference between the House and Senate provisions, it did not explain the significance of the language adopted. 1034
This language could be interpreted to require a court to consider the
number of documents ordered disclosed relative to the number
of records sought by the plaintiff. However, since many different
types of records that could be requested under the Act are not
capable of direct comparison in this way, no clear definition of
"substantially prevailed" would emerge. The language could also
be interpreted to require a substantial legal victory for the plaintiff,
or a lack of any reasonable support for the government's position.
Because the "substantially prevailed" language is ambiguous,
courts may adopt the standards used for awarding attorney fees in
other substantive areas of the law. In Natural Resources Defense
Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544 (5.D.N.Y. 1973); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), Indeed, one party's failure to accept a reasonable settlement offer may be evidence of bad faith, justifying a fee award on the basis of the "obdurate behavior"
rationale. See De Thomas v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 335, 345-46 (D.P.R. 1973);
text at notes 1041-45 infra.
1029. Subsection 552(a)(6)(C) permits requesters to bring suit after the expiration
of the time limits for agency action. Such a suit would clearly be a "case under this
section," since section 552 specifically provides for the cause of action. Similarly, where a
requester seeks review of the fees appµed to his request, he is also seeking an "order
[for] production of agency records improperly withheld." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(Il)
(Supp. Feb. 1975). See Diapulse Corp. v. FDA, 500 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1974).
1030. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(F) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at notes 1072-97 infra.
1031. In such a case, the employee's cause of action arises under 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1970) and not under any provision of the FOIA. It is unclear whether attorney fees
may be awarded in "reverse FOIA" suits. Some courts have found that these suits
are based on the FOIA, while others have found jurisdiction under other parts of
the APA. See note 1137 infra.
1032. H.R. 12471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § l(c) (1974).
1033. See 5. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § l(b)(2) (1974).
1034. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 9-10.
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Council} Inc. v. EPA,1°35 for example, several issues were decided
against the plaintiff yet an award of fees was made:
Were we to believe that the litigation were wholly or in substantial
part frivolous, we would not, of course, award costs of any description to petitioners. In such cases, indeed, we reserve the right to
award costs and fees in favor of the EPA. But the challenges here,
even those not sustained, were mainly constructive and reasonable.
And petitioners were successful in several major respects; they should
not be penalized for having also advanced some points of lesser
weight.1oa6
The court thus considered only the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
litigation posture in deciding whether the award of fees was warranted.1037 Under such an interpretation, a plaintiff's success on one
major issue in an FOIA case, even if several issues were in question,
may justify an award of attorney fees. 1038
The final and most amorphous condition is that an award of
attorney fees and litigation costs must be an appropriate exercise of
the court's discretion. The subsection does not make the award
mandatory; it provides only that "the court may assess ...." 1039 The
conference report refused to delineate guidelines for the exercise
of this discretion, despite the fact that the Senate bill enumerated
several factors: "[T]he conferees believe that because the existing
body of law on the award of attorney fees recognizes such factors, a
statement of the criteria may be too delimiting and is unnecessary. "1040 Thus, the "existing body of law," that is, the common law
1035. 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973).
1036. 484 F.2d at 1338. Similarly, the court in Wilderness Soc. v. Morton, 495 F.2d
1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4561 (U.S. May 12, 1975), did not think that the fact
that the plaintiffs' action was mooted by legislation declaring the NEPA impact statement to be sufficient, should bar the award of attorney fees: "The advancement of
important legislative policy justifying an award of attorneys' fees can be accomplished
even where the plaintiff does not obtain the ultimate relief sought by the filing and
prosecution of his suit." 495 F.2d at 1034.
1037. 484 F.2d at 1338.
1038. See Comment, Balancing the Equities in Attorney's Fees Awards: Losing
Plaintiffs and Private Defendants, 62 GEO. L.J. 1439, 1452-53 {1974).
1039. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(E) (Supp. Feb. 1975). A number of other federal statutes
include similar, discretionary, attorney fee provisions. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 49ll(d) (Supp.
III, 1973). Other federal acts make the award of attorney fees to a prevailing party
mandatory. E.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970); Truth-in-Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640{a)(2) (1970). As the Supreme Court recently stated: "[I]t is
apparent that the circumstances under which attorneys' fees are to be awarded and
the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters for Congress
to determine." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4561, 4568
(U.S. May 12, 1975) (footnote omitted).
1040. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at IO. The Senate bill provided: "In

1138

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 7ll:971

defining the equitable powers of the courts to award attorney fees,
is intended to guide awards in FOIA cases.
One situation in which attorney fees have been awarded under
current equity practice is when the losing party acts in bad faith. 1041
Here, the rationale of the award is punitive, so that "the essential
element in triggering the award of fees is . . . the existence of 'bad
faith' on the part of the unsuccessful litigant." 1042 One court1 M 8 has
spoken of a corollary to the "obdurate behavior" rule that applies to
a defendant whose unfounded resistance to a suit results in unnecessary litigation: "When a suit alleging violation of clearly established
law in a particular area is filed, and the defendants, in the face of
evident violation of this law, persist in forcing the plaintiffs to
expend efforts in preparing and/or conducting a trial, then attorneys'
fees may appropriately be awarded." 1044 An unfounded agency denial
of an FOIA request may result in just this sort of "unnecessary"
litigation. Thus, the existence of bad faith on the part of an agency
resisting an FOIA request may, without more, justify an award of
attorney fees for the successful plaintiff.1045
The "common fund" rationale also provides a basis in current
equity practice for the award of attorney fees. 1046 In a case where the
plaintiff's suit results in the creation of a common fund for members
of an ascertainable class, a court may award the plaintiff attorney
fees out of this fund so that the costs of the litigation will be apporexercising its discretion under this paragraph, the court shall consider the benefit to
the public, if any, deriving from the case, the commercial benefit to the complainant
and the nature of his interest in the records sought, and whether the Government's
withholding of the records sought had a reasonable basis in law." S. 254ll, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. § l(b)(2) (1974).
1041. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 4ll U.S.L.W. 4561, 4567
(U.S. May 12, 1975); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) ("[I]t is unquestioned that a
federal court [in the exercise of its equitable powers] may award counsel fees to a
successful party when his opponent has acted 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or
for oppressive reasons,'" quoting 6 J. MOORE, supra note 1017, at 1709).
1042. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 5 (1973).
1043. Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974).
1044. 493 F.2d at 606. While this doctrine originated as an exercise of the court's
equitable power to award fees, the policies underlying the doctrine have been considered by a court in awarding fees pursuant to a statute. In United States v. Gray,
319 F. Supp. 871 (D.R.I. 1970), the government had brought a "pattern and practice"
discrimination suit under title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5
(1970). The court found the government's case to be without merit, and, exercising
its discretion under section 2000a-3(b), assessed fees against the United States,
stating, "the policy behind the award of counsel fees in § 2000a-5 cases ••• is that
of discouraging the government from bringing meritless cases." 319 F. Supp. at 872.
1045. The Senate report indicates that private interests might recover attorney fees
merely because a withholding was without a reasonable basis in law. See S. REP. No.
93-854, supra note 329, at 19-20.
1046. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 43 U.S,L.W. 4561, 4567
(U.S. May 12, 1975).
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tioned among its beneficiaries.1047 While the doctrine originally
required a monetary fund, it has been expanded to include cases
where nonmonetary benefits accrue to large numbers of people.1048
This doctrine appears to have limited applicability to FOIA cases,
however. Even where the requested information benefits the public
generally, the class of beneficiaries is difficult to define with accuracy, and the benefits are often diffuse.1049 In similar cases of amorphous benefits, the courts have been reluctant to apply this doctrine.
One court has stated:
[I]t has become exceedingly difficult to trace the benefits of litigation
to their ultimate beneficiaries, so as to apportion attorneys' fees
amongst them. Because of the attendant difficulties in determining
the ultimate beneficiaries, the "common fund" mold simply does not
fit the present situation. As Judge Merhige stated in Bradley v.
School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, 53 F.R.D. 28, 35
(E.D. Va. 1971), wherein he rejected the common fund theory as a
basis for awarding attorneys' fees in a school desegregation case:
"School desegregation cases, or any suits against governmental bodies,
do not fit this fund model without considerable cutting and trimming:•1050
1047. See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Natl. Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). See also Falcon,
Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 :Mn. L.
REv. 379, 402-07 (1973); King &: Plater, supra note 1017, at 43-48.
1048. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375 (1970), a stockholder challenged
a merger on the ground that misleading proxy solicitations had been distributed in
violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1970). The Court held that it was not necessary that the common benefit procured
by the plaintiff's suit be a pecuniary benefit:
The dissemination of misleading proxy solicitations was a deceit practiced on the
stockholders as a group ••• and the expenses of petitioners' lawsuit have been
incurred for the benefit of the corporation and the other shareholders.
The fact that this suit has not yet produced, and may never produce, a
monetary recovery from which the fees could be paid does not preclude an award
based on this [common fund] rationale ••••
• • • [A] corporation may receive a "substantial benefit" from a derivative suit,
justifying an award of counsel fees, regardless of whether the benefit is pecuniary
in nature.
396 U.S. at 392-95.
In Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972), the plaintiffs sought the return
of over $1,000,000 in traffic fines, collected under a state system that was held to be
unconstitutional by the district court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
refusal to grant the refund; thus, no fund was created. However, the court reversed
the denial of attorney fees and remanded for a determination of the appropriate
award: "It is unquestionable that plaintiffs' attorneys rendered a public service •••
by laying to rest the confusion that had existed, and by bringing to an end the
improper practice." 466 F.2d at 62.
1049. There is, of course, little possibility that a pecuniary benefit will accrue to
other class members in FOIA suits.
1050. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 97 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd., 488 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted). In this case, the court stated that it could not
award attorney fees under the common-fund theory, 57 F.R.D, at 97, but it pro-
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A more recently created development in the attorney fee area,
which draws on both the bad faith and common fund doctrines, is
the "private attorney general" rationale. This rationale is largely the
product of case law developing under the attorney fees provision of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1051 In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 1052 the Supreme Court stated:
"When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that
enforcement would prove difficult and that the nation would have
to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad
compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus private in form only.
"When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a "private attorney general," vindicating a
policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If successful
plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few
aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts.
Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees-not simply
.to penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know
to be untenable but, more broadly, to encourage individuals injured
by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II.
It follows that one who succeeds in obtaining an injunction under
that Title should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust.lous

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the FOIA are similar in that
both rely on private litigation as an enforcement mechanism, and
both allow no damage awards to be granted in such enforcement
suits. The successful FOIA plaintiff, like the successful Civil Rights
Act plaintiff, is effectuating a strong congressional policy.10li 4 Attorney fees are awarded under the Civil Rights Act to encourage
aggrieved parties to litigate1055 and to discourage United States
Attorneys from litigating meritless suits.1056 Similar concerns motivated Congress to amend the FOIA in 1974 to allow the assessment
of attorney fees against the government.1057 Accordingly, the "private attorney general" rationale behind the award of attorney fees in
ceeded to make such an award under the private attorney-general rationale, discussed
infra at note 1051. 57 F.R.D. 98-101.
1051. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
1052. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
1053. 390 U.S. at 401-02 (footnotes omitted).
1054. "Generally, if a complainant has been successful in proving that a government official has wrongfully withheld information, he has acted as a private attorney
general in vindicating an important public policy." S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note
329, at 19.
1055. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968).
1056. United States v. Gray, 319 F. Supp. 871, 872 (D.R.I. 1970). See note 1044 mpra,
1057. See text at notes 1016-26 supra.

May-June 1975]

Project

1141

civil rights suits should also justify the award of attorney fees in
FOIA cases where the plaintiff's suit vindicates the public interest.1058 The Newman doctrine, which allows a successful plaintiff to
recover attorney fees "unless special circumstances render such an
award unjust," 1059 should guide courts in awarding fees in these
FOIA suits. The "special circumstances" that justify a refusal to
award attorney fees under the Newman doctrine have been narrowly
construed.1060
This existing body of case law suggests that the courts should
look primarily at three factors in determining whether an award of
attorney fees would be an appropriate exercise of discretion: 1061 the
significance and degree of public benefit afforded by the plaintiff's
success,1002 the reasonableness of the government's litigation posture,1063 and the commercial motive of the plaintiff.1064 In light of the
1058. In discussing the criteria specified in the Senate bill, quoted in the text at
note 1040 supra, the Senate Judiciary Committee specifically referred to the "private
attorney general" rationale. See S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 19-20.
1059. See text at note 1053 supra.
1060. In Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1970), the
court rejected the defendant's contention that, because he raised no frivolous defenses
or issues and put forward his contentions in good faith and because several judges
had agreed with him along the way, special circumstances were present. 426 F .2d
at 538. In Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd. per curiam, 409
U.S. 942 (1972), a reapportionment case, the court awarded the plaintiff attorney fees,
stating that once a plaintiff came within the definition of a "private attorney general,"
"the award loses much of its discretionary character and becomes a part of the effective remedy a court should fashion to encourage public-minded suits • • • and to
carry out congressional policy." 340 F. Supp. at 694. In Northcross v. Board of Educ.,
412 U.S. 427 (1973), the Supreme Court, construing the attorney fees provision of the
Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. III, 1972), which provides that the court "in its discretion • • • may allow the prevailing party • • • a
reasonable attorneys fee as part of the costs,'' held that "if [the] other requirements
of § 718 are satisfied, the successful plaintiff 'should ordinarily recover an attorney's
fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'" 412 U.S. at 428,
quoting Newman, 390 U.S. at 402. See Nussbaum, supra note 1026, at 322-23.
1061. These factors are similar to those enumerated in the Senate bill. See S. 2543,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. § l(b)(2) (1974), quoted in the text at note 1040 supra.
supra,
1062. See text at notes 1046-60 supra.
1063. See text at notes 1041-45 supra.
1064. In cases where there is a pecuniary benefit to the requester, the incentive
to litigate provided by an award of attorney fees is not necessary. See text at notes
1018-21 supra.
Senator Kennedy and Representative Moorhead, chairpersons of the Senate and
House conferees respectively, stated in a letter to President Ford:
You expressed concern that the amendments to the Freedom of Information
Law authorizing the Federal courts to award attorney fees and litigation costs
not be used to subsidize corporate interests who use the law to enhance their
own competitive position.
The members of the conference committee completely share your concern in
this connection, and the Statement of Managers will reflect [sic] mutual view that
any award of fees and costs by the courts should not be automatic but should be
based on presently prevailing judicial standards, such as the general public benefit
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legislative history of (a)(4)(E), emphasizing the need to encourage
requesters to exercise their right to judicial enforcement, and the
case law in the civil rights area, courts should be liberal in awarding fees to successful plaintiffs.
Difficulty in applying these factors will arise when some of them
justify an award of attorney fees and others do not. Perhaps the
paradigm of a conflict in policies is the case in which a private corporation sues for information that is commercially valuable to it,
but that also benefits the public in some way (even if only in the
attenuated form of creating "good" FOIA precedent). Here the
presence of a public benefit weighs in favor of the fee award. But,
since the information is commercially valuable, there is apparently
no need for the award as an incentive to enforce FOIA rights.
It can be argued that fees should be awarded regardless of the
commercial benefit to the plaintiff, since the assessment of fees is
justified by the value of deterring agencies from taking untenable
legal positions. 1065 One FOIA plaintiff's lawyer suggested that such
awards would come to the attention of the General Accounting
Office (GAO):
[I]f [the GAO] discover[s] that the executive branch is suddenly
spending a lot of money on attorneys' fees for cases they are losing,
they will promptly conduct an investigation of the implementation
of this act and report it to Congress. I think really the watchdog
effect of the GAO on the amount of money that the Government is
required to pay in attorneys' fees for cases they lose might be the
most important part, have the most salutary effect from authorizing
the courts to award attorneys' fees ....1006
The Justice Department, on the other hand, does not believe that
awards of attorney fees will significantly deter agency misconduct
and would limit such awards:
We agree that the awarding of attorney's fees might in theory be
of limited help in discouraging some agencies from litigating weak
or marginal cases where information has been refused, but we do not
believe it would have a significant effect. The usual reasons for
arising from the release of the information sought, as opposed to a more narrow
commercial benefit solely to the private litigant.
120 CONG. REc. Hl0,003 {daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974).
1065. See 2 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 102 (testimony of H. Wellford,
Center for the Study of Responsive Law), 109 (statement of R. Ackerly), 211 (testimony of R. Nader). It can be argued that Congress' failure to provide for the assessment of attorney fees against individual agency appropriations demonstrates its intent
not to employ such an award as a deterrent. However, in light of Congress' approval
of the essentially punitive "bad faith" standard, see note 1040 supra and accompanying
text, it seems more reasonable to conclude that Congress did intend to deter unreasonable denials by the award of attorney fees.
1066. 1(1. at 109 (statement of R. Ackerly).
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litigating weak or marginal cases are that the agency thinks its
policy or legal position is stronger than may appear to others, that
the agency believes it will be criticized by a portion of the public
or within Congress if it voluntarily releases the information, that the
agency considers itself morally obligated to -protect third persons or
its own employees, or that the agency seeks the guidance of a court
decision as to its obligations and options in circumstances of the
type involved in the case. To the extent that an agency might decide
to release information to avoid the risk of an award of attorney's fees,
there is no assurance that such a disclosure would not be at the
expense of some legitimate private interest such as individual
privacy.1001
It also might be argued that since an award of attorney fees is assessed from the United States Treasury and not from individual
agency accounts,1° 68 it would not provide an economic deterrent.1069
The ultimate decision will lie with the courts and will in all
probability tum on how they weigh the conflicting policies.107° For
example, a media plaintiff derives some "commercial" benefit from
the information it uncovers, but there is also a significant public
educational benefit from the publication of government decisions
and processes. Since one of the purposes of the 1974 amendment was
to encourage greater use of the FOIA by the press, fees will probably
be awarded in these cases.1071
1067. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 756, at 174 (letter from Department of
Justice).
1068. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(E) (Supp •. Feb. 1975) provides that the court "may
assess against the United States" and says nothing about assessments against the individual agencies.
1069. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 756, at 278-79 (statement of A. Scalia,
Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States) ("That the provision will
be a disincentive to agency refusals seems doubtful, because the money will come
from general Government funds rather than the agency's appropriation. Even if it
came from the agency's budget, the impact on the officer making the decision not
to disclose would be remote"); Clark, supra note 911, at 766-67. Cf. note 1026 supra.
1070. It is also possible that courts will decide to ignore the public benefit and
pecuniary factors and apply only a "bad faith" test in awarding fees, in order to avoid
an anomalous result under the new disciplinary provision, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(F)
(Supp. Feb. 1975), discussed in the text at notes 1072-97 infra. That provision is
triggered by the award of "reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs." See
text at note 1072 infra. It does not seem reasonable to interpret the Act to allow
one agency employee to deny arbitrarily the request of a private-interest requester (for
information that does not benefit the public or that results in pecuniary benefit to
the requester) and be free from any disciplinary action, while subjecting another to
such di![ciplinary action if he denies the same information to a public-interest group.
1071. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in commenting on how the criteria
contained in the Senate bill should be applied, see note 1040 supra, stated that "a
court would ordinarily award fees • • . where a newsman was seeking information
to be used in a publication •••" and that "for the purposes of applying [the criterion of 'commercial benefit to the plaintifI1, news interests should not be considered commercial interests." S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 19. See generally
4 1972 House Hearings, supra note 326, at 1279-332,

1144

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '13:971

f. CSC proceedings. The 1974 FOIA amendments added subsection (a)(4)(F), which provides the threat of a punitive sanction for
agency officials who have flagrantly violated the Act's disclosure
mandates. It states:
Whenever the court orders the production of any agency records
improperly withheld from the complainant and assesses against the
United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs, and
the court additionally issues a ·written finding that the circumstances
surrounding the withholding raise questions whether agency personnel acted arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to the withholding, the Civil Service Commission shall promptly initiate a
proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action is warranted
against the officer or employee who was primarily responsible for the
·withholding. The Commission, after investigation and consideration
of the evidence submitted, shall submit its findings and recommendations to the administrative authority of the agency concerned and
shall send copies of the findings and recommendations to the officer
or employee or his representative. The administrative authority shall
take the corrective action that the Commission recommends.1 072

The provision was the product of a conference committee compromise: The House bill did not include agency employee sanctions,1073
and the Senate bill included a sanction provision authorizing the
court, upon finding that the withholding was without a reasonable
basis in law, to suspend the responsible officer or employee for up to
sixty days or take other "appropriate disciplinary or corrective action
against him." 1074
The subsection represents a relatively new disciplinary technique
in federal administrative law.10w It provides for a CSC investigation
1072, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(F) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1073. See H.R. 12471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
1074. S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § l(b)(2) (1974) provided:
Whenever records are ordered by the court to be made available under this section,
the court shall on motion by the complainant find whether the withholding of
such records was without reasonable basis in law and which Federal officer or
employee was responsible for the withholding. Before such findings arc made,
any officers or employees named in the complainant's motion shall be personally
served a copy of such motion and shall have 20 days in which to respond thereto,
and shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard by the court. If such findings
are made, the court shall, upon consideration of the recommendation of the agency,
direct that an appropriate official of the agency which employs such responsible
officer or employee suspend such officer or employee without pay for a period of
not. more. than 60 days or take other appropriate disciplinary or corrective action
agamst bun.
See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 10; S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329,
at 21-23. See also 120 CONG. REc. Hl0,001-02 (daily ed. Oct. '1, 1974) (statement of
Representative Moorhead).
1075. Cf. 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.206, .303 (1974) (CSC Regulations prohibiting the use of
official information in furtherance of private purposes when such information has not
been made available to the general public).
A number of states have included disciplinary sanctions provisions in their openrecords laws. See S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 63-64; notes 1296-802 infra
and accompanying text.
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to be triggered by the award of attorney fees to the plaintiff and
by a ·written judicial finding that questions of arbitrary and capricious action by government employees were raised. The CSC must
then initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action
is warranted.1076 While the subsection is far from clear on this
matter,1°77 it was probably contemplated that the CSC "proceeding"
be undertaken pursuant to the procedures of the CSC presently in
effect regarding disciplinary proceedings.1078 Under those proceedings, disciplinary sanctions may be imposed "only for such cause as
will promote the efficiency of the service."1079
The subsection was intended to affect the motivation of the
individual agency officials who must implement the disclosure provi1076. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 225, at 10; 120 CONG. REc. Hl0,001-02 (daily
ed. Oct. 7, 1974) (statement of Representative Moorhead).
1077. Representative Erlenborn, one of the conferees, stated: "I asked the principal
sponsor of the Senate provision, Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts, what a proceeding
was. He was unable in conference to define it. It is neither defined in the Civil Service
law, nor is it defined in the Freedom of Information Act. What kind of proceeding
is intended by the compromise of the conferees is really rather vague.'' 120 CONG.
REc. Hl0,006 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974). Neither the language of the amendment nor the
conference report clarify what type of "proceeding" was intended.
1078. Representative Moorhead stated: "The Civil Service Commission would then
investigate the circumstances, may hold hearings, and otherwise proceed in accordance with regular civil service procedures." 120 CONG, REc. HI0,001-02 (daily ed.
Oct. 7, 1974).
The present CSC regulations provide for the hearing of appeals from disciplinary
actions taken by agencies against their employees. In considering those appeals, the
CSC may make its own investigation and hold evidentiary hearings. 5 C.F.R. §§ 772.301.308 (1974). The regulations also permit the CSC to initiate actions, but only against
employees in the competitive service and only with regard to employees "appointed
subject to investigation under [5 C.F.R.] § 731.301 [of their qualifications and suitability
for employment] ••• .'' 5 C.F.R. § 754.101 (1974). While either the appellate procedures
or the initiating procedures may be adaptable to the proceedings mandated by the
FOIA amendments, the latter already include specific procedural safeguards and therefore seem preferable. They require that the employee (1) must receive at least 30
days advance notice of the proposed disciplinary action, 5 C.F.R. § 754.102 (1974);
(2) "may answer the charges either orally in person, or in writing, or both" within
15 days of the notice, 5 C.F.R. § 754.103 (1974); (3) must be notified of the agency
decision and informed of his appeal rights, 5 C.F.R. § 754.104 (1974); and (4) "may
appeal an adverse decision" within fifteen days. 5 C.F.R. § 754.105 (1974). See generally
Berzak, Rights Accorded Federal Employees Against Whom Adverse Personnel Actions
Are Taken, 47 NOTRE DAME I.Aw. 853 (1972); Merrill, Procedures for Adverse Actions
Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. REv. 196 (1973).
1079. 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970). This provision applies only to those in the competitive
service and was enacted to protect federal employees from arbitrary personnel actions.
Berzak, supra note 1078, at 853-54, 860-61. There is some question as to whether this
standard would be applicable to FOIA disciplinary proceedings or whether the CSC
would merely investigate the facts surrounding the withholding to determine whether
the employee's action was arbitrary and capricious. In view of the CSC's expertise in
personnel management, the fact that Congress provided no guidance of what an appropriate sanction might be, and the lack of a clear repudiation of the "efficiency of
the service" standard, it can be argued that Congress intended to adopt the existing
CSC procedures with no substantive modifications, deferring to the CSC's discretion in
determining whether disciplinary action is warranted.
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sions of the FOIA.1080 Attorney General Ramsey Clark predicted in
1967 that the effectiveness of the Act would ultimately depend on
the attitudes of those who administer it:
No review of an area as diverse and intricate as this one can anticipate all possible points of strain or difficulty. This is particularly
true when vital and deeply held commitments in our democratic
system, such as privacy and the right to know, inevitably impinge one
against another. Law is not wholly self-explanatory or self-executing.
Its efficacy is heavily dependent on the sound judgment and faithful
execution of those who direct and administer our agencies of
Government. 1081

Before the enactment of the 1974 FOIA amendments, agency officials
were encouraged to refuse disclosure in potentially troublesome cases
by a federal statute imposing criminal penalties for the general disclosure of confidential information,1°82 and by the threat of suits
brought by private parties to protect from disclosure documents held
by government agencies.1083 In 1973, one commentator stated:
"[U]nder the Freedom of Information Act as it appears to work now
the reflex of the official, if he has any doubts at all, is to deny information. That seems to keep him out of trouble-rather than to act
under the Freedom of Information Act and to grant informa1080. Senator Kennedy gave this account of the Senate's purpose in providing for
disciplinary sanctions:
Former Attorney General Richardson observed in our hearings that"The problem in affording the public more access to official information is
not statutory but administrative."
He indicated that"The real need is not to revise the act extensively but to improve compliance."
That is precisely why we included this sanction in S. 2543.
There are three problems to which this new accountability provision ad•
dresses itself: where officials refuse to follow clear precedent, forcing a rcciucster
to go to court despite the clarity of the disclosure requirement in the specific case:
where officials deny requests without bothering to inform themselves of the mandates of the law; and where obstinacy provides the obvious basis for tl1e official's
refusal to disclose information.
120 CoNG. REc. S9314 (daily ed. May 20, 1974).
1081. ATI'ORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 209, at III.
1082. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970) provides:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or
agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to
any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course
of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department
or agency or officer or empfoyee thereof, which information concerns or relates to
the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or appartus, or to the identity,
confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or
expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association; or permits any income return or copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or
particulars thereof to be seen or examined by any person except as provided by
law; shall be fined not more than Sl,000, or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both; and shall be removed from office or employment."
Cf. text at notes 572-80 supra.
1082. See text at noies Il$2-67 infra,
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tion." 1084 For example, consider the plight of Rudy Frank, an OEO
employee. He was suspended by the OEO for releasing the salaries
of teachers at a day-care center operated by a private corporation
under contract with the OEO. Frank successfully argued in court
that the FOIA required the release of the records, but the CSC persisted in resisting Frank's claim for back pay.1085
Although the practical effect of subsection (a)(4)(F) remains to
be seen, it is doubtful that the provision will significantly encourage
disclosure. There are several problems with the provision. First, it
does not clearly establish a standard of conduct the violation of
which will be penalized.1086 The exemptions to the FOIA are broad
and complex; their implementation must depend in large part on ·
administrative discretion. Allowing courts that find that a case raises
questions of arbitrary and capricious action to submit officials to a
CSC judgment on the promotion of "the efficiency of the service"1087
makes the disciplinary process highly discretionary.
Second, it may be difficult to determine who is "primarily responsible for the withholding" and therefore subject to the subsection's procedures.1088 Under the FOI procedures of most agencies, a
requester must appeal the agency's initial decision to withhold materials within the agency before he may seek judicial review.1089 The
agency's decision at the agency appeal level usually includes consultation with the Department of Justice's FOI Committee.1090 Thus,
responsibility for the disclosure decision will usually have passed
from the official making the initial determination to those at the
higher levels of the agency who decide the appeal.1091 Does the provi1084. Interagency Symposium, supra note 913, at 28 (statement of F. Graham, CBS
News).
1085. See 1 197:J Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 209 (statement of H. Wellford,
Center for the Study of Responsive Law); 2 197:J Senate Hearings, supra, at 105 (testimony of R. Nader).
1086. It could be argued that this failure to provide an adequate standard would
deny an employee subjected to disciplinary measures due process of law. However, in
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), a plurality of the Court rejected the argument
that the standard of 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970) ("such cause as will promote the efficiency
of the service') was unconstitutionally vague in failing to provide sufficiently precise
guidelines as to which kinds of speech could be the basis for adverse actions. 416 U.S.
at 163-64.
1087. See text at note 1079 supra.
1088. As a starting point in determining which official was "primarily responsible,"
the amendments require: "Any notification of denial of any request for records under
this subsection shall set forth the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial of such requesL" 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(C) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1089. See text at notes 955·56 supra.
1090. See text at note 1003 supra.
1091. Representative Erlenborn, one of the conferees, stated:
As a matter of fact, the provision that is now in the bill is one that, in my
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sion still allow the disciplining of lower level officials if internal
agency appeals have been made or are only the final decision makers
"primarily responsible"? The resuJt of the confusion may be simply
that the sanction provision will rarely be invoked. 1002
Third, the CSC traditionally has not encouraged agency officials
to disclose FOIA information.1003 One disgruntled newspaperman
stated that "[t]here is no more outrageous agency in the city from the
standpoint of coverup than the Civil Service Commission."1094 Since
the CSC is a vital link in the disciplinary mechanism, its reluctance
to encourage compliance with the FOIA may serve to nullify the
corrective strength of the sanction.
Finally, assuming that the sanction is perceived by agency officials
as significant and that it is clear enough to encourage those officials
to handle properly their tasks of disclosure, imposing the sanction
may cause undesirable organizational consequences. For example, if
sanctions are applied to low level officials, it may cause them to refuse
to exercise their discretion: "[L]ow level officials ... simply ...
won't make a decision. They wiII consult their superiors. And you
will find that the amount of initiative and informed discretion which
you can expect at the lower and middle levels of the bureaucracy,
the people who are really going to make or break this program, will
progressively lessen as they are whipsawed between mandatory
time limits and the possibilities of civil penalties."109G As a result,
centralization and formalization of the FOIA agency decision-making
process will be encouraged, adding time and red tape to disclosure
decisions. A Commerce Department official noted that "the idea of
having penalties attached to the quality of the decision that is made
judgment, could never result in the imposition of a sanction against a Federal
employee•
. . • As a matter of fact, before the case ever gets to court, the employee who
refuses to give information when a demand is made will have to have been supported by his superior. There will have had to have been an administrative appeal
within the agency.
In most agencies this would mean that the general counsel of the agency would
support the decision of the employee, and then the case would have to be brought
to court by the one who was seeking the information. The Attorney General or
the general counsel of the agency would then have to make a decision at that
point that the case is sufficiently meritorious to defend. Then possibly the court
might find the agency to be wrong, but I think in that circumstance the court
could hardly find that the employee who has been sustained all the way along the
line had acted arbitrarily or capriciously.
120 CONG. REc. HI0,006 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974).
1092. Thus, Representative Moorehead said: "I seriously doubt that such procedures
will actually be invoked except in unusual circumstances." 120 CoNG, REc. HI0,002
(daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974).
1093. See, e.g., text at note 1085 supra (discussing the CSC's position in the Frank
case).

1094. 1973 House Hearings, supra note '756, at 42 (statement of C. Mollenhoff,
Washington Bureau Chief, Des Moines Register).
1095. Interagency Symposium, supra note 913, at 126-27 (statement of R. Berg,
Executive Secretary, Administrative Conference of the United States).
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is going to counteract any pressure towards decentralizing the decision-making process in the hope that . . . a decision will be made
faster and the public interest will pe served." 1096
If sanctions are applied to the high level officials who handle administrative appeals or establish agency procedures and guidelines
for disclosure, other problems could result. Because such officials
have many responsibilities, they may be unable to consider carefully
each request; thus, their approval may amount to no more than a
"rubber stamp." The CSC may find it inequitable to apply disciplinary sanctions to persons in this position. There is also some
question whether present CSC procedures reach such officials.1097
Although Congress' intent in enacting subsection (a)(4)(F) was
salutary, the practical effect of the provision will undoubtedly be
minimal. The subsection's disciplinary procedure will be invoked,
in all probability, only infrequently. Even if the subsection's sanction
does gain clout, organizational dysfunction may result, outweighing
the intended benefits of more careful disclosure decisions. In sum, it
appears that the significance of the disciplinary sanction provision is
largely symbolic.
6. FOIA Problem Areas

a. Discovery and the FOIA. Two questions have arisen concerning the relationship beav-een the FOIA and the law of discovery.
The first question is whether the government can use an FOIA
exemption as a defense against a discovery motion.1098 While this
issue could arise in connection with any of the exemptions,1099 it has
occurred most frequently in exemption five cases due to the express
reliance on discovery standards in that exemption.1100 Several courts
have permitted the government to assert exemption five as a defense
1096. Id. at 218 (statement of D. Malone, Office of Telecommunications, Department of Commerce).
1097, For example, in the Department of Justice, appeal of the initial denial is
made directly to the Attorney General. 28 C.F.R. § 16.7 (1975). Since the Attorney
General is appointed by the President, subject to Senate approval, 28 U.S.C. § 503
(1970), he is not a member of the competitive service. 5 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1975). Thus,
existing procedures for "adverse actions" are inapplicable to him. 5 C.F.R. § 752.103
(a)(4) (1975). Since Congress, by enacting subsection (a)(4)(F), has apparently authorized
the CSC to exercise jurisdiction over all officers and employees to determine whether
their conduct should be subject to disciplinary sanction, the CSC could amend its
regulations to apply to those officers who are not in the competitive service.
1098. Clearly the discovery rules should not be used to withhold material that
should be disclosed under the FOIA. See Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp.
of Baltimore, 508 F.2d 945, 950 (4th Cir. 1974).
1099. See Note, 74 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 895, supra note 333, at 928-29. See also Note, 8
U. MICH. J. L. REF. 329, supra note 333, at 339.
1100. Exemption five protects from disclosure internal agency memoranda "which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency." See text at notes 648-99 supra.
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against discovery.11°1 However, since the FOIA expressly rejects consideration of individual need, while discovery procedures encourage
balancing of individual interests, it may be unfair to a litigant to
deny discovery on the basis of an FOIA exemption. One court has
recognized this fundamental distinction and found that "the fact that
§ 552(b) of the Information Act provides specified exemptions from
the Act's public information requirements does not in and of itself
create a judicial discovery privilege with respect to such exemptions."1102
The second question that has arisen is whether a litigant may use
an FOIA suit rather than discovery procedures to obtain information.1103 Certainly, if information should be released under the
FOIA, a litigant should be able to use that information at trial.
A court may, however, be reluctant to stay judicial or agency proceedings while a litigant pursues his FOIA remedies since this may
result in unnecessary delay.1104
In resolving these questions, it is important to note that the
policies behind the FOIA and the discovery procedures are entirely
different. The purpose of the FOIA is public disclosure of as much
information as possible; the discovery rules are concerned with
individual requests made during litigation, and have as their primary goal the elimination of surprise and unfair trial practices. The
two should not be used interchangeably.
b. Equity powers of the judiciary in FOIA cases. The lower
federal courts are divided on the question whether they retain
equitable discretion in FOIA cases to permit the withholding of
information that does not fall ·within any of the Act's exemptions.1100
1101. E.g., Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 976 (1971), where the court relied partially on exemption five to quash a subpoena
requiring the production of an agency report; Talbott Constr. Co. v. United States, 49
F.R.D. 68 (E.D. Ky. 1969), where the court applied exemption five to deny discovery
of some IRS letters and memoranda in a tax refund case.
1102. Verrazzano Trading Corp. v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (Cust, Ct.
1972). See Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct., 511 F.2d 192, 197 (9th Cir, 1975); B & C Tire
Co., Inc. v. IRS, 376 F. Supp. 708, 713 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
1103. Compare Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 792-93 (6th Cir. 1972), and United
States v. Wahlin, 384 F. Supp. 43, 47 0iV.D. Wis. 1974) (FOIA may be used as an
alternative to discovery), with Seafarers Intl. Union v. Baldovin, 508 F.2d 125, 128-29
(5th Cir. 1975) ("[T]he [FOI] Act was not intended to create a redundant power in this
district court to require a government agency litigant in the appeals court of the District of Columbia to furnish that latter court with documents from which it can select
those needed to exercise its judicial functions'); National Cable Television Assn,, Inc.
v. FCC, 479 F.2d J83, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("these matters should be settled through
the discovery process as much as possible') (dictum), and Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp,
591, 594 (D. Del. 1972), afjd., 479 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973) (FOIA docs not affect "rights
of specific persons under government investigation and seeking the files dealing with
them").
1104. See text at notes 989-96 supra.
1105. There are three possible opportunities for the courts to exercise discretion
in applying the FOIA exemptions. The discussion here considers the exercise of

May-June 1975]

Project

1151

The FOIA states that it "does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as
specifically stated in [the Act]."110 6
A majority of the courts have held that the only exceptions to
disclosure under the FOIA are those expressly provided for in the
Act and that the courts do not have the equitable power to deny disclosure if the requested information is not exempt.11°7 In EPA v.
equitable discretion to refuse to order disclosure despite a finding that the requested
information does not fall within any specific exemption. A court could also exercise
discretion to order the release of information that has been found to be protected by a
specific exemption. See text at notes 1141-51 infra. Finally, discretion may enter into
the decision whether the requested material is within the scope of an exemption. The
proper role of the courts in balancing the various purposes of the exemptions in the
process of statutory interpretation is discussed in the text at notes 496-500 supra.
1106. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970). See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 265, §§ 3A.6,
3A.15 (Supp. 1970); Engel, supra note 282, at 193-94; Kramer & Weinberg, supra note
333, at 59-62; Project, 1972 DUKE L.J. 115, supra note 323, at 144-46; Project, Federal
Administrative Law Developments-1969, 1970 DUKE L.J. 67, 95-98; Note, 74 CoLUM.
L. R.Ev. 895, supra note 333, at 911-20; Note, Administrative Law-The Freedom of
Information Act and Equitable Discretion, 51 DENVER L.J. 263 (1974); Note, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 416, supra note 333, at 424-27; 1973 DUKE L.J. 178, supra note 333, at 178-86; Note,
42 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 869, supra note 323, at 879 n. 64; Note, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. R.Ev.
694, supra note 750, at 708-11; 85 HARV. L. R.Ev. 861, 862 n.11 (1972); 5 HARv. CIV.
R.lGHTS·CIV. Lm. L. R.Ev. 121 (1970); 47 IND. L.J. 530, 542-45 (1972); 45 IND. L.J. 421
(1970); 51 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 119, 124 (1972); 44 TUL. L. R.Ev. 800 (1970); 6 u. TOLEDO L.
R.Ev. 215, 231-36 (1974).
1107. See, e.g., Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
modifying 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (D.D.C. 1973); Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490
F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974); Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843,
847 (4th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 67 F.2d 787, 792 (6th Cir. 1972) (dictum); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 661-62 (6th Cir. 1972); Getman v. NLRB,
450 F.2d 670, 677-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076-77 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 371 F. Supp. 97, 102 (D.D.C. 1974); Wine
Hobby, USA, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 363 F. Supp. 231, 236
(E.D. Pa. 1973), revd. on other grounds, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974); Legal Aid Soc. v.
Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771, 774 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp. 1371,
1376-77 (N.D. Ga. 1972), affd. sub nom. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699, 701 (5th Cir.
1973); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 347 F. Supp. 751, 754 (D.D.C. 1972), affd., 480
F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), affd., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4496 (U.S. April 29, 1975). See also
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973); Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d
261, 269-70 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Feb. 14, 1975) (No. 74489); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 995 n.14 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973); Nicholas v. United States, 460 F.2d 671, 673 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972); People v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 733, 734 (N.D. Cal.
1972); Wecksler v. Shultz, 324 F. Supp. 1084, 1086 (D.D.C. 1971). Cf. NLRB v. Getman,
404 U.S. 1204 (1971), where Justice Black's denial of a stay arguably resolved the
question of the federal courts' residual equitable powers to expand the exemptions.
Justice Black, Acting Circuit Justice, implied that only the statutory exemptions could
prevent disclosure: "The [NLRB] was created by Congress and Congress has seen fit
to make identifiable records of the Board and other government agencies available
to any person upon proper request. I find no exception in the Freedom of Information Act which would authorize the Board to refuse promptly to turn over the requested records." 404 U.S. at 1204-05. However, the court in Tennessean Newspaper,
Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1972), noted that the stay application in
Getman did not directly present the residual equitable discretion question and cannot
be viewed as dispositive of the issue. On this point see Kramer & Weinberg, supra
note 333, at 61 n.83,
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Mink,11° 8 the Supreme Court implied that this result is correct,
stating that "these exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(c), and are plainly intended to set up concrete, workable
standards for determining whether particular material may be withheld or must be disclosed." 1109 Some courts, however, have reached
the opposite conclusion, finding that the FOIA does not preclude the
exercise of equitable discretion to deny disclosure.1110
Congress has the power to limit the equitable discretion of federal courts in order to implement important federal legislative
policy. 1111 It has been held, however, that deprivation of the traditional equity powers of the courts is not to be lightly inferred: 1112
The language of the statute and its legislative history must clearly
indicate that such a deprivation was intended. Ambiguities must be
resolved "in favor of that interpretation which affords a full opportunity for equity courts to exercise their traditional practices."1113
The language of section 552(c) appears clearly to limit judicial
discretion to order the disclosure of nonexempt information. That
section provides that the FOIA does not authorize the withholding
The language in Soucie v. David, 448 F,2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971) is often cited when
equitable discretion is denied:
Most significantly the Act expressly limits the grounds for nondisclosure to those
specified in the exemptions. Through the general disclosure requirement and
specific exemptions, the Act thus strikes a balance among factors which would
ordinarily be deemed relevant to the exercise of equitable discretion, i.e., the
public interest in freedom of information and countervailing public and private
interests in secrecy. Since judicial use of traditional equitable principles to prevent
disclosure would upset this legislative resolution of conflicting interests, we arc
persuaded that Congress did not intend to confer on district courts a general
power to deny relief on equitable grounds apart from the exemptions in the Act
itself.
488 F.2d at 1077 (footnotes omitted). The Soucie result was approved by a House
committee reviewing the operation of the FOIA. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra
note 327, at 77.
1108. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 383 F. Supp.
1065, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), where the court cited Mink for the proposition that courts
do not have equitable discretion to refuse to order disclosure of nonexempt materials.
1109. 410 U.S. at 79.
1110. See, e.g., Theriault v. United States, 503 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1974) (dictum);
Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 66 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1974); GSA v. Benson,
415 F.2d 878,880 (9th Cir. 1969), affg. 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wasb. 1968); Long v. ms,
349 F. Supp. 871, 873 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
Veterans Admn., 301 F. Supp. 796, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v.
Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D.P.R. 1967). These decisions have been criticized
as not having been "the product of sedulous analysis. [The courts] examined neither
the relevant legislative history nor the text of the FOIA to support their bald conclu,
sion that traditional equity principles should guide the courts in administering the
FOIA.'' Note, 74 CoLUM, L. REv. 895, supra note 333, at 912.
1111. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Virginia
Ry. Co. v. System Fedn. No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 549-53 (1937); K. DAVIS, supra note 265,
§ 3A.15, at 142 (Supp. 1970).
1112. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944).
1113. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944).
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of information "except as specifically stated in [the Act]."1114 Several
courts have concluded that this language should be read literally:
Any information not within an exemption must be disclosed.1115 The
enforcement clause of the FOIA, however, can be read to conflict
with this interpretation of 552(c).1116 That clause provides, in part:
"On complaint, the district court . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin
the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld ...." 1117 The Supreme Court held that similar language in another statute did not
deprive courts of their traditional discretion to render equitable
relief.1118 But the Court has indicated that such language can be
read to eliminate equitable discretion if there exists a clear conflict
between the courts' retention of equitable discretion and the· broad
purposes of the legislation,1119 or if there is a strong indication of
congressional intent to restrict the equity powers of courts.1120
1114. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970). "The pull of the word 'specifically' is toward emphasis on statutory language and away from all else-away from implied meanings,
away from reliance on legislative history, away from needed judicial legislation.'' K.
DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.15, at 142 (Supp. 1970).
1115. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 995 n.14 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Nichols v. United States, 460 F.2d 671, 673 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972); People v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 733, 734
(N.D. Cal. 1972); Wecksler v. Shultz, 324 F. Supp. 1084, 1086 (D.D.C. 1971).
1116. This argument is outlined in Note, 74 CoLuM. L. REv. 895, supra note 333,
at 914. Cf. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974). In Bannercraft Clothing, the Court reviewed orders enjoining the :Board from withholding
documents requested under the FOIA and from conducting any further renegotiation
proceedings until the documents were produced. The Court examined the language
of the enforcement clause and concluded that with "the express vesting of equitable
jurisdiction in the district court by § 552(a), there is little to suggest, despite the Act's
primary purpose, that Congress sought to limit the inherent powers of an equity
court.'' 415 U.S. at 20. The Court, however, was not referring to the equitable discretion to determine whether documents must be disclosed under the FOIA; it was discussing only the equitable discretion to fashion additional means of enforcing the Act.
415 U.S. at 18, 20. Congress could well have intended to limit judicial discretion in
the initial disclosure decision, without intending to limit the courts' ability to fashion
additional sanctions. (The Court of Appeals in Bannercraft Clothing had stated that
its determination that a court could issue an injunction prohibiting further proceedings
"is unchanged by the decision of this and other courts holding that the Freedom of
Information Act does not permit a court to balance the equities before ordering release
of records within the Act's ambit.'' 466 F.2d 345, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1972).)
1117. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at notes 943-64 supra.
1118. See Hecht Co. v. :Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944) (refusing to construe the language establishing remedies under the Emergency Price Control Act to deprive the
courts of their equitable discretion in the absence of a sufficient indication of legislative
intent); Note, 74 CoLUM, L. R.Ev. 895, supra note 333, at 915-18. See also 4 1972 House
Hearings, supra note 326, at 1077 (testimony of F. Wozencraft).
1119. See United States Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959),
where the Court held that the language of the Taft-Hartley Act mandated the issuance
of an injunction once certain facts were found. The majority opinion did not attempt
to distinguish Hecht, but Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, in their concurring opinion,
pointed out that the broad purposes of the Act would be vitiated if a court, exercising
equitable discretion, denied injunctive relief. 361 U.S. at 55-59.
1120, See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961). The
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Since the only method provided by Congress for enforcing the
FOIA is through actions for injunctive relief, all limitations on the
availability of such relief arguably run counter to the purposes of
the Act.1121 Furthermore, congressional intent to restrict the courts'
discretion to grant relief under the FOIA can be found in the legislative history. Speaking directly to the purpose of section 552(c), the
Senate report on the original bill said, "The purpose of this subsection is to make it clear beyond doubt that all materials of the
Government are to be made available to the public by publication or
othenvise unless explicitly allowed to be kept secret by one of the
exemptions in subsection (b)."1122 Although the House report con•
tains some contrary language on the question,11 23 it is a less authoritaCourt, citing Hecht, said that Congress will "not be deemed to have restricted the
broad remedial powers of courts of equity without explicit language doing so, in
terms, or some other strong indication of intent." 366 U.S. at 316 (1961) (emphasis
added).
1121. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("The chief purpose
of the new· Act was to increase public access to governmental records by substituting
limited categories ... for ••• discretionary standards, and providing an effective ju•
dicial remedy'). See also text at notes 128-31 infra. But see Note, 74 COLOM. L. REv.
895, supra note 333, at 917 ("[IJt cannot seriously be contended that the success of the
FOIA is inexorably linked to an automatic grant of injunctive relief").
1122. S. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 10 (emphasis original). The Senate
report also states:
S. 1160 would emphasize that section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act is not
a withholding statute but a disclosure statute by the following major changes:
(1) It sets up workable standards for what records should and should not be
open to public inspection. In particular, it avoids the use of such vague phrases
as "good cause found" and replaces them with specific and limited types of information that may be withheld.
Id. at 5.
1123. The House report is self-contradictory. While it recognizes that the Act "sets
up workable standards for the categories of records which may be exempt from public
disclosure, replacing the vague phrases good cause found, in the public interest, and
internal management with specific definitions of information which may be withheld,"
H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 2, and that the purpose of the Act "is to
make clear beyond doubt that all materials of Government are to be available to the
public unless specifically exempt from disclosure by the provisions of subsection (e)
or limitations spelled out in earlier subsections," id. at 11, it interprets the enforce•
ment section to mean that "[t]he court will have authority whenever it considers sucl1
action equitable and appropriate to enjoin the agency from withholding its records
and to order the production of agency records improperly withheld." Id. at 9.
The Attorney General's Memorandum, because it relics on the House report, is also
self-contradictory. It quotes the House report's discussion of the purposes of the
Act, see ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 39, and then comments
on the enforcement section:
The injunction is an equitable remedy. As the above language recognizes, in a trial
de novo under subsection (c) the district court is free to exercise the traditional
discretion of a court of equity in determining whether or not the relief sought by
the plaintiff should be granted. In making such determination the court can be
expected to weigh the customary considerations as to whether an injunction or
similar relief is equitable and appropriate, including the purposes and needs of
the plaintiff, the burdens involved, and the importance to the public interest of
the Government's reason for nondisclosure. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321
(1944); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); 2 POMEROY's EQUITY JURIS•
l'RUDENCE 397-404 (Symons 5th ed. 1941).
Id. at 28.
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tive source.1124 A report issued by a House committee, after hearings
in 1972 reviewing the operation of the FOIA, also supports the view
that federal courts have no equitable discretion to refuse to order
disclosure:
Finally, some courts have decided for themselves that it is discretionary with them whether they order the production of information
which is held not to be subject to the exemptions permitted by
subsection (b) of the FOI Act. In effect, they are applying theories
of equity to balance the need of the individual citizen to the information requested under the act and the need of the Government to
withhold such information. Information requested under the act by
the plaintiff should be considered only with respect to whether or
not the Government's arguments fulfill the "burden of proof" requirement that the information is subject to the subsection (b)
exemptions claimed. If the court finds that the Government has not
met such test, the information should be ordered to be made promptly
available to the plaintiff solely on the substantive merits of the
case.1125
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress sought to weigh
carefully all competing interests involved in the disclosure controversy. Upon balancing those interests, it created specific exemptions
for the limited instances in which nondisclosure would be justifiable.1126 It did not intend that the federal courts, through the exercise of their equity powers, be allowed to alter that balance.1127
Thus, the FOIA enforcement clause should not be construed to
allow courts to exercise discretion in ordering the disclosure of nonexempt records.
Policy considerations also support the conclusion that the courts
should not retain this equitable power.1128 First, if the courts are
1124. See note 323 supra.
1125. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 327, at 77. See id. at 3; 5 1972 House Hearings, supra note 326, at 1377-78 (it "was not the intention of the drafters" that the
courts should apply "theories of equity'') (testimony of B. Fenstenvald, Jr.).
1126. See text at notes 496-500 supra.
1127. Professor Engel argues that if courts retain this equitable power, congressional
intent to eliminate the uncertainties that arose under the APA disclosure provisions
will be undermined. See Engel, supra note 333, at 193. He also notes that there is
"some danger that the provision imposing the burden on the agencies to establish the
basis for an exemption will be substantially diminished, if the equity considerations
become confounded by judicial deference to agency determinations." Id. at 193-94
(footnotes omitted).
1128. The government has argued that ti110 policy considerations support the opposite conclusion. See Brief for Appellees at 29-35, Rose v. Department of the Air
Force, 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3435 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975)
(No. 74-489) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees]. First, it has argued that the policy of
the general administrative statutory scheme supports the conclusion that the courts
retain their equitable powers under the FOIA. The judicial review provision of the
FOIA (5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975)), giving ·the courts the power to
review the matter de novo is, the government contended:
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allowed to exercise their equitable discretion to ecape the dictates
of the Act, increased uncertainty as to the validity of any particular
claim for documents will inevitably result. Uncertainty may deter
requesters from questioning an agency decision not to disclose the
requested information.1129 Since requesters would be less confident
of the validity of their legal position, the potential expense of a lost
legal battle might keep them from seeking judicial redress. And
second, the knowledge that courts might exercise equitable discretion might encourage agencies to withhold information. If disclosure is not mandatory upon a finding that the requested information
is not exempt, agency officials might continue to refuse disclosure in
the hope of persuading a court to exercise its equity powers in their
favor.11so
Examination of the language of the statute, of the relevant legislative history, and of the policies behind the FOIA suggests that
Congress intended to eliminate the courts' equitable discretion under
the FOIA. Congress intended its balancing process to be conclusive;
it was willing to risk undesirable results in those few cases where the
congressional balance may be inequitable in order to ensure a substantial increase in the amount of government information available
to the public.1131
an exception to the traditional rule of administrative law that the basic decision
is within the discretion of the agency and that judicial power is invoked only for
review of alleged abuse of discretion or error of law. It is highly unlikely that
Congress-having vested such e.;:traordinary authority in district courts in an area
of vital public concern-would at the same time have stripped those courts of
their traditional equitable power to act or decline to act so as to fulfill equitable
principles and the public interest.
Brief for Appellees at 30-31,
Second, the government has cited examples of information that would not be
exempt under the Act, but that it claims Congress intended to keep confidential, For
example, the government has pointed to Professor Davis' example of confidential
communications between the President and the governor of a state about plans for
racial tranquility. See K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.21, at 156 n.85 (Supp, 1970), The
government argues that these communications are not clearly within any of the specific
exemptions and would be required to be disclosed if the courts were denied equitable
discretion. Brief for Appellees at 31-32.
The court in Rose did not reach the merits of these claims by the Government,
However, with respect to the first claim, the legislative history shows that Congress
did clearly intend to deprive the courts of their equitable discretion in addition to
giving them de novo review powers. See text at notes 1122-27 supra, The second claim
is part of a general •'foreseeability" problem that arises whenever Congress legislates,
Cf. note 1131 infra.
1129. 45 IND. L.J. 421, 425-26 (1970). See also Kramer &: Weinberg, supra note 333,
at 60.
1130. 45 IND. L.J. 421, 426 (1970), The House report on the FOIA indicates that
one of the purposes of the Act was to "serve as influence against the initial wrongful
withholding." H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, supra note 310, at 9. The continued possibility
of a court expressing its discretion to support an agency's refusal to disclose would only
encourage such refusals and thus defeat this purpose.
1131. Professor Davis disagrees with this general conclusion and advocates that the
courts exercise their equitable discretion in administering the FOIA. K. DAVIS, supra
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c. "Reverse FOIA" suits. Most FOIA cases have arisen in the
context of a requester seeking information from an agency that has
refused disclosure. 1182 In a few recent cases,1188 however, persons who
have supplied information to the government have asked the courts
to enjoin the disclosure of that information to requesters. These
"reverse FOIA"1134 cases may also arise when an agency has obtained
information about a person from third parties, other agencies, or its
own investigation, and the subject of that data wants to prevent its
disclosure. Two holdings that emerge from one of these reverse
FOIA cases1135 may radically affect the future operation of the Act.
The first is that a "supplier"1136 may obtain judicial review of an
agency's decision to release information; the second is that agencies
may have the discretion to release material that is exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. The following discussion will conclude
that, although reverse FOIA suits may distort the statutory scheme,
these suits should be permitted so long as the Act's exemptions are
viewed as permissive, rather than mandatory.
Although there does not appear to be any procedural basis for
precluding supplier suits,1137 the language of the FOIA strongly sugnote 265, §§ 3A.6, 3A.32 (Supp. 1970). Professor Davis points to various drafting errors
in the FOIA and argues that equitable discretion is needed to ensure the effective
operation of the Act by allowing remedial judicial "legislation." Id. at 177. But see
45 IND. L.J. 421, 432-34 (1970). Continued congressional attention to the operation of
the FOIA, as manifested in the 1974 amendments, suggests that such judicial legislation is unnecessary.
1132. E.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See Brief for Appellant at 8, Charles
River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, Civil No. 73-1930 (D.C. Cir. March 10, 1975).
1133. Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974); Sears,
Roebuck &: Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C.), stay dissolved, 509 F.2d 527
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal.
1974); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, Civil No. 118-74-A (E.D. Va. April
3, 1974); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 360 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1973), remanded, Civil No. 73-1930 (D.C. Cir. March 10, 1975). The factual pattern of these
cases is essentially the same. The plaintiff had submitted information to a government
agency, often in compliance with government regulations. A third party requested
that information from the government, and the plaintiff sued the government to
enjoin disclosure. But cf. Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171, 1173 (D.D.C.
1973), in which a company which had supplied information to the government was
allowed to intervene in an FOIA suit for disclosure of that information.
These reverse FOIA suits can arise under any of the exemptions. See, e.g., Sears,
Roebuck&: Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1001-02 (D.D.C.), stay dissolved, 509 F.2d 527
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (considering claims arising under exemptions three, four, six, and
seven). Claims are more likely to arise under those exemptions that are based, at
least in part, on the interests of the supplier-for example, exemptions four, six,
and seven. See text at notes 496-500 supra.
1134. Sears, Roebuck &: Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1006 (D.D.C.), stay dissolved,
509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1135. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, Civil No. 73-1930 (D.C. Cir. March 10,
1975). See generally Note, 1975 DUKE L.J. 416, supra note 333, at 427-32.
1136. Hereinafter the term "supplier" will refer to a person who is· the subject of
information, whether or not that person has given the information to the government.
1137. The courts have rejected sovereign immunity as a defense to these suits. See
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gests that the Act gives judicial remedies only to requesters. For
example, the provision that confers jurisdiction on the federal courts
speaks only in terms of a complainant who has been denied information.1138 Supplier suits not only violate the statutory language of
the FOIA, they also interfere with the Act's obvious intent to discourage agencies from withholding information. The statute provides that agency officials who deny access to requesters may incur
de novo court review of their actions, assessment of court costs
against their agencies, and investigation by the Civil Service Commission.1139 With the emergence of reverse FOIA suits, however,
officials are confronted with a new threat: court review of decisions
to disclose. The FOIA was designed to counteract and outweigh the
pressures officials may be under to withhold information;1140 it was
not intended to create them. Thus, reverse FOIA suits upset the
skewed balance in favor of disclosure established by the Act.
The problems raised by allowing suppliers to bring reverse FOIA
suits are inextricably linked to the question whether the Act's exemptions are mandatory or permissive. Only two of the reverse FOIA
cases1141 have reached the issue whether the Act requires the agencies
to withhold exempt material or merely permits such withholding.
Surprisingly, this mandatory-permissive issue has not been raised by
requesters in their suits to obtain disclosure.1142 In Charles River
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292, 294 (C.D. Cal. 19'74); Scars,
Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (D.D.C.), stay dissolved, 509 F,2d 52'7
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, Civil No, IIS-74-A, mcm, op.
at 3 (E.D. Va. April 3, 1974). The courts in Hughes, 384 F. Supp. at 294, and Westing•
house, Civil No. 118-74-A, mem. op. at 3, found that subject matter jurisdiction was
based on the FOIA. This position was explicitly rejected in Sears: "[The FOIA]
provides a right to de novo court review for those who are denied information, not
for those who would suppress it." 384 F. Supp. at 1000. The court, however, allowed
the suit under the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). 384 F. Supp. at 1000-01. The APA
also provided the basis for jurisdiction in Charles River Park "A", Inc, v. HUD, Civil
No. 73-1930 (D.C. Cir. March 10, 1975).
ll38. "On complaint, the district court •.• has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency
from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records
improperly withheld from the complainant." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb,
1975). See text at notes 943-64 supra. Other sections of the Act also speak only in
terms of requesters' suits. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(a)(4)(F) (a court may order "the
production of any agency records improperly withheld • • • .'); (a)(6)(A) ("[e]ach
agency, upon any request for records ••• .''); (a)(6)(C) ("(a]ny person making a request
to any agency for records ••• .'? (Supp. Feb. 1975). See also 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(d) (Supp.
Feb. 1975) (reverse FOIA suits are not included in the list of FOIA-related matters to be
reported by the agencies to Congress).
1139. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(a)(4)(B), (E), (F) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at notes 965-1097
supra.
1140. See, e.g., S. REP. 93--854, supra note 329, at 1-2, 5.
1141. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, Civil No. '73-1930, slip op. at '7 (D.C.
Cir. March 10, 1975); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, Civil No. 118-'74-A,
mem. op. at 5, 8 (E.D. Va. April 3, 1974).
1142. If the exemptions were found to be permissive, a requester could argue that
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Park "A", Inc. v. HUD,1143 the District of Columbia Circuit Court
held that a finding that information was exempt did not preclude agency disclosure.1144 In the earlier case of Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger,1145 a district court, rejecting the government's argument that the exemptions are permissive,1146 enjoined
release of financial information because it was within exemption
four.1141
The statutory language and legislative history strongly support
the holding in Charles River that the exemptions are permissive.
The FOIA merely states that the mandatory disclosure provisions
of section (a) do not apply to exempted materials.1148 Thus, the Act
can easily be interpreted to mean that the exemptions determine
only the maximum amount of information that may be withheld.·
This interpretation is consistent with the basic purpose of the
FOIA,1140 since it permits the agencies to disclose what would otherwise be automatically exempt material. Several commentators, including the Attorney General, have agreed with this interpretation.1150 Significantly, the Senate report on the 1974 amendments to
the Act stated: "Congress did not intend the exemptions in the FOIA
to be used either to prohibit disclosure of information or to justify
automatic withholding of information. Rather, they are only permissive."1151
even though the information he sought was exempt from mandatory disclosure, the
court should review the agency's discretionary decision not to permit disclosure.
1143. Civil No. 73-1930 (D.C. Cir. March 10, 1975).
1144. Slip op. at 7. See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996, 1000
(D.D.C. 1974), stay dissolved, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v.
Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 777 n.37 (D.D.C. 1974).
1145. Civil No. 118-74-A (E.D. Va. April 3, 1974).
1146. Slip op. at 8.
1147. Slip op. at 5-7.
1148. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). The recent statement of the Supreme Court that "if
the [requested documents] do fall within one of the Act's exempt categories, our inquiry is at an end for the Act 'does apply' to such documents," NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 4491, 4496 (U.S. April 28, 1975), was made in the context
of a requester suit and precludes neither discretionary agency release of exempt materials nor court review of agency decisions to release such matetjal.
1149. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, No. 73-1930, slip. op. at 7 (D.C. Cir.
March 10, 1975). The Act was intended to facilitate public access to government information. See text at notes 308-12 supra.
1150. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 2-3 ("Agencies
should keep in mind that in some instances the public interest may best be served
by disclosing, to the extent permitted by other laws, documents which they would be
authorized to withhold under the exemptions''); K. DAVIS, supra note 265, § 3A.5, at 122
(Supp. 1970) ("The Act contains no provision forbidding disclosure •.•. The exemptions protect against required disclosure, not against disclosure''). In Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore, 508 F.2d 945, 950 (4th Cir. 1974), the court
also agreed with this interpretation.
1151. S. REP. No. 93-854, supra note 329, at 6 (emphasis original). The report adds:
"A number of agencies have by regulation adopted this position that, notwithstanding
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Thus, assuming that the exemptions are permissive, an agency
must engage in a three-step analysis when it receives a request for
information. First, it must determine if the information is exempt.
Second, if it is exempt,1152 it must then determine if another statute
would prohibit disclosure.1153 If there is another statute barring disclosure of the information, it may prevent the agency from exercising
discretion. 1154 Finally, if there is no statutory prohibition, the agency
must exercise its discretion to decide whether to release the information.1155 This third step raises the issues of the standard the agency
should apply in exercising its discretion to release exempt information, whether there should be a modification of the general rule that
release of information to one requester mandates release to the
public in general, and whether this discretionary decision is review•
able by the courts and, if so, under what standard of review.
There has been very little discussion of the appropriate agency
standard. Charles River implicitly suggests that the agency should
balance the interests of the requester and the public against the
interest of the supplier when deciding to release or withhold exempt
information.1156 This balancing approach is inadequate because it
fails to recognize that there is also a governmental interest in ensurthe applicability of an FOIA exemption, records must be disclosed where there is no
compelling reason for withholding•••• This approach was clearly intended by Congress in passing the FOIA.'' Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 93-221, supra note 160, at 59-60.
1152. If the material is not exempt, it must be released. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (Supp.
Feb. 1975).
1153. If there is another statute prohibiting disclosure, the information requested
may be exempt from disclosure under the FOIA as well. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970)
exempts materials that are "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.'' See
text at notes 568-610 supra.
1154. If the other statute exempts information under exemption three, sec note
1153 supra, and itself leaves no room for the exercise of agency discretion, e.g., INT,
R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 7213(a)(l) (prohibiting the disclosure of information contained
in income tax returns) (see Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir.
1974)), then the agency should not be able to release the information pursuant to the
FOIA. If the other statute exempts information under exemption three, but provides
for the exercise of agency discretion, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970) (permitting the
Administrator of the FAA to determine whether certain documents filed pursuant to
the Civil Aeronautics Act should be released) (see FAA v. Robertson, 43 U.S.L.W.
4833 (U.S. June 24, 1975)), then the agency should be able to use that discretion to
release the information pursuant to the FOIA. At least one statute that has been held
not to exempt information under exemption three, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970) (providing
criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information) (see, e.g.,
Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, Civil No. '73-1930, slip op. at 8 (D.C. Cir. March
10, 1975)), has been found to bar voluntary disclosure of information falling within
one of the other FOIA exemptions. See Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, Civil
No. 73-1930, slip op. at 9-10 (D.C. Cir. March 10, 1975); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Schlesinger, Civil No. 118-74-A, mem. op. at 7-8 (E.D. Va. April 2, 1974).
1155. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, Civil No. 73-1930, slip op. at 6·11
(D.C. Cir. March IO, 1975), outlined this three-step analysis in a reverse FOIA case.
1156. Slip op. at 10-11.
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ing that the supplier's information remains confidential.1157 The
government may not be able to obtain the data necessary to make
informed decisions unless it can assure suppliers that the information
they give to the government will not be released. Furthermore, it is
imperative that the agency require a showing that the interests of the
requester and the public clearly outweigh the interests of the supplier and the government before it releases exempt information. In
creating the exemptions, Congress has presumably determined that
the interests of the supplier and the goverment are important enough
to outweigh the general public interest in disclosure.1158 Thus, a
decision to disclose exempt information should be based upon a
showing that the requester's purpose is of extraordinary public
benefit.1159
After the agency determines that an extraordinary public benefit
is present, it should consider disclosing the information only to the
requester. If the agency limits disclosure in this way, violation of the
supplier's and government's interests in confidentiality will be minimized. This alternative may provide a satisfactory compromise between conflicting interests and has in fact been suggested by some
courts.1160 Although by requiring disclosure to "any person"1161 Congress made it clear that the particular purposes of individual
requesters were not to be considered by the courts,1162 it is arguable
that a different rule should apply to an agency's discretionary decision to release exempt material. Since Congress would have allowed
the agency to withhold such information altogether, the agency
should be able to place restrictions on its release. This argument
may be compelling, but it is not supported by the language of the
statute. The courts should be encouraged to employ this alternative,
but only a revision of the statute can ensure its uniform application.
Finally, there is the question whether suppliers can seek judicial
review of these discretionary decisions. Despite the dangers inherent
in allowing reverse FOIA suits,1163 it is imperative that suppliers be
1157. See National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767-68
(D.C. Cir. 1974); note 636 supra and accompanying text.
1158. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See text at notes 496500 supra.
1159. See, e.g., Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, Civil No. 73-1930, slip op. at
10 (D.C. Cir. March 10, 1975), in which the court pointed to the extra public benefits
that might result from the disclosure of the information to the requester, "a local
governmental body which intends to use the information in performance of the legitimate and traditional government function of assessing property for the purposes of
taxation." Cf. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 2.
1160. See, e.g., Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, Civil No. 73-1930, slip op.
at 11 (D.C. Cir. March 10, 1975). Cf. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 n.24 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); text at notes 723-26 supra.
1161. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970). This language was not changed by the 1974 FOIA
amendments.
1162, See note 458 supra and accompanying text.
1163. See text at notes 1138-40 supra.
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allowed to sue in this context. The Act, through the nine exemptions, does take the supplier's and the government's interests into
consideration.1164 If the exemptions are interpreted to be permissive
so that agencies have the discretionary power to release exempt material, the protections afforded suppliers will be drastically reduced.
It would be inappropriate to decrease the suppliers' protection
further by barring reverse FOIA suits.
If courts agree to hear these suits, they should then subject these
discretionary agency decisions to de novo review.1106 Although an
agency does have expertise in evaluating the effect of release or withholding of information upon the government's interest, it would not
seem to have particular expertise in evaluating either the public
interest or the supplier's interests. Furthermore, the availability of
de novo review may deter and correct any elements of agency bias. 1100
If the exemptions were mandatory so that the agencies were
prohibited from releasing exempt material, it would perhaps be appropriate for Congress to preclude most reverse FOIA suits. Barring
these suits to ensure that the FOIA would continue to encourage
disclosure would be justified because the supplier's and the government's interests generally would be sufficiently protected. One exception might be where individuals claimed that release of certain
material would be an invasion of their privacy. It is doubtful that
the mandatory exemptions would be sufficient protection in these
cases. Congress has already recognized the importance of protecting
the individual's right of privacy1167 and should continue this special
treatment by permitting reverse FOIA suits in these instances.
Congress is thus left with the choice of encouraging disclosure
through permissive exemptions at the cost of allowing supplier suits,
or encouraging disclosure by barring supplier suits at the cost of
making the exemptions mandatory. The first alternative is now in
force, perhaps more by accident than by design. It is very difficult to
evaluate its effect on disclosure since requesters have not argued for
release of exempt information, and suppliers have only recently
brought suits against the agencies. I£ the present scheme proves to
affect adversely public access to information, Congress should con1164. See text at notes 496-500 supra.
1165. De novo review of agency decisions to withhold information is provided
in 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975), formerly 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
See text at notes 962-64 supra. De novo review of a decision to release seems to have
been required in Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, No. '13-1930, slip op. at 4,
10-11 (D.C. Cir. March 10, 1975). But see Sears, Roebuck &: Co. v. GSA, 384 F,
Supp. 996, 1001 (D.D.C. 1974), where the court, basing jurisdiction on the APA,
applied the "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or othenvise not in ac•
cordance with law" standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
1166. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, supra note 865, at 621-22.
1167. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at
notes 1966-2214 infra. See generally text at notes 1499-561 infra,
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sider implementing the second alternative. In any case, no modifications to the present scheme should be made without recognizing the
interdependence of the mandatory-permissive issue and the supplier
suit.
D. State Open-Records Laws
A limited common-law right of access to information held by
state agencies is generally recognized.1168 However, the vast majority
of states have adopted legislation broadening this right.1169 During
the past decade, many states that previously had no open-records
laws have enacted them;1170 other states have replaced or amended
extant statutes to expand the public right of access.1171 The pace of
this legislative activity, especially in the last three years, has been
frenetic. The trend is almost certain to continue, and all states will
probably have enacted such laws within the next several years.1172
1168. H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT To KNow 55-56 (1953).
1169. See ALA. CODE tit. 41, §§ 145-47 (1959), tit. 55, § 289(6) (1960); ALAS. STAT.
§§ 09.25.110-.120 (1962); Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 122801 to -2807 (1968); CAL. GOVT. CoDE §§ 6250-60 (West Supp. 1975); CoLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24-72..:201 to -206 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19 to -20 (Supp. 1975);
FLA, STAT. ANN. § 119.01 (1960), as amended, §§ 119.02, .07-.11 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-2701 to -2703 (Supp. 1974); HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 92-1 to -6 (1968); IDAHO
CODE § 59-1009 (1948); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 116, §§ 43.4-.28 (Supp. 1974); IND. ANN. STAT.
CODE §§ 5-14-1-1 to -6 (Burns 1974); IowA CODE §§ 68A.l-.9 (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45-201 to -203 (1973); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:1 to :7, 44:31 to :39 (West 1950),
as amended, (Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 404-A (Supp. 1974), § 405
(1964); Jl,fi>. ANN. CoDE art. 76A, §§ 1-5 (Supp. 1974); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 66, §§ 1-18
(1971), as amended, ch. 4, § 7(26) (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.17 (1967), as
amended, (Supp. 1974); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 109.180-.190 (1969); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN.
§ 59-512 (1970); MoNT. CoNsr. art. II, § 9; NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 84-712 to -712.03 (1971);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 239.010 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 47:lA-l to -4 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-5-1 to -3 (Supp. 1973);
N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS I.Aw §§ 85-89 (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1 to
-9 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 149.40-.99
(Page 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24 (1962); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 192.410-.500
(1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 66.1-.4 (1959), as amended, (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 1-20 to -20.4 (Supp. 1974); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 1-27-1 to -3 (1974); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 15-304 to -307 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1974), § 15-308 (Supp. 1974);
TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, §§ 1-15 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-26-1 to -3 (1953), § 63-2-61 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-341 to -345
(1973), as amended, (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 42.17.010, .250-.940 (1974); Wxs.
STAT. ANN. §§ 16.80, 19.21 (1972); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-692.1-.5 (Supp. 1973). See also
Model State Freedom of Information Statute [hereinafter Model FOIA] in R. Plesser
&: P. Petkas, Government in the Sunshine, Open Records Open Meetings, Emphasis:
Texas 34 (1975) (one of a series of 11 booklets published by the Southern Governmental
Monitoring Project, each containing the Model FOIA, and each examining the law
of a particular southern state).
'
1170. New York, for example, recently enacted such a law, effective Sep. I,
1974. N.Y. LAws ch. 578 (1974) (codified at N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW §§ 85-89 (McKinney
Supp. 1974).
1171. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10 (Supp. 1974), ch. 4, § 7(26) (Supp. 1974).
1172. See, e.g., Michigan House of Representatives, Bill No. 4272, introduced
Feb. 11, 1975. The Michigan "Administrative Procedures Act" includes a provision
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This legislative response has been prompted, at least in part, by
the federal government's adoption of the Freedom of Information
Act in 1967.1178 Indeed, these statutes are intended to further at the
state level the same fundamental objectives that the federal act was
intended to effect at the national level.1174 These objectives include
encouraging the informed participation of citizens in the process of
government, ensuring governmental accountability, and generally
increasing public confidence in the political system.1170 Despite these
common ends, it is evident that states differ widely, both among
themselves and from the federal government, in the degree to which
their laws ensure citizen access to government information.
This section of the Project will examine and compare the various
state statutes dealing with the problem of public access and will
point out particular state provisions that appear to be superior to
their federal counterparts. Since the right of citizens to inspect public
records has its roots in the English common law,1170 the analysis will
consider the scope of the common-law right as well.
I. The Significance of the Common-Law Right
The common-law right of inspection, even as liberalized by the
courts, is quite narrow and contains many technical and often arbitrary limitations. Although the right of inspection at the state level
is now generally regulated by statute, the common-law right remains
important in several ways. First, many of the present statutes are,
at least in part, codifications of the common-law right. Second, many
of the statutes now in effect are drawn very broadly and lack specific
definitions of statutory terms. Thus, the courts must often turn to
common-law definitions for guidance. Third, in those states that
have not yet enacted open-records statutes,1177 the common law remains the sole source of the right of inspection. Finally, even in those
states that have enacted comprehensive open-records statutes, the
common law may remain an alternative source of the right of inspecfor inspection of agency records. MICH. COMP, LAws ANN, § 24.221-.223 (Supp. 1974),
However, this act does not appear to be a true open-records law. But see Note, Michi•
gan "Freedom of Information Act", 3 PROSPECTUS 441 (1970).
1173. See Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 635, 652, 11'1 Cal. Rptr, 106,
110 (1974); Marino, The New York Freedom of Information Law, 43 FoRDHAIII L. REv,
83 (1974).
1174. Cf. materials cited in note 1173 supra.
1175. See s. REP. No. 89-813, supra note 310, at 2-3, ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMO•
RANDUM, supra note 309, at III.
1176. See Nowack v. Auditor Gen., 243 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1928); Clement v.
Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 63 A. 146 (1906); H. CRoss, supra note 1168, at 25-26, It has also
been suggested that this right may have constitutional roots. See Black Panther Party
v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 635, 654-55, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 111-12 (1974).
1177. Kentucky, Mississippi, and Rhode Island, for example.
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tion: 1178 Some statutes expressly preserve preexisting rights of access,1179 and some courts have held that the passage of an open-records
law was not intended to abrogate the common-law right of access.1180

2. The Elements of a Comprehensive Open-Records Law
Whether based on a state statute or on the common law, the
scope of the right of access to government information is determined
by five factors: the inclusiveness of the definition of "public records,"
the number and substance of exemptions from disclosure, the
nature of the interest required of a person attempting to exercise
the right of inspection, the procedures available for enforcing the
right, and the sanctions provided for violations of the right. 1181
a. The definition of "public records." Before it can be determined whether a right of access exists in a given case, the term
"public records" must be defined. Ascertaining the scope of this term
has occasionally proved to be a significant problem on the state
level. 1182 Under the common law, problems may arise as a result of a
1178. Some open-records statutes, however, have been held to supersede the common
law. See, e.g., Meriden Record Co. v. Browning, 6 Conn. Cir. 633, -, 294 A.2d 646, 648
(1971), which states that the common-law right has been "incorporated into" the
Connecticut act (CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19 (Supp. 1975)). Cf. 20 KAN. L. REv. 525,
537 (1972). In such a case, a citizen's right of inspection is derived solely from the
statute. See, e.g., Wiley v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 348, 141 A.2d 844, 848 (1958) (rejecting
the contention that the Pennsylvania statute was not intended to "divest or restrict"
inspection rights granted by the common law to a person with a personal or property
interest in the examination of public records). Cf. Mooney v. Temple Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 448 Pa. 424, 429-30 n.10, 292 A.2d 395, 398 n.10 (1972).
1179. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAw § 88.10 (McKinney Supp. 1974) ("Nothing
in this article shall be construed to limit or abridge any existing right of access at
law or in equity of any party to public records kept by any agency or municipality").
1180. See Irval Realty Inc. v. Board of Pub. Util. Commrs., 61 N.J. 366, 373, 294
A.2d 425, 429 (1972) ("the statute clearly was not intended to diminish or in anyway
curtail the common law right of examination. That right remains unaffected by this
legislation"); People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, 34 Ill. App. 2d 372, 374-75, 181 N.E.2d
376, 378 (1962). Cf. Tex. Atty. Gen. Open Records Dec. No. 25, at 3 (March 7, 1974),
which states that although records of the judicial branch are exempted from the
Texas open-records act, the papers of the justice of the peace that were sought were
required by law to be kept and thus were subject to the common-law right of inspection. See also An Overview of the Law Governing Access to Information Held by Public
Agencies in the State of Illinois and the City of Chicago, 68 Nw. U. L. REv. 223, 237
(1973) [hereinafter Overview] in Research Study, Public Access to Information, 68 Nw.
U. L. R.Ev. 177 (1973).
1181. See H. CROSS, supra note 1168, at 6-7.
1182. This particular problem apparently has not arisen at the federal level. The
provisions of the federal FOIA apply either to specifically enumerated categories of
records, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(l), (2) (1970), or to all records "reasonably described."
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
Some state statutes precisely define "public records." For example, the Texas Act
contains a general definition of public information, TEX. REv. C!v. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-17a, § 3 (Supp. 1974), as well as a nonexhaustive list of specific records required
to be made available, See TEX, REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 6 (Supp. 1974).
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lack of well-articulated standards. Even in jurisdictions where the
open-record statute contains an express definition, courts have had
interpretative difficulty because of the existence of other statutes
dealing with public records.1183 As one court noted "Whether a
record is to be regarded as a public record in a particular instance
will depend upon the purposes of the law which will be served by
so classifying it. A record may be a public record for one purpose
and not for another." 11 84
The courts have articulated several different common-law definitions of public records.1185 Most courts have held that, in the absence
of an express statutory provision, the mere fact that a writing is in
the custody of a public agency does not suffice to make it a public
record.1186 The most restrictive definition limits the scope of public
records, for the purposes of inspection, to records required by law
to be kept.1187 For example, an early Florida supreme court opinion
states, "A public record is a written memorial made by a public
officer .... [It] is one required by law to be kept, or necessary to be
kept in the discharge of a duty imposed by law, or directed by law to
serve as a memorial and evidence of something written, said, or
done." 1188 This definition has often been applied "when the legislature has left the term 'public records' undefined" in its access
statute.1189
The Model FOIA also contains such a list. See Model FOIA, supra note 1169, § 5. Sec
also N.Y. Pun. OFFICERS LAw § 88 (McKinney Supp. 1974). Amendments to this re•
cently adopted act are already being proposed. One such proposal is to eliminate the
list of accessible information and presume everything to be public unless specifically
exempted. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1975, at 46, col. 4 (city ed.).
1183. See, e.g., Citizens for Better Educ. v. Board of Educ., 124 N.J. Super, 523, 308
A.2d 35 (App. Div. 1973). In deciding to require disclosure of the results of standardized
achievement tests under New Jersey's "right-to-know law," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:lA-l
to -4, (Supp. 1974), the court looked to the definition of public records contained
in the "destruction-of-public-records law," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:3--16 (Supp. 1974).
1184. MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Ore. 27, 36, 359 P.2d 4:13, 41'1 (1961).
1185. H. CROSS, supra note 1168, at 42-45.
1186. See, e.g., Coldwell v. Board of Pub. Works, 187 Cal. 510, 202 P. 879 (1921);
Whelan v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. 548, 46 P. 468 (1896).
1187. See Wash. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 99, at 7 (Oct. 15, 1973), citing State ex rel.
Cook v. Reed, 36 Wash. 638, '79 P. 306 (1905); Pickerell, Secrecy and the Access to
Administrative Records, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 305, 315 (1956). See also Holcombe v. State
ex rel. Chandler, 240 Ala. 590, 597, 200 S. 739, 746 (1941).
1188. Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 303, 94 S. 615, 634 (1922) (emphasis added).
1189. Fla. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 074-215, at 2 Guly 24, 1974). See [1967] OP. N.M.
AITY. GEN. 80, 81.
In Town Crier, Inc. v. Chief of Police, - Mass. -, 282 N.E.2d 379 (1972), the
court, in considering the statutory definition of public records included in the Massachusetts statute then in effect, noted that although the right of inspection ltad been
broadened over the years, the definition of public records had remained the same:
"The current statutory definition which follows the 1902 revision, although less explicit in language than the first statutory definition, incorporates the provision of
the original enactment that, for a book or a paper containing written entries to be
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In an effort to broaden the common-law right of inspection, a
number of courts have liberalized the definition of public records.
For example, in International Union, UAW v. Gooding,1190 the
Wisconsin supreme court stated: "It is the rule independently of
statute that public records include not only papers specifically required to be kept by a public officer but all written memorials made
by a public officer within his authority where such writings constitute a convenient, appropriate or customary method of discharging
the duties of the office." 1191 Even such liberalized definitions may be
interpreted narrowly by the courts. In a recent Iowa case, the court
accepted a definition similar to the one stated in Gooding, but held
that the requested documents were not "public records" subject to
inspection because they did not evidence any action taken by the
agency.1102
Some courts have further expanded the common-law definition.
In MacEwan v. Holm, 1193 the court had to interpret the Oregon
open-records statute, which failed to define public records. It concluded:
We do not think it is necessary to look outside of our statute ..•
permitting the inspection of "any public writing" and "records and
files" [in order] to authorize the inspection of tentative or preliminary data in the possession of a governmental agency. For the
purpose of deciding whether a writing is subject to public inspection,
we regard all data gathered by the agency in the course of carrying
out its duties, irrespective of its tentative or preliminary character,
as falling ·within the definition of "records and files." 1194
The court emphasized that such an expansive definition of public
records was fundamental to an effective implementation of the general policy underlying "freedom of information." The court stated:·
"Writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with
their official functions should generally be accessible to members of
a public record, the entries must have been made pursuant to a requirement of law." ·
- Mass. at -, 282 N.E.2d at 382.
1190. 251 Wis. 362, 29 N.W.2d 730 (1947).
1191. 251 Wis. at 371, 29 N.W.2d at 735 (emphasis added). See also Disabled Police
Veterans Club v. Long, 279 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Mo. 1955); Conover v. Board of Educ.,
1 Utah 2d 375, 377, 267 P.2d 768, 770 (1954).
1192. Linder v. Eckard, 261 Iowa 216, 220, 152 N.W.2d 833, 836 (1967) (applying
IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.46 (1950), as amended, IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A (1973)). See
Note, Iowa's Freedom of Information Act: Everything You've Always Wanted To Know
About Public Records But Were Afraid To Ask, 57 IoWA L. REV. 1163, 1168 (1972).
The court in Linder considered but rejected the broader definition of public records
stated in MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Ore. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961), adopting instead "the
narrower and more prevalent view·." 261 Iowa at - , 152 N.W.2d at 836. The MacEwan definition is set out in the text at note 1194 infra.
·
1193. 226 Ore. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961).
1194. 226 Ore. at 43, 359 P.2d at 420 (emphasis added).
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the public so that there will be an opportunity to determine whether
those who have been entrusted with the affairs of government are
honestly, faithfully, and competently performing their function as
public servants."1195
Unlike Oregon, most states have included a definition of public
records in their open-records statutes. Several states have adopted the
common-law definition that limits public records to those records
required by law to be kept.1196 Such a definition was the focus of
recent litigation arising under the Arkansas "Freedom of Informa•
tion Act."1197 Although the Arkansas act broadly defines public
records,11 98 it limits the right of inspection to those records required
to be kept or maintained.1199 In interpreting this statute, the court
noted:
the Freedom of Information Act does not itself provide that any
particular records shall be kept; it only provides that records which
are required by some statute (other than the Freedom of Information
Act) to be made and kept, shall be open to public inspection. There
is no semblance of ambiguity in this provision ... [;] the Freedom of
Information Act, as far as inspection of records is concerned, applies
only to those records which by statute are required to be kept and
maintained.1200
Most states, however, have adopted broadened definitions of
public records, thus significantly expanding the right of inspection.
The open-records laws in these states can be divided into two categories:1201 the first defines public records in terms of the source of
1195. 226 Ore. at 38, 359 P.2d at 418. See also People ex rel. Hamer v. Board of
Educ., 130 Ill. App. 2d 592, 596, 264 N.E.2d 420, 423 (1970) (discussing the "general
desirability" of a policy permitting inspection of any documents that had been "acted
upon").
1196. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-201 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:lA-2 (Supp.
1974); OHIO R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Page 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24 (1962);
S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 1-27.1 (1974). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2803 to -04 (1968),
discussed in the text at notes 1197-200 infra. The South Carolina statute defines
"public records" to include records required to be kept, but does not restrict access
to only such records. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-20.1-.2 (Supp. 1974). See also HAWAII
R.Ev. STAT, § 92-1 (1968).
1197. See McMahan v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ark., 255 Ark. 108, 499
S.W.2d 56 (1973).
1198. " 'Public records' are records made, maintained or kept by any public or
governmental body, board, bureau, commission, or agency of the State or any political subdivision of the State, or organization, corporation or agency, supported in
whole or in part by public funds, or expending public funds." ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2803 (1968).
1199. "Except as othenvise specifically provided by [law], all state, county, township, municipal and school district records which by law are required to be kept and
maintained shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizen of the State of
Arkansas ••••" ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2803 (1968).
1200. 255 Ark. at Ill, 499 S.W.2d at 58 (emphasis original).
1201. There are, of course, statutory definitions that are not susceptible to such
categorization. For example, the Pennsylvania statute specifically limits the substantive
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the materials, while the second focuses on content. The Florida act
is an example of the first type of statute. It defines public records to
include "[a]ll records made or received pursuant to law or ordinance
or in connection with the transaction of official business by any
agency."1202 The Florida attorney general has•interpreted this provision to be a significant broadening of the common-law definition:
"[I]t is not unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature added to
the definition the words 'or in connection with the transaction of
official business by any agency' for the purpose of including all correspondence and reports that were made or received by a public agency
in connection with an official transaction, and not just the official
document memorializing the transaction, such as a contract, deed or
mortgage." 1203 Although this interpretation is quite expansive, it
demonstrates some potential weaknesses in the Florida definition.
First, the interpretation seems to exclude records of "unofficial"
transactions,1204 which may well be of significant interest to the
public. Second, the statement to the effect that it was not unreasonable to interpret the statutory definition this broadly suggests that
there is no statutory mandate to do so. Thus, courts could conceivably narrow this interpretation in the future.
The second type of statute generally defines public records in
terms of their informational content.1205 The Washington act is annature of the records that are required to be disclosed. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65,
§ 66.1(2) (Supp. 1974). Although the Illinois statute defines public records broadly,
see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.5 (Supp. 1974), the access provision is considerably
more limited in scope. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.7 (1973).
1202. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011(1) (Supp. 1974). For similar definitions see ALA.
CoDE tit. 55, § 289(6) (1960); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-202(2) (1973); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19 (Supp. 1975); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 92-1 (1968); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 44:l(A) (West Supp. 1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § l(a) (Supp. 1974); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 4, § 7(26) (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.17(1) (1967); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 132-1 (1974); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3 (Supp. 1974);
VA. CODE ANN.§ 2.l-34l(b) (Supp. 1974). (Prior to 1974, the definition of public records
in the Virginia statute was very limited. See Act of April 4, 1968, ch. 479, § 2(b), [1968]
Va. Acts of Assembly 691.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.l(a) (Supp. 1973). See also Model
FOIA, supra note 1169, § 2(C).
1203. Fla. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 071-243, at 2-3 (Aug. 17, 1971) (emphasis original).
See also Fla. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 074-215, at 2 Guly 24, 1974) (commenting on the
effect of the 1967 amendments).
1204. The Minnesota statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.17 (1967), has been similarly
interpreted. It defines as public records, and requires state and local officials to make
and keep "all records necessary to a full and accurate knowledge of their official
activities." In Kottschade v. Lundberg, 280 Minn. 501, 160 N.W.2d 135 (1968), the
court observed that the definition, read literally, seemed to be boundless, including
every "casual jotting" of any official. 280 Minn. at 504, 160 N.W.2d at 137. Faced
with the necessity of placing some "reasonable limits" on the statutory definition,
the court decided that only "official actions as distinguished from thought processes"
constituted "official activities." It followed that "all that need be kept of record is
information pertaining to an official decision, and not information relating to the
process by which such a decision was reached." 280 Minn. at 505, 160 N.W.2d at 139.
1205. E.g., CAL. GoVT. CODE § 6252(d) (West Supp. 1975); ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.410(4)
(1974); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-20.l (Supp. 1973).
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example. Its definition covers "[a]ny writing containing information
relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any
governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used or
retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or
characteristics."1206 This seems to include a broader range of materials than the Florida-type statutes and apparently minimizes the
potential for restrictive interpretations.
b. Exemptions. Once it has been determined that the materials
being sought are included within the definition of public records,
the problem remains of determining whether these records are
exempt from inspection.1207 The right of inspection can be defeated
as effectively by broad exemptions from disclosure as it can by
narrow definitions of public records. The general rule of exemption
at common law has been stated as follows: "[T]he records in public
offices which are not subject to public inspection are (I) those which
are not public in the legal sense, but are non-public, private, secret,
privileged or confidential because of their nature or stated considerations of public policy and (2) those which, though public in the
legal sense, are withheld from such inspection based on stated considerations of public policy." 1208 These exemptions from disclosure
are the products of a judicially administered balancing test1200 that
1206. WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 42.17.020(24) (1974). See Wash. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 99,
at 7 (Oct. 15, 1973): "[I]t is not the presence or absence of a requirement of mainte•
nance of a particular record by a public agency that gives rise to a right of access
or inspection and copying; instead, it is the content of the record which is deter•
minative of whether or not the various requirements of the initiative apply." (Em•
phasis original.) The Washington act also specifically includes the following docu•
ments within its definition of public records open to inspection: "Correspondence
and materials referred to therein by and with the agency relating to any regulatory,
supervisory or enforcement responsibilities of the agency whereby agency determines
or opines upon, or is asked to determine or opine upon the rights of the state, the
public .•• or of any private party." Id.
1207. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. Goldtrap, 302 S.2d 174, 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974). A further problem may arise if only part of a particular document is exempted
from disclosure. The question is then whether the entire document should be withheld or whether deletions can be made to enable part of the document to be disclosed. Cf. text at notes 501-05 supra. Some state statutes include a provision govern•
ing such cases. See, e.g., ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 192.500(3) (1974). See also WASH. R.Ev.
CODE § 42.17.310(2) (1974); TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 2(2) (Supp. 1974)
(implying that portions of materials containing public information must be severed
and disclosed); Model FOIA, supra note 1169, § 4(B).
1208. H. CROSS, supra note 1168, at 75. For general discussion, see id. 75-91.
1209. The initial determination at the agency level of whether or not to disclose
may also involve the application of a balancing test:
The duty of first determining that the harmful effect upon the public interest
of permitting inspection outweighs the benefit to be gained by granting inspection
rests upon the public officer having custody of the record or document sought to
be inspected. If he determines that permitting inspection would result in harm
to the public interest which outweighs any benefit that would result from granting inspection, it is incumbent upon him to refuse the demand for inspection ••• ,"
State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 682, 137 N.W.2d 470, 475 (1965).
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requires the courts to weigh the importance of public access against
the harm that might result from disclosure.1210
- In most of the states where the right of inspection is governed by
statute, the legislatures have adopted specific statutory exemptions.1211 The majority of these states have some provision exempting
records that are deemed by other laws to be privileged, confidential,
or prohibited from disclosure. 1212 Some states exempt only records
that are prohibited from disclosure by other laws.1213 Other states
are less specific and grant exemptions for records as'"othenvise provided" by law.1214 This type of exemption may cover records that are
1210. See, Comment, Access to Government Information in California, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 1650, 1665 (1966); Overview, supra note 1180, at 238-39.
1211. These exemptions generally parallel those of the federal FOIA. See text at
notes 506-846 supra.
1212. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 145 (1959); CAL. GoVT. CoDE § 6254(k) (West
Supp. 1975); COLO, REv. SrAT. ANN. § 24-72-204 (1973); CONN. GEN. SrAT. ANN. § 1-19
(Supp. 1975); FLA. SrAT. ANN. § 119.07(2)(a) (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2701
(Supp. 1974); HAWAII REv. SrAT. § 92-4 (1968); IND. CoDE § 5-14-1-5 (1971); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 76A, § I (Supp. 1974); Mo. REv. STAT. § 109.180 (1969); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 239.010 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:4 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:lA-2 (Supp. 1974); N.M. SrAT. ANN. § 71-5-l(D) (Supp. 1973); OHIO REv. CoDE
ANN. § 149.43 (Page 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24 (1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65,
§ 66.1(2) (Supp. 1974); s.c. CODE ANN. § 1-20.2 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 15-304
(1973); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(1) (Supp. 1974); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-692.1-.3 (Supp. 1973). See Model FOIA, supra note 1169, § 4(A)(4). The Oregon
act includes a unique provision containing an exhaustive list of all other statutes
of that state exempting records from disclosure. See ORE. REv. SrAT. § 192.500(2)(h)
(1974).
Some states permit the Governor to exempt records from public disclosure by
executive order. See, e.g., N.J. SrAT. ANN. § 47:lA-2 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 192.500(4) (1974). But see lrval Realty Inc. v. Board of Pub. Util. Commrs., 61 N.J.
366, 294 A.2d 425 (1972), in which the court took a very restrictive view of the
Governor's statutory authority to order the withholding of public records. The court
held that "the power was intended to be exercised only when necessary for the protection of the public interest." 61 N.J. at 374, 294 A.2d at 429.
1213. See, e.g., ALA.s. SrAT. § 09.25.120(4) (1962); COLO. REv. SrAT. ANN. § 24-72-204
(1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.07(2)(a) (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2701 (Supp.
1974); HAWAII REv. STAT, § 92-4 (1968); KAN. SrAT. ANN. § 45-201 (1973); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 76A, § 3(a) (Supp. 1974); N.H. REv. SrAT. ANN. § 91-A:4 (Supp. 1973);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Page 1969); OKLA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24 (1962);
ORE. REV. SrAT. § 192.500(g)(h) (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 66.l (Supp. 1974); S.D.
COMP. LAws ANN.§ 1-27-3 (1974); WYO. SrAT. ANN. § 9-692.3(a) (Supp. 1973).
Several states exempt records deemed confidential by law. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 514-1-5 (1971); NEV. REv. STAT. § 239.010 (1973); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 625217a, § 3(a)(l) (Supp. 1974). The scope of the two types of exemptions is probably the
same.
1214. Statutes that contain one of the various formulations of the "otherwise provided" language include ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 145 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2804
(1968); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19 (Supp. 1975); MINN. SrAT. ANN. § 15.17(4) (1967),
as amended, (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. SrAT. § 109.180 (1966); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-712
(1971); N.J. SrAT, ANN. § 47:IA-2 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT, ANN. § 71-5-l(D) (Supp.
1973); N.Y. Pun. OFFICERS LAw § 88.7(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 44--04-18 (1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-20.2 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 15-304
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merely permitted to be kept secret by other laws, as well as those that
are prohibited from disclosure. Exempting only the latter records
seems preferable. Unless specific laws prohibit the disclosure of certain records, those records should be open to public scrutiny.1216
The majority of the states that have adopted statutory exemp•
tions also recognize various substantive exemptions, which vary
greatly in number, specificity, and content.1216 These exemptions
represent legislative determinations that in certain situations the
public interest in disclosure is outweighed by one or more com•
peting interests.1217 The vast majority of states exempt specific types
of records, the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of
personal privacy1218 or an "unwarranted" invasion of privacy.1210
(1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT, ANN.
§ 19-21(2) (1972). The statutes in Iowa, IowA CODE § 68A.2 (1971), California, CAL,
GoVT. CODE § 6254 (West Supp. 1975), and Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 4,
§ 7(26)(a) (Supp. 1974), contain exemptions that do not employ "otherwise provided"
language but seem to be substantially similar.
1215. But cf. FAA v. Robertson, 43 U.SL.W. 4833 (U.S. June 24, 1975).
1216. Statutory exemptions are usually permissive rather than mandatory; an
agency generally has the authority to allow inspection in cases where the records can
be exempted from disclosure. See Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 635,
656, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 113 (1974). But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-204 (1973);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 3 (Supp. 1974); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.3 (Supp. 1973).
These statutes distinguish mandatory exemptions, designed to protect individual pri•
vacy, from permissive exemptions, designed to protect the interests of the state. See
note 1707 infra and accompanying text. Section 3(c) of the Texas act, TEX. REV. C1v.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Supp. 1974), specifically gives the custodian discretion to
disclose certain categories of records. This seems to imply that as to other categories
of records, there is no such discretion. Section 10 of that article specifically proscribes
the distribution of information deemed confidential.
1217. For an excellent discussion of the policies underlying the exemptions in the
Oregon Act, see 36 OP. ORE. ATTY. GEN. 543, 556-63 (1973).
1218. See, e.g., ALAs. STAT. § 09.25.120 (1962) (vital statistics, adoption proceedings,
juvenile records, medical and public health records); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2804 (1968)
(state income tax returns, medical records, scholastic records, adoption records); CAL.
GoVT. CODE §§ 6254(c),(i),(n) (West Supp. 1975) (personnel and medical files, individual tax files, statements of personal worth used in licensing procedures); COLO,
REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-204(3) (1973) (medical, psychological and sociological data,
personnel files, letters of reference); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19 (Supp. 1975) (per•
sonnel and medical files); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2703 (Supp. 1974) (medical records);
IOWA CODE § 68A.7 (1971) (student records, hospital and medical records, personal
information in confidential personnel records); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-201 (1973) (juve•
nile records, adoption records, records of birth of illegitimate children); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 44:4 (West 1950) (tax returns, records relating to old-age assistance, aid to the
blind and AFDC, records concerning the fitness of a person to practice medicine); MD.
ANN. CoDE art. 76A, § 3(c) (Supp. 1974) (medical, psychological and sociological data on
individuals, adoption and welfare records, personnel files, letters of reference, hospital
records, school district records on individuals, circulation records of public libraries);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 4, § 7(26)(c), as amended, (Supp. 1974) (personnel and medical
files); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 59-512 (1970) (adoption records); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 91-A:5(IV) (Supp. 1973) (personnel, medical, and welfare records); N.M. STAT.
ANN. 71-5-1 (1961), as amended, (Supp. 1973) (records of physical and mental treatment and examination, letters of reference, letters or memos that represent matters
of opinion in personnel or student files); N.Y. Pun. OFFICERS LAw § 88(3) (McKinney
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Many states also shield from disclosure records containing trade
secrets or other confidential commercial data1220 and certain types
of records that, if disclosed, would injure some legal or economic
interest of the state.1221 Finally, other governmental interests are
Supp. 1974) (employment, medical and credit histories, personal references); Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Page 1969) (physical and psychiatric examinations, adoption
proceedings); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tiL 51, § 24 (1962) (income tax records); S.C. CoDE
ANN. § 1-20.1 (Supp. 1974) (income tax returns, medical, scholastic, and adoption
records); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 15-305 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1974) (medical and
student records); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. arL 6252-17a, §§ 3(2), (14), (15) (Supp.
1974) (personnel files, student records, birth and death records); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1342(b)(3) (Supp. 1974) (state income tax returns, medical and mental records, scholastic and personnel records); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 42.17.310(a), (b), (c) (1974) (per-

sonal information regarding students, patients, welfare recipients, prisoners, probationers, parolees, or employees of public agencies, and taxpayer information); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 9-692.3(d) (Supp. 1973) (medical, psychological, and sociological data on
individuals, individual welfare and adoption records, personnel files, letters of reference, hospital and school district records).
1219. See, e.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE § 6254(c) (West Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 1-19 (Supp. 1974); GA. CoDE ANN. § 40--2703 (Supp. 1974); HAWAII REv. STAT.
§ 92-1(2) (1968); N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW §§ 88(3), (7)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1974); PA.
STAT. ANN. tiL 65, § 66.1(2) (Supp. 1974).
Oregon exempts "(i]nformation of a personal nature ••• if the public disclosure
thereof would constitute an unreasonable invasion of privacy, unless the public interest by clear and convincing evidence requires disclosure in the particular instance."
ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.500(2)(b) (1974). The Montana constitution, art. II, § 9, provides
for the public right of access to public records "except in cases in which the demand
of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure." An Illinois provision states that "[n]othing in this section shall require the State to invade or assist
in the invasion of a person's right to privacy." Iu.. REv. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.6 (1973).
See also Model FOIA, supra note 1169, § 4(A)(2); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970), discussed in the text at notes 700-44 supra.
1220. See, e.g., CAL. GoVT. CODE §§ 6254(d), (e), 6254.7(d) (West Supp. 1975); CoLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-204(3)(e) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19 (Supp. 1975);
IowA CODE § 68A.7(3) (1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:4(3)-(5) (West 1950); Mn. ANN.
CODE arL 76A, § 3(c){v) (Supp. 1974); MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 4, § 7(26)(g) (Supp. 1974);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:5(IV) (Supp. 1973); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 192.500(l)(b), (e),
(2){e) (1974); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. arL 6252-17a, §§ 3(10), (13) (Supp. 1974);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.3(d)(v) (Supp. 1973). See also Model FOIA, supra note 1169,
§ 4(A)(l); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970), discussed in the text at notes 611-47 supra.
1221. See, e.g., CAL. GoVT. CODE §§ 6254(b), (h) (West Supp. 1975) (records pertaining
to pending litigation to which an agency is a party, appraisals regarding prospective
public acquisition of land and other contracts); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-204
(2){a)(iv), (v) (1973) (specific details of bona fide research projects being conducted by a
state institution, real estate appraisals regarding the acquisition of property by the
state); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-4 (1968) (permitting the Attorney General and district
attorneys to withhold records in their offices pertaining to the preparation of the prosecution or defense of any action); IowA CODE §§ 68A.7(4), (6), (7), (8) (1971) (work
products of attorneys related to litigation by or against a public body, reports to
government agencies that, if released, would give advantage to competitors and serve
no public purpose, appraisal information concerning purchase for public purpose,
information on industrial negotiations of the Development Commission); Mn. ANN.
CODE art. 76A, §§ 3(b)(iii), (iv) (Supp. 1974) (specific details of bona fide research
projects conducted by state institutions, real estate appraisals); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 4,
§§ 7(26)(h), (i), (Supp. 1974) (proposals and bids to enter into contracts or agreements,
appraisals of real estate); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 192.500 (l}(a), (f) (1974) (litigation involving a public body, information relating to real estate appraisal); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT.
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protected in many states by exemptions for intra- or inter-agency
memoranda and correspondence1222 and/or investigatory files and
records.1223
In addition to these specific categories of exemptions,1224 several
states have included in their statutes a general "withholding"
exemption.1225 In Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, the California court
ANN. art. 6252-17a, §§ 3(3), (4), (5) (Supp. 1974) (information relating to agency litigation
or settlement negotiations, information that would give advantage to competitors or
bidders, information pertaining to the location of property prior to formal announce•
mentor contract awards); VA. CODE .ANN. § 2.l-342(b)(5) (Supp. 1974) (records pertaining to litigation involving a public body); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 42,I7.310(l)(g), (h), (j)
(1974) (real estate appraisals relating to the acquisition of property, valuable formulas,
research data, etc., obtained by an agency, the disclosure of which would produce
private gain and public loss, records relevant to a controversy to which the agency is
a party that would not be accessible by discovery); WYO. STAT. ANN, §§ 9-692.!l(b)(iii),
(iv) (Supp. 1973) (specific details of bona fide research projects conducted by state
institutions, real estate appraisals).
1222. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN, STAT• .ANN.

§

1-19 (Supp. 1975); Mn. ANN. ConE art. '76A,

§ 3(b)(v) (Supp. 1974); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 4, § 7(26)(d) (Supp. 1974); TEX. REv. C1v.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(ll) (Supp. 1974): WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310(l)(i) (1974):

WYo. STAT• .ANN. § 9-692.3(b)(v) (Supp. 1973). Oregon exempts "[c]ommunications
within a public body or between public bodies of an advisory nature to the extent
that they rover other than purely factual materials and are preliminary to any final
agency determination of policy or action." ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.500(2)(a) (1974). However, this exemption is not applicable "unless the public body shows that in the par-·
ticular instance the public interest in encouraging frank communication between officials
and employees of public bodies clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure."
ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.500(2)(a) (1974). California restricts its exemption to cases in which
"the public interest in withholding such records clearly outweighs the public interest in
disclosure." CAL. Govr. CODE § 6254(a) (West Supp. 1975). See also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)
(1970), discussed in the text at notes 648-99 supra.
The rationale underlying these exemptions seems to conflict with that underlying
open-meeting laws, thus casting serious doubt on the desirability of these exemptions.
See text at notes 1305-498 infra.
1223. See, e.g., CAL. GoVT. CODE § 6254(£) (West Supp. 1975); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN,
§ 24-72-204(2)(a)(ii) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19 (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE
§ 68A.7(5) (1971); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 44:3 (West Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:IA-3 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ I92.500(l)(c), (h) (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
65, § 66.1(2) (Supp. 1974); TENN. ConE ANN. § 15-305 (1973); TEX. R.Ev. C1v. STAT, ANN.
art. 6252-17a, § 3(8) (Supp. 1974); VA. ConE ANN. § 2,l-342(b)(l), (2) (Supp. 1974); WASH,
REv. CODE§ 42.I7.3I0(l)(d) (1974); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.3(b)(i) (Supp. 1973). See also
Model FOIA, supra note ll69, § 4(A)(3); 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (7) (Supp. Feb. 1975),
discussed in the text at notes 745-828 supra.
1224. There are various specific exemptions in the state acts that are not susceptible
to meaningful categorization. Several states, for example, exempt records of parole
and pardon boards. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:5(11) (Supp. 1973); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Page 1969); ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.500(2)(d) {1974); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 2.1-345(5) (Supp. 1974). Some states exempt certain library and museum materials,
See CAL. GOVT. CODE § 6254(j) (West Supp. 1975); COLO, R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 24-72204(3)(£) (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 3(c)(vi) (Supp. 1974); WYO. STAT. ANN,
§ 9--o92.3(d)(vi) (Supp. 1974). A number of states also exempt test questions and answer keys. See CAL. GoVT. CODE § 6254(g) (West Supp. 1975); CoLO. R.Ev. STAT, ANN.
§ 24-72-204(2)(a)(iii) (1973); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 3(b)(ii) (Supp. 1974): ORE. REv.
STAT. § 192.500(1)(d) (1974); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.310(1)(£) (1974); WYO, STAT. ANN.
§ 9-692.3(b)(ii) (Supp. 1973).
1225. See, e.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE § 6255 (West Supp. 1975); IOWA ConE ANN, § 68A.8
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of appeals described such an exemption as follows: "The Public
Records Act recognizes that fixed statutory categories do not always
respond to real-life situations. Thus, aside from the 14 exempt categories listed in section 6254, section 6255 provides a residual exem~
tion where, on the facts of the particular case, the public interest
served by not making the record public clearly outweighs the public
interest served by its disclosure." 1226
A residual exemption, such as the one referred to in Kehoe,
compels a court to balance the competing interests in order to determine whether specific records should be disclosed. This weighing
is similar to the judicial function a court performs when faced with
a claim of exemption under the common law.1227 There is a significant distinction ben'leen this general- residual statutory exemption
and the common-law test, however: The exemption establishes a
presumption in favor of disclosure by requiring a clear demonstration that the public interest in disclosure is outweighed by another
interest in the particular case.1228
Some states have adopted more restrictive residual exemptions
that require a finding of "substantial injury to the public interest"
as a condition of withholding records.1229 The custodian of such
records must obtain a court order before the records qualify for the
exemption. Such provisions place a significant burden on an agency
seeking to withhold records. Not· only must it sustain the burden
of proof,1280 it must also initiate a judicial proceeding in order to
(1973); S.C. CODE .ANN.
the federal FOIA.

§

1.20.1 (Supp. 1973). This type of exemption has no parallel in

1226. 39 Cal. App. 3d 900, 907, 114 Cal. Rptr. 725, 729 (1974). CAL. Govr. ConE
§ 6255 (West Supp. 1975), at issue in this case, allows an agency to withhold "any

record by demonstrating that • • • on the facts of the particular case the public
interest served by not making the record public clearly outweighs the public interest
served by disclosure of the record."
1227. See text at notes 1209-12 supra.
1228. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 68A.8 (1971), which permits the invocation of such an
exemption "[i]f the court finds that such examination would clearly not be in the
public interest and would substantially and irreparably injure any person or persons.
The district court shall take into account the policy of this chapter that free and open
examination of public reoords is generally in the public interest • • • ." Cf. note 1212
supra (discussing the statutory authority of the Governor to order the withholding of
records). The clear demonstration necessary for the application of a resid1:tal exemption
was made in Yarish v. Nelson, 27 Cal. App. 3d 893, 104 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1972).
1229. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-204(6) (1973); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 76A,
§ 3(f) (Supp. 1974); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.3(g) (Supp. 1973).
1230. See, e.g., Meriden Record Co. v. Browning, 6 Conn. Cir. 633, - , 294 A.2d 646,
649 (1971), in which the court, quoting an earlier case, required a showing by the
agency that "such a protection of the records being shielded from scrutiny • • • [is]
vital to public security." (Emphasis added.) The court seemed to increase significantly
the presumption in favor of disclosure, since the exemption clause in question provided that a custodian shall refuse permission if the inspection or copying of particular
records "would adversely affect the public security." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-20
(1969).
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invoke the exemption. These safeguards minimize the chance that
the residual exemptions will be abused.
Specific statutory exemptions are legislative attempts to predetermine the results of the balancing test on a categorical basis.
However, such predeterminations may allow records to be withheld
in situations where no persuasive reason exists for making them
unavailable.1231 In response to this problem, several states have added
provisos to specific exemptions that state that the exemptions are not
always to be determinative. Thus, the Oregon act states that exempted
records should be disclosed if "the public interest requires disclosure
in the particular instance."1232 Similarly, the Iowa1233 and Washington1234 statutes allow a court to order disclosure notwithstanding the
existence of othenvise applicable exemptions.1286
In the absence of a "public interest" provision, a court is not
necessarily precluded from overriding a legitimate claim of exemption. There is authority for the proposition that a balancing test
should be applied even when the requested information falls within
a specific exemption.1236 In one opinion, the California Attorney
General stated:
The same historical evidence which compels the conclusion that the
California Public Records Act should be construed broadly also
compels the conclusion that these two sections must be construed
strictly so as not to interfere with the basic policy of the act. The
specific exceptions of section 6254 should be viewed with the general
philosophy of section 6255 in mind; that is, that records should be
withheld from disclosure only where the public interest served by not
making a record public outweighs the public interest served by the
general policy of disclosure.12a1
1231. Cf. Wash. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 4 at 12 (Jan. 19, 1973): "As you will note from
a reading of the full text of the initiative, its drafters did not define or othenvise state
specific standards outlining the right of personal privacy-in apparent recognition
of the uniqueness of that right to each individual or entity which might wish to raise
it in opposition to the disclosure of a particular record. Instead, they appropriately
left it to the court to protect that personal right on a case-by-case basis as it is individually invoked . • • ."
1232. ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 192.500(1) (1974). See Papadopoulas v. State Bd. of Higher
Educ., 8 Ore. App. 445, 494 P.2d 260 (1972). In response to a claim of exemption based
on a statute that arguably protected certain documents "when the public interest
would suffer by the disclosure," 8 Ore. App. at -, 494 P.2d at 262, the court lteld:
"The evidence does not establish that keeping the promise of secrecy outweighs the
citizens' rights to know the contents of this public record. Nor docs the evidence cs,
tablish that it will be significantly more difficult to obtain similar information in the
future, absent assurances of permanent secrecy." 8 Ore. App. at -, 494 P.2d at 2'70.
1~3~.. IOWA CODE § 68A.7 (1971).
1234. WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.1'7.310(3) (19'74).
1235. Although the federal act does not contain such a provision, it may permit
agencies to release information falling within an exemption. See text at notes 1141-51
supra.
1236. See Uribe v. Howie, 19 Cal. App. 3d 194, 206, 96 Cal. Rptr. 493, 500 (1971).
123'7. 53 OP. CAL. ATrY. GEN. 136, 143 (1970). The sections construed are CAL. GOVT,
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This interpretation furthers the basic policy of "freedom of information," which is that all public records should be available unless
the public interest requires otherwise; however, it may be contrary
to the legislative intent to preclude judicial discretion in cases where
exemptions apply.
In the absence of particular statutory language enabling the
courts to balance the public interest in disclosure against the public
interest protected by the exemption, they will probably adhere to
the statutory guidelines.1238 In order to effectuate fully the policy
of freedom of information, it is arguably desirable for the legislative categories to be viewed as merely presumptive exemptions.1239
Thus, a court should be able to order the disclosure of exempted
records when the public interest in freedom of information substantially outweighs the legislatively favored interest expressed
in the exemption.1240
c. Persons who can invoke the right of inspection. The third
important element that bears on the scope of the public right of
inspection is the class of persons that can invoke the right.1241 Most
states currently have statutes that make the right of inspection available to "any person." 1242 The courts generally construe these proviCODE §§ 6254-55 (West Supp. 1975) (the former section has been amended since the
Attorney General's opinion). See also Note, supra note 1192, at 1175.
1238. In construing the federal act's exemption scheme, the courts have generally
not looked beyond the initial determination whether the exemption claimed does
apply. See text at notes 496-500 supra. The only exception to this practice has been
with regard to the exemption for personal privacy, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970), which
includes the word "unwarranted." See text at notes 700-44 supra.
1239. The related proposition that a court could create exemptions other than
those specified by the legislature would be inconsistent with the fundamental policy
of freedom of information. See text at notes 1105-31 supra.
If the courts are given the authority to balance the countervailing interests in cases
where an exemption is found to be applicable, it is important that they be allowed
to review the matter de novo, rather than be restricted to a review of the agency's
balancing determination. See text at notes 1268-70 infra.
,
,
1240. Cf. text at notes 1156-59 supra.
1241. This question of the class of persons to whom the right of inspection extends
does not arise at the federal level. The federal act grants access "to any person" who
requests it. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975). This provision was explicitly
intended to prevent the imposition of any requirement that the requesting party
establish his "need to know." See note 458 supra and accompanying text.
1242. See, e.g., Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (1956); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-712
(1971) ("all citizens of this state, and all other persons interested in the examination
of the public records"); ORE. REV. STAT. § 192.420 (1974) ("every person"); S.D. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 1-27-1 (1974). TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3 (Supp. 1974)
siiµply states that public information shall be "available to the public." See also Model
FOIA, supra note 1169, § 3(A).
Some states limit the right of inspection to citizens only. See, e.g., Ar.A. CODE tit.
41, § 145 (1959); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.01 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2701 (Supp.
1974); !DAHO CODE § 59-1009 (1948); IND. CODE § 5-14-1-3 (1971); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
ch. 1, § 405 (1964); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:4 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 71-5-1 (Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-26-2 (1953). The Virginia statute originally
contained an "interest requirement." See Act of April 4, 1968, ch. 479, § 3(a), [1968]
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sions literally and require no showing of special interest or proper
purpose.1243 Mans v. Lebanon School Board,1244 a New Hampshire
case, typifies this approach: "One consideration not relevant to our
inquiry is the plaintiff's lack of a sufficient personal reason for seeking the information. At common law a court might deny access to
information if it thought plaintiff's reasons whimsical or antisocial.
... Our statute grants rights to 'every citizen.' ... Plaintiff's rights
under [the act] do not depend upon his demonstrating a need for
the information."124°
Although these statutes have obviated the common-law standards
governing who can invoke the right of inspection, it is nevertheless
important to examine those standards. First, such an examination
will lead to an understanding of why some courts have confused the
question of standing to invoke the right of inspection with that of
standing to enforce the right. Second, it will demonstrate the radical
change that open-records statutes have effected in this area.
At common law, only a very limited class of persons could invoke
the right to inspect public records.1246 In order to gain access to
public records, a person had to demonstrate some legally recognized
"interest" therein. The earliest and most restrictive interest recognized was adopted from the narrow English rule. 1247 One court
characterized this interest as follows: "[T]his court recognizes the
common-law right of inspection of public records by a proper person
or his agent provided he has an interest therein which is such as
would enable him to maintain or defend an action for which the
document or record sought can furnish evidence or necessary information."1248 This narrow rule has been criticized as a misapplication
of the English law. In the Michigan case of Nowack v. Auditor
General,1249 the court stated that this limitation was not intended to
restrict the right of inspection; rather it was intended to limit the
Va. Acts of Assembly 691. Now, however, Virginia allows inspection by "any citizen
of this state." VA. CODE .ANN. § 2.1-342 (Supp. 1974).
1243. See, e.g., Denver Publishing Co. v. Dreyfus, - Colo.-,-, 520 P.2d 104, 106
(1974); Citizens for Better Educ. v. Board of Educ., 124 N.J. Super. 523, 528, 308 A.2d
35, 37 (App. Div. 1973); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. State, 282 Minn. 86, 89·
90, 163 N.W. 2d 46, 48 (1968); State ex rel. Journal Co. v. County Court, 43 Wis. 2d
297, 309, 168 N.W.2d 836, 841 (1969).
1244. 112 N.H. 160, 290 A.2d 866 (1972).
1245. 112 N.H. at 162, 290 A.2d at 867.
1246. See H. CRoss, supra note 1168, at 25-29.
1247. See Nowack v. Auditor Gen., 243 Mich. 200, 204-06, 219 N.W. 749, 750-51
(1928).
1248. Nolan v. McCoy, 77 R.I. 96, 103, 73 A.2d 693, 697 (1950). See also State ex rel.
Holloran v. McGrath, 104 Mont. 490, 497, 67 P.2d 838, 841 (1937).
'
1249. 243 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1928).

May-June 1975]

Project

1179

class able to enforce that right by means of a writ of mandamus.1250
The court said:
The [English] courts held that, to entitle [a party] to the writ, his
interest must be direct and tangible, and that the right to inspect ,
public records to secure evidence for a lawsuit was such an interest.
By this the courts did not-mean that he had no right to inspect the
books unless he wanted to use them as evidence, but they meant
that they would not issue the extraordinary writ of mandamus to
enforce a private right of inspection unless the purpose was to use
it in some pending or prospective suit.1 251
American courts have generally broadened this prerequisite to
the right of inspection, although many continue to require a showing
of some type of interest.1262 In these states, cases have often turned
on the question whether a citizen's "public interest" is sufficient to
afford him the right of inspection without a showing of any private
interest.1263 Courts have generally held that the public interest alone
is sufficient.1254
Other states have not required the demonstration of a particular
interest but have limited the right of inspection to persons having
a "proper purpose." Thus, it has been held that a citizen can invoke
the right of inspection "except in instances where the purpose is
purely speculative or from idle curiosity, or such as to unduly interfere or hinder the discharge of the duties of [a public] officer." 1266
This standard is an improvement upon the "interest" requirement.
However, its vagueness may offer a court an opportunity to deny
the right of inspection whenever it feels that the public interest
warrants nondisclosure.1256 Some courts have achieved the most
1250. 243 Mich. at 203-04, 219 N.W. at 750-51. For a discussion of the common-law
standing requirements to enforce the right to inspection see text at notes 1271-72 infra.
1251. 243 Mich. at 205-06, 219 N.W. at 751 (emphasis added).
1252. See, e.g., Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 315-16, 63 A. 146, 153-54 (1906);
State ex rel. Charleston Mail Assn. v. Kelly, 149 W. Va. 766, 770, 143 S.E.2d 136, 139
(1965).
1253. See Comment, supra note 1210, at 1668-69.
1254. See, e.g., Moore v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 76 N.J. Super. 396, 184 A.2d
748 (App. Div.), modified on other grounds, 39 N.J.2d 26, 186 A.2d 676 (1962); Nowack
v. Auditor Gen. 243 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1928). As the court said in State ex rel.
Charleston Mail Assn. v. Kelly, 149 W. Va. 766, 770, 143 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1965), "The
petitioners ••• are citizens, voters, and taxpayers of this state and as such allege that
they are interested in 'being fully informed on the activities and conduct of its government and the elected officers thereof and the handling of public monies.' It is indeed
difficult to envision a greater interest in public records which reflect the handling of
public funds than that of a citizen and taxpayer whose own contribution to the public
funds is directly involved."
1255. Holcombe v. State ex rel. Chandler, 240 Ala. 590, 597, 200 S. 739, 746 (1941).
See also Payne v. Staunton, 55 W. Va. 202, 213, 46 S.E.2d 927, 932 (1904).
1256. Cf. People ex rel. Better Broadcasting Council, Inc. v. Keane, 17 Ill. App. 3d
1090, 1096, 309 N.E.2d 362, 367 (1973).

ll80

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 73:971

desirable result by refusing to impose any restrictions upon the
right of inspection.1257
d. Enforcement procedures. Once a person establishes that he
can invoke the right, at common law or under a statute, to inspect
particular public records, there remains the problem of enforcing
this right if access to the requested records is denied. The class of
persons who have the right to inspect and the class of persons who
can enforce the right of inspection are not necessarily co-extensive
under state law. 1258 Because, as a practical matter, there is no right
without a remedy, the limitations on enforcement are crucial.121i0
At common law, the procedure that must be used to compel an
agency or public official to permit the inspection of public records
is the writ of mandamus. 1260 It is appropriate to use mandamus to
force public officials to perform ministerial duties; 1261 generally,
it has been held that the duty to allow reasonable inspection of
public records is "ministerial in its nature, and so clear and specific
that no element of discretion nor of official judgment is involved
in its performance."1262 In the absence of a specific enforcement
provision, states with open-records statutes rely on the same procedure. As the Wisconsin court stated: "Mandamus is the proper
remedy to test the reasons for withholding documents or records
from inspection. In Wisconsin, we have traditionally tested the
right to inspection by the use of mandamus ...."12oa
1257. See, e.g., Disabled Police Veterans Club v. Long, 279 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1955) ("[It is not] essential that the inspection of public records be limited
to persons who have some legal interest to be subserved by the inspection, Neither
does it detract from the right to inspect public records that it is done for others for
compensation").
1258. See Nowack v. Auditor Gen., 243 Mich. 200, 208, 219 N.W. 749, 751 (1928);
Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. Cavanaugh, 15 Mich. App. 203, 205-06, 166 N,W.2d 546, 547
(1968).
1259. See Note, supra note ll92, at ll86. The federal act provides a remedy in every
case in which the right of inspection under the statute is improperly denied. A minority
of the courts however, relying on traditional equity principles, have refused to order
disclosure of improperly withheld records in some cases. See note 1110 supra and accompanying text.
1260. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Boller, 231 Cal. App. 2d 482, 41 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964);
State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900); Clement v. Graham,
78 Vt. 290, 63 A. 146 (1906). See generally H. CRoss, supra note 1168, at 30-33; Annot.,
60 A.L.R. 1356 (1929), updated 169 A.L.R. 653 (1947).
1261. "[W]here the duty of a public official requires the exercise of discretion,
mandamus will not be granted to control his decision •••• But the law is equally clear
that mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a public official to perform a ministerial duty in which the applicant for the writ has a sufficient interest." Pressman v.
Elgin, 187 Md. 446, 451, 50 A.2d 560, 563 (1947).
1262. Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 318, 63 A. 146, 154 (1906). See also State
ex rel. Davidson v. Couch, 115 Fla. 115, 118, 155 S. 153, 153-54 (1934).
1263. Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 518-19, 153 N.W.2d 501, 504 (1967).
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Many states have specifically provided in their statutes that courts
shall have jurisdiction in mandamus to review denials of the right
of inspection.1264 Other states allow courts to grant "injunctive
relief,"1265 or to "enter such orders for disclosure" as they deem
appropriate,1266 or to require agencies to show cause why such relief
should not be granted.1267 These procedures are probably equivalent
to the common-law writ of mandamus. The most significant difference exists in those states that have included a provision in their
statutes for de novo review of denials of the right of inspection.1268
In the absence of such a provision, a court is generally limited to
reviewing whether the official's decision to refuse inspection was
supported by sufficient evidence.1269 Under the de novo review
standard, a court may determine the applicability of a claimed
exemption unfettered by any presumption in favor of the legitimacy
of the agency determination.1270 This procedure should provide the
public with more effective protection against unwarranted withholdings of public records.
The most troublesome requirement for mandamus at common
law has been that of standing. In the absence of a statutory provision
to the contrary, courts often require that a person petitioning for
such a ·writ demonstrate some "special" or "beneficial" interest in
the requested records. 1271 As noted above, some courts have confused
the standing requirement for enforcement with the common-law
standing requirement for invocation of the right of inspection.1272
Although most states have abrogated the interest requirement for
1264. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 66, § IO(b) (Supp. 1974); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 84712.03 (1971); TEx. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 8 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 2.1-346 (1973).
1265. See, e.g., CAL. GoVT. CODE § 6258 (West Supp. 1975); N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.
§ 91-A:l (Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-20.4 (Supp. 1973). See also Model FOIA,
supra note 1169, § 6(A).
1266. See, e.g., CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. § 1-20 (Supp. 1975). See also PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 65, § 66.4 (1959).
1267. See, e.g., COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 24--72-204(5) (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art.
76A, § 3(e) (Supp. 1974); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.3(f) (Supp. 1973).
1268. See, e.g., CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. § 1-19 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.490
(1974); WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 42.17.340(2) (1974). See also Model FOIA, supra note 1169,
§ 6(B).
1269. See Freedom of Information Clearinghouse, Summary of State FOI Laws
(n.d.) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). See generally, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TEXT § 29.10 (3d ed. 1972); L. JAFFE, supra note 865, at 622-23.
1270. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 1269, at § 29.07; L. JAFFE, supra note
865, at 618-23; R. Plesser & P. Petkas, supra note 1169, at 43. The federal act also
provides for de novo review. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at
notes 962-64 supra.
1271. See, e.g., Boylan v. Warren, 39 Kan. 301, 18 P. 174 (1888).
1272. See text following note 1245 supra. Of course, courts can reach the same result
by denying a remedy for the right of inspection as they can by denying the right itself.
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the right of inspection, many still retain such a limitation on the
right of enforcement.
A problem may arise when a person seeking to enforce his right
to inspect public records has only a general "public interest" in
obtaining those records, that is, one common to all citizens, rather
than a unique personal interest.1273 Although many courts allow a
citizen to petition for mandamus to vindicate a general public in•
terest in inspection,1274 others require that, in the absence of the
requisite special interest, the petition must be brought by the attor•
ney general or another designated official.1276 Thus, the Pennsylvania
court held:
[W]hile the plaintiff had a statutory right of inspection, the breach
of the public duty by the respondents did not result in the plaintiff
suffering an injury special and peculiar to himself. The mere fact
that the right of inspection was refused him is not such an injury.
Otherwise, in every instance where a mandamus could issue on the
relation of the attorney general or the district attorney, it could
issue on behalf of an individual plaintiff where the respondents
refused to the plaintiff the performance of the duty sought to be
enforced.1276

Requiring a petition for mandamus to be brought by a public official
may deprive a person of the right of inspection if the official fails
either to petition for enforcement or to pursue the petition to
its fullest extent. Compelling a citizen to rely on a public official
1273. See Comment, supra note 1210, at 1667-69.
1274. See, e.g., Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 63 A. 146 (1906). The opinion includes
an excellent discussion of numerous early cases on point. See also Butcl1er v, Civil
Serv. Commn., 163 Pa. Super. 343, 61 A.2d 367 (1948). Although holding that there
was no general right to petition for mandamus, the Butcher court seemed to indicate
that sucll a right might exist if "municipal finances" were involved. 163 Pa. Super. at
346, 61 A.2d at 368.
1275. See Holcombe v State ex rel. Chandler, 240 Ala. 590, 200 S. 739 (1941); Nowack
v. Auditor Gen., 243 Micli. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1928) (newspapers allowed to petition
in their own right since they were deemed to have a special interest in public records);
Colnon v. Orr, 71 Cal. 43, 45, 11 P. 814, 815 (1886), in which the court held:
While it is the right of a citizen of this state to inspect the public records at
sucll times as the statute provides, nevertheless a writ of mandate to enforce that
right cannot always be invoked.
It must be issued upon affidavit, on the application of the party beneficially
interested, in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
given by law, and not otherwise. • . .
What beneficial interest in the examination of this document, even conceding
that it was a part of the public records, Mr. Colnon can have, simply for the
reason that he is a citizen of California, we cannot perceive from the record, nor
has he sought to allege any sucll interest in his petition; and therefore he has not
brought himself within the purview of the law, whicll grants to citizens, in certain cases, this special writ.
(Emphasis original.)
1276. Butclier v. Civil Serv. Commn., 163 Pa. Super. 343, 348, 61 A.2d 367, 369
(1948) (emphasis original).
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for enforcement seems inconsistent with the underlying theme of
freedom of information.
A large number of states with open-records statutes have abrogated any special interest requirement for enforcement. Some of
these statutes grant standing to any person (or citizen) "denied"
access; 1277 some grant standing to "any person (or citizen) aggrieved."1278 The same legislative intent probably underlies these
two types of provisions, although one could argue that all citizens
of a state are "aggrieved" by the failure of a public official to make
records available for inspection or publication to anyone who rightfully requests them. Finally, some states apparently do not limit
standing and allow any citizen to sue for enforcement of the public
right of inspection.1279
Even if all states eliminated the standing requirement for judicial
review, the enforcement process would remain seriously flawed. The
expense and delay incurred in seeking judicial review may negate
the effectiveness of the review mechanism.1280 A number of statutory
provisions have been adopted by various states in an effort to alleviate these problems.
The provisions that alleviate the cost problem most effectively
are found in the Texas1281 and Oregon1282 acts. Both of these acts
require the attorney general to make a determination before judicial
review is available.1283 The Texas procedure provides that a govem1277. E.g., .ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2806 (1968); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-204(5)
(1973); IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 5-14-1-6 (Burns 1974) (specifically stating that there
need be no showing of special damage); MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 3(e) (Supp. 1974);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-712.03 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:IA-4 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. PUB.
OFFICERS LAW, § 88(8) (McKinney Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.4 (1959);
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-346 (1973); WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.340(1) (1974); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 9-692.3(f) (Supp. 1973). See also Model FOIA, supra note 1169, § 6(A).
1278. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-20 (Supp. 1975); HAWAII REv. STAT, § 92-6
(1968); N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:7 (Supp. 1973). See also CAL. GoVT. CODE § 6258
(West Supp. 1975).
1279. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 44-35 (West 1950); s.c. CODE ANN. § 1-20.4 (Supp.
1973); MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 39, § 23C (1973) (allowing "any three registered voters" to
petition for enforcement).
1280. The obstacles of cost and delay also represent serious problems at the initial
stage of the requesting process. Excessive copy or search fees may interfere with public
access to information. Similarly, long time-delays before agencies act on information
requests can preclude effective public use of public records. Although the states have
not generally included provisions in their acts to eliminate such obstacles, the 1974
amendments to the federal FOIA included such provisions. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552
(a)(4)(A), (a)(6) (Supp. Feb. 1975). These provisions are discussed in the text at notes
847-99 &: 900-38 supra.
1281. TEX. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 7 (Supp. 1974).
1282. ORE. REv. SrAT. § 192.440 (1973). The Oregon procedure, however, does not
apply to denials that have been made by elected officials. The courts must review
such denials directly. ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.480 (1973). See also Model FOIA, supra
note 1169, § 6(A).
1283. However, in Oregon, the appropriate district attorney makes the initial review
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ment body seeking to withhold records under a statutory exemption
must petition the attorney general for a determination of the appli•
cability of the claimed exemption. This petition must be filed within
a reasonable time, but not later than ten days from the date of the
request. The Texas statute further specifies that if an agency fails
to file a timely petition, "the information shall be presumed to be
public.''1284 This procedure places the burden of going fonvard upon
the agency, thereby sparing the requesting party the cost and trouble
of an appeal in the courts. The stringent time limit should eliminate
some of the delays in the review process. Although the act allows
either the requesting party or the attorney general to petition the
appropriate court to compel compliance,1285 this procedure may be
weakened by the absence of a provision for judicial review of the
attorney general's determination.
The Oregon statute provides that a person denied records by a
public official may petition the attorney general for review. 1280 After
the attorney general rules upon the validity of the withholding,
either the requesting party or the agency may institute proceedings
for judicial review of this determination. 1287 The act states that the
agency has the burden of sustaining its denial of disclosure. 1288
Because of its more stringent time limits and the heavier burden it
places upon the agency seeking to invoke an exemption, the Texas
act may be superior to the Oregon act. However, the failure of the
Texas act to allow appeals from the attorney general's determinations
may be a significant defect in that act.
The tremendous costs necessarily incurred when an agency denial is challenged in the courts makes these attorney general review
provisions especially significant. Even when these nonjudicial review
procedures must be initiated by the party requesting the records, as
for public bodies other than state agencies. ORE, R.Ev. STAT. § 192.460 (1973). In Texas,
the decisions of local government bodies are reviewed by the attorney general. TEX.
REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 7 (Supp. 1974).
1284. TEX. R.Ev. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 7 (Supp. 1974). See Tex. Atty. Gen.
Open Records Dec. No. 26, at 2 (March 15, 1974), interpreting this provision as follows:
"As a result of the city's failure to comply with the procedure established in § 'l(a), we
are directed to presume that the information in question is public information Ordinarily, this presumption will not be overcome unless there is a compelling demonstration that the information requested should not be released to the public, as might be
the case, for instance, if it is information deemed confidential by some other source of
law." See also Tex. Atty. Gen Open Records Dec. Nos. 31, (May 'l, 1974), 44 (Aug. 16,
1974).
1285. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 8 (Supp. 1974).
1286. ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 192.450(1) (1974).
1287. ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 192.450(2) (1974), which provides for review under ORE,
R.Ev. STAT. § 192.490 (1974).
1288. ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.450(1) (1974). See also Model FOIA, supra note 1169,
§ 6(B).
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is the case under the Oregon act, they can greatly reduce the costs
to the parties involved.1289
Another method of mitigating the cost of challenging agency
withholdings is to allow a party to recover some of the costs of
litigating an enforcement suit. The Oregon statute specifically
provides that a party prevailing on appeal shall be awarded
reasonable attorney fees and that a party prevailing in part may be
awarded reasonable attorney fees or a part thereof.1290 The Washington act states that a person prevailing against an agency shall be
awarded all costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred in
connection with the legal action. 1291 Finally, Colorado provides that
the custodian of the disputed records personally may be ordered to
pay the applicant's court costs and attorney fees, upon a finding that
the denial was arbitrary and capricious.1292 An express provision
that makes an agency liable for litigation costs is necessary because
"'[t]he general rule is that in suits where the state is a party in its
own courts, it is not liable for costs in the absence of an express
statute creating such liability' . . . . This general rule is also applicable not only to 'the state' as such, but also to state agencies." 1293
The significant delays that often accompany the judicial review
process may also hinder the effective enforcement of the right of
inspection. The information sought may be virtually useless by the
time it is obtained; thus, many persons seeking public records may
be deterred from challenging an agency denial in court unless the
review process is expedited. In recognition of this problem many
states have granted cases reviewing information denials a preference
1289. The implementation of such a procedure at the federal level should be considered. The Justice Department has, on its own initiative, taken one step toward
implementing a pre-judicial review procedure. The Department currently requires
all federal agencies to inform the Department's Freedom of Information Committee
of all intended denials of FOIA requests. The Committee screens these denials and
recommends disclosure or withholding. If the Committee does not approve the withholding, and the denial is subsequently challenged in court, the Justice Department
will refuse to defend the agency. 28 C.F.R. § 50.9(a) (1974). See note 956 &: text at note
1003 supra. Although this procedure is not adversarial, it could serve as the foundation
for the establishment of an attorney general review procedure such as that mandated in
Texas.
·
1290. ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 192.490(3) (1974). See also Model FOIA, supra note 1169,
§ 6(D).
1291. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.340(3) (1974).
1292. COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-204(5). (1973).
1293. Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 101 S.2d 371, 371 (Fla. 1958). See Annot., 72 AL.R.
2d 1376 (1960) (discussing numerous cases on point). Such a statutory provision is also
necessary on the federal level, although in some cases federal courts may award attorney fees even in the absence of such a provision. See text at notes 1016-71 supra.
The federal act expressly allows the courts to "assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any [FOIA case] in
which the complainant has substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(E) (Supp.
Feb, 1975).
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or priority on the trial calendar,1294 while others have set a definite
time limit for a hearing.12or;
e. Sanctions. The final element of a comprehensive open-records
law is a sanctions provision. Such a provision is intended to deter
public officials from wrongfully refusing to comply with information
requests. Most access statutes include one or more sanctions. The
great majority of them make it a misdemeanor for public officials
to violate the provisions of the act.1296 The specified criminal penalty
is usually a small fine, a short jail sentence, or both.1297 Some statutes
require that a violation be "willfully and knowingly" committed in
order to be a criminal offense; 1298 others include no specific scienter
requirement.1299 Although the latter standard might encompass even
an innocent violation, it seems unlikely that an official acting in good
faith would be held criminally liable.
It is difficult to determine whether such sanctions are effective
in deterring public officials from wrongfully withholding public
records. In order for penal sanctions to be effective, the states must
be willing to prosecute violators. Because the states may hesitate to
do so, especially where the official has simply made a mistake of
1294. See, e.g., CAL. GoVT. CODE § 6258 (West Supp. 1975); CoLO. REv. STAT, ANN,
§ 24-72-204(5) (1973); LA. REv. STAT. § 44:35 (West 1950); N.H. REv. STAT, ANN. § 91-A:7
(Supp. 1973); ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.490(2) (1974). See also Model FOIA, supra note
1169, § 6(C); 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(D) (Supp. Feb. 1975). The federal provision is
merely a general directive that priority is to be accorded FOIA cases, and its effect
appears to be limited. See text at notes 1007-15 supra. The federal act docs, however,
include an additional provision requiring defendants in FOIA cases to answer the
complaint within 30 days after it is served "unless the court othcnvise directs for good
cause shown." 5 U.S.C.A. § 522(a)(4)(C) (Supp. Feb. 1975), discussed in the text at notes
997-1006 supra.
1295. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2806 (1968) (seven days); VA. CODE ANN. § 21346 (1973) (seven days or given preference).
1296. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 146 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2807 (1968); COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-206 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN, §§ 119.02, .10 (Supp. 1974); IND,
CoDE § 5-14-1-6 (1971); IOWA CODE § 68A.6 (1971); KAN, STAT, ANN, § 45-203 (1973);
LA. REv. STAT, § 44:37 (West 1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. '76A, § 5 (Supp. 1974); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 66, § 15 (1971); Mo. REv. STAT. § 109.180 (1969); NEB, R.Ev. STAT. § 84712.03 (1971); NEV. REv. STAT, § 239.010(2) (1973); N.M. STAT, ANN. § 71-5-3 (1961);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 15-306 (1973); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-692.5 (Supp. 1973). See generally Cassidy v. Cannon, 18 Cal. App. 426, 123 P. 359
(1912) (on petition for rehearing); [1967] OP. N.M. ATrY. GEN. 80, 82-83. A few states
prescribe, as an alternative, that an official who violates the act shall be subject to
removal or impeachment. See, e.g., FLA. STAT, ANN. § 119.02 (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 45-203 (1973); Mo. R.Ev. STAT. § 109.180 (1969); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-712.03
(1971).
1297. These range from up to $1000 or up to six months for the first offense, and
up to $2000 and/or up to 6 months for subsequent offenses, LA. REV. STAT. § 44:37
(West 1950), to not more than $20 for each month of refusal or neglect. MASS. ANN,
LAws ch. 66, § 15 (1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9 (1974).
1298. E.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-'72-206 (1973); Mo. ANN. CODE art. '76A, § 5
(Supp. 1974); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.5 (Supp. 1973).
1299. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119,02 (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN, § 45-203 (1973);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 71-5-3 (1961).
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judgment, such penal sanctions may be relatively ineffectual. As an
alternative, a few states have provided for the imposition of civil
sanctions upon offending officials. The Washington act allows a
court to assess up to $25 per day against the offending official for
each day of improper withholding.1800 The Ohio act provides that
the attorney general may collect up to $100 in a civil action against
an offending official.1301 In addition, a few state statutes specifically
provide that noncompliance with a court order requiring disclosure
will be considered a contempt of courV302 Finally, the Washington
act includes a unique provision to the effect that a party may not
be "adversely affected" by records that have not been made available
as required by law.1303 This provision parallels the provision unde~
many state open-meeting laws for nullification of official actions
taken at meetings improperly closed to the public.1304 The efficacy
of such a provision, however, has not yet been tested in the courts.
It may be that none of these sanctions will be particularly
effective. Because most unlawful withholdings are probably not
done in bad faith, officials are not likely to respond to punitive
sanctions. Although all open records statutes should include a strong
sanctions provision as a symbolic manifestation of the importance
of bureaucratic compliance with the policy of freedom of information,
the actual deterrent effect of such sanctions is probably minimal.
The most effective remedy for abuses may simply be the establishment of an expedient and efficient review procedure to correct
unlawful withholdings of public records.

E. State and Proposed Federal Open-Meeting Laws
An important result of the campaign to promote "freedom of
information" and to ensure open government has been the proliferation of open-meeting laws.1305 While there is no general
1300. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.340(3) (1974).
1301. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 149.99 (Page 1969). The most effective alternative
would be a provision authorizing either disciplinary action against officials who improperly withhold information, cf. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(F) (discussed in the text at
notes 1072-97 supra), or removal of such officials from office.
1302. E.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE § 6259 (West Supp. 1975); ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.490(1)
(1974). See also Model FOIA, supra note ll69, § 6(B).
1303. WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.250(2) (1974). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ·ANN.
§ 24.223(1) (Supp. 1974). The federal act contains a somewhat analogous provision
that states that "[e]xcept to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice
of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or
be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal Register
and not so published." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l) (1970). There is a similar provision in 5
U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. Feb. 1975). These provisions are more limited than the
Washington act, in that they refer only to two categories of public records (those
defined in 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(l) and (2)). Further, they require only "actual notice,"
rather than full compliance with the statute in making the information available.
1304. See text at notes 1392-415 infra.
1305, These statutes have been given a variety of names, including "right-to-know"
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common-law right to attend meetings of government agencies,1800 all
but a few states have enacted relatively comprehensive statutes providing such a right,1807 and Congress is currently considering proposals for a comprehensive federal open-meeting act.1308
laws and "sunshine" laws. Some open-meeting laws are incorporated along with state
open-records laws in comprehensive "freedom of information" acts, See, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2801 to -2807 (1968); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2,1-340 to -346 (1973), as
amended, (Supp. 1974). See generally Annot., 38 A.L.R. 3d 1071 (1971).
1306. See Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Akron, 3 Ohio St. 2d 191, 198,
209 N.E.2d 399, 404 (1965); City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 S.2d 38, 40 (Fla. 1971);
Reeves v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 281 S.2d 719, 723 (La. 1973) (Summers, J., con•
curring); H. CRoss, supra note 1168, at 180-82; Comment, open Meetings in Virginia:
Fortifying the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 261, 262
(1974).
It has been suggested that there may be a first amendment right to attend such
meetings, but the courts have not accepted this argument. See Note, Open Meeting
Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right To Know", 75 HARV. L, REv. 1199, 1204
(1962); Comment, Ambiguities in Oregon's Open Meeting Legislation, 53 ORE. L. REv.
339, 341-42 (1974). Cf. Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 654-55, 117
Cal. Rptr. 106, 111-12 (1974), dting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1307. See ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 393-94 (1958); AI.As. STAT. §§ 44,62.310-.312 (1967),
as amended, (Supp. 1974); Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-431 to -431.08 (1974); ARK,
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2801 to -2807 (1968); CAL. GoVT. ConE §§ 11120-31 (West Supp. 1975),
§§ 54950-60 (West 1966), as amended, (West Supp. 1975), 54961 (West Supp. 1975);
Cow. REv. STAT. ANN, §§ 24--6--401 to -402 (1973), 29-9-101 (1973), as amended, 1974
Session Laws ch. 102, § I; CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21 (1969), as amended, (Supp.
1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5109 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (Supp. 1974);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-3301 to -3303 (Supp. 1974); HAWAU REV. STAT. §§ 92-1 to -6
(1968); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-2340 to -2346 (Supp. 1974); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 41-46
(1973); IND. CODE §§ 5-14-1-1 to -6 (1971); IOWA CODE §§ 28A.l-.8 (1971); KAN, STAT.
ANN. §§ 75--4317 to --4320 (Supp. 1974); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.805-.991 (Supp.
1974); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:5 to :8 (West 1965), as amended, (Supp. 1975), § 42:9
(Supp. 1975); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 401-06 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1974);
Mn. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 14 (1971), art. 23, § 8 (Supp. 1974), art. 25, § 5 (1973); MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. 30A, § llA (1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 15.251-.253 (1970); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 471.705 (Supp. 1974); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 610.010-.030 (Cum. Supp. 1973); MoNT.
REv. CODES ANN. §§ 82-3401 to -3403 (1966); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 84-1401 to -1407 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 241.010-.040 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 91-A:l
to :8 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:4-1 to -5 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN,
5-6--23 to -26 (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.l to .7 (1974), as amended, (Supp.
1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page 1969);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 201-02 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REv. STAT, §§ 192,610-.690
(1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 261-69 (1974 Purdon's Pa. Legis. Serv. 480); S.C. Com;
ANN. §§ 1-20 to -20.4 (Supp. 1974); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 1-25-1 to -5 (1974);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8--4401 to --4406 (Supp. 1974); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-17 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 52--4-1 to --4 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN, tit. 1,
§§ 311-14 (1972), as amended, (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-340 to -346 (1973),
as amended, (Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.30.010-.920 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN,
§ 66.77 (1974 West's Wis. Legis. Serv. 332); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-692.10 to .16 (Supp.
1973).
A few states have recently adopted constitutional provisions that may guarantee
a public right of access to meetings of government bodies. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art.
XII, § 3 ("No person shall be denied the right to observe the deliberations of public
bodies ••• except in cases established by law"); MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 9 ("No person
shall be deprived of the right ••• to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or
agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in cases where the demand
of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure''). There has been
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Underlying such legislation is the belief that it is "essential to
the maintenance of a democratic society that public business be
performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens be
advised of and aware of the performance of public officials and the
deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public
policy.''1309 It is hoped that open-meeting laws will increase citizen
participation in government, thereby improving the political
decision-making process:
Every meeting of any board, commission, agency or authority of a
municipality should be a marketplace of ideas, so that the governmental agency may have sufficient input from the citizens who are
going to be affected by the subsequent action of the municipality.
The ordinary taxpayer can no longer be led blindly down the path
of government . . . . Government, more so now than ever before,
should be responsive to the wishes of the public. These wishes could
a tremendous amount of legislative activity on the issue of open meetings in recent
years, See Note, The People's Right To Know in Georgia, IO GA. ST. B.J. 598, 599
(1974). See generally L. Gu:soN, MONEY AND SECRECY (1972); J. Adams, State Open
Meetings Laws: An Overview (July 1974) (published by the Freedom of Information
Foundation); Stein, The Secrets of Local Government, in NoNE OF YouR BUSINESS (N.
Dorsen &: S. Gillus eds. 1974).
For a discussion of attempts to enact an open-meeting law in Mississippi, which
currently bas no such law, see Comment, Open Meetings Laws: An Analysis and a
Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151 (1974). The other states that do not have such laws are
New York, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.
1308. See S, 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); text at notes 1444-98 infra.
1309. Common Cause, An Act Requiring Open Meetings of Public Bodies § I
[hereinafter Common Cause Proposed Act], in Government in the Sunshine Act, Hearings on S. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization, Research, and International
Organizations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
307, at 307 (1974) [hereinafter Open-Meeting Hearings]. See Comment, The Iowa Open
Meetings Act: A Right Without a Remedy?, 58 IowA i... REv. 210 (1972); Comment,
supra note 1210, at 1655. See also Reeves v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 281 S.2d 719,
723 (La. 1973) (Summers, J., concurring).
In an early case interpreting the Florida sunshine law, the Florida supreme court
demonstrated that the courts recognized the importance of this policy. Thus, the court
said:
The right of the public to be present and to be heard during all phases of enactments by boards and commissions is a source of strength in our country. During
past years tendencies toward secrecy in public affairs have been the subject of ex.tensive criticism•••. One purpose of the Sunshine Law was to maintain the faith
of the public in governmental agencies. Regardless of their good intentions, these
specified boards and commissions, through devious ways, should not be allowed to
deprive the public of this inalienable right to be present and to be heard at all
deliberations wherein decisions affecting the public are being made.
Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 S.2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969).
A number of cases imply that the right of access may include a right to participate
in public proceedings. See, e.g., Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 S.2d 473, 475
(Fla. 1974). But see Barnes v. City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 20, 98 A.2d 523, 530
(1953). Such public participation would further many of the policies underlying openmeeting acts. See generally Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public
Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525 (1972); Gellhorn, Public
Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972). Generally, however, open-meeting laws ensure only the right to observe public proceedings.
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never be known in nonpublic meetings, and the governmental agencies would be deprived of the benefit of suggestions and ideas which
may be advanced by the knowledgeable public.
Also, such open meetings instill confidence in government. The
taxpayer deserves an opportunity to express his views and have them
considered in the decision-making process.1310
Although the benefits of open meetings are generally recognized,
it has been argued that it may be undesirable to require that they
be held.1311 Some have suggested that opening the preliminary stages
of the decision-making process to public scrutiny will impair the
entire process because the free exchange of ideas among public officials may be curtailed.1312 Similarly, the achievement of necessary
compromise may be frustrated if officials, having expressed what
were intended as preliminary positions, are thereafter inhibited from
modifying them.1313 As one commentator has suggested, the "value
competing against a 'right to know' ... is not a 'right to secrecy,'
but an assurance of some_ insulation from the intense heat of public
pressure.''1314 Finally, it can be argued that discussion of certain matters in public meetings may so adversely affect other recognized
interests (for example, personal privacy) that the public interest in
access should yield.1 315
The implementation of the open-meeting principle at the state
level has produced considerable variation in approach. This section
of the Project will examine and compare the experience of a number
of states under differing statutory schemes and conclude with an
assessment of the proposed federal act.

I. State Open-Meeting Laws
A comprehensive open-meeting law should include: (1) a description of both the government bodies that are subject to the act's
provisions and the "meetings" of such bodies or their members that
must be open; (2) a list of the specific subjects that may be discussed
1310. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 S.2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1974).
13ll. See Open-Meeting Hearings, supra note 1309, at 205-06; Note, supra note
1306, at 1202-03.
1312. See Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 28 Ohio App. 2d 95, 98, 274
N.E.2d 766, 768 (Ct. App. 1971) ("Freedom of discussion and the exchange of ideas is
essential to an understanding of a problem. It cannot be satisfactorily accomplished
under a spotlight or before a microphone."); Open-Meeting Hearings, supra note 1309,
at 205-06; Note, supra note 1306, at 1202-03. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
705 (1974); Perritt &: Wilkinson, Open Advisory Committees and the Political Process:
The Federal Advisory Committee Act After Two Years, 63 GEO, L.J. 725, 740 (1975).
1313. Note, supra note 1306, at 1202-03. There is also a danger that those involved
in open discussions will be pressured either to reject reasonable positions offered by
other participants or to decline to advance unpopular recommendations.
1314. Wickham, Let the Sunshine In!, 68 Nw. U. L. REv. 480, 481 (1973).
1315. See text at notes 1362-82 infra.
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in closed (executive) session; (3) procedures for citizen enforcement;
(4) steps to be taken after a meeting has been held in violation of
the act; and (5) sanctions to be applied to individuals who participate in meetings that fail to conform to the act's requirements.1816
a. General coverage provisions. State open-meeting laws contain
various definitions of the government bodies that are subject to their
requirements. Many of these laws simply provide that they apply
to all boards, agencies, commissions, and similar governmental
groups.1317 A number of other statutes use a "public funds" test,
whereby any government body "supported in whole or in part by
or expending public funds" is required to hold open meetings.1818
The remaining statutes contain coverage provisions that are generally phrased in terms of the method by which the government
bodies were created and/ or the purposes that such bodies were intended to serve.1819
1316. In addition, comprehensive acts should also require that adequate public notice be given before all meetings, open or closed, and that transcripts of such meetings be prepared, maintained, and to the extent mandated by the state's open-records
act, open to public scrutiny. Provisions requiring notice have been widely enacted.
See, e.g., CAL. Govr. CODE § 11125 (West Supp. 1974); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, § 42.02
(1973); IowA CODE § 28A.4 (1971); M:Ass. ANN. LAws ch. 30A, § HA (1973); MicH.
CoMP. LAws § 15.253 (1970); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1402 (Cum. Supp. 1974); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 91-A:2 (Supp. 1973); ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.640 (1974); TEX. REv. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 3A (Supp. 1974); WASH. R.Ev. CODE §§ 42.30.070, .080 (1974).
See also Common Cause Proposed Act, supra note 1309, § 6. Provisions requiring the
preparation of transcripts include GA. CoDE ANN. § 40-330l(b) (Supp. 1974); IowA
CODE§ 28A.5 (1971); VA. CoDE ANN. § 2.1-343 (Supp. 1974).
1317. See, e.g., CoLo. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 24-6-402(1) (1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-21 (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5109 (1974); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 286.011(1) (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3301 (Supp. 1974); IND.
CODE § 5-14-1-2 (1971); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402 (1964); NEV. R.Ev. STAT.
§ 241.020 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:l(III) (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 5-6-23(B) (Supp. 1974); OHIO R.Ev. CoDE ANN. § 121.22 (Page 1969); TEX. R.Ev. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(a) (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-2 (1970); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312(a) (Supp. 1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.77(2)(c), (3) (1974 West's
Wis. Leg. Serv. 332).
1318. See, e.g., ALAs. STAT. § 44.62.3IO(a) (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1974); Aruz.
R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 38-431(1) (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2803 (1968); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-4318 (Supp. 1974); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:5 (West 1965); MoNT. R.Ev. CoDES ANN.
§ 82-3402 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-20.1 (Supp.
1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.l-34l(a) (1973).
1319. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 393 (1958); CAL. Govr. CODE § 11121 (West Supp.
1974); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 92-1(1) (1968); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (1973); M:Ass.
ANN. LAws ch. 30A, § llA (1973); MICH. COMP. LAws § 15.251 (1970); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 471.705 (Supp. 1974); Mo. R.Ev. STAT. § 610.010(2) (Cum. Supp. 1973); NEB.
R.Ev. STAT. § 84-1401 (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-2 (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-318.2 (1974); ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.610 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 261
(1974 Purdon's Pa. Legis. Serv. 480); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 1-25-1 (1974); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Supp. 1974); WAsH. R.Ev. CODE §§ 42.30.020(1), (2) (1974); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 9-692.ll(a)(2) (Supp. 1973). It should be noted that some states have
limited the coverage of their acts to multi-member agencies, similar to the coverage
of the proposed federal act. See, e.g., CAL. Govr. CODE § 11121 (West Supp. 1975); Mo.
R.Ev. STAT. § 610.010(2) (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-2 (Supp. 1974); ORE. R.Ev.
STAT. § 192.610(3) (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Supp. 1974).
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Although the ultimate scope of an open-meeting law may depend
upon the type of definitional provision it contains,1320 it would be
inconsistent with the basic policy behind open-meeting legislation to
apply such a provision restrictively. Legislatures have often expressed
their desire that open-meeting acts be liberally construed,1321 and
although the question whether particular bodies are within the
scope of a particular open-meeting act is not often litigated,1822
courts have shmvn a general willingness to construe such statutes
to effectuate the intent of the legislature that the performance of
public business be open to public scrutiny.1823
The more important and difficult problem in interpreting the
scope of an open-meeting act is to determine which gatherings of
members of included government bodies must be open to the
Common Cause has taken an eclectic approach to the definitional problem in its
proposed act:
"Public body" means any administrative, advisory, executive, or legislative body of
the state or local political subdivision of the state, or any other entity created by
law, that expends or disburses or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue
or that advises or makes recommendations to any entity that expends or disburses
or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue, including but not limited to
any board, commission, committee, subcommittee, or other subsidiary thereof.
Common Cause Proposed Act, supra note 1309, § 2(b).
1320. Note, supra note 1306, at 1205. Thus, the application of a "public funds"
test could result in the exclusion of certain advisory groups. For example, in Town of
Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 S.2d 473 (Fla. 1974), the court held that advisory groups
were within the scope of the Florida sunshine law. If that law had contained a "pub•
lic funds" test, the advisory groups would probably not have been required to conduct
open meetings.
1321. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 5-14.-1-1 (1971); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 82-3401
(1966); WASH. R.Ev. CoDE § 42.30.910 (1974). See also Common Cause Proposed Act,
supra note 1309, § I; 36 OP. ORE. ATIY. GEN. 543, 544 (1973). Cf. Arut. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2802 (1968); CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ lll20 (West Supp. 1975), 54950 (West 1966);
!LL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 102, § 41 (1973); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 401 (1964); NEV,
R.Ev. STAT. § 241.010 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4.-1 {Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143-318.l (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52--4--1 (1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.77(1) (1974
West's Wis. Legis. Scrv. 332).
1322. Most questions of coverage deal with problems of advisory bodies or sub•
groups of agencies. See, e.g., McLarty v. :Board of Regents, 231 Ga. 22, 200 S.E,2d 117
(1973). See text at notes 1348-61 infra. Those courts that have considered whether
specific government bodies are within the purview of an open-meeting act generally
have dismissed the contention that a particular body is not included with little dis•
cussion. See, e.g., Selkowe v. :Bean, 109 N.H. 247, 248, 249 A.2d 35, 36 (1968).
1323. For example, in Raton Pub. Serv. Co. v. Hobbes, 76 N.M. 535, 417 P.2d 32
(1966), the court held that a city-owned electric utility company must meet the re•
quirements of the state's open-meeting act, stating:
To conclude that the legislature was thinking specifically of bodies such as ap•
pellant when it used the language it did would accord to them more reason and
foresight than could be supported by the facts. However, the language used, being
broad enough to include appellant, we perceive it as our duty to uphold the act
and its application to appellant. The legislature, in its wisdom, having passed
§ !H>--17, N.M.S.A. 1953, and appellant being within its broad terms, we arc impressed that there is no reason to attempt to excuse it from the operation of the
act.
76 N.M. at 543, 417 P.2d at 37. Cf. Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S,W.2d 753
(1968).
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public. There is a wide spectrum of gatherings that can be considered
"meetings," ranging from formal convocations of an entire agency
membership to informal conversations between two agency members.1324 Since open-meeting acts are aimed at permitting the public
to know about and contribute to deliberations that lead to government action, a requirement that meetings be open only when final action is to be taken would be inadequate.1325 Nevertheless, while mere
administrative inconvenience is not sufficient to outweigh the public
interest in open government,1326 a requirement that all gatherings
at which public business may be discussed be open (and preceded by
notice) would unnecessarily interfere with the lives of public officials and impair governmental efficiency.1827
Florida's experience under a statute that speaks only of "meetings
... at which official acts are to be taken" 1328 demonstrates the problems that arise when an open-meeting law does not specifically delimit its scope.1329 In Florida, the courts and the attorney general
have had to make essentially legislative judgments about which
gatherings constitute "meetings."
The Florida courts have recognized that the policy underlying
the Florida sunshine law requires that the whole decision-making
process be as open as possible;1330 thus, they have construed expansively the phrase "meetings at which official acts are taken." One
Florida court has stated:
1324. See Reeves v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 281 S.2d 719, 721 (La. 1973) ("The
key to the problem is the meaning of the word 'meetings' as used in the quoted statutes. A meeting may be simply a coming together or a gathering for business, social
or other purposes''); Comment, supra note 1210, at 1655.
1325. As was stated in the early case of Acord v. Booth, 33 Utah 279, 284, 93 P.
734, 735-36 (1908): "The purpose [of allowing public access] was not that the public
might know how the vote stood, but the purpose evidently was that the public might
know what the councilmen thought about the matters • • • • Moreover, the public
have the right to know just what public business is being considered, and by whom
and to what extent ••••"
1326. See Sullivan v. Credit River Township, - Minn. - , - , 217 N.W.2d 502,
506-07 (1974).
1327. See Reeves v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 281 S.2d 719, 721 (La. 1973), in which
the court refused to proscribe preliminary discussions between members of the board
on matters "which do not require official board action" because it was "satisfied [that]
the statutes intend[ed] no such crippling limitation." The court did, however, prohibit
informal conference sessions by the board. See also Comment, supra note 1210, at 1651.
1328. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(1) (Supp. 1974).
1329. See generally Kalil, Florida Sunshine Law: Is Florida Sunshine the Most
Powerful of Disinfectants?, 49 FLA. B.J. 72 (1975).
1330. See Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 S.2d 470, 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969). Other states have similarly interpreted their sunshine laws. See, e.g., Letter from
Israel Packel, Pennsylvania Attorney General, to Governor Milton Shapp, September
12, 1974, at I [hereinafter Packel Letter]; Local 92, Am. Newspaper Guild v. Board of
Supervisors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 47, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1968) ("Recognition of
deliberation and action as dual components of the collective decision-making process
brings awareness that the meeting concept cannot be split off and confined to one
component only, but rather comprehends both and either''),
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Every thought, as well as every affirmative act, of a public official as
it relates to and is within the scope of his official duties, is a matter
of public concern; and it is the entire decision-making process that
the legislature intended to affect by the enactment of the statute
before us .... Every step in the decision-making process, including
the decision itself, is a necessary preliminary to formal action. It
follows that each step constitutes an "official act," an indispensable
requisite to "formal action," ·within the meaning of the act.1831
Additionally, the Florida supreme court, holding that a city council
could not conduct closed meetings even for the purposes of discussion,
has said: "It is the law's intent that any meeting relating to any
matter on which foreseeable action will be taken, occur openly and
publicly. In this area of regulating, the statute may push beyond
debatable limits in order to block evasive techniques. An informal
conference or caucus of any two or more members permits crystallization of secret decisions to a point just short of ceremonial
acceptance."1832
In 1971, the Florida Attorney General cons!dered whether telephone conversations between two members of a board or commission
were subject to the sunshine law.1388 Relying on the liberal construction given the law by the courts, he concluded that such "con•
versations between public officials on aspects of the public's business
are part of the process which ultimately leads up to a final recorded
action in a formal public meeting" and that the public may not
be deliberately excluded from these "meetings."1834 He refused,
however, to require that public officials provide advance notice before engaging in such discussions.1885 Applying what he labeled the
"rule of reason," he stated that "[t]o force public officials to give
a period of notice to the press and public before making individual
telephone calls or engaging in informal conversation with other
members of the board or commission would slow the free and healthy
conduct of the public's business to a standstill and thwart the interchange of ideas among public officials."1836 His opinion effectively
excludes these discussions from public scrutiny.
The next year, in Bassett v. Braddock,1881 the Florida supreme
court held that preliminary labor negotiations may be conducted
in private. The court observed:
Every action emanates from thoughts and creations of the mind and
1331. Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 S.2d 470, 473 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
1332, City of Miami :Beach v. :Berns, 245 S.2d 38, 41 (1970).
1333. Op. Fla. Atty. Gen. No. 071-32 (March 3, 1971).
1334. Id. at 7.
1335. Id. at 8.
1336. Id.
1337. 262 S.2d 425 (1972).
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exchanges with others. These are perhaps "deliberations" in a sense
but hardly demanded to be brought forward in the spoken word at
a public meeting. To carry such matters to an extreme approaches
the ridiculous; it would defeat any meaningful and productive
process of government. One must maintain perspective on a broad
provision such as this legislative enactment, in its application to the
actual workings of an active Board fraught with many and varied
problems and demands.1338
Thus, in the absence of clear legislative guidelines, both the courts
and the Attorney General in Florida have had to recognize, on a
case-by-case basis, that there are practical considerations that dictate
limitations upon the fundamental policy of openness.
The states have variously defined the stage in the decision-making
process at which their open-meeting requirements become operative.
Many states simply include "all meetings."1339 A number of other
states use language similar to that of the Florida act-"all meetings
at which official acts are to be taken." 1340. Still other states have
statutes that cover all meetings, "formal or. informal" and/or
"special or regular."1841 The danger inherent in such vague defi- ,
nitions is that some courts may be reluctant to construe them as
broadly as have the Florida courts. Where open-meeting statutes
are restrictively interpreted to cover only meetings at which final
approval is given to public measures,1342 their fundamental policy
1338. 262 S.2d at 428.
1339. See, e.g., AI.As. STAT. § 44.62.310(a) (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1974); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 92-2 (1968); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (1973); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:5 (West 1965); l\IAss. ANN. LAws ch. 30A, § llA (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705(1)
(Supp. 1974); NEV. REv. STAT. § 241.020 (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (1960);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 201 (Supp.
1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-2 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. l, § 312(a) (Supp. 1974).
1340. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(1) (Supp. 1974). Similar provisions include GA.
CODE ANN. § 40-330l(a) (Supp. 1974); MICH. COMP. LAws § 15.251(2) (1970) (defining
"public meeting" as that part of a meeting during which the body votes); MoNT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 82-3402 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-2 to -3 (Supp. 1974) (meetings at
which a vote is taken); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 261-62 (1974 Purdon's Legis. Serv.
480) (meetings at which there is voting or setting of official policy); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 692.ll(a)(l) (Supp. 1973) (meetings at which collective commitments or promises to
make a positive or negative decision are made). The Washington statute states that
official "action" includes but is not limited to collective decisions, commitments, and
votes. WASH. REv. CODE§ 42.30.020(3) (1974). Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5109 (1974);
IND. CODE § 5-14-1-2(2) (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:l (Supp. 1973); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2 (1974).
1341. See ARK. STAT. _ANN. § 12-2805 (1968); Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.010(3) (Cum.
Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § l-20.3(a) (Supp. 1975). See also IowA CoDE § 28A.l
(1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 14 (1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.l-34l(a) (1973).
1342. See Turk v. Richard, 47 S.2d 543 (Fla. 1950) (interpreting the old Florida
open-meeting law). See also Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 770-71, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 805, 810 (1960). But see Local 92, Am. Newspaper Guild v. Board of Supervisors,
263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 487 (1968), in which, in interpreting the "all
meetings" language of the California local government open-meeting act, the court held:
"As operative criteria, formality and informality are alien to the law's design, expos•
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of allowing the public to participate during all stages of the decisionmaking process can easily be subverted.1348
States that have decided not to restrict the scope of their
statutes to meetings at which final action is taken have had to
consider how best to resolve the conflict between the principle of
open government and the need to ensure the efficient functioning
of government. Some states, choosing to further the ideal of citizen
participation, require that any gathering to discuss or formulate
public policy be open to the public.1844 Other states, more concerned
with the problems of efficiency, require only that "official" or "con•
vened" meetings be open,1845 or specifically exclude social or chance
gatherings.1846 Finally, a number of states have "compromised" by
restricting the applicability of their open-meeting laws to meetings at
which a quorum is present1847 on the theory that, since no binding
ing it to the very evasions which it was designed to prevent. Construed in light of the
[statute's] objectives, the term "meeting" extends to informal sessions or conferences
of the board members designed for the discussion of public business."
1343. See Grogan v. De Sapio, 15 N.J. Super. 604, 83 A.2d 809 (L, Div. 1951); Cul•
lum v. Board of Educ., 15 N.J. 285, 104 A.2d 641 (1954); Detroit Free Press, Aug. 30,
1974, § C, at 6, col. 3 (metro ed.) (suggesting that "[t]he most common method of
evading the [Michigan open-meeting law] is for public bodies ••• to go into private
executive sessions to make their decisions and then cast perfunctory votes in public'),
See also Comment, supra note 1210, at 1651; 49 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 764, 769-70 (1971),
1344. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-6-402(2) (1973); KY. R.Ev. STAT, § 61.805
(1) (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-6-23(C) (Supp. 1974); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 192,610
(1974); TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § I (Supp. 1974). See also Common
Cause Proposed Act, supra note 1309, § 2(a),
1345. See, e.g., .Aroz. R.Ev. STAT. § 38---431.0l(A) (1974); IND. CODE § 5-14-1-2 (1971);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1401 (Cum. Supp. 1974); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 1-25-1 (1974);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Supp. 1974). Limitations such as these may result in the
elimination of uncertainty if they are interpreted to exclude all but the final steps of
the decision-making process from the open-meeting requirements. Cf. Comment, 53
ORE. L. REv. 349, supra note 1306, at 349. However, the result would thus be identical
to that achieved in states where the term "meeting" itself is read restrictively to include only meetings at which final action is taken. See text at notes 60-61 supra. Cf.
text at notes 1348-50 infra. But see Wis. STAT. ANN, § 66.77(2)(b) (1974 West's Wis.
Legis. Serv. 332), which defines "meeting" as "the convening of a governmental body
in a session such that the body is vested with authority, power, duties, or responsibil·
ities not vested in the individual members." While the term "convening" might be a
limitation, the remainder of the definition implies that it will be given considerable
scope.
1346. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN, § 8-4402 (Supp,
1974): VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-34l(a) (1973); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.77(2)(b) (1974 West's
Wis. Legis. Serv. 332).
1347. See, e.g., .Aiuz. R.Ev. STAT. § 38---431(2) (1974): CAL. GOVT. CoDE § 54952,8
(West Supp. 1975); KY. R.Ev. STAT. § 61.805.3 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT, ANN. §§ 5-6-23(13),
(C) (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2 (1974); ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.630 (1974);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Supp. 1974): TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. ANN, art. 6252-17, § I
(Supp. 1974). See also Common Cause Proposed Act, supra note 1309, § 2(a), At least one
state supreme court, see Reeves v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 281 S.2d 719, 721·22 (La,
1973) (dictum), and one state attorney general, see Packel Letter, supra note 1330, at
5, have interpreted "all meetings" to mean that a quorum must be present, Even in
Florida, where the courts have accepted no definite limitations on the scope of the
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decisions can be reached absent a quorum, the public will still have
an opportunity to observe the agency's final action.1848 Unfortunately, this last group of states may be seriously undermining the
policy of open government: Meaningful citizen input into the
decision-making process requires that public observation be allowed
during the early stages of deliberation,18 49 especially in situations
where the recommendations of a less-than-quorum-sized group1850
may be approved by the agency membership with only perfunctory
consideration.
State experience in dealing with the question whether-and, if
so, how-advisory committees should be treated under an openmeeting act illustrates some of the most significant issues involved
in defining the scope of a coverage provision.1851 The Georgia supreme court, holding that a university student-activity fund committee was not covered by the Georgia sunshine law, stressed the
group's inability to take binding action:
What the law seeks to eliminate are closed meetings which engender
in the people a distrust of its officials who are clothed with the power
to act in their name. It declares that the people, who possess ultimate
sovereignty under our form of government, are entitled to observe
the actions of those described bodies when exercising the power
delegated to them to act on behalf of the people in the name of
sunshine law, the attorney general has apparently recognized the certainty that such
a "quorum limit" would afford. Op. Fla. Atty. Gen. No. 071-32, at IO (March 3, 1971).
1348. 32 OP. CAL. ATrY. GEN. 240, 242 (1958).
1349. See Note, supra note 1306, at 1205-06.
1350. For the purposes of this discussion a "less-than-quorum-sized group" should
be distinguished from a formally constituted agency subunit that would itself be considered a separate government entity. A number of state open-meeting statutes apply
by their terms to the meetings of "subsidiary bodies," "subordinate units," or committees and subcommittees. E.g., AI.As. STAT. § 44.62.310(a) (Supp. 1974); ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 102, § 42 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318 (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705
(1) (Supp. 1974); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 84-1401 (Cum. Supp. 1974). Since several statutes
that have similar provisions also have "quorum-limit" rules, e.g., KY. R.Ev. STAT.
§§ 61.805(2), .810 (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.2, .3 (1974); ORE. R.Ev. STAT.
§§ 192,610(2), .630(2) (1974), such provisions refer only to formally constituted subunits.
The Wisconsin Act specifically so limits its provision for subgroups. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 66.77(2)(c) (1974 West's Wis. Legis. Serv. 332).
1351. "Advisory groups" may serve many different functions and may assume various forms. Thus, the Georgia supreme court, in McLarty v. Board of Regents, 231 Ga.
22, 22-23, 200 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1973), described them as "the innumerable groups which
are organized and meet for the purpose of collecting information, making recommendations, and rendering advice but which have no authority to make governmental decisions and act for the State." Recoguizing the potential inclusiveness of the term,
the Oregon attorney general stated:
The law also applies to any formal or informal advisory group or body appointed
by a state or local governmental agency or official which also operates as a deliberative body. The test of whether an advisory group is covered by the laws is
whether the group is deliberative in the sense that votes are taken and there is
normally a quorum ~equirement. Consequently the law does not apply to internal agency staff meetmgs ••••
36 OP. ORE. ATrY. GEN. 543, 545 (1973).
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the State. There is no such compelling reason to require public
meetings of advisory groups. They can take no official action.1352
This emphasis on the type of action taken, however, ignores the
fundamental objective of opening the preliminary steps in the govemment's decision-making process to public scrutiny.ma Although
the student and faculty members of this committee were not "public
officials," their recommendations arguably constituted the most significant stage of the budgetary process. Moreover, the premise that
closing the committee's meetings would not engender distrust of
government does not appear to be well-founded. Public distrust can
result whether or not the closed meeting was convened to take
"official action." 1354
Unlike Georgia, most of the states that have considered the issue
have included advisory committees within the scope of their openmeeting acts-some by explicit legislation1355 and others by judicial
or attorney general interpretation. In Florida, for example, the
state supreme court, reasoning that advisory committee meetings fell
within the sunshine law's provision for "the collective inquiry and
discussion stages" of agency business, held that "any committee
established by the Town Council to act in any type of advisory
capacity would be subject to the provisions of [that] law."18G0 Simi1352. Mel.arty v. Board of Regents, 231 Ga. 22, 23, 200 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1973).
1353. The Georgia sunshine law requires "[a]ll meetings of any State department,
agency, board, bureau, commission or political subdivision ••• at which official actions
are to be taken" to be open to the public. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-330l(a) (Supp. 1974).
Although the term "official actions" is ambiguous and could be read to exclude meet•
ings at which no formal action is taken, such a reading seems inconsistent not only
with the policies generally underlying open-meeting laws, see text at notes 1309-10
supra, but also with the intent of the Georgia legislature, which "substantially copied"
the Florida act. See Note, supra note 1307, at 601-03.
1354. Cf. text at note 1434 infra.
1355. See, e.g., .AI.As. STAT. § 44.62.310(a) (Supp. 1974); !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, § 42
(1973); KY. REv. STAT. § 61.805(2) (Supp. 1974); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1401 (Cum. Supp.
1974); ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.610 (1974): TENN. CoDE ANN. § !Hl402 (Supp. 1974). In
California, the original local government open-meeting act, the Brown Act, was in•
terpreted as excluding advisory groups. See Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal. App. 2d
763, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1960). In response, the legislature amended the act to include
such committees. See CAL. GoVT. CODE § 54952.3 (West Supp. 1975); 42 OP. CAL. Anv.
GEN. 61, 64-65 (1963). Although the recently enacted state government open-meeting
act, CAL. GoVT. CoDE §§ 11120-31 (West Supp. 1975), does not include such a provision,
the two acts parallel each other in most respects.
1356. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 S.2d 473, 476-77 (1974) (emphasis
added). With regard to advisory groups, the Florida Attorney General had originally
taken the position that such groups are "not of the type commonly thought of as
'governmental' and thus [are] not within the purview of the 'Government in the Sun•
shine' Law." Op. Fla. Atty. Gen. No. 071-380 at 2 (Dec. 3, 1971). In an opinion issued about 18 months later, however, the Attorney General reconsidered his initial
position. In Op. Fla. Atty. Gen. No. 073-159 (May 10, 1973), he analyzed the status of
these groups less in terms of technical form and more in terms of whether open meet•
ings at the advisory level would effectively serve the public interest. He found that,
because of its expertise, the planning commission in question would play a very "slg•
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Iarly, the Pennsylvania Attorney General has interpreted that state's
act to extend to advisory comm.ittees.1357 He emphasized that "[t]he
Legislature intended the full decision-making process . . . to be
revealed to public scrutiny and this intent may not be subverted by
delegating authority to a group claimed to be beyond the scope of
the Act." 1368
It is unfortunate that states such as California1359 and Pennsylvania,1360 which require advisory committees to conduct public meetings, permit "less-than-quorum-sized" groups to conduct closed
sessions. The policies underlying open-meeting acts require that both
types of groups be included in order to open the entire decisionmaking process to public scrutiny.1361
b. Exemptions. The second major provision that a comprehensive
act should include is a specific list of exemptions: particular substantive matters that the legislature, after carefully balancing the
countervailing public interests, determines may be discussed in
closed session.1362 Any agency dealing with an exempt matter should be
able to discuss it in executive session.1363 However, when discussing
nificant role'' in the decision-making process and that other bodies would "necessarily
rely heavily" on its recommendations. Id. at 3. He therefore concluded "that the pro•
ceedings at the planning commission level [would] provide the best opportunity for
both public input and public information," and that such meetings should be open
to the public. Id. See also Op. Fla. Atty. Gen. No. 073-223 Gune 20, 1973). In Gradison,
the Florida court arguably went even further than the Attorney General by eliminating
the necessity of examining the weight that will be given to the advice of a partirular advisory group. But see Op. Fla. Atty. Gen. No. 074-267 at 1 (Sept. 5, 1974), in
which the Attorney General still found it necessary to make such an examination.

1357. See Packel Letter, supra note 1330, at 1-2:
[l]f a body which is formally organized by statute, exerutive order, administrative
directive or regulation, is delegated a function, even though wholly advisory, its
meetings are also subject to the Act. The collective decisions of advisory boards,
commissions and committees often provide the foundation upon which ultimate
decisions are made, and the fact that a partirular advisory group cannot bind its
parent agency does not exempt the former from the Sunshine Law.
1358. Id. at I. See also Op. Fla. Atty. Gen. No. 074-84 at 5 (March 25, 1974).
1359. See note 1355 supra. The same section of the Brown Act that expressly includes meetings of advisory groups, expressly excludes meetings of groups composed
solely of members of a governing body when such a group numbers less than a
quorum. See CAL. Govr. CoDE § 54952.3 (West Supp. 1975).
1360. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 261-62 (1974 Purdon's Legis. Serv. 480-81).
1361. Those states that impose a "quorum-limit" apparently do so in recognition
of the fact that this is almost the only manageable (and meaningful) standard that
does not prohibit all interaction among public officials. These states have apparently
concluded that a standard that affords some certainty to the application of the law,
even at the risk of evasion by some public officials, is superior to a law that has .no
real standards at all. For an attempt to create an alternative standard see Op. Fla.
Atty. Gen. No. 071-32 (March 3, 1971).
1362. The considerations involved in determining whether partirular matters should
be exempted or not are essentially the same as those considered with regard to openrecords laws. See text at notes 1207-40 supra.
1363. See Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 405-06, 432 S.W.2d 753, 755-56 (1968).
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all other matters, agencies covered by the statute should be required
to meet in public.1364
Where the legislature either fails to enumerate exempt substantive matters or unclearly defines the scope of a particular exemption,
the courts, the attorney general, and the agencies themselves may
face difficult interpretative questions with little more than a general
policy of openness to guide them. In Florida, the courts have generally interpreted their act quite broadly1360 and have been reluctant
to read exemptions into a statute that recognizes no exemptions
"except as otherwise provided in the constitution .... .''1866 In Times
Publishing Co. v. Williams, 1867 however, an intermediate Florida
court recognized a limited exemption for consultations between an
agency and its attorney regarding pending litigation.1308 While such
1364. A distinction should be drawn between provisions that exempt matters from
the operation of a sunshine law and provisions that exclude matters from the scope
of such an act. The former provisions allow agencies that otherwise have to hold open
meetings to conduct executive sessions when specified subject matters are to be discussed. The latter provisions allow specified government bodies to conduct executive
sessions regardless of the subject matter to be discussed. One common exclusion covers
judicial bodies (including juries) and quasi-judicial proceedings. See AI.As. STAT. §§ 44,•
62.310(d)(l), (2) (1973); ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 38-431.08 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2803,
-2805 (1968); CAL. Govr. CODE § 11121 (West Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-1(1)
(1968); ILL. REY. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (1973); IOWA CODE § 28A.6 (1971); KY, REV, STAT,
§ 61.810(4) (Supp. 1974); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 30A, § llA (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN,
§ 471.705(1) (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-4 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT, ANN,
§ 5--6-23(E) (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT, §§ 143-318.4(6), (8) (1974); ORE. REv. STAT,
§ 192.690 (1974); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(d) (Supp. 1974); VT, STAT,
ANN. tit. 1, § 312 (Supp. 1974); VA. CoDE ANN. § 2.1-345(6) (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv,
CODE § 42.30.20(l)(a) (1974); Wis. STAT, ANN. § 66.77(4) (1974 West's Wis. Legis. Serv,
332). Many states also exclude parole and pardon boards. See ALAS. STAT. § 44.62.310
(d) (Supp. 1974); CAL. Govr. CoDE § 11126 (West Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3302
(b) (Supp. 1974); !LL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 42(b) (1973); KY, REv, STAT. § 61,810(1)
(Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705(1) (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-4
(Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.4(3), (4) (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1974);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page 1969); ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.690 (1974); S.C.
CODE ANN. § l-20.3(c)(2) (Supp. 1974); True, REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(p)
(Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-345(6) (Supp. 1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.'77(4)(c)
(1974 West's Wis. Legis. Serv. 332). A number of states exclude other specific agencies
from their act's coverage. See, e.g., CAL. Govr. CODE § 11126 (West Supp. 1975) (Alcoholic :Beverage Appeals :Bd., Franchise Tax :Bd.); !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (1973)
(Commerce Commn.); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 30A, § UA (1973) (:Board of Bank Incorpo•
ration, General Insurance Guaranty Fund, Small Loans Regulatory :Bd., State Tax
Commn.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.4(2), .5(a) (1974) (:Board of Awards, Advisory Budget Commn.); S.C. CoDE ANN. § l-20.3(c)(2) (Supp. 1974) (State Election Commn.).
Although these exclusions are the result of a legislative balancing process similar
to that involved in providing exemptions, and, although the excluded bodies or proceedings usually deal with a particular substantive matter that the legislature seeks
to exempt, it is probably more appropriate to include exclusions as part of the general coverage provision and to segregate the substantive exemptions,
1365. See, e.g., :Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 S.2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969).
1366. See, e.g., City of Miami :Beach v. :Berns, 245 S.2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1970), construing
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(1) (Supp. 1974).
1367. 222 S.2d 470, 476 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
1368. See also Local 92, Am. Newspaper Guild v. :Board of Supervisors, 263 Ca].
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an exemption seems clearly reasonable in light of the state's interest
in litigating on equal terms with other parties,1369 the language of
the Florida act required the court to find a constitutional basis for
the exemption. Accordingly, it found that an attorney has a duty
of confidentiality that derives from canons of ethics promulgated
under state constitutional authority1370 and that the legislature,
"fully aware of its constitutional limitations ... did not intend,"
by enacting the open-meeting law, to transgress this obligation.~371
Similarly, in Bassett v. Braddock,1312 the Florida supreme court, in
order to exempt public employee collective bargaining from the
open-meeting law, was forced to interpret the state constitutional
provision concerning employee bargaining1373 to so provide.1374
Whatever the merits of these exemptions, and notwithstanding the
courts' strained attempts to impute the exemptions to the intent of
the legislature,1375 it is clear that they are the product of "judicial
legislation.'' 1376 It would seem to be in the long-run interest of the
public to deter judicial tampering with the legislative mandate of
openness as much as possible. Forcing the courts to carve exemptions
may ultimately undermine the integrity of the law. A legislature
should therefore-without sacrificing the interests of "freedom of
information"--carefully articulate the desired exemptions.
A substantial number of states have attempted to avoid interpretative difficulties by exempting several broad categories of subApp. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968); Society for Protection of N.H. Forests v. Water
Supply &: Pollution Control Com.nm., - N.H. - , 337 A.2d 788 (1975); 36 OP. CAL. ArrY.
GEN. 175 (1960). But see Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968). Cf.
note 1374 infra and accompanying text.
1369. See note 1382 infra (listing states that recognize such an exemption).
1370. 222 S.2d at 475.
1371. 222 S.2d at 476.
1372. 262 S.2d 425 (1972). See also 25 FLA. L. REv. 603 (1973).
1373. FLA. CoNsr. art. I, § 6.
1374. 262 S.2d at 426. The court also held that the school board may not be required to hold its conferences with its own negotiator in public. 262 S.2d at 428.
1375. In Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 231 S.2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970),
the court recognized an exemption from the sunshine law for quasi-judicial adjudications, reasoning that although the legislature could invest agencies with quasi-judicial
authority, only the judicial branch could constitutionally regulate such functions. The
Florida supreme court reversed, 278 S.2d 260 (1973), holding that "[t]he judiciary
should not encroach upon the Legislature's right to require that the activities of the
School Board be conducted in the 'sunshine.'" 278 S.2d at 264. The court observed
that "[v]arious boards and agencies have obviously attempted to read exceptions into
the Government in the Sunshine Law which do not exist.••• If the board or agency
feels aggrieved, then the remedy lies in the halls of the legislature and not in efforts
to circumvent the plain provisions of the statute by devious ways in the hope that
the judiciary will read some exceptions into the law.'' 278 S.2d at 264. See also 57 OP.
CAL. ArrY. GEN. 189 (1974).
1376. See Bassett v. Braddock, 262 S.2d 425, 431 (Fla. 1972) (Adkins, J., dissenting).
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stantive matters,13 77 including matters exempted by other laws,1378
security and law enforcement matters,1379 personal privacy matters,1880
matters concerning internal agency operations,1381 and matters affect1377. Since these exemptions vary greatly among the states, and since an analysis
of them would closely parallel the analysis of the exemptions contained in state openrecords acts, see text at notes 1207-40 supra, their specifics will not be considered here.
1378. See, e.g., AI.As. STAT. § 44.62.310(c)(3) (Supp. 1974); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102,
§ 42 (1973); IOWA CoDE § 28A.l (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7H318 (Supp. 1974); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 403 (1964); MAss. ANN. LAws cb. 30A, § llA (1973); MINN,
STAT. ANN. § 471.705(1) (Supp. 1974); Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.025(5) (Cum. Supp. 1973);
MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 82-3402 (1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1401 (Cum, Supp. 1974);
S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ l-20.3(a), (c), (e) (Supp. 1973); S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN, §§ 1-25-1 to
-2 (1974); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, §§ 2(a), (b), (k) (Supp. 1974); VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.1-343 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312
(Supp. 1974); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.12(a) (Supp. 1973).
The specific language of this exemption varies from state to state and the scope of
its application may differ significantly depending on the exact words used. Compare
Kv. REv. STAT. § 61.810(1) (1974) ("meetings which federal or state law specifically re•
quire to be conducted in privacy"), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-4 (Supp. 1974) ("where
contrary provision is made by law'').
1379. See, e.g., CAL. GoVT. CoDE § 11126 (West Supp. 1975); MASS. ANN, LAws ch.
30A, § llA (1973); MONT, REv. CODES ANN. §§ 82-3402(1), (6) (1966); s.c. CODE ANN,
§ l-20.3(c)(4) (Supp. 1974); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 20) (Supp. 197'1);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 313(a)(!i) (Supp. 1974); WAsH. REV. CODE § 42.30.110 (1974):
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.77(4)(c) (1974 West's Wis. Legis. Serv. 332); WYO. STAT. ANN,
§§ 9-692.14(a)(i), (iv) (Supp. 1973). See also GA. CODE ANN, § 40-3302(c) (Supp. 1974);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.025(3) (Cum. Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4(5) (1974)
(all excluding agencies dealing with law enforcement or security matters); Common
Cause Proposed Act, supra note 1309, § 5(a)(3).
1380. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 393 (1958) ("character or good name of a woman
or man''); Aus. STAT. § 44.62.310(c)(2) (1973) ("subjects that tend to prejudice the .
reputation and cliaracter of any person''); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-3302(e), -3303(b) (Supp,
1973) (meetings of public hospital committees concerning abortions, confidential tax
matters); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (1973) (school board disciplinary hearings, mat•
ters of professional ethics or performance); KY. REv. STAT, § 61.810(6) (Supp. 1974)
(student or employee problems "provided that this exception jg designed to protect
the reputation of individual persons and shall not be interpreted to permit discussion
of general personnel matters in secret''); MAss. ANN. LAws cb, 30A, § llA (1973) (mat·
ters that would "adversely affect ••• the reputation of any person''); Mo. REv. STA1',
§§ 610.025(1), (4) (Cum. Supp. 1973) (illegitimacy and adoption court proceedings,
mental health proceedings, student problems); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:ll(II)(c)
(Supp. 1973) ("matters, which, if discussed in public, would be likely to affect ad•
versely the reputation of any person''); N.C. GEN, STAT. §§ 143-318.3(a)(4), (b) (1974)
(privileged relationships, student disciplinary proceedings); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-20.3
(b)(3) (Supp. 1974) ("private matters presented by individuals or groups of citizens");
S.D. COMP, LAws ANN. § 1-25-2 (1974) (student, employee, and personnel matters);
TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, §§ 2(h), (o) (Supp. 1974) (school disciplinary
hearings, meetings of medical boards considering disability benefit claims); VA. CoD.E
ANN, § 2.l-344(a)(3) (1973) ("protection of privacy of individuals in personal matters
not related to public business''); WASH, REv. CODE § 42.30.140(1) (1974) (occupational
and professional disciplinary proceedings); WIS. STAT. ANN, § 66.77(4)(e) (1974 West's
Wis. Legis. Serv. 332) (financial, social, and other data "which may unduly damage
reputations''); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 692.14(xi) (Supp. 1973) (student disciplinary pro•
ceedings). See also MONT. CoNsr. art. II, § 9 ("except in cases in which the demand
of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure''); Common Cause
Proposed Act, supra note 1309, § 5(a)(l).
1381. Many of these provisions exempt not only matters concerning internal agency
administration, but also matters affecting individual agency personnel. Thus, these
provisions might also have been categorized as privacy exemptions, as was KY, REv.
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ing financial or legal interests of the state.1882 One exemption found
STAT. § 61.810(6) (Supp. 1974), quoted in note 1380 supra. See, e.g., A.rut. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2805 (1968); ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (Supp. 1973); IOWA CODE § 28A.3 (1971);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.025(4) (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(b) (1974); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 201 (Supp. 1974); s.c. CODE ANN. § l-20.3(b)(l) (Supp. 1974); S.D.
Cor.rP. LAws ANN. § 1-25-2 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-344(1) (1973), as amended,
(Supp. 1974).
Other states have similar exemptions but require a public hearing if the person
in question so requests. See, e.g., Aroz. REv. STAT. § 38-431.03(A)(l) (1974); CAL. GoVT.
CODE § 11126 (West Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3302(£) (Supp. 1974); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §§ 82-3402(2), (3) (1966); NEV. REv. STAT. § 241.030 (1973); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 91-A:3(1I)(A) (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-6-23(E) (Supp. 1974);
ORE. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 192.660(a), (b) (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 263 (1974 Purdon's
Pa. Legis. Serv. 481); TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(g) (Supp. 1974); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 313(a)(3), (4) (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv. CODE § 42.30.110 (1974);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.77(4)(b) (1974 West's Wis. Legis. Serv. 332); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-692.14(a)(ii) (Supp. 1973).
1382. See, e.g., AI.As. STAT. § 44.62.310(c)(l) (1973) ("matters, the immediate knowledge of which would clearly have an adverse effect upon the finances of the governmental unit''); Aroz. REv. STAT. §§ 38-431.03(A)(3), (4), (5) (1974) (collective bargaining
issues, consultations with attorneys, international or interstate negotiations); CAL.
GOVT. CODE § 11126 (West Supp. 1975) (site selections for state colleges, investment
decisions regarding retirement funds, sessions relating to salaries and benefits); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-3302(d), -3303(a) (Supp. 1974) (future acquisition of real estate, attorney-client privilege); !LL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (1973) (collective bargaining, acquisition of real property, litigation involving the agency); IowA CoDE § 28A.3 (1971)
(proposed purchase of real estate); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 61.810(2), (3), (5), (7) (Supp. 1974)
(real estate matters when publicity would be likely to affect its value, litigation, collective bargaining negotiations, meetings between agencies and industrial prospects);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § llA {1973) (matters that would "adversely affect ••• the
financial interests of the Commonwealth''); Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.025(2) (Cum. Supp.
1973) (litigation involving the agency, acquisition of real estate if public knowledge
might adversely affect value); MoNT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. § 82-3402(4) (1966) (purchases
and investments that, if made public, would adversely affect financial interests of the
state); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:3(ll)(d) (Supp. 1973) (dealings in real estate
"which, if discussed in public, would be likely to benefit a party, or parties whose
interests are adverse to those of the general community''); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-4
(Supp. 1974) (investment of public funds "where the accomplishment of the object
••• is likely to be materially prejudiced''); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.3(a)(l), (2), (5)
(1974) (acquisition of property, negotiations between public employers and their employees, conferences with legal counsel regarding litigation); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 192.660(2)(a), (c) (1974) (certain deliberations relating to labor negotiations, real estate
purchases, preliminary negotiations regarding trade and commerce where Oregon
is in competition with other states or nations); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 263 (1974
Purdon's Pa. Legis. Serv. 481) (labor negotiations); S.C. CODE ANN. § l-20.3(b)(2) (Supp.
1974) (negotiations incident to proposed contracts or land sales, consideration of litigation or "the position of the public agency in other adversary situations"); TEX.
REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, §§ 2(e), (f), (m) (Supp. 1974) (litigation, real estate
and contract deliberations, school board discussions of employee relations); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. l, §§ 313(1), (2) (Supp. 1974) (contracts and litigation "where premature general public knowledge would place the state at a substantial disadvantage," real estate
transactions); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.l-344(a)(2), (4), (5), (6) (1973) (acquisition or sale of
~eal property, discussion of prospective business or industry for the community, investment of public funds, litigation); WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 42.30.110 (1974) (purchase of
real property, hearings of complaints against public officials and employees); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 66.77(4)(d), (f) (1974 West's Wis. Legis. Serv. 332) (litigation, acquisition
of property, labor negotiations); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-692.14(a)(iii), (vii), (x) (Supp.
1973) (litigation, real estate acquisition, wage and salary negotiations). See also Common Cause Proposed Act, supra note 1309, § 5(a){2).
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in a number of state open-meeting acts merits separate consideration.
This exemption allows a government body to convene in executive
session whenever a prescribed proportion of the membership so
determines, despite the fact that the subject discussed does not fall
within a specific substantive exemption.1383 In an attempt to curtail
the abuse of these exemptions, most such states require that no binding action be taken at these closed meetings.1384 Despite this "safeguard," however, exemptions of this type may significantly undermine the policy behind open-meeting requirements and therefore
should not be incorporated into open-meeting laws.
c. Enforcement procedures. A comprehensive open-meeting
act should establish procedures whereby any individual can compel
any agency subject to the act to conform to its requirements. 1381l
While it is essential to determine the effect to be given actions taken
in violation of the act,1886 remedies must also be available to prevent
impending violations.1381 The availability of expeditious relief is
1383. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21 (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1975) (majority vote); HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. § 92-3 (1968) (two-thirds vote); IowA CODE § 28A.3
(1971) (two-thirds vote); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4319 (Supp. 1974) (majority vote); LA,
R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 42:6 (West 1965) (majority vote); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 404
(1964) (majority vote); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 84-1405 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (majority vote). See
also IND. CODE § 5-14-1-5 (1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 14 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 91-A:3(!) (Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-3 (1970).
1384. See, e.g., KAN. STAT• .ANN. § 75-4319 (Supp. 1973); LA. R.Ev. STAT• .ANN. § 42:0
(1965); ME. R.Ev. STAT• .ANN. tit. 1, § 404 (1964); N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:3(1)
(Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-3 (1970). Cf. !ND. CODE § 5-14-1-5 (1971).
1385. Some states grant standing under their open-meeting laws to any citizen or
any person. See, e.g., CAL. GoVT. CODE § 11130 (West Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN,
§ 286.011(2) (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-330l(b) (Supp. 1974); KY. R.Ev. STAT.
§ 61.845 (Supp. 1974); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 406 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN,
§ 471.705(2) (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 269 (1974 Purdon's Pa, Legis. Scrv.
482); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-20.4 (Supp. 1974). Other states limit standing to person aggrieved, affected, or denied rights. See, e.g., Aruz. R.Ev. STAT. § 38-431.07 (1974); AnK.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2806 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. CoDE § 5-14-l-6(c) (Bums 1974);
N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:7 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318,6 (1974); ORE,
R.Ev. STAT. § 192.680 (1974); VA. CoDE ANN. § 2.1-346 (1973). Wisconsin allows an individual to bring suit if the district attorney has not commenced an action within 20
days of receipt of the individual's verified complaint. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.77(10) (1974
West's Wis. Legis. Serv. 333) The New Mexico act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-6-25(B), (D)
(Supp. 1974), provides that the act may be enforced either by a group of five individuals or by the attorney general. See also Common Cause Proposed Act, supra note
1309, §§ 9(a), (b). Cf. text at notes 1271-79 supra.
In the absence of a standing provision, an individual may have no recourse except
to petition the state to institute proceedings. See, e.g., State ex rel. Adams v. Rockwell,
167 Ohio St. 15, 145 N.E. 2d 665 (1957); State ex rel. Wineholt v. Superior Court, 249
Ind. 152, 230 N.E.2d 92 (1967). Some courts, however, will allow individuals to sue for
enforcement of an open-meeting act even when there has been no statutory grant of
standing. See, e.g., Green v. Beste, 76 N.W.2d 165 (N.D. 1956). Cf. IND. ANN. STAT,
CODE § 5-14-l-6(b) (Burns 1974); Acord v. Booth, 33 Utah 279, 93 P. 734 (1908),
1386. See text at notes 1392-415 infra.
1387. A number of states expressly authorize courts to grant prospective relief. See,
e.g., ARiz. R.Ev. STAT, §§ 38-431.04, .07 (1974); CAL, GOVT, CoDE § 11180 (West Supp.
1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(2) (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8301 (Supp, 1974);
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even more important under an open-meeting law than under an
open-records act: 1388 It is probable that exclusion of the public from
an improperly closed session of a government body can never adequately be remedied, even if only "preliminary deliberations" have
taken place.1389
In authorizing the courts to enforce the act, the legislature should
establish guidelines prescribing the circumstances in which prospective relief, such as an injunction or writ of mandamus, is appropriate.
Since the standards for granting prospective relief are generally left
· to the discretion of the courts, they may, in the absence of any legislative declaration of policy, refuse to act unless shown evidence of
"irreparable injury" to the particular plaintiffl.300 or a history of
violations by the government body involved.1391
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, § 43 (1973); IND. ANN. STAT. CoDE § 5-14-l-6(c) (Burns 1974);
IOWA CODE § 28A.7 (1971); KY. REv. STAT. § 61.845 (1974); MA$. ANN. LAws ch. 39, § 23C
(Supp. 1974); Mo. REv. STAT. § 610.030 (Cum. Supp. 1973); N.H. REv. STAT• .ANN. § 91A:7 (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-6-25(B) (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.6
(1974); ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.680 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 269 (1974 Purdon's
Pa. Legis. Serv. 482); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-20.4 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4406(a)
(Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-346 (1973); WASH. REv. CODE § 42.30.130 (1974). A
Florida court took an interesting view of such a provision and held that any attempt by
the legislature "to dictate to ••. courts when, how or under what conditions injunctions
should issue ••• would constitute an unlawful legislative infringement on a judicial
function." Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 S.2d 470, 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
As well as providing citizens with a means for prospective relief, it is also important
that an open-meeting act grant authority to the courts to assess the costs of an enforcement proceeding, including reasonable attorney fees, against an agency or against
agency members that have violated the act. Without such a provision many individuals
will be deterred from enforcing the act by the prohibitive costs necessarily incurred
in an enforcement proceeding. See Letter from Jon Mills, Center for Governmental
Responsibility, University of Florida Law School, to Senator Lawton Chiles, Oct. 30,
1974 in open-Meeting Hearings, supra note 1309, at 379. Although the Florida act
contains no provision authorizing the award of court costs, in Hough v. Stembridge,
278 S.2d 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), the trial court assessed certain costs against
named defendants on a pro rata basis. The appellate court did not discuss the issue.
Cf. Haven v. City of Troy, 39 Mich. App. 219, 197 N.W.2d 496 (1972) (assessing costs
against the plaintiff even though he prevailed at trial and on appeal). A few state acts
do include a provision allowing the courts to assess costs against agencies. E.g., Aruz.
REV. STAT. § 38--431.07 (1974); ORE. REv. STAT. § 192.680 (1974); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 66.77(10) (1974 West's Legis. Serv. 333).

1388. When a meeting is called on short notice, action to prevent the meeting from
being closed to the public often must be taken quickly. Thus, an expedited hearing
procedure for actions challenging the closing of a meeting is an essential element of
any open-meeting law. Open-Meeting Hearings, supra note 1309, at 267 (statement of
D. Wickham). A few states include provisions for such a procedure in their acts. See,
e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2806 (1968); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 39, § 23C (Supp. 1974);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:7 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-346 (1973).
1389. Cf. text at notes 1347-50 supra.
1390. But see Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 S.2d 470, 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969), interpreting the Florida legislature's grant of jurisdiction to issue injunctions as "the equivalent of a legislative declaration that a violation of the statutory
mandate constitutes an irreparable public injury •••• The effect of such a declaration
in a subsequent judicial proceeding, then, would be that one of the requisites for a
writ of injunction need not be proven, i.e., an irreparable injury; and a mere showing
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d. Invalidation provisions. A comprehensive open-meeting act
should establish procedures for invalidating actions taken at an improperly closed meeting. Procedures of this kind are necessary both
to describe the effect of a particular action taken when prospective
relief is either unavailable or ineffective, and to deter future violations.
Admittedly, an invalidation remedy is inherently limited and is
not without costs.1392 Although some courts have invalidated publicly
made decisions that were the direct result of improperly closed deliberations,1393 it is not likely that invalidation can eliminate the effect
of prior deliberations or discussions. Furthermore, whatever its
effectiveness in deterring future violations of the act, invalidation of
actions othenvise properly taken may unfairly disadvantage persons
relying on the validity of such actions.1394 At the very least, the
potential for invalidation will create substantial uncertainty. 1806
Despite these limitations, and notwithstanding the availability of
sanctions against individual officials,1896 invalidation seems the most
effective device to compel compliance with the mandate of openness.1ao1
that the statute has been or is clearly about to be violated fully satisfies such require•
ment."
1391. Two state statutes do provide standards for granting prospective relief: MASS,
.ANN. LAws ch. 39, § 23C (Supp. 1974) (requiring proof of past violation), and ILL, REV,
STAT. ch. 102, § 43 (1973) (allowing mandamus to issue "where the provisions of this
Act are not complied with" or upon a showing of probable cause that they will not
be complied with). Because of the difficulty of demonstrating the probability of future
violations, the citizenry in other jurisdictions may have to endure one or more violations of the open-meeting laws before a court will enjoin future violations, Comment,
8 U. RICH. L. REv. 261, supra note 1306, at 268-69, although the possibility of contempt
penalties should help to ensure future compliance. See generally Note, supra note 1306,
at 1215.
1392. See generally Note, supra note 1306, at 1213-14.
1393. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Howze, 291 S.2d 645 (Fla. Dist, App, 1974); Kramer v.
Board of Adjustment, 80 N.J. 454, 194 A.2d 26 (L. Div, 1963), But see Herron v. North•
wood, lll N.H. 324, 282 A.2d 661 (1971); Schults v. Board of Educ., 86 N.J. Super, 29,
205 A.2d 762 (1964), atfd., 45 N.J. 2, 210 A.2d 762 (1965); In re Housing Authority, 62
Wash. 2d 492, 383 P.2d 295 (1964), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964).
1394. Note, supra note 1306, at 1213-14; 49 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 764, 776 (1971).
1395. Note, supra note 1306, at 1213-14. It is possible that the costs of invalidation
outweigh the benefits of this sanction, however important the latter might be. Note,
Government in the Sunshine: Judidal Application and Suggestions for Reform, 2 Fl.A.
ST. U. L. REv. 535, 556 (1974). See Elmer v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 343 Mass. 24,
27, 176 N.E.2d 16, 18 (1961). The Florida Attorney General has stated that "an en
masse declaration of unconstitutionality of thousands of enactments throughout the
nation without any consideration being given to the substantive content of the enact•
ments or the procedures involved in the enactment of any individual statute or
ordinance, could serve no purpose but to throw organized societies of people and their
local governments into panic and confusion." Op. Fla. Atty. Gen. No. 071-32, at 15
(March 3, 1971).
1396. See text at notes 1416-22 infra.
1397. 49 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 764, 776 (1971); Detroit Free Press, Aug. 30, 1974, § C, at 6,
col. 3 (metro ed.). But see Note, supra note 1306, at 1214,
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The importance of including an invalidation provIS1on in an
open-meeting law is demonstrated by the unwillingness of many
courts to imply such a remedy in the absence of express authorization
from the legislature. Some courts justify their reluctance to vacate
agency action by describing their statutes as merely "directory" because they provide no method of enforcement and fail to specify
that action taken in violation of their requirements is invalid.1398
Such an analysis simply begs the question. Other courts have relied
on canons of statutory construction to reason that since the legislature included remedies other than invalidation in the act, it must
have intended those remedies to be exclusive.1399 In Dobrovolny v.
Reinhardt,1400 for example, the Iowa supreme court interpreted the
state open-meeting act, which provides that it "may be enforced by
mandamus or injunction, whether or not any other remedy is also
available,"1401 to preclude any judicial authority to "render the
actions of [a] public body void or voidable."1402
Some courts, in considering whether to imply an invalidation
remedy, have gone beyond such limited modes of analysis to examine
the policies underlying open-meeting acts. In states where the act is
silent on the issue of enforcement or sanctions, a few courts have
been willing to imply such a remedy.1403 Where remedies are already
provided, at least two state courts have rejected the "exclusive
remedies" construction as inconsistent with the open-meeting principle.1404 One of these courts commented:
While the statute provides a [criminal] remedy against the members
of the Authority for a violation thereof such remedy is not exclusive;
were it othenvise, the entire purpose of the statute would be nullified
and the statute could be violated by members of the Authority with
particular impunity. In order to require the Authority to live up
1398. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Credit River Township, - Minn. - , 217 N.W.2d 502
(1974). See also Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 764, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805, 812
(1960).
.
1399. See, e.g., Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1960).
1400. 173 N.W.2d 837 (1970).
1401. IOWA CODE § 28A.7 (1971).
1402. 173 N.W.2d at 841. The violation complained of in Dobrovolny had occurred
before the suit was brought. The court found that neither an injunction nor mandamus (the act's specified remedies) would be appropriate to compel reconsideration of
action already taken at an illegal meeting. 173 N.W.2d at 841. Thus the court precluded
effective enforcement of the act for past violations. See Comment, supra note 1309, at
220.
1403. See, e.g., Hamrick v. Town of Albertville, 219 Ala. 465, 122 S. 448 (1929);
Town of Paradise Valley v. Acker, 100 Ariz. 62, 411 P.2d 168 (1966); City of Lexington
v. Davis, 310 Ky. 751,221 S.W.2d 659 (1949); Haven v. City of Troy, 39 Mich. App. 219,
197 N.W.2d 496 (1972); Green v. Beste, 76 N.W.2d 165 (N.D. 1956). See also Comment,
8 U. RicH. L. REv. 261, supra note 1306, at 269-70.
1404. See Bogert v. Allentown Housing Authority, 426 Pa. 151, 231 A.2d 147 (1967);
Toyah Independent School Dist. v. Pecos-Barstow Independent School Dist., 466 S.W.2d
877 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1971).
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to the mandate of the "Right to Know" statute, plaintiffs had to
resort to equity or other appropriate remedy.1405
Although this reasoning seems consistent with the purposes of openmeeting acts, not all courts have found it persuasive; thus legislatures
should be explicit in providing for invalidation.
If a legislature chooses to include an invalidation clause in its
act, it should clarify whether finding a violation automatically renders the action taken void or whether the courts have some discretion
in this regard. A number of states expressly provide that actions taken
at improperly closed meetings are "null and void" or "invalid,"1400
while others provide only that such actions are "not binding,"1407 a
phrase that may obscure the legislature's intent. Thus, in Florida the
Attorney General and the supreme court have interpreted this language quite differently. According to the Attorney General, this
language
does not require each and every violative action by every board and
commission in the state to be deemed a nullity, wholly void ab initio
and as though never enacted. It means rather that individual actions
taken by boards and commissions in violation of the statutory inhibition are individually voidable and thus subject to challenge by
persons with proper standing to sue in court cases. To hold otherwise would be to create public chaos ... _14os
The court, without reference to the Attorney General's opinion, subsequently said: "Mere showing that the government in the sunshine
law has been violated constitutes an irreparable public injury so that
the ordinance is void ab initio." 140 9
Even where the open-meeting act clearly specifies that actions
taken in violation of it are only "voidable" in a court proceeding,141o
1405. Bogert v. Allentown Housing Authority, 426 Pa. 151, 157, 231 A.2d 147, 150
(1967).
1406. See, e.g., AI.As. STAT. § 42.62.310(£) (1967); Aruz. REv. STAT. § 38-431.05 (1974):
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-6--402(4), 29-9-101(2) (1973); IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 5-141-6 (Burns 1974); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 84-1405 (Cum. Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 5-6-25(A) (Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 201 (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 65, § 262 (1974 Purdon's Pa. Legis. Serv. 481); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 8-4405 (Supp.
1974) (adding a proviso stating "that nullification ••• shall not apply to any commit•
ment, othenvise legal, affecting the public debt of the entity concerned"); WASH. REv.
CODE § 42.30.060 (1974); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.12(a) (Supp. 1973). See School Dist.
No. 354 v. Mead Educ. Assn., - Wash. -, -, 530 P.2d 302, 305 (1975) (interpreting
Wash. Rev. Code § 42.30.060 (1974)).
1407. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(1) (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 40330l(a) (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312(a) (Supp. 1974). The Arkansas statute
provides that no action taken at an improperly closed meeting shall be "legal." ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (1968). In Virginia, actions are not "effective" unless the open•
meetings act is complied with. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.l-344(c) (1973).
1408. Op. Fla, Atty. Gen. No. 071-32, at 14-15 (March 3, 1971).
1409. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 S.2d 473, 477 (1974).
1410. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 61.830 (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN, § 10:4-5 (Supp.
1974); WIS, STAT, ANN. § 66.77(3) (1974 West's Wis, Legis, Serv. 332).

May-June 1975]

Project

1209

a court may still be unsure of the standards to be applied in judging
a particular action. The only case to consider this problem interpreted such a provision as creating a strong presumption of invalidity
upon the finding of a violation:
Appropriate implementation of [the policy behind the act] calls, as a
general rule, for the Superior Court ... to set aside any official action,
... which is taken without compliance ·with the prescriptions of the
statute .... We need not now decide that no discretion is ever to
be reserved to the court to save the validity of official action taken
in contravention of the statute. That question may be left to await
a case where a sufficiently impelling counter-interest may be argued
to bespeak sustaining the action impugned. It suffices here to say
that mere absence of bad faith or other impropriety on the part of
the public body should not ordinarily move the court to stay its
hand in voiding official action taken contrary to the statute upon
proper application therefor.1411

This statement suggests that there may be no practical difference
between a mandatory invalidation provision and a discretionary
invalidation provision when the latter, as here, is interpreted narrowly.
Perhaps the most significant problem with any invalidation
remedy is delimiting its scope: The steps required to "re-validate" a
nullified action have to be determined.1412 It seems clear that there
must be some method by which a government body can "cure" the
defects of its original proceedings; the public interest would be disserved if a court-assuming it possessed such power-permanently
invalidated a particular course of action simply because it was first
adopted at a meeting in violation of the act. Probably the most that
the courts can do is to require a complete reconsideration of the
matter at issue, with full opportunity for public observation and
input.
Because none of the state acts prescribe standards for determining
what constitutes an appropriate cure, courts have been forced to
develop their o·wn guidelines. Some courts have considered even
perfunctory re-votes sufficient if conducted in public.1413 Other
courts, while failing to make their standards explicit, have required
substantially more.1414 It is clear, however, that if curative proceedings are to serve the policy underlying open-meeting acts, they must
1411. Wolf v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 79 N.J. Super. 546, 553, 192 A.2d 305, 30809 (1963).
1412. See generally Note, An Extension of the Public Meeting Principle, 46 Cm-KENT
L. REv. 207 (1969).
1413. See, e.g., Bassett v. Braddock, 262 S.2d 425, 428-29 (Fla. 1972); State ex rel.
Wineholt v. Superior Court, 249 Ind. 152, 156, 230 N.E.2d 92, 94-95 (1967).
1414. See, e.g., Scott v. Bloomfield, 94 N.J. Super. 592, 600, 229 A.2d 667, 671 (L.
Div.), afjd., 98 N.J. Super. 321, 237 A.2d 297 (App. Div. 1967).
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be more than a public ratification of a decision previously made
behind closed doors. Such proceedings must at least allow the public
to contribute to the decision-making process and to learn the premises relied upon by their representatives. While this process may not
alter the ultimate result, it will foster public confidence in government and will impress upon agency. officials the importance of complying with the act. 1415
e. Sanctions. Finally, a comprehensive open-meeting law should
include a provision indicating an appropriate sanction to be applied
to individual officials who violate the act. While there is every reason
to expect that injunctive relief will be effective,1410 an additional
sanction applicable to individual violators should be available. The
mere existence of such a sanction may be an effective deterrent to
potential violators.1417
Most open-meeting acts contain a provision making violation of
the act a misdemeanor.1418 Because some courts are reluctant to apply
criminal penalties,1419 especially when there is no proof of scienter,1420
an alternative sanction should be devised. A few acts contain a provision for assessing a civil fine against offending officials.1421 The most
effective sanction, however, might be removing willful violators from
office.1422
1415. See Comment, supra note 1210, at 1664-65.
1416. See generally Note, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 535, supra note 1395, at 549; Note,
supra note 1306, at 1215; Comment, supra note 1307, at 11'79-80.
1417. But see 49 TEXAS L. REv. 764, 773-74 (1971).
1418. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 394 (1958); Aruz. REv. STAT. § 38-431.06 (1974);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2807 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(3) (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-330l(c), -9911 (Supp. 1974); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, § 44 (1973); IND, ANN.
STAT. CODE § 5-14-l-6(a) (Bums 1974); IOWA CODE § 28A.8 (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-4320 (Supp. 1974); KY. REv. STAT. § 61.991 (Supp. 1974); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:9 (West Supp. 1975); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 406 (1964); NED. REV. STAT.
§ 84-1404 (Cum. Supp. 1974): NEV. REv. STAT. § 241.040 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-6-26
(Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 202 (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 65, § 268
(1974 Purdon's Pa. Legis. Serv. 482); TEX. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 4 (Supp.
1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-4 (1970).
The penalties imposed for violations vary greatly among the states. Compare NED,
REV. STAT. § 84-1404 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (allowing imposition of a fine not exceeding
$25) with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:9 (West Supp. 1975) ($2000 maximum fine) and ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 406 (1964) (up to one year's imprisonment).
1419. See Comment, supra note 1210, at 1662; Comment, supra note 1309, at 216,
1420. See, e.g., :Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 S.2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969).
Some open-meeting acts specifically require that a violation must have been willfully
and knowingly committed before criminal sanctions may attach. See, e.g., Aruc. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2807 (1968); IowA CODE § 28A.8 (1971); KY. REV. STAT. § 61.991 (Supp. 1974);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 268 (1974 Purdon's Pa. Lcgis. Serv. 482); TEX. REV. CIV, STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-17, § 4 (Supp. 1974).
1421. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705(2) (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 42.30.120 (1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.77(8) (1974 West's Wis. Legis Serv. 333). A
provision in the Tennessee act, TENN. CoDE ANN. § 8-4406(a) (Supp. 1974), apparently
gives the courts discretion to impose such a fine.
1422. Minnesota has a provision authorizing the removal from office of willful
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2. Federal Open-Meeting Legislation
Although presently there is no comprehensive federal openmeeting act, both houses of Congress are considering such legislation.1423 Until Congress acts, federal administrative agencies can
continue to conduct a significant part of their activities in private.1424
a. The Federal Advisory Committee Act. One statute that currently requires a limited number of federal agencies to hold open
meeting-sis the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).1425 This
act regulates agency advisory committee use of executive sessions.
Specifically, it requires advisory committees to hold open meetings1426
unless the substantive matters to be discussed fall within one of the
exemptions to the FOIA.1427
Although the F ACA includes no express enforcement provisions,
the results in two recent cases1428 involving the applicability of the
FOIA's exemption for inter- and intra-agency memoranda1429 indicate that the courts are willing to treat this act as a functional extension of the FOIA.
In Gates v. Schlesinger,1430 an Assistant Secretary of Defense had
determined that "working sessions" of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) should be closed
violators after their third offense. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705(2) (Supp. 1974). No
other state act contains a removal sanction.
1423. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), was introduced on January 15, 1975. H.R.
5075, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), an identical version of the "Government in the
Sunshine" bill, was introduced on March 18, 1975. Both are modified versions of S. 260,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), introduced on January 9, 1973. S. 260 was substantially
modified following hearings held by the Subcommittee on Reorganization, Research,
and International Organizations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations
on May 21-22, 1974, resulting in Committee Print No. 3 of S. 260 (September 30, 1974)
[hereinafter S. 260, Comm. Print No. 3]. See open-Meeting Hearings, supra note 1309,
at 1-185. The current version of the bill, which includes additional changes, is largely
the result of further hearings held by the same subcommittee on October 15, 1974.
See id. Although the current version will undoubtedly undergo further modification,
its major provisions are likely to remain intact when and if it is voted on. Interview
with George L. Patten, Legislative Assistant to Senator Chiles, in Washington, D.C.,
April 28, 1975.
The relative tardiness of Congress in dealing with open-meeting legislation is in
stark contrast to its approach to the areas of "open-records" and "freedom of information" laws. In these areas Congress set an example that has subsequently been followed
by many states. See text at note 1305 supra.
1424. See Open-Meeting Hearings, supra note 1309, at 51-52.
1425. 5 U.S.C. app. I (Supp. Ill 1973). For a discussion of the role of advisory committees and the legislative history of the FACA, see Perritt & Wilkinson, supra note
1312.
1426. 5 U.S.C. app. I, §§ IO(a)(l), (3) (Supp. III 1973).
1427. 5 U.S.C. app. I, § IO(d) (Supp. III 1973).
1428. Gates v. Schlesinger, 366 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C. 1973); Nader v. Dunlop, 370
F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1973).
1429. For a discussion of this exemption see text at notes 648-99 supra.
1430. 366 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C. 1973).
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because they involved "the exchange of verbal information and
proposals benveen the Directors of the women's military components
which, if written, would fall within the [section 552(b)(5)] exemption ... .''1431 The court did not address the question whether there
can ever be an exemption for such meetings equivalent to the "interagency" exemption1432 because it found that since DACOWITS possessed "no substantial authority," it was not an "agency" and matters
before it could not therefore be considered "inter-agency" affairs.1488
According to the court, both legislative intent and general public
policy considerations supported this narrow interpretation of the
exemption:
Congressional intent and the policy of the Federal Advisory Committee Act underlie the result thus reached. Congress was concerned
with the proliferation of unknown and sometimes secret "interest
groups" or "tools" employed to promote or endorse agency policies.
Congress established openness to public scrutiny as the keystcme of
the Advisory Committee Act. Arguments that public participation
and disclosure would inhibit debate and frank expression of views
were heard and rejected by Congress.1434

In Nader v. Dunlop,1435 where plaintiffs challenged the exclusion
of the public from meetings of advisory committees to the Cost of
Living Council, the court recognized that there is an advisory committee analogue to the intra-agency exemption, but limited it to
situations where there has been "a specific finding made by the
[Council's director] that the meeting, or a portion thereof, is to discuss a document which is specifically exempt from public disclosure
under ... 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)."1436 In granting plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment and ordering that all future meetings be open
to public access absent the requisite specific finding, the court apparently rejected any notion that there is a general "working session"
exemption.
Although the FACA, unlike the FOIA,1437 contains no provision
allocating the burden of proof to the agency claiming an exemption,
the courts in both Gates and Dunlop took the view "that the underlying policy considerations are identical and that the burden of proof
should be comparable.''1438 In neither case were the general conclusory statements of the agencies deemed sufficient.
1431.
1432.
1433.
1434.
1435.
1436.
1437.
1438.

866 F. Supp. at 798.
5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
366 F. Supp. at 799.
866 F. Supp. at 799-800 (footnote omitted).
870 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C. 1973).
370 F. Supp. at 180.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
370 F. Supp. at 179; 366 F. Supp. at 800.
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Notwithstanding these judicial attempts to apply the FACA
broadly to further the policy of open government, the Act's limited scope makes further legislation in this area essential. The Act
applies only to advisory committees; it defines "advisory committee"
as
any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task
force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup
thereof (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as "committee"),
which is(A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or
(B) established or utilized by the President, or
(C) established or utilized by one or more agencies [as defined
in 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)]
in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the
President or one or more agencies or officers of the Federal Government, except that such term excludes (i) the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, (ii) the Commission on Government Procurement, and (iii) any committee which is composed wholly
of full-time officers or employees of the Federal Government. 1489
In the recent case of Nader v. Baroody,1440 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia found that this definition was
intended to encompass only formally organized committees and not
"casual, informal contacts by the President or his immediate staff
with interested segments of the population ...." 1441 Thus, the court
held that informal biweekly meetings between White House officials
and private sector groups to discuss various public issues were not
subject to the requirements of the FACA, despite the fact that these
groups occasionally offered written recommendations to the President.1442 For the purposes of the FACA, it may well be necessary to
distinguish between established advisory committees and chance
gatherings so as not to impede the efficient functioning of government.1443 However, by excluding informal but "planned" advisory
meetings from the scope of the FACA, the Baroody court has unduly
restricted the scope of the statute: Government agencies should not
be able to avoid the mandate of openness by relying upon the recommendations of "unestablished" committees.
b. The proposed federal open-meeting act. The same policies
1439. 5 U.S.C. app. I, § 3(2) (Supp. ill 1973).
1440. 44 U.S.L.W. 2031 (D.D.C. June 23, 1975).
1441. 44 U.S.L.W. at 2031.
1442. 44 U.S.L.W. at 2031.
1443. See text at notes 1324-61 supra. The New York Times recently reported that
the Chairman of the Federal Election Commission objects to requiring casual conversations between commissioners to be open because "[t]his • • • might prevent the
commission from carrying out its statutory duty of correcting possible campaign law
violations by 'informal methods of conference, conciliation· and persuasion.' " N.Y.
Tim.es, July 16, 1975, at 40, col. 3 (late city ed.).
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that underlie the FOIA and the FACA have prompted Congress to
consider enacting federal open-meeting legislation. Thus, S. 260, 1444
the 1973 version of the "Government in the Sunshine Act," was introduced in the spirit of "freedom of information," in an attempt
"to assure the openness of our governmental process and to restore
public confidence in those processes."1440 S. 51446 and H.R. 5075,1447
the 1975 versions,1448 are consistent with these original objectives.
Although the bills also contain provisions requiring congressional
committee meetings to be open to the public1440 and regulating ex
parte communications with federal agencies,1400 the remainder of this
discussion will focus exclusively on section 201 and S. 5,1401 which
limits the ability of federal agencies to conduct closed meetings.
Section 201 applies to "any agency, as defined in [5 U.S.C.
§ 551(1),] where the body comprising the agency consists of two or
more members." 1452 Thus, the bill itself does not describe which
government bodies are within its scope, but instead relies upon the
definition of "agency" in the AP A.1453 While the AP A's definition
appears to be broad, it is significant that Congress, in amending the
FOIA, concluded that the definition was too restrictive to serve the
purposes of the FOIA.1454 Because the policies represented by S. 5
parallel those behind the FOIA, it would seem reasonable to expect
Congress to broaden the definition of "agency" contained in the
current version of S. 5.
1444. S. 260, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § I (1973).
1445. SENATE COMM, ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 93D CONG,, lsr SESS., GOVERNMENT
IN THE SUNSHINE viii (Comm. Print 1973).
1446. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
1447. H.R. 5075, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
1448 For a brief discussion of the legislative history of the federal sunshine bills
see note 1423 supra.
1449. See S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I (1975). Although such a provision is of vital
importance in any comprehensive federal open-meeting law, an analysis of it is beyond
the scope of this Project. It should be noted, however, that a number of states have
enacted comparable r~quirements for committees of their legislatures. See, e.g., N,H,
REv. STAT, ANN. § 91-A:l (I) (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN, § 5-6-24 (Supp. 1974);
TEX. REv. CIV. STAT, ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(b) (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT, ANN. tit. I,
§ 313(d) (Supp. 1974). These requirements have apparently proved to be workable
and effective.
1450. See S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1975). This section deals with the problem
of ex parte communications relating to "on-the-record agency proceedings." Although
requiring the disclosure of all such ex partc communications is an important part of
providing the public with a full picture of all the considerations that arc involved in
the decision-making process, cf, HAWAII REv. STAT. § 91-13 (1968), this topic is also
beyond the scope of this Project.
1451. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1975). H.R. 5075, 94th Cong., 1st Sess, § 4
(1975), is an identical provision and will not be discussed separately.
1452. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1975).
1453. This definition is set out in the text at note 336 supra.
1454. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(c) (Supp. Feb. 1975); text at note 338 supra.
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Section 20l's exclusion of single-member agencies1455 has been
the focus of considerable criticism. The policies underlying the
requirement of open meetings for multi-member agencies would
seem to be equally applicable to single-member agencies. As one of
the staunchest opponents of the proposed bill stated, in arguing
against requiring open meetings for all agencies:
[S. 5] may also implicitly assume that multi-headed agencies are entirely different, and have entirely different functions from single-member agencies. This is simply not so .... [For example,] regulatory
functions similar to those performed by the [SEC] are also performed
by single-member agencies. National banks, for example, are regulated by the comptroller of the currency, who has much the same
powers as any other regulatory agency.
The bill, however, would have no application to these singlemember agencies notwithstanding the fact that their decisions will
often be reached by much the same processes as those of the
[SEC] ....1456

Proponents of a blanket exclusion for single-member agencies
argue that it is difficult to determine what constitutes a "meeting"
of a single-member body, inasmuch as there can be no deliberations
"among" members, and that inclusion would provoke political
opposition from the single-member bodies.1457 While it is admittedly more difficult to define a "meeting" where a single-member
agency is involved, a blanket exclusion of all such agencies is a negation of one of the key purposes of open-meeting legislation: that the
public should be able to observe the preliminary stages of the decision-making process. In apparent recognition of this purpose, the
proposed act expressly includes "meetings to conduct hearings"
within its definition of "meetings."1458 Surely no greater burden
would be imposed on single-member agencies than on multi-member
agencies to permit the public to attend such hearings. As a matter
of public policy, therefore, at least hearings conducted by singlemember agencies should be exposed to public scrutiny.
1455. Because it incorporates the APA definition of agency, section 201 also appears
to exclude a significant number of executive branch agencies, see Open-Meeting Hearings, supra note 1309, at 175 (testimony of R. Plesser, Center for the Study of
Responsive Law); American Bar Association Standing Committee on Association
Communications, Report to the House of Delegates 5 (Aug. 1974) [hereinafter A.B.A.
Report], including some multi-member bodies established by the Executive Office of
the President. See Open-Meeting Hearings, supra note 1309, at 53 (testimony of
J. Gardner, Chairman, Common Cause). Adoption of the expanded FOIA definition
of "agency" would allow the inclusion of the Executive Office agencies. See text at
note 338 supra.
1456. Open-Meeting Hearings, supra note 1309, at 201-02 (testimony of R. Garrett,
Chairman, SEC).
1457. Id. at 22 (remarks of Senator Chiles).
1458. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(a) (1975).

1216

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 73:971

In describing the types of gatherings that it covers, S. 5 goes
beyond many state provisions by explicitly including the preliminary
stages of discussion and consideration.1460 Significantly, however, it
limits application of the open-meeting requirements to meetings of
an agency and any "subdivision . . . authorized to take action on
behalf of [an] agency" where "official agency business is considered
or discussed by at least the number of agency members [or subdivision members] required to take action on behalf of the agency."1400
This insertion of a "quorum-limit" clearly indicates that the bill is
not intended to cover all informal discussions between or among
members of an agency.1461 Apparently the drafters of S. 5 determined,
as have a number of states,1462 that the need for manageable standards
outweighs the public interest in requiring all such discussions to be
open.
The bill contains no express provision covering agency advisory groups. While the FACA may be thought to make such a
provision unnecessary, that Act does not deal with advisory groups
composed entirely of full-time employees or officials of the government.1463 Thus, it seems that neither it nor S. 5 covers advisory groups
composed of such employees or officials if any one of them is not a
member of the parent agency. This exception to open-meeting
requirements does not comport with the underlying policies of either
act and should be remedied.
Aside from these general scope provisions, section 201 also contains exemptions, enforcement procedures (including a description
of the effect to be given actions taken in violation of S. 5), and sanctions. Recognizing the importance of carefully delineating issues that
should be considered privately, the proposed act contains exemptions
for matters concerning national defense and foreign policy,1404 individual agency personnel and internal agency management,1400 un1459. Compare S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(a) (1975), with statutes cited in notes
1339-41 supra.
1460. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(a) (1975).
1461. The definition of "meeting" was added to the proposed bill after concern was
voiced that courts would interpret "meetings" too expansively if the congressional
language did not clearly indicate the type of gatherings covered by the bill. See openMeeting Hearings, supra note 1309, at 190 (testimony of G. Stafford, Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission). The drafters of the original bill had been willing to
leave to the courts the task of establishing meaningful standards for the statute's
application. See id. at 236 (remarks of Senator Chiles).
1462. See text at note 1347 supra.
1463. 5 U.S.C. app. I, § 3(2)(iii) (Supp. III 1973).
1464. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20I(b)(l) (1975), authorizes the closing of any meeting that "will disclose matters necessary to be kept secret in the interests of national
defense or the necessarily confidential conduct of the foreign policy of the Unlted
States ••••"
1465. The bill provides that any agency may close a meeting that "will relate solely
to individual agency personnel or to internal agency office management and adminis•
tration or financial auditing ••••" S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(b)(2) (1975).
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warranted invasions of individual privacy,1466 law enforcement,1467
trade secrets or commercial information,1468 and the conduct or disposition of agency adjudications.1469 These exemptions closely
parallel the exemptions included in most state acts1470 and in the
FOIA.1471 The drafters apparently intended to restrict the scope of
these exemptions while maintaining consistency with the FOIA.1472
1466. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(b)(3) (1975), authorizes an agency to close, by
majority vote, any meeting or portion thereof that
will tend to charge with crime or misconduct, or to disgrace any person, or will
represent a clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of any individual: Provided, That this paragraph shall not apply to any Government officer or employee
with respect to his official duties or employment: And provided further, That as
applied to a witness at a meeting this paragraph shall not apply unless the witness
requests in writing that the meeting be closed to the public • • • •
1467. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(b)(4) (1975), permits the closing of a meeting
or portion of meeting that
will disclose information pertaining to any investigation conducted for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the disclosure would (A) interfere
with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or
an impartial adjudication, (C) disclose the identity of a confidential source and,
in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the
course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national
security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the
confidential source, (D) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, (E) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel, or (F) in the case
of an agency authorized to regulate the issuance or trading of secunties, disclose
information concerning such securities, or the markets in which they are traded,
when such information must be kept confidential in order to avoid premature
speculation in the trading of such securities • • ••
Major changes in this exemption resulted from the recent amendments to exemption seven of the FOIA, see 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. Feb. 1975), amending 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970); the drafters wanted to keep the two acts consistent. See note
1472 infra. Subsection (F) of this rewritten exemption seems to have resulted primarily from the strong opposition on the part of the SEC. See Open-Meeting Hearings,
supra note 1309, at 203-04 (testimony of R. Garrett, Chairman, SEC).
1468. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(b)(5) allows agencies to close meetings that
will disclose information relating to the trade secrets or financial or commercial
information pertaining specifically to a given person where
(A) a Federal statute requires the information to be kept confidential by Government officers and employees; or
(B) the information has been obtained by the Federal Government on a confidential basis other than through an application by such person for a specific
Government financial or other benefit and the information must be kept secret
in order to prevent grave and irreparable injury to the competitive position of
such person ••••
1469. The bill allows any agency to close a meeting that "will relate to the conduct or disposition (but not the initiation) of a case of adjudication governed by the
first paragraph of section 554(a) of title 5, United States Code, or of subsection (I),
(2), (4), (5), or (6) thereof." S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(b)(6) (1975).
1470. See text at notes 1258-63 supra.
1471. See te.xt at notes 506-846 supra. The bill's exemption for agency personnel
matters, § 20l(b)(2), however, has no analogue in the federal FOIA.
1472. We looked at [the FOIA exemptions] to start with and if you have noticed, we have interwoven ours with those exemptions feeling that should some
one raise one of those areas we would say, wait a minute now; that was one of
the exceptions set in the Freedom of Information Act. So basically, we have tried
to kind of weave through that pattern. If anything, I think we have tried to
tighten our exemptions and not make them as broad. If there is a way in which
we can tighten more, we would like to do that, too, at the same time keeping in
mind that we have the practical job of trying to pass a piece of legislation if we
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In general, there is little to criticize about these exemptions. A few
points, however, warrant discussion. First, presumably because it is
very difficult for Congress to predetermine that in all cases within
a given category the public interest will be best served by allowing
closed sessions,1473 most of the exemptions contain language that
limits the circumstances in which they may be invoked. Thus,
exemption one limits the national security exemption to matters
"necessary" to be kept secret and the foreign policy exemption
to the "necessarily confidential" conduct of United States foreign
policy. Similarly, exemption three limits the general privacy exemp•
tion to "clearly unwarranted" invasions of individual privacy.
Exemption four limits the law enforcement exemption by enumerating the specific independent interests Congress intended to protect.
Finally, exemption five contains language restricting the trade secret
exemption to cases where disclosure would cause "grave" and
"irreparable" injury. Such limitations are important: They provide
reviewing courts with a standard (albeit imprecise) by which to
determine the scope of a particular exemption.1474 Exemptions two
(agency personnel matters) and six (agency adjudications) do not contain limiting language. Thus, any matter within the scope of these
exemptions could be considered in closed session, notwithstanding
special circumstances favoring its discussion in public. While the
absence of a limitation in exemption six appears justifiable-espe•
dally since information regarding the initiation of agency adjudications is not exempt-the absence of any limitation in exemption two
is troublesome. The public might have a substantial interest, at
least in certain cases, in matters involving the internal management
of government bodies.
Second, a further modification of the exemptions should be considered. The exemptions involving personal privacy,147" including
individual agency personnel matters, should be amended to prohibit
closed sessions when the individual involved requests that the proceedings be open. The public interest in protecting the privacy of
the individual disappears when the individual waives the exempcan and trying to antici_pate wherein we will get the most heat or where we will
have the most difficult time moving the legislation thing along,
Open-Meeting Hearings, supra note 1309, at 22-23 (remarks of Senator Chiles), See also
A.B.A. Report, supra note 1455, at 506. Probably the most significant change from
the FOIA exemptions is the omission of any parallel to the inter-agency and intra•
agency memoranda exemption in the proposed bill. A number of agencies have argued
that such an exemption should be added to the bill. See, e.g., Open-Meeting Hearings,
supra note 1309, at 205 (testimony of R. Garrett, Chairman, SEC). See generally text
at notes 1428-36 supra.
1473. Cf. text at notes 1231-35 supra.
1474-. This is especially important because the clause providing for de novo review
by the courts was eliminated from the most recent draft. See note 1482 infra.
1475. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 20I(b)(2), (3) (1975).
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tion's protection.1476 A number of state acts include this limitation.1477 In fact, S. 5 itself contains a similar limitation in exemption
three, but restricts it to witnesses only. There is no sound basis for
distinguishing between witnesses and other persons whose privacy
may be invaded but who nevertheless seek to have the agency proceedings open to the public.1478
Sections 2O1(g) and (h) of S. 5 contain the essential elements of an
adequate enforcement procedure. The bill grants standing to "any
citizen or person resident in the United States" to enforce the act's
requirements in an "action . . . against an agency and its members."1470 The courts are given jurisdiction to enforce the act "by
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or othenvise." 1480 The jurisdiction provision seems sufficiently broad to enable the courts to
fashion appropriate relief in cases where an agency is either violating
or threatening to violate the act. Moreover, the bill provides that
"[t]he burden is on the agency to sustain its action"; 1481 it thus reinforces the general presumption of openness and makes it clear that to
survive a challenge, the agency must demonstrate the applicability
of one of the statutory exemptions.1482
Section 2O1(h) allows the court to apportion costs among the
parties: "[T]he reasonable costs of litigation (including reasonable
fees for attorneys and expert witnesses) may be apportioned to the
original parties or their successors in interest whenever the court
determines such award is appropriate. In the case of costs against an
agency or its members, the costs may be assessed by the court against
the United States."1483 This provision is preferable to the analogous
state provisions: 1484 The court has complete discretion in awarding
costs and is not limited to cases in which the plaintiff has substantially prevailed. This provision should both encourage private citizens to contest legitimate violations of the act-the closing of agency
sessions-and serve to deter frivolous actions.
S. 5 also provides for expeditious hearings: "[A] defendant shall
serve his answer within nventy days after the service of the com1476. See Comment, 8 U. RicH. L. R.Ev. 261, supra note 1306, at 267.
1477. See note 1381 supra.
1478. The hearings are silent on the reasons for the distinction.
1479. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(g) (1975).
1480. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(g) (1975).
1481. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(g) (1975).
1482. Unlike the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975) (see text at
notes 962-64 supra), S. 5 does not contain a provision calling for the de novo review of
agency actions. An earlier version of the bill contained such a provision. See S. 260,
Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 1423, § 20l(h). The elimination of the provision was
presumably a concession to the agencies, although no particularly severe criticism of
this provision appears in the hearings.
1483. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(h) (1975).
1484. See note 1387 supra.
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plaint.... Except as to causes the court considers of greater importance, proceedings before the district court, as authorized by this
paragraph, take precedence on the docket over all other causes and
shall be assigned a hearing and trial at the earliest practicable date
and expedited in every way."1485 This provision seems adequate in
all respects.
Mention should be made of one enforcement provision contained
in prior drafts but not included in the proposed bill. This provision
required that an agency obtain a written determination from the
Assistant Attorney General Office of Legal Counsel "in advance of
the closing of [a] meeting . . . that the designation of such meeting
is authorized ...." 1486 This provision parallels a section of the Texas
open-records law,1481 but has no counterpart in state open-meeting
acts. Unfortunately, it was deleted following considerable criticism
by a number of agencies.1488 Although it would have placed increased
burdens upon both the agencies and the Department of Justice, this
provision would have greatly reduced the overall costs of enforcement by discouraging frivolous assertions of exemptions and thereby
reducing the need for citizen enforcement. The agencies objected
primarily to the fact that a "pre-screening" requirement would have
prohibited them from convening sessions on short notice and to the
current inability of the Justice Department to review such claims.1480
None of these problems is insurmountable. This provision could be
a most effective enforcement device and should receive further
serious consideration before it is eliminated from the proposed act.
Once an enforcement action is brought, the bill permits courts,
"having due regard for orderly administration and the public
interest, [to] set aside any agency action taken or discussed at an
agency meeting improperly closed to the public."1400 This provision,
while similar to those of a number of state acts,1491 is significant in
three respects. First, instead of requiring that all actions taken at
meetings in violation of the act be invalidated, it gives the courts
discretion to consider all relevant factors. Second, it attempts to
establish some standard, however vague, to guide the courts in the
exercise of their discretion. Third, it specifically applies not only to
1485. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(g) (1975).
1486. S. 260, Comm, Print No. 3, supra note 1423, § 20I(c) (1975).
1487. See TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 7 (Supp. 1974), discussed in
the text at notes 1281-85 supra.
1488. See, e.g., Open-Meeting Hearings, supra note 1309, at 245-46 (testimony of R,
Berg, Executive Secretary, Administrative Conference). See also id. at 218-19 (testimony
of H. Geller).
1489. Id. at 245 (testimony of R. Berg, Executive Secretary, Administrative Con•
ference).
1490. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(g) (1975).
1491. See text at notes 1406-07 supra.
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actions taken at meeting-s in violation of the act, but also to official
actions resulting from discussions at improperly closed meeting-s.
Thus, this provision may be a more effective deterrent than many
of its state counterparts.
S. 5 also requires that suits challenging closed meeting-s be brought
within sixty days after the meeting or, "if public notice of such
meeting was not provided by the agency in accordance with the requirements of this section," within sixty days after public announcement of the meeting.1492 This provision was apparently included to
mitigate the uncertainty that an invalidation provision might
cause1403 by limiting the period during which persons may challenge
agency actions. This limitation does not seem unreasonable and
should be retained.
Unlike most of the state acts,1494 S. 5 contains no criminal sanctions against individual officials who violate the act. In fact, it contains no individual sanctions. An earlier draft of the bill contained
a provision that allowed the courts to assess a civil fine of between
$100 and $1000 against agency members, payable to the United
States, if the courts found such members guilty of a willful violation
of the requirements of the act.1495 It is unclear why this provision,
which may be a fairly effective deterrent, was eliminated.1406
It would seem that some type of individual sanction against
willful violators should be included in the act. The inclusion of a
provision for removing willful violators from office was urged during
the hearings on the proposed bill1497 and should be seriously considered. The recent amendments to the FOIA added a similar provision.1408 Any federal open-meeting law should contain one.
II.

INCREASIN9 PROTECTION OF CITIZEN PRIVACY

A. Introduction
The subcommittee, under your able direction, has been conducting
hearings for over a year now on failures by the Federal Government
to make information available to the public. You are to be commended for your efforts because, surely, there is no single attribute
more fundamental to a democratic society than the free flow of information. Liberty and freedom are dependent upon the truth.
There is another side of this issue, however, which deserves
1492. S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20l(g) (1975).
1493. See text at notes 1394-95 supra.
1494. See text at note 1418 supra.
1495. S. 260, Comm. Print No. 3, supra note 1445, § 20l(i).
1496. For criticism of the provision see Open-Meeting Hearings, supra note 1309,
at 219 (testimony of H. Geller).
1497. See id. at 202 (testimony of D. Wickham).
1498. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(F) (Supp. Feb. 1975), discussed in the text at notes
1072-97 supra.
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equal respect and examination-the right of individuals to maintain
personal privacy.... [I]nvasion of the sanctity of a person's privacy
will be as destructive of a society's freedom and liberty as will the
foreclosure of information about the acts of government in such a
society.1499

When President Johnson signed the Federal Public Records Act
into law, he expressed pride in "an open society in which the people's
right to know is cherished and guarded." 1500 The federal and state
governments have figured prominently in the controversy over the
"right to know," as government operations have become increasingly
numerous, complex, and removed from public scrutiny. Governmental growth, with its attendant increase in information needs, has
also given rise to crusaders for the necessary complement of the
right to know-the right of privacy.
The long-standing tension between governmental information
needs and the desire of individuals to withhold personal, identifying
details about their lives has heightened in the past several decades as
a result of the interplay of three developments. First, these years
have witnessed a geometric growth in government regulation and
services that have increased government-citizen contacts. Second,
acceptance of the behavioral-predictive theory of information-the
theory that behavior patterns can be predicted if enough relevant
data is gathered and properly analyzed11i01-has led to demands for
increasing amounts of information in ever widening areas.1602 Third,
rapid advances in computer science have eliminated the traditional
hindrances to government acquisition of data1 uo3 by increasing the
ease of information acquisition, lessening the need to limit data
retention,1504 and increasing intragovernmental transfer of informa1499. Sale or Distribution of Mailing Lists by Federal Agencies, Hearings on H.R.
8903 and Related Bills Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government op.
erations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1972) (statement of Representative Goldwater) [here•
inafter Hearings on Mailing Lists].
1500. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 309, at 11 (statement of President Johnson).
1501. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 135-57 (1967).
1502. See Ervin, Privacy and Government Investigations, l!l71 U. ILL. L.F. 137, 138,
See also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY xvii (A. Westin
& M. Baker eds. 1972) [hereinafter DATABANKS]; House Republican Research Committee,
Task Force on Privacy, Recommendations, Aug. 21, 1974, at I.
1503. For a full discussion of the impact of computers see A. MILLER, AssAULT oN
PruvACY 1-53, 322 (1971).
1504. See Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 943 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings on Data Banks] (statement of C.
Lister); DATABANKS, supra note 1502, at 320 ("The National Academy of Sciences re•
ported in 1972 that it is now technologically possible to build a computerized on-line
file containing the compacted equivalent of 20 pages of typed information about the
personal history and selected activities of every person in the United States").
Data that might once have been discarded are now more likely to be kept, in an

May-June 1975]

Project

1223

tion.1605 As Professor Miller has pointed out: "In accordance with
a principle akin to Parkinson's Law, as capacity for informationhandling increases there is a tendency to engage in more extensive
manipulation and analysis of data ... pertaining to a larger number
of variables."1506 Together, these three phenomena have created a
spiraling demand for information and have left us threatened with
the emergence of a "dossier society."
I. The Extent of Government-Held Information
Government data acquisition statistics make clear that not only
political activists and government employees are threatened by the
accumulation of information by the government. Increasingly, access
to government benefits and services requires a willingness on the
part of individuals to divulge private information.1507 Moreover, an
observable trait of government agencies is that when a problem is
confronted, the tendency is to react with a demand for more data,1508
as evidenced by the 1970 census1509 and the rising number of government questionnaires.1510
In 1966, in the midst of debate over the proposed National Data
Center, a Senate Judiciary subcommittee initiated a survey to determine "the amount, nature, and use of information which Government agencies currently maintain on individuals."1511 The survey
revealed that federal files contained more than 3 billion records on
individual citizens,1512 nearly one half of which were retrievable by
computer, including over 27 .2 billion names, 2.3 billion present
and past addresses, 264 million criminal histories, 280 million mental
expectation that a purpose may ultimately be found for them. In fact, it has been suggested that the ability of a computer to store large quantities of data compels the
owner to increase data acquisition in order to reduce the cost per unit of data. See
Report of Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, HEW,
Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens 13 (1973) [hereinafter HEW Report].
Computerization also permits more complete use of the information gathered, and
facilitates the tasks of retrieving and disseminating: Data may be more imaginatively
collated and collections may be searched for relatively low priority purposes. Hearings
on Data Banks, supra, at 943.
1505. See A. WESTIN, supra note 1501, at 161-62; A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at
24-54. But see DATABANKS, supra note 1502, at 253, 255.
1506. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New
Technology in an Information Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1089, 1103 (1969).
1507. Miller, supra note 1506, at 1103.
1508. Hearings on Data Banks, supra note 1504, at 942-43 (statement of C. Lister).
1509. See Privacy, the Census and Federal Questionnaires, Hearings on S. 1791
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 460-95 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings on the Census].
1510. See, e.g., Hearings on the Census, supra note 1509, at 37-53, 867-926.
1511. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISl'RATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SEN•
ATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., GOVERNMENT DOSSIER 1 (Comm.
Print 1967) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT DOSSIER].
1512. See id. at 9.
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health records, 916 million profiles on alcoholism and drug addiction, and over 1.2 billion financial records,llil 8 More significantly,
the report concluded that much of the information retained was
irrelevant to agency needs and that in many instances confidentiality
provisions were nonexistent or not meaningful.1014 A 1974 survey by
a different subcommittee, which supplemented and updated these
findings, pointed out that 86 per cent of the government data banks
are computerized, and that few of the data banks had any explicit
statutory authorization for their retention of files.um; Computerization, however, cannot itself account for the abundance of government-held data concerning individual citizens: According to at least
one study, for most organizations computerization has not brought
an increase in scope of the content of records maintained on each
individual.1516
It has been estimated that the average American is the subject of
ten to twenty personal files or dossiers compiled by either government units or private organizations.1017 The threat to individual
privacy is thus no longer a potential-it is a reality.1618 As Senator
Mathias aptly described the situation, "If knowledge is power, this
encyclopedic knowledge gives Government the raw materials of
tyranny."1510
2. A Definition of Privacy
The counterweight to this growing governmental power is the
developing concern over privacy. A definition of privacy that will
provide a conceptually sound basis for the development of rules con1513. Hearings on Data Banks, supra note 1504, at 574,
1514. GOVERNMENT DoSSIER, supra note 1511, at 8. Further, as Representative Horton
pointed out: "Even if ••• the most sensitive and personal information is shielded in
confidence ••• large additional reservoirs of data on individual citizens are not only
not secure but actually available for public disclosure for purposes of commercial or
other types of solicitation." Hearings on Mailing Lists, supra note 1499, at 63,
1515. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM, ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM, ON
THE JUDICIARY, 93D CoNG., 2D SESS,, FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 10-11, 26-29 33-35 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter SUlll•
MARY AND CoNCLUSioNs]. Besides tabulating the amount of information held by agencies, the study of this committee, in six volumes, analyzes the information-gathering
practices of all government agencies with respect to statutory authority, subject notification, subject review, access by other agencies, public access, security precautions,
and sources of information. See STAFF OF SUBCOl\lM, ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
SENATE CoMlll. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS,, FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTI•
TUTIONAL RIGHTS (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter FEDERAL DATA BANKS],
1516. See DATABANKS, supra note 1502, at 244,
1517, See Records Maintained by Government Agencies, Hearings on H.R, 9527
and Related Bills Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1972) (statement of Representative Patten) [hereinafter
Hearings on Records].
1518. Hearings on Mailing Lists, supra note 1499, at 63 (statement of Represcnta•
tive Horton).
1519. Hearings on Data Banks, supra note 1504, at 574.
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cerning information practices is difficult to formulate because the
significance of privacy protection varies for each individual and with
each individual circumstance.152°Further, privacy collides with other
social values that have proved equally difficult to define, such as
freedom of the press and freedom of information.1521 Nevertheless, to
determine the degree to which government must respect privacy, it is
necessary to establish a working definition. 1522
Since Warren and Brandeis seized upon Judge Cooley's definition of privacy as the "right to be let alone," 1523 numerous persons
have attempted to sophisticate a privacy doctrine.1524 Clearly, privacy
interests of the individual are many and varied. At issue in this discussion are privacy interests relating to government informationhandling and the individual's desire to maintain anonymity with
regard to personal, identifying details. A useful definition, therefore,
is one in which a number of writers have concurred: the right of
privacy is the right to control the flow of information concerning the
details of one's individuality-one's physical and individual characteristics, knowledge, capabilities, beliefs, and opinions.1525 In specifying the areas protected by the privacy right, however, legislatures
and courts have invariably turned to a right of privacy based on the
content of the information: only certain categories of informationinformation regarding the family or individual sexuality, for example-are protected.1526 But the underlying privacy concept, which
is tied to the individual and his personality, has a considerably
1520. HEW Report, supra note 1504, at 38.
1521. Id.
1522. Pipe, Privacy: Establishing Restrictions on Government Inquiry, 18 AI.r. U.
L. REV. 516, 518 (1969).
1523. See Warren &: Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. R.Ev. 193, at 193
(1890).
1524. See, e.g., A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 210-38; A. WESrIN, supra note 1501,
at 31-51, 330-99; Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 175, 182 (1968); Parker, A Definition of
Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 275 (1974).
1525. See A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 25 ("[P]rivacy is the individual's right to
control the circulation of information relating to him .• .'); Fried, supra note 1524,
at 483 ("Privacy, thus, is control over knowledge about oneself'); Comment, Maintenance and Dissemination of Criminal Records: A Legislative Proposal, 19 UCLA L.
R.Ev. 654, at 654 n.2 (1972) ("The right of privacy is the right of the individual to
decide for himself how much he will share with others his thoughts, his feelings, and
the facts of his personal life"). Cf. Justice Douglas' definition of privacy as having a
"dual aspect: [E]very individual needs both to communicate with others and to keep
his thoughts and beliefs from others. This means that a person should have the freedom to select for himself the time and circumstances when he will share his thoughts
and attitudes with others and to determine the extent to which that sharing will go.''
Douglas, Foreword to Project, The Computerization of Government Files: What Impact
on the Individual?, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1374, 1375 (1968). A broad view of privacy would
also require that a person who discloses information to another be able to control
the latter's disposition of that information.
1526. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970), discussed in the text at notes 700-44 supra;
text at notes 1562-788 &: 1897-902 infra.

1226

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 73:971

broader reach and thus has a significant potential for development
and expansion, as the Privacy Act of 1974 illustrates.11l27

3. Government Invasions of Privacy: Methods and Results
There are three major stages in any information-handling system:
acquisition, retention, and dissemination. Government information
practices may threaten the individual's control over the flow of information about himself at any of these stages; thus, four questions
are raised: What information may be collected; under what circumstances may it be retained; to whom may the data be made available;
and what remedies or sanctions are available to secure effective protection for privacy.
The question of acquisition is the most crucial because all other
problems come into play only after information is obtained. Government agencies "tend to defend needs for information with a
pledge of confidentiality of personal reports once secured, omitting
the fact that intrusions on a person's privacy begin at the taking of
sensitive personal facts." 1628 Problems of acquisition have provoked
considerable discussion. For example, certain questions asked of
applicants for federal jobs have been challenged,m 0 and several
questions were removed from the proposed 1970 census after an
outcry from persons protesting the sensitivity of the questions.mo
Even if the collection of certain information would not violate
individual privacy rights, the methods employed to collect it, such
as wiretapping and electronic surveillance,11l31 may constitute such a
violation.
Retention and dissemination of acquired information. pose
equally grave threats. The retention of certain criminal justice111a2
and welfare data1633 has become a prominent concern; in fact, the
controversy that first focused attention on the right of privacy-the
National Data Bank proposal-involved the place of retention.1 1l 34 A
problem that arises in the area of dissemination is that one agency
that may legitimately collect and retain certain information on an
individual, may, without the individual's consent, give the informa1527. See text at notes 1966-2214 infra.
1528. Hearings on the Census, supra note 1509, at 130 (Representative Betts). Sec
id. at 270-82 (testimony of L. Speiser, ACLU).
1529. See text at notes 2031-43 infra.
1530. See text at notes 1990-93 infra.
1531. See text at notes 1844-48 infra; Hearings on Military Surveillance Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter Hearings on Military Surveillance].
1532. See, e.g., Tarleton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d lll6 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1533. See text at notes 1709-18 infra.
1534. See FEDERAL DATA BANKS, supra note 1515; notes 2102-04 infra ;ind accom-

panying text.
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tion to an agency that could not have legitimately collected it. The
1974 Senate survey of agency practices found this danger quite real:
"Once information about an individual is collected by a Federal
agency, it is likely that that information will be fairly readily passed
on to other Federal, State and local agencies."1535 Finally, privacy interests are often further infringed when an individual whose privacy
has been invaded is denied a remedy.
The harms from unregulated government information-handling
can be divided into three categories: psychological problems created
by acquisition of data, loss of individual benefits due to misuse of
the data, and invasion of privacy per se. Any attempt to appraise
the impact on individuals of data acquisition must consider the
potential psychological harms. First, there is the very real possibility that individuals will, with increasing frequency, base their decisions regarding activities and expressions on how they will enhance
their record.1536 A concern for a clean record, reinforced by the popular conception of the computer as unforgetting,1537 could threaten
to create "a society in which unorthodoxy is discouraged by its
notoriety, and even the mildest eccentricities are catalogued for
official evaluation."1538 This "chilling effect" on unpopular expressions and beliefs exemplifies the theory of "aversive control" avoidance-learning-that as an individual learns to avoid activities that
he feels are disapproved, he will stop not only the disapproved activities, but similar or related activities as well.1530 In the extreme, individuals may begin to doubt whether they exist apart from their
record.1540
A 1952 study evaluating the impact of governmental loyalty and
security inquiries found many resulting behavioral changes: severance of membership in organizations on the Attorney General's list
and cancellation of subscriptions to literature sent by these organizations; refusal to sign petitions without proof of a bona fide sponsorship; refusal to join an organization not on the Attorney General's
list for fear it might later develop in a radical direction; and cautiousness in political conversations with strangers.1541 Moreover, it
1535. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 1515, at 37.
1536. A. Mn.I.ER, supra note 1503, at 50.
1537. This has been described as an "information prison" in which a person's past
places inescapable limits on his future. See Hearings on Data Banks, supra note 1504,
at 943 (testimony of C. Lister, ACLU).
1538. Id.
1539. See A. BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 293-354 (1969).
1540. A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 49.
1541. See Johoda & Cook, Security Measures and Freedom of Thought: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of Loyalty and Security Programs, 61 YALE L.J. 295,
307-08 (1952). For a detailed treatment of the chilling effect of surveillance on legitimate political activity see Askin, Surveillance: The Sodal Science Perspective, in
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has been observed that surveillance of a particular individual need
not actually be going on to produce the effect in that individual as
long as there is public knowledge that surveillance has occurred
and is continuing to occur.1542 This is especially relevant because
of recent surveys revealing widespread public concern over the threat
to privacy from computers.1543 Privacy is necessary for proper psychological development,1544 for health,1545 and for the growth of democratic societies.1546 Yet, as Richard L. Tobin commented in a 1968
editorial entitled "1984 Minus Sixteen and Counting," "[w]e cannot
assume ... that privacy will survive simply because man has a psychological or social need for it." 1547
Even certain decisions of federally elected officials seem "chilled"
by various surveillance and information-keeping techniques. The
New York Times stated on February 25, 1974:
The source recalled one Senator who had been told of an investigation concerning his daughter, a college student who had "gotten
involved in demonstrations and free love," and a Republican Representative who had been told that the [FBI] possessed evidence indicating that he was a homosexual.
"We had him in our pocket after that," the source said of the
Representative. He added that he could not recall the Senator, a
liberal Democrat, ever criticizing the FBI in public.ms

But, as Representative Mikva, himself the subject of an Army intelligence file pointed out:
The objection to this program is not that a U.S. Senator may have
SURVEILLANCE, DATAVEILLANCE AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS 72-86 (COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS
L. REv. ed. 1973).
1542. See Askin, supra note 1541, at 82.
1543. For example, a national survey conducted in 1971 found that 53 per cent of
the sample believed that computerized information files might be used to destroy individual freedoms, and 58 per cent felt that computers will be used in the future to
keep people under surveillance. In addition 38 per cent believed that computers rep•
resent a real threat to personal privacy, 91 per cent of those questioned felt that com•
puters were used to compile information files on U.S. citizens, and 54 per cent be•
lieved these files were maintained for surveillance of activist or radical groups, Finally,
62 per cent expressed their concern over the types of information being kept, and 45
per cent said political activity records should not be kept. Id. at 88.
1544. Cf. Handler & Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy, and Other Attitudes of Welfare Redpients, 22 STAN. L. REv. I, 2 (1969).
1545. Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 LAW & CoNTEMP, Pnon,
307, 318 (1966).
1546. A. WESTIN, supra note 1501, at 34.
1547. Tobin, 1981 Minus Sixteen and Counting, SATURDAY REv., April 13, 1968, at
77-78.
1548. Crewdson, Files from Hoover to Backers Reported, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1974,
at 52, col. 1 (late city ed.), quoted in 120 CONG. REc. H2440 (daily ed. April 2, 1974).
See Hearings on Data Banks, supra note 1504, at 137 (statement of Representative
Mikva).
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been subjected to surveillance, or that a special file was or was not
kept on him . . . .
The harm comes rather when the ordinary citizen feels he cannot
engage in political activity without becoming a "person of interest,"
without having his name and photo placed in a file colloquially, if
not officially, labeled "subversive."1549
Invasions of privacy also result in direct injury to the individual
through misuse of his records, for once an individual divulges personal information, he in most instances loses all effective control
over it.1550 Harm can result if information that is accurate from one
perspective is used in a different context in which it is misleading.
Harm can also result from incomplete or erroneous information
collections. These possibilities are aggravated because in many situations individuals have only limited rights to see, supplement, or
correct their records.1°51
Damages flowing from the use of incomplete information are
clear: In 1973, Massachusetts Governor Sargent gave a full pardon
to a former felon who had kept his record clean for IO years. The
individual moved to a community 1000 miles away and enrolled
in a community college. The college president, after running a routine police check with the state's new computer file, learned of his
conviction and expelled him. The computer record had not included
the full pardon.1552 Another case was related by Representative Moss:
A young couple were returning home to San Francisco one evening
a year ago when they were stopped by Santa Clara County Sheriff's
deputies, eventually handcuffed, held at gunpoint and locked up
overnight on charges of auto theft. The arresting officers had queried
the San Francisco city and county criminal justice data bank and
learned that the couple's Falcon had been reported stolen a year
earlier. Police had failed to enter into the computer the "pink slip"
record that the car had been recovered by its rightful owners.1553
There are countless similar examples of individuals being denied
employment, promotion, or some other benefit because of records
of prior arrests.1554 That charges were dropped or dismissed, or that
1549. Hearings on Data Banks, supra note 1504, at 89.
1550. Criminal Justice Data Banks, Hearings on S. 2542, S. 2810, S. 2963, S. 2964
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judidary,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974) (statement of Senator Ervin) [hereinafter Hearings on
Criminal Justice Data Banks].
1551. See, e.g., text at notes 1678-93 infra. The new federal Privacy Act takes steps
to provide rights of access and challenge for records held by the federal government.
See text at notes 2084-98 infra.
1552. 120 CONG. REC. H2459 (daily ed. April 2, 1974) (remarks of Representative
Heinz).
1553. Id. at H2456.
1554. See Hearings on Criminal Justice Data Banks, supra note 1550, at 5-7 (statement of Senator Ervin).
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the person was found not guilty, is often not added to the record.mill
The injuries resulting from inaccurate information are similar. An
employer in Texas managed to get the arrest record of one Tosh
from a friend on the Fort Worth police department. He displayed
mug shots and rap sheets to discourage voting for the union Tosh
was organizing. The record being displayed was for one Charles
Tosch, however, a convicted felon. Tosh, the organizer, had been
arrested on minor charges and released.1556
The following sections of this Project discuss the development
of a right of privacy in state and federal law. Using as an analytical
framework the four questions regarding the threats posed by government information-practices to individual privacy, the discussion
examines consecutively the common-law privacy tort,mn state
statutes,1558 the federal constitutional law,m0 federal statutes prior
to the enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974,1000 and, finally, the
new Privacy Act,1561 to see how the balance has been struck between
the governmental need for information and individual privacy, and
to see the extent to which these areas of the law provide adequate
protection from the above-mentioned harms. Although the focus of
the discussion is on federal law, state statutes and the common law
are included in order to give a more complete picture of the themes
underlying the development of legal protections for privacy.
B. State Law of Privacy
Citizen-government relationships at the state level are far more
numerous and varied than those at the federal level, and are thus,
from the point of view of the individual's right of privacy, of considerably greater potential danger. In addition to the revenue and
law-enforcement functions conducted at both levels of government,
state governments administer, for example, welfare benefits, educational systems, and licensing requirements. These close contacts
create a large state appetite for personal information,1002 which is
restrained externally by federal and state constitutions, and internally only by the moral, social, and political judgments, both indi1555. See id. at 19.
1556. 120 CONG. REc. H2452 (daily ed. April 2, 1974) (statement of Representative
Moss).
1557. See text at notes 1564-625 infra.
1558. See text at notes 1626-788 infra.
1559. See text at notes 1789-915 infra.
1560. See text at notes 1916-65 infra.
1561. See text at notes 1966-2214 infra.
1562. For an overview of the dimensions of state record-keeping see Project, supra
note 1525. One commentator has identified at least a dozen personal information files
that any "ordinary young adult" can expect the government to have. See Karst, "The
Files": Legal Controls over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31
LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 342 (1966).
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vidual and collective, of state legislators and administrators. This
section considers the scope of the states' power to collect, retain, and
disseminate information about individuals, and evaluates the effectiveness of state common-law, constitutional, and statutory recognitions of the individual's right of privacy in protecting the individual
from unwanted and unwarranted governmental intrusions. The
conclusion reached is that while the fundamental notion of a "right
to be let alone"1563 is sufficiently broad to protect against such intrusions, the legal development of this right in the narrow context of
private litigation and ad hoc legislation has so stunted the concept
that it is today insufficiently responsive to the particular problems of
government information-handling.
I. Common-Law Protection of Privacy
Commun-law tort actions for invasion of privacy,1564 now recognized in a majority of jurisdictions,1565 provide only a limited restraint against governmental action because of the state's power to
override common-law rights by explicit statutory authorization,1566
and because the doctrines of sovereign immunity1567 and govern1563. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1523, at 195, quoting T. COOLEY, TORTS 29
(2d ed. 1888).
1564. Tortious invasion of privacy has been the subject of considerable comment
over the years. See, e.g., A. MILLER, supra note 1503; A. WESTIN, supra note 1501;
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964); Brodie, Privacy, the Family and the State, 1972 U. ILL. L.F.
743; Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966); Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MICH. L. REv. 526 (1941);
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960); Wade, Defamation and the Right of
Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093 (1962); Comment, Tortious Invasion of Privacy in Tennessee, 38 TENN. L. REv. 260 (1971).
1565. See Prosser, supra note 1564, at 386-88 (listing 27 states that accepted the tort
outright); w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1971) Qisting six.
more states). To these lists may be added Texas, see Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d
858 (Tex. 1968), and perhaps Massachusetts, see Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass.
251, 249 N.E.2d 251 (1969), and Washington. See Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334,
487 P.2d 211 (1971) (giving express recognition to the constitutional right and using
language that indicated it might feel constrained to recognize the tort in the future).
The tort has been expressly rejected in Nebraska, see Brunson v. Ranks Army Store,
161 Neb. 517, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955), Wisconsin, see Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430,
75 N.W.2d 925 (1956), and Rhode Island. See Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73
A. 97 (1909). Tennessee has been counted on both sides of the fence. See Prosser,
supra, at 387; Comment, supra note 1564, at 261. Dean Prosser has speculated that the
developing constitutional right might require these states to recognize the tort right.
See W. PROSSER, supra, at 816.
In addition to the states recognizing the common-law tort, four states provide
statutory recognition of a cause of action for invasion of privacy. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAw § 50 (McKinney 1948); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.I (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-9--401 (Supp. 1973); VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-650 (1957).
1566. See R. POUND, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 612, 654-59 (1959). See also id. at 663-64
(regarding the traditional doctrine of strict construction of statutes in derogation ot
common law).
1567. It is well established that a state is not liable in tort unless it gives consent.
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mental immunity1568 may preclude the individual from obtaining a
remedy. Moreover, the rigid, often mechanically applied requisites
of the privacy cause of action, which have gradually developed
since the tort was first recognized in the late nineteenth century,
have made the common-law action an often ineffective tool in protecting the individual from the threats to privacy that are peculiar
to government information-handling. Nevertheless, the concept of
privacy embodied in the tort law is of consequence in that it manifests the significance that society attaches to this right, a significance
that is often reflected in legislative treatment of personal information. In addition, the tort law of privacy provides a useful argument
in trying to limit ambiguous state statutes, and many states have
incorporated its protections into their freedom of information stat•
utes as an exemption to the general requirement of disclosure.1000
There are two fundamentally different views of the commonlaw right of privacy, which partially reflect different perceptions of
the dangers against which the tort right should protect. The 1890
law review article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis,mo which
first called for recognition of a right of privacy, contained elements
of both. On the one hand the authors called for a unitary right
See, e.g., Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 353 P.2d. 609 (1960); Lewis v. State, 96 N.Y. 71
(1884); W. PROSSER, supra note 1565, at 975. In all states consent has been given to a
greater or lesser extent, but such legislation has been narrowly construed in favor ot
the states. Id. at 975-76. See generally Shumate, Tort Claims Against State Govern•
ments, 9 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 242 (1942); Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the
States, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1363 (1954).
1568. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (plurality decision) (extending
an ab~lute privilege to all federal officials for acts done in connection with mandatory
or discretionary duties). Some state courts recognize only a qualified privilege that
does not shield state officers from liability for willful or malicious conduct. See, e.g.,
Ca:,;r v, Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962) (holding that the claim that two
police officers had maliciously divulged plaintiff's arrest record, knowing that he would
lose his job, stated a cause of action against the officers for invasion of privacy). In
addition, the "official" privilege is declared by statute in some states, See, e.g., CAL.
Civ. ConE § 47.l (West 1954), construed in White v. State, 17 Cal, App. 3d 621, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 175 (1971). In White, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants had been gullty
of negligence in disseminating an erroneous arrest record and the court held that the
complaint was properly dismissed. However, where records are required by statute to
be kept confidential, a ca1,1se of action for wrongful disclosure may be implied. See
text at note 1759 infra. In such. cases official immunity would not apply since the act
was done in violation, not in pursuit, of official duties.
1569. Many state open-records laws, like the federal Freedom of Information Act,
see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970), specifically exempt records the disclosure of which
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. See notes 1218-19 supra and ac•
companying text; text at notes 700-44 supra. These provisions are often given content
by reference to tort-law principles. See note 701 supra. In addition, the typical exemp•
tion for records "othenvise made confidential by law" has been construed in some
states to include the common-law right of privacy. See, e.g., Tex. Atty, Gen, Open
Records Dec, No. 2 (Sept. 10, 1973).
1570. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1523. This article has been called a ''model
of how effectively presented legal scholarship can lead to a change in the Jaw." A.
MILLER, supra note 1503, at 170,
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protecting one's "inviolate personality,"1571 which, they suggested,
should protect all emotions, ideas, and sensations, in whatever form
expressed, and all activities and private facts not made public by
the individual. The authors' specific concern, on the other hand,
was ·with a prying and aggressive press that thrived on publication
of private, often embarrassing details about individuals.1572 The
relationship between the new privacy right and the principles of
free speech and free press was therefore a major concern of the
article; the privacy cause of action actually delineated was narrowed by two broad exceptions allowing "any publication of matter
which is of [legitimate] public or general interest," 1573 and "any
publication made by one in the discharge of some public or private
duty."1574 Moreover, similar concerns led the authors to rely on
concepts established in the law of defamation. Their specific proposal
thus dealt only with publication of personal information rather
than with intrusions into "inviolate personality" resulting from the
mere acquisition and retention of information.
Perhaps because the period following the publication of the Warren and Brandeis article was a time of rapid technological growth,
shifting population patterns, and changing conceptions of the relationship between the individual and his community,1575 the tort de1571. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1503, at 205. In searching for the legal principle that would protect privacy, the authors.analyzed the cases allowing recovery for
publication of private matter on theories of common-law copyright, implied contract,
or breach of confidence. They concluded that the results in these cases were not fully
explained by narrow property or contract theories. "[T]he protection afforded to
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of
the arts ••• is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the
individual to be let alone••.• The principle which protects • . • personal production,
not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any form, is
in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality."
Id.
1572. The article was written at a time when "yellow journalism" was reaching its
peak. Apparently Mr. Warren was inspired to initiate the project by the extensive
and, to him, offensive coverage that his daughter's wedding received in the press.
Prosser, supra note 1564, at 383. Warren and Brandeis exclaimed:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and
of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery•.•. The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual . . • ."
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1523, at 196. As other commentators have pointed out,
there was little or no threat to privacy when snooping was "inhibited by the natural
limitations of the human eye [and] ear,'' A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 171, or when
there was a "degree of mutual interdependence among neighbors which generated
tolerance and tended to mitigate the harshness of the whispered disclosure." Bloustein,
supra note 1564, at 984.
1573. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1523, at 214.
1574. Id. at 217.
1575. See generally J. Eu.UL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964); M. McLUHAN,
THE GUTENBERG GALAXY (1962).
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veloped in a state of disarray.1576 In 1960, Dean Prosser sought to
order the chaos with a new analysis of the tort, which he characterized as
not one tort but a complex of four. The law of privacy comprises
four distinct kinds of invasions of four different interests of the
plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but othenvise
have almost nothing in common .... Without any attempt to exact
definition, these four torts may be described as follows:
I. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness.1577
The Prosserian analysis quickly gained wide acceptance.1u7s While
Warren and Brandeis' lofty ideal of the inviolate personality was
not entirely forgotten, Prosser's compartmentalization of the privacy
tort indicated that, as judicially developed, the tort remained close
to their specific, more limited, proposal.
In each of the four branches of the tort, Prosser identified the
factors employed by courts to separate wrongful invasions of protected interests from acceptable social interaction in an increasingly crowded world. In each case, "[t]he protection afforded [by
the tort] to the plaintiff's interest [is] relative to the customs of
the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff, and to the
habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens."1570 The test of what is
"offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man,"1uso applies in
different ways to the intrusion,1 581 disclosure,11i82 and false light1G88
1576. See Prosser, supra note 1564, at 407. Prosser quotes Judge Biggs, who, in
Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956),
likened the tort to a "haystack in a hurricane."
1577. Prosser, supra note 1564, at 389. Prosser's analysis was based on "something
over three hundred cases in the books" at the time. Id. at 388. Cases on invasion of
privacy are also collected in Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942); Annot., 168 A.L.R. 446
(1947); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950).
1578. Writing in 1962, Dean Wade pointed out that five state courts had already
quoted Prosser's analysis. See Wade, supra note 1564, at 1095 n.13. Prosser is still
widely quoted as a leading authority in the field. See, e.g., Billings v. Atkinson, 489
S.W.2d 858, 859 (Tex. 1973).
1579. R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 13,
1967).
1580. Prosser, supra note 1564, at 390-91.
1581. See id. An actionable intrusion must involve prying into some matter that is,
and is entitled to be, private. Thus, both the act of intruding and the matter in•
truded upon must be "offensive." The example given by Prosser of an unobjectionable
intrusion involved a landlord calling to ask for rent on a Sunday, which was offensive
to the plaintiff, but would not be to an ordinary person. See Horstman v. Newman,
291 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1956). Initially the intrusion tort was related to physical trespass,
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branches. The intrusion1584 and disclosure1585 branches also protect
only matters that are in fact private; there is no protectible interest
in activities done in a public place1586 or in matters of public
record.1687 The requirement of publicity is a further limitation on
but it has grown with technology to encompass electronic eavesdropping. Prosser, supra note 1564, at 391. REs'I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B (Tent. Draft No. 13,
1967) imposes liability on "[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another." See also Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d
858 (Tex. 1973).
1582. In the disclosure branch of the tort, whether the revelation would be offensive to a reasonable person must be tested against prevailing community standards.
Prosser, supra note 1564, at 396. Thus the boundaries of the zone of privacy are somewhat vague. Intimate details of family life or sexuality are clearly within the zone,
see, e.g., Gamer v. Triangle Publications, 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), while matters relating to one's business life are not. For example, in Patton v. Royal Indus.,
Inc., 263 Cal. App. 2d 760, 70 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1968), the court held that the complaint
did not state a cause of action for invasion of privacy because: "There was absent a
statement of fact relative to their private lives or any other secret matter, and although
the statements were defamatory they reflected exclusively upon the professionally [sic]
standing of the plaintiffs in the public view." 263 Cal. App. 2d at 766-68, 70 Cal.
Rptr. at 48. However, publication of a private debt is generally actionable. See, e.g.,
Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
1583. The parameters of the "false-light" branch of the tort are blurred by its
close connection with the law of defamation. Prosser, supra note 1564, at 400-01. See
also Wade, supra note 1564, at 1093. While the false disclosure need not be defamatory,
it must be something that would be objectionable to a reasonable person under the
circumstances. As in the disclosure cases, see note 1582 supra, something of a "mores"
test must be applied.
1584. Prosser, supra note 1564, at 390-91.
1585. Id. at 394.
1586. Id. at 395. The leading case is Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224,
253 P .2d 441 (1953), holding that publication of a photo of plaintiff embracing his
wife in a public market was not an invasion of privacy.
1587. Prosser, supra note 1564, at 395-96. See, e.g., Berg v. Minneapolis Star &:
Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948) (newspaper coverage of divorce proceedings not actionable); Bell v. Courier-Journal &: Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d
84 (Ky. 1966) (report of judge's delinquent taxes not actionable). The REs'I'ATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D, comment c (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967), explains: "[T]here
is no liability [for invasion of privacy) for giving publicity to facts about the plaintiff's life which are matters of public records.••• On the other hand, if the record
is one not open to public inspection ••• it is not public and there is an invasion of
privacy when it is made so." Thus, in Patterson v. Tribune Co., 146 S.2d 623 (Fla.
App. 1962) a newspaper was held liable for republication of a court dock.et showing
plaintiff's voluntary narcotic commitment proceeding, on the basis of a statute, Law of
June 15, 1953, ch. 28233, § 4 [1953] (repealed 1970), limiting access to the records of
such proceedings. See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 43 U.S.L.W. 4343 (U.S.
March 3, 1975). In that case the Georgia supreme court had held that publication of
the name of a rape-murder victim violated her father's common-law right of privacy.
A state statute, GA. ConE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972), made such publication a misdemeanor,
but the court said that the tort right did not depend upon the statute. 231 Ga. 60,
62, 200 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1973). In reversing the judgment for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court showed considerable sensitivity to the right of privacy, see 43 U.S.L.W.
at 4349-52, and confined itself to the circumstances of the case, holding that a state
"may not impose sanctions for the publication of truthful information contained in
official court records open to public inspection." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4351. The court added
that the holding implied nothing about the constitutionality of a state policy "not
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the disclosure1588 and false light1589 torts, and is only satisfied when
disclosure is to more than a few persons. 1690 The disclosure branch
is also subject to a privilege for reporting about events and persons
of public interest,1591 and the defenses of consent and waiver may
defeat claims under any of the branches.1592
On the basis of his analysis, Prosser concluded that the "right of
privacy" did not protect a unique or definable interest in what
Warren and Brandeis called "inviolate personality,'' 1093 but rather
addressed the more familiar interests in freedom from mental distress,1594 reputation,1595 and the proprietary interest in name and
allowing access by the public and press to various kinds of official records ••• ," 43
U.S.L.W. at 4352 n.26. The separate concurring opinions by Justices Douglas and
Powell, see 43 U.S.L.W. at 4352, both evidenced a preference for a broader holding,
more protective of first amendment rights. However, Justice Powell was willing to
allow a different balancing where "a State's desire to protect privacy ••• implicate[s]
interests that are distinct from those protected by defamation actions." 43 U.S.L.W. at
4353. See Prosser, supra note 1564, at 397. Compare Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co., 113
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), afjg. 34 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), with Melvin v. Reid, 112
Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). See also Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 4 Cal. 3d
529,483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971); Frick v. Boyd, 350 Mass. 259, 214 N.E.2d 460
(1966).
1588. See Prosser, supra note 1564, at 393-94. The requirement of "publicity" is a
different standard than the "publication" concept in defamation law. Thus, in addition to newspaper reporting, posting a notice in a public place is sufficient, see Brents
v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927), but communication to an individual,
such as plaintiff's employer, or even to a small group, is not. See, e.g., Hawley v. Pro•
fessional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835 (1956) (to employer); Gregory
v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1943) (oral accusation of theft before
customers in a store).
Publicity is not required if the claim of invasion of privacy is based on breach of
a trust or confidential relationship, which affords an independent basis of relief. See,
e.g., Copley v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 93 (D. W. Va. 1968).
1589. See Prosser, supra note 1564, at 400.
1590. But see Copley v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 93 (D. W.
Va. 1968).
1591. Prosser, supra note 1564, at 410-15. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 326 U.S. 254 (1964). See also A. MILLER, supra note
1503, at 190-99.
1592. Prosser, supra note 1564, at 419-20. Consent may be given either expressly or
implicitly, as by actively seeking publicity. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124
F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941). In either case, if the invasion goes beyond that to which the
plaintiff can fairly be said to have consented, there is liability. See, e.g., Manger v.
Kree Institute of Electrolysis, 233 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1956); Russell v. Marboro Books, 18
Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
The concept of waiver is closely tied both to implied consent and to the privilege
of reporting on newsworthy events. See text at note 1591 supra. The terms are used
rather loosely: "The utilization of these concepts [consent and waiver] by the courts
has been somewhat Draconian and has resulted in an understandable dampening of
enthusiasm for pursuing the privacy theory•••• For example, a woman was held to
have· 'waived her right of privacy' by leaping from a twelve story building. [Metter
v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939)]" A. MILLEn, supra
note 1503, at 185.
1593. See Prosser, supra note 1564, at 389, 422.
1594. See id. at 392, 398, 422. Prosser identifies freedom from mental distress as the
interest protected by the intrusion and disclosure torts.
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likeness.1596 Prosser's descriptive analysis of the tort's development
thus represented a retrenchment from the ideal advocated by Warren
and Brandeis. Of greatest significance is the limitation, noted by
Prosser, that the publication of private information about an individual is actionable only if the publication is highly objectionable
or if the information places the individual in a false light. Prosser's
tort recognizes no interest in "selective disclosure," no right simply
to control the flow of ordinary information about oneself. Moreover,
the acquisition of information is wrongful only if the method by
which it is obtained is sufficiently intrusive. This means, stated
Prosser, that "[o]n the public street, or in any other public place,
the plaintiff has no legal right to be let alone." 1597 Finally, none of
the aspects of the privacy tort as set forth by Prosser protect against
the psychological effect of the retention by government bodies of
masses of personal information.
Prosser's analysis of the limitations imposed by the courts on the
tort of privacy has been disputed. It has been argued, in particular,
that Prosser's compartmentalization of the privacy tort ignores the
underlying "spiritual" interest in freedom and individuality suggested by many of the decisions,1598 and has thus, in the language of
Warren and Brandeis, prevented "the common law, in its eternal
youth, [from] grow[ing] to meet the demands of society."1599 The
dispute over whether "privacy" is a single interest or a deceptive
term for several distinct interests has important implications for
the expansion of the tort. I£ the Prosserian analysis is retained, the
present limitations may be applied without regard to the source of
the threat, and the tort will thus fail to recognize the threats to the
individual that are unique to government information-handling.1600
1595. See id. at 398, 401, 422. Both the disclosure and false light branches are
viewed as protecting the interest in reputation.
1596. See id. at 406, 423. Under this aspect of the privacy tort there must be some
advantage to the defendant. "Under the statutes this must be a pecuniary advantage;
but the common law is very probably not so limited." Id. at 405-06. Thus, use for political advantage is sufficient. See, e.g., State ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86,
229 P. 317 (1924). It has been suggested that what is involved here is not so much a
right of privacy as a "right of publicity," i.e., the right to determine when and for
whose advantage one's identity will be exposed to the public. See Nimmer, The Right
of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954).
1597. W. PROSSER, supra note 1565, at 808.
1598. See Bloustein, supra note 1564. Reviewing many of the cases on which Prosser
based his analysis, Bloustein concluded that "the tort cases involving privacy are of
one piece and involve a single tort." Id. at 1000. "[T]he interest served in the privacy
cases is in some sense a spiritual interest rather than an interest in property or reputation. Moreover ••• the spiritual characteristic which is at issue is not a form of
trauma, mental illness or distress, but rather individuality or freedom." Id. at 1002.
1599. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1523, at 193.
1600. See, e.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307
N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970), discussed in the text at notes 1608-12 infra.

1238

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 73:971

But if the underlying interest in privacy is viewed as a unified, personal right that is an extension of an individual's personality, the
limitations can be discarded when it becomes apparent that the
fundamental interest has been infringed in a new and unanticipated
way. Government's size and its unique capacity to inquire, to remember, and to affect people's lives, enable it to invade privacy in
ways that individual defendants cannot. The concept of privacy
must be flexible enough to recognize that a governmental act can
do more damage to the "inviolate personality" than would the same
act by an individual.
The literature on the right of privacy reflects a tension between
the fear that it protects a merely trivial interest in a highly interactive society1601 and the concern that it should protect the individual from, but often fails to reach, the ·wrongs affronting "human
dignity and individuality."1602 Prosser's retrenchment from the idea
of a unitary right of privacy and the impatience of those writers
who view the privacy tort as trivial have partially accounted for the
hesitancy to advance beyond Warren and Brandeis' specific dislike
of "yellow journalism."1603 The irony is that, in attempting to prune
the "most marvelous tree that [grew] from the wedding of the daughter of Mr. Samuel D. Warren,"1604 Dean Prosser delineated a cause
of action large enough to redress many petty grievances, but too
narrow to cover new threats to the fundamental spiritual interest
that Warren and Brandeis were concerned with in a larger sense.
The tort law of privacy is by no means as settled as the oftquoted Prosserian formula seems to indicate. Some recent cases
demonstrate a willingness to relax the limitations of Prosser's tort
when an act outside the Prosserian mold causes genuine harm to
the "inviolate personality."1605 For example, some courts have suggested that large institutions can violate the right of privacy even
1601. See Kalven, supra note 1564. Kalven offers "as an example of the unbeatable
triviality of some privacy litigation" the case of Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704,
211 P.2d 320 (1949), which was based on a one line reference to "a fighter named
Canvasback Cohen" on Groucho Marx's radio show. While the plaintiff, a former
boxer, was denied recovery, the case also illustrates Kalven's objection that "[t]he lack
of legal profile for the tort makes any sort of unconsented•to reference to the. plaintiff look colorable •••. I suspect, therefore, that the achievement of the new tort
remedy has been primarily to breed nuisance claims." Kalven, supra, at 339,
1602. Bloustein, supra note 1564, at 1003.
1603. "One may perhaps wonder if the tort is not an anachronism, a nineteenth
century response to the mass press which is hardly in keeping with the more robust
tastes of today.'' Kalven, supra note 1564, at 327.
1604. Prosser, supra note 1564, at 423.
1605. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 533-34, 483 P.2d 84,
37, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 869 (1971); United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R.
1968); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334,487 P.2d 2ll (1971).
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without publicity,1606 and without intrusion into exclusively private
areas of one's life.1607
In a number of recent decisions, however, the limitations announced by Prosser have been mechanically applied to defeat a
privacy claim without any sensitivity to the magnitude of the threat
inherent in institutional handling of personal information. For
example, in Nader v. General Motors Corp.,1608 in which Ralph
Nader charged that GM's campaign to elicit damaging information
about him from his friends constituted an invasion of his privacy,
the majority said that "the mere gathering of information about a
particular individual does not give rise to a cause of action under
this theory. Privacy is invaded only if the information sought is of
a confidential nature and the defendant's conduct was unreasonably
intrusive."1600 The cour~ concluded that questioning third parties
1606. See, e.g., Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962), in which malicious disclosure by police to plaintiff's employer was held to state a cause of action for
invasion of privacy. It may be questioned, however, whether this relaxation of the
publicity requirement is really a departure from the norm of tort cases. It can be
argued that cases holding that disclosure to an employer is not an invasion of privacy, see, e.g., Hawley v. Professional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835
(1956), tum on a judgment that the loss of a job is an economic, not a dignitary,
harm. See Blaustein, supra note 1564, at 980-83. In addition, the publicity requirement has not been an obstacle to the protection of privacy from governmental dissemination, since disclosure to even a single requester under a freedom of information
act makes the information "public." Under most freedom of information acts, the
requester is not required to show any need for the information he seeks. Thus, the
decision to disclose a record to any one requester means that it is open to anyone who
cares to see it; in this sense, such a record is clearly made "public." See note 458 supra and accompanying text; note 1242 supra and accompanying text. See also Tex.
Atty. Gen. Open Records Dec. No. 2 (Sept. 10, 1973), holding that under Prosser's
standards, disclosure to a single requester of certain records "would constitute an invasion of privacy by reason of being a public disclosure of private information of a
highly objectionable kind." The requester in that case was a newspaper reporter, but
the Attorney General did not rely on that fact, nor in any way elaborate on his conclusion that the disclosure was "public." The notion that simply placing the information in the public domain satisfies the publicity requirement is clearly a loosening
of the traditional rule, and undercuts the inference that the interest being protected
is one's reputation. This understanding that an individual's privacy may be infringed
simply by having his identity held up to public view, even if the public never looks,
is essential to the protection of the right of privacy in government-held information.
A long-standing application of this principle is the general agreement that an acquitted arrestee may force the police to remove his photograph from a "rogue's
gallery." See, e.g., State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946),
appeal after retrial, 225 Ind. 360, 74 N.E.2d 914 (1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 834
(1948); Itzkovich v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42 S. 228 (1906); State ex rel. Reed v.
Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153 S.W.2d 834 (1941).
1607. See, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dictum).
1608. 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
1609. 25 N.Y.2d at 567, 255 N.E.2d at 769, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 652-53. Nader's complaint alleged six specific instances of GM's intrusive conduct, including interviews
with his acquaintances, surveillance in public places, attempts to entrap him in illicit
relationships, threatening and harassing telephone calls, wiretapping, and harassing
investigations. The court upheld the order denying dismissal of the privacy claims to

1240

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '13:971

was not unreasonably intrusive conduct1610 and that any information
Nader's acquaintances were capable of divulging obviously was not
secret.1611 Judge Breitel's concurrence took issue with this analysis,
however, pointing out that the unique capacity of the corporate
defendant to damage the plaintiff's right of privacy in this instance
should affect the determination of whether the acts complained of
were mere annoyances or significant wrongs requiring legal redress.1612
If the tort is indeed a "dignitary" one protecting a fundamental
spiritual interest rather than a loose mixture of interests in property
and reputation, then the damage done by the mere creation or maintenance of a file "unsupported by palpable social excuse or economic
justification"1613 is clearly within its spirit.1614
Several state attorneys general, dealing with the disclosure tort's
"offensive facts" requirement, have also made merely mechanical
decisions about threatened privacy violations. For example, one
such decision interpreting a state open-records act required disclosure of the names and addresses of freshmen entering a state university to the proprietor of a local bookstore.1616 While an individual's student status is hardly such an intimate detail that disclosure
to third parties is offensive to most persons, it is disturbing that the
offensive facts limitation requires state agencies, without consent
and without consideration of opposing interests, to act as market
researchers in the service of private interests. A similar state attorney
the extent that they were supported by the allegations of wire-tapping and over•
zealous surveillance. 25 N.Y.2d at 569-71, 255 N.E,2d at 770-71, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 654-56.
But the majority felt compelled to elaborate on its view of the insufficiency of the
other allegations "for the guidance of the trial court and counsel." 25 N.Y,2d at 568,
255 N.E.2d at 769, 307 N.Y.S,2d at 653.
1610. 25 N.Y.2d at 569, 571, 255 N.E.2d at 770, 771, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 654, 656.
1611. 25 N.Y.2d at 569, 255 N.E.2d at 770, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
1612. Judge Breitel concurred in the aflirmance, but disagreed with the majority's
restrictive and unnecessary advice about specific allegations. Breitel pointed out that
The real issue in the volatile and developing law of privacy is whether a private
person is entitled to be free of certain grave offensive intrusions unsupported by
palpable social or economic excuse or justification.
True, scholars, in trying to define the elusive concept of the right of privacy,
have, as of the present, subdivided the common law right into separate classifi•
cations •••• This does not mean, however, that the classifications are either frozen
or exhausted, or that several of the classifications may not overlap•
• • • Although acts performed in "public," especially if taken singly or in small
numbers, may not be confidential, at least arguably a right to privacy may never•
theless be invaded through extensive or exhaustive monitoring and cataloguing
of acts normally disconnected and anonymous.
It is not unimportant that plaintiff contends that a giant corporation had al•
legedly sought by surreptitious and unusual methods to silence an unusually ef•
fective critic.
25 N.Y.2d at 572-73, 255 N.E.2d at 772, 307 N.Y.S,2d at 656-57.
1613. 25 N.Y.2d at 572, 255 N.E.2d at 772, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
1614. Cf. Goldstein, Legal Control of the Dossier, in ON REcoRD 415, 419 (S.
Wheeler ed. 1969).
1615. Tex. Atty. Gen. Open Records Dec. No. 16 Gan. 15, 1974).
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general opinion required disclosure of the race of specific individuals
because information regarding race or ethnic background is not "in~
trinsically confidential."1616 While there may be valid reasons for
public access to such information,1617 the decision to disclose should
be based on those reasons rather than on a rigid application of the
offensive facts limitation. That limitation may achieve a rough bal~
ance of interests in a noninstitutional context, but when the govern~
ment is the discloser and the potential damage is on a much greater
scale, a more flexible and sensitive test is needed.
Similar problems of inflexibility in applying tort concepts to
government information-handling are caused by the defenses of consent and waiver. Governmental units that have given no express
promise of confidentiality have tried to defeat the claim of privacy
on the grounds either that the information is now a matter of public
record and therefore no longer private, or that the individual has
implicitly consented to the dissemination of information voluntarily
disclosed to the government. While courts have not generally regarded the public-record label as conclusive,1618 such arguments
have met with some success.1619 It has been suggested that the privacy
claim is strongest with respect to information the government acquires as a result of a coerced relationship, such as arrest records,1620
and that, by way of contrast, the acceptance of a public benefit
constitutes an implied consent to the dissemination of information
to anyone properly concerned with the administration of the benefit,
perhaps including the public as a whole in its watchdog capacity.1621
1616. Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. H-118 (Oct. 3, 1973) (emphasis original).
1617. For example, any effort to assess the effectiveness and integrity of an affirmative action program would require such data. Most state open-records acts do not,
however, permit inquiry into the requester's motives in seeking the information. See
note 1242 supra and accompanying text.
1618. See, e.g., Jordan v. Loos, 204 Misc. 814, 125 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct. 1953), holding that parole records are not disclosable under the New York statute requiring the
custodian of public records to provide copies on request (N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS I.Aw§ 66
(McKinney 1948)). The fact that parole records had been confidential since the inception of the parole system was important in the court's decision. See 204 Misc. at 819,
125 N,Y.S.2d at 452. In Gallagher v. Boller, 231 Cal. App. 2d 482, 41 Cal. Rptr. 880
(1964), the absence of a promise of confidentiality on the face of an application for
tax exemption and the voluntary nature of the disclosure led the court to conclude
that the information was disclosable. In both of these cases the courts looked for circumstances indicating an expectation of privacy, rather than relying on the "public
record" label. See also MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Ore. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961). Dean
Prosser concludes that "[t]he answer may be that the existence of a public record is
a factor of a good deal of importance, which will normally prevent the matter from
being private, but that under some special circumstances it is not necessarily conclusive." Prosser, supra note 1564, at 396.
1619. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 43 U.S.L.W. 4343, 4351 (U.S. March
3, 1975), discussed in note 1587 supra.
1620. See Karst, supra note 1562, at 344 n.10.
1621. See, e.g., MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Ore. 27, 38, 359 P.2d 413, 418 (1961). Cf.
Gallagher v. Boller, 231 Cal. App. 2d 482, 492, 41 Cal. Rptr. 880, 886 (1964) (observing
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Although the element of voluntarism is a proper consideration in
assessing a privacy claim, this blanket rule ignores the fact that
many government benefits, such as welfare benefits, are of such importance to the individual that any appearance of choice in accept•
ing the benefit is merely illusory. 1622' In the government setting, the
concept of consent and waiver must be applied in a manner that
accounts for inequality of bargaining position.1023
Thus, if the current Prosserian view of the tort law of privacy
is adopted as a prescriptive delineation of the limits of societal concern for privacy and applied in unmodified form to governmental
acquisition and handling of personal information, many important
privacy interests are left unprotected. Despite broader views of this
developing area of tort law, there is a danger that state agencies,
courts, and legislatures will rely on the seemingly firm and authoritative outlines of Prosser's tort.1624 In order to deal with the newly
perceived governmental threat to privacy, courts, legislatures, and
all other shapers of the law must update the concept of privacy as
a "bulwark built up against the threatened annihilation of man's
personal life." 1625

2. State Constitutional and Statutory Protection of Privacy
The development of the common-law privacy right necessarily
has suffered from the ad hoc approach of case adjudication, a method
of development that leaves many aspects of the common law in doubt.
While constitutional or statutory provisions could define the right
of privacy comprehensively, few states have enacted such provisions.1626
Although the source of the federal constitutional right of privacy is not well-defined,1627 it is clear that the federal Constitution
accords individual privacy a degree of indirect protection flowing
from the limits of the federal government's enumerated powers.102s
that the absence of statutory confidentiality for records relating to tax-e.xempt status
was reasonable since an institution claiming such status could fairly be required to
submit to public scrutiny in exchange for relief from its tax obligation).
1622, Welfare is the clearest example-it can hardly be said that the choice between privacy and starvation is a free one. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). Even in the more mundane area of driver's licenses it is clear that one must
pay a considerable price for anonymity.
1623. See A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 187.
1624. See, e.g., Tex. Atty. Gen. Open Records Dec. No. 2 (Sep. 10, 1973), applying
Prosser's standards to determine whether certain records were disclosable under the
state open-records act.
1625. Nizer, supra note 1564, at 559.
1626, The only exceptions are the new Minnesota and Utah privacy acts. MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 15.162-.168 (Supp. 1975); Ch. 194, §§ 1-12, [1!175) Laws of Utah 870. See
text at notes 1768-87 infra.
1627. See text at notes 1825-30 infra.
1628. See text at notes 1789-824 infra.
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Unlike the federal government, however, the state governments pos•
sess a plenary residual power to adopt measures, and hence to gather
information, in a wide range of contexts.1629 This power is subject
to no significant inherent limitations other than the restraints result•
ing from the operation of the supremacy clause of the federal Con•
stitution,1680 the restraints imposed by the federal Bill of Rights,
and the restraints contained in the state constitutions.
Some state constitutions expressly recognize a right of privacy,1681
but few decisions interpreting such provisions go beyond the scope
of the federally protected constitutional right.1632 Indeed, California
and Alaska seem to be alone in developing broad state constitutional
protection for this right.1633 A general state constitutional provision
creating or protecting a right of privacy can be of significant value
in developing greater protections for the individual privacy interests.
Such a provision could, with broad judicial interpretation, develop
a right of privacy almost as comprehensive and effective as any enacted
by a state legislature. Moreover, general constitutional protection of
privacy would permit courts to interpret statutes and regulations
that affect privacy, such as those dealing with the handling of personal information, with greater sensitivity to the privacy interest than
1629. See F. MICHAELMAN &: T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GoVERNMENT IN URBAN
AREAs 20 (1970). It has been suggested that the introduction of the due process residual
personal rights concepts to the discussion of state power to regulate individual conduct in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), might revive the doctrine that
the state's police power to regulate for the general welfare must be exercised only for
public purposes. See, e.g., Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA.
L. R.Ev. 1048, 1057-71 (1968). However, Michaelman and Sandalow note that as a matter of practice, courts never challenge a state's decision that an enactment serves a
public purpose. See F. MICHAEi.MAN &: T. SANDALOW, supra, at 110.
1630. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
1631. See, e.g., AI.As. CONST. art. I, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § l; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
1632. For example, in Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill. 2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 925 (1973), the court said that campaign disclosure requirements infringed upon a privacy right protected by the state constitution, but held
that this was justified by the state's compelling interest in eliminating abuses of public office. In an earlier case, City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466
P .2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), the California supreme court had struck down a similar
statute as a violation of the federal right of privacy.
1633. In White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 553 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975), the
California supreme court unanimously held that undercover police surveillance of
university classes was "a prima fade violation of the state constitutional right [of
privacy]." 13 Cal. 3d at - , 553 P .2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106. Quoting extensively from the state's election brochure as an aid to construction of the 1972 amendment creating this right, the court said that it was specifically aimed at "the accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance
and data collection activity in contemporary society • . . . 'At present there are no

effective restraints on the information activities of government and business. This
amendment creates a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian.'
(Emphasis in original.)" 13 Cal. 3d at - , 533 P .2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105. In
Ravin v. State, 43 U.SL.W. 2502 (Alas. May 27, 1975), the court relied on both federal
privacy law and the Alaska constitutional provision to prohibit prosecution for the
possession or use of marijuana within the home.
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might othenvise be possible. It seems clear, however, that a constitutional provision alone, either as adopted or as intrepreted, cannot
adequately protect the individual from government's information
demands. Judicial development of a general constitutional right of
privacy would, like the common-law right, be limited by the individual litigation context. In an area like privacy where conflicting
interests are many and varied (and often unrepresented in a particular judicial controversy) and the need to balance these interests
is critical, case law is too imprecise a tool to shape a broad policy
for the handling of personal information by the government.
Even a constitutional provision aimed specifically at the problem
of government information-handling would not be wholly satisfactory. A right of privacy tied to a constitutional provision is inherently inflexible and difficult to change: An improper balance struck
by a state judiciary or a balance no longer desirable in light of
changed conditions is outside of the legislature's power to alter.
Finally, total reliance on a constitutional right of privacy generates
the assumption that the government should exercise its power right
up to the limits of the individual's constitutional right to resist.
The conflict between the government's need for information and
the individual's right of privacy involves questions of political
judgment. Even in the face of a generous constitutional provision,
it is to be hoped that the legislature will refrain from unnecessary,
though constitutionally permissible, intrusions. A government information-handling policy of sufficient sensitivity and responsiveness
to both individual and governmental interests can be achieved more
successfully in a setting in which those administering the policy have
a voice in its development. Such a policy would recognize that the
most potent protection of the right of privacy lies with the political
judgment of the legislatures to refrain from unnecessary intrusion
upon individual lives. Unfortunately, the present state statutes regulating the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of personal
information reflect almost no consideration of the privacy interests
of the subjects of government files.
The state governments' power flows through agencies to which
specific governmental functions have been delegated. The delegation
of state powers to act in many contexts carries with it either an
express or an implied power to acquire information.1684 The delegation of state power in theory could constitute a significant limitation on the scope of agency power to acquire information, but
such restrictions in practice are of minimal scope and significance.
When the delegating statute does not limit the type of information
an agency may collect it has been held that an agency may collect
any information reasonably necessary to the performance of its
1634. See Goldstein, supra note 1614.
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functions. 1685 This standard has resulted in no real limitations on
agency information acquisition because courts have thus far been
reluctant to substitute their judgment of necessity for that of the
agency that uses the information.1636
Most statutes provide no basis for any greater limitation on
agency powers to acquire information. For example, the statutes
delegating power in connection with the welfare, licensing, taxation,
education, and police functions manifest little concern with the
proper limits of state information-gathering. In administering welfare benefits, granting drivers licenses, or collecting taxes, a state
agency clearly needs detailed information about individuals in order
to decide whether to grant a benefit or impose a burden,1637 and
the substantive requirements of these programs largely determine
the agency's information needs.1638 Perhaps because in most instances
the need for information is obvious, statutes delegating these func~
tions typically do not delineate information-gathering functions. 1689
1635. See, e.g., Belmont v. State Personnel Bd., 36 Cal. App. 3d 518, Ill Cal. Rptr.
607 (1974) (state welfare agency); California Portland Cement Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 67 Cal. 2d 578, 432 P .2d 700, 63 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1967) (property tax board).
1636. DATABANKS, supra note 1502, at 379. For example, in Belmont v. State Personnel Bd., 36 Cal. App. 3d 518, Ill Cal. Rptr. 607 (1974), two psychiatric social
workers attempted to resist an order to provide case history information on their welfare clients to a new computerized information system on the ground that such information was not necessary to the state welfare agency's functions. The court held that
some relevancy to the agency's functions was sufficient to support the inquiry and
further, that the determination of "necessity" was "best left to the agency charged by
law with making it." 36 Cal. App. 3d at 524, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 610. The same standard
of "reasonable relevance" has been applied to inquiries by a state taxing authority,
see California Portland Cement Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 67 Cal. 2d 578, 432
P.2d 700, 63 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1967), and by the police. See Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210,
265 A.2d 678 (1970).
1637. See, e.g., Zimmerman, Record Keeping and the Intake Process in a Public
Welfare Agency, in ON RECORD 319 (S. Wheeler ed. 1969).
1638. In the welfare area, the variety of eligibility requirements imposed on welfare programs, see, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 1637, at 322, and the fact that the
eligibility inquiry will necessarily touch on inherently personal matters of family life,
make informational intrusion a very sensitive problem: "Closely related to stigma is
the problem of privacy. Disclosing assets and resources, revealing the names of one's
friends and associates, submitting to investigation and questioning • • • these are the
price of receiving welfare. Loss of privacy is loss of dignity and is part of the shame
of being a welfare recipient." Handler &: Hollingsworth, supra note 1544, at 2. Argnably, any significant curtailment of the degree of inquiry intrusion associated with receipt of welfare benefits would require a fundamental restructuring of the system, for
example, the elimination of characteristics of family life as criteria of eligibility.
Handler &: Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justice, 31
LAW&: CONTEMP. PROB. 377, 378-94 (1966).
1639. For example, many statutes authorize the administering agency to prepare
application forms that call for certain specified information and "such other information as the agency may require" (or similar Iangnage). In the areas of motor vehicle
licensing, see NEV. REv. STAT. § 483.290 (1967); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 31-10-12 (1968);
Mo• .ANN. STAT. § 302.171 (1969); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 31-130 (1961), as amended
(Supp. 1974), taxation, see GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3208 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2614
(1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-15A-10 (Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-42 (1960);
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In the area of education, in particular, detailed records are often
constructed to measure the effectiveness of the educational process,1640
many times ·with the aim of drawing a complete portrait of the
subject by including many kinds of objective and subjective data.1641
Because local communities have principal responsibility for education,1642 state statutes generally do not regulate the gathering of
information by schools, and local practices with respect to the content of school records vary considerably.1643 While it has been questioned whether schools should be concerned with nonacademic
information like family characteristics, background, and personality,1644 there are at present no statutory constraints on the power
of school authorities to gather such information.1645
In the area of criminal law, information-gathering has been the
subject of express statutory concern. Nearly all states have statutes
requiring the collection of identification data concerning persons
arrested for or convicted of certain offenses.1646 These statutes typically govern the activities of a state bureau of criminal identification,
which aids local and federal law enforcement officials by providing
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5867 (1970), and welfare applications, See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 44:8-121 (1953); HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 346-10, 346-72 (1968); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 71-231 (1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 205.940 (1972). The federal regulation governing applications and investigations under the federally funded aid programs docs not
delineate the scope of permissible inquiry but merely requires that "[s]tandards and
methods for determination of eligibility shall be consistent with the objectives of pro•
grams, and shall respect the rights of individuals [under the Constitution and relevant
state and federal statutes]." 45 C.F.R. § 206(10)(a)(IO) (1974).
1640. Goslin &: Bordier, Record-Keeping in Elementary and Secondary Schools, in
ON R.EcoRD 29 (S. Wheeler ed. 1969).
1641. Goslin &: Bordier, supra note 1640, at 61-65, School authorities take the po•
sition that society's increasingly broad expectations of the educational process require
a great deal of information about the "whole child." See also Divoky, Cumulative
Records: Assault on Privacy, reprinted in Privacy, Joint Hearings on S. !J1181 S. !J6!J!J,
S. !J116, S. 2810, S. 2512 Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Privacy and Information
Systems of the Senate Comm. on Government operations and the Subcomm. on Con•
stitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1773
(1974) [hereinafter Joint Hearings].
1642. Goslin &: Bordier, supra note 1640, at 41.
1643. Id. at 43-49. Some states do, however, impose affirmative obligations on school
boards to maintain certain types of student records. See, e.g., OHIO REv, CODE ANN,
§ 3319.32 (Page 1972),
1644. See Goslin&: Bordier, supra note 1640, at 61-65.
1645. See Divoky, supra note 1641, at 1773, The sole possible exception is an interesting Rhode Island statute that prohibits the use in schools of questionnaires that
would invade the privacy of the pupils without prior approval of the school board.
See R.I. GEN. LA.ws ANN. § 16-38-5 (1969).
1646. See, e.g., AI.As. STAT. § 12.62.020 (1962); CONN. GEN, STAT, ANN, § 29-12 (1958);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8519 (1953); N.J. STAT, ANN. § 53:1-15 (1953); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 39-3-8 (1953); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN, § 109.60 (Page 1964). See also Arrest/Crim.
ID statutes coded "A" and "0" in Chart, appendi.x to this section. Typically these
statutes require state and local police to obtain fingerprints and "other identification
data" on persons arrested for felonies, or "serious crimes" and other named offenses,
and to fonvard such information to a central state bureau of criminal identification.
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data for the identification of criminals.1647 The collection of information for such an agency is thus an end in itself, rather than an
adjunct to the performance of another function. With rare exceptions1648 the statutes do not limit the scope of information collection,
but merely establish minimum information requirements for the
statewide criminal identification system.1649 Even recent comprehensive reforms of criminal identification systems1650 have concentrated
on the problem of retention of identification data, rather than on
the problem of acquisition.1651
While given broad discretion by delegating legislation, most state
agencies are confronted with internal restraints on information gathering, such as formal guidelines or fiscal and storage-space limitations.1662 Such self-restraint provides, however, only the roughest of
safeguards against privacy violations. A frequent contention of agencies, whether or not accurate, is that their increased efficiency depends upon the accumulation of more information,1653 and it is
likely that those agencies that most clearly perceive a need for data
are least apt to give full weight to the individual's countervailing
claim to privacy. Moreover, even assuming that most agencies are
concerned with the privacy rights of citizens,1654 each agency can
1647. See Arrest/ Crim. ID statutes code "B" in Chart, appendix to this section.
1648. An Oklahoma statute provides that the duty of local police to obtain fingerprints "is not intended to include violators of city or town ordinances, or persons arrested for ordinary misdemeanors, and great care shall be taken to exclude such persons." OKLA. STAT• .ANN. tit. 74, § 158 (1961). It is not clear, however, whether the
statute prohibits the taking of fingerprints in such cases, or merely prohibits the filing
of such identification data in the central system.
1649. See, e.g., State v. Accor, 277 N.C. 65, 175 S.E.2d 583 (1970) (holding that a
state statute requiring fingerprinting of persons charged with certain crimes neither
authorized nor prohibited the fingerprinting of persons not charged with such a crime);
40 N.C. ATrY. GEN. OP. 173 (1970) (concluding that a limitation in the same statute on
photographing misdemeanants did not limit local police authority to fingerprint misdemeanants).
1650. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. §§ 749.I (1950), as amended, (Supp. 1974) (the Iowa
TRACIS Act, analyzed in Note, The Dissemination of Arrest Records and the Iowa
TRACIS Bill, 59 IowA L. REv. 1162 (1974)); .AI.As. STAT. §§ 12.62.010-.070 (1972).
1651. For example, the Iowa TRACIS Act "does not directly control the collection
and dissemination of surveillance data by law enforcement agencies, [but] these practices seem to be significantly constrained by prohibiting the storage of such data in
any files-manual or automated," Note, supra note 1650, at 1174 (emphasis original),
and ALAS. STAT. § 12.62.020 (1972), provides that only information specifically required
by state statute may be entered on the computerized statewide identification system.
See note 1675 infra.
1652. Project, supra note 1525, at 1434-73, Table 6.
1653. "Nearly all questioned agencies desired additional types of information in
their files, but indicated that financial considerations limit the gathering of such information." Id. at 1434.
1654. The UCLA Project, supra note 1525, indicates, as might be expected, that
there are differences of opinion among state officials as to the degree of deference due
the privacy rights of individuals: "The majority of agency directors interviewed agreed
that certain subjects were not proper items for governmental inquiry; but this general
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perceive the problem only from the vantage point of its own informational needs and is thus unlikely to be sensitive to the cumulative
threat to privacy posed by the compilation of multiple dossiers and
the possibility of inter-agency correlation of information.101Hi The
legislature or a similar overseeing body is probably most capable
of the type of coordination of state information-demands that is
necessary to guard against the psychological impact and chilling
effect of large-scale information-gathering.1650
In light of the varied information needs of state agencies and
administrators, and the risk that agency performance would be frustrated if specific limitations on information-gathering were imposed
without knowledge of particular agency problems, it is understandable that legislatures have been unwilling to restrain significantly
information-handling processes. There is little reason, however, why
delegating legislation cannot contain policy directives and, in areas
where legislatures feel capable of assessing conflicting interests,
specific proscriptions against clearly undesirable practices. A statute listing the items of information an agency can acquire would
have to be based on intimate knowledge of the agency's operations and would hamper the agency's ability to respond to changed
circumstances; in contrast, a statement that privacy interests must
be considered in an agency's information policy would both
limit administrative discretion and allow courts greater leeway to
accommodate the interests of information subjects. Moreover, if
administrators were evaluated on the basis of their compliance with
these policy directives it would not be unreasonable to expect that
most administrators would make some effort to effectuate them.
Like the determination of what information to acquire, the decision as to how long a given file is to be retained is almost always
left to the discretion of the record keeper. In areas like welfare and
motor vehicle licensing, housekeeping statutes authorizing the destruction of records after a certain time are common,1°67 but statutes
agreement was opposed by a hard-core dissent to the effect that no information could
be rightly classified as 'none of the government's business.'" Id. at 1434.
1655. Indeed, what some commentators view as a dangerous threat to privacy may
be viewed by a government agency as a valid part of its function. For example, it
has been suggested that one of the primary dangers of a dossier society is the power
of the file to control social behavior. See, e.g., A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 50. Cf.
Project, supra note 1525, at 1416-22. But under existing legislation it is not entirely
clear that controlling social behavior is an improper purpose of the educational, po•
lice, and, perhaps, social welfare institutions.
1656. This overview function could be served, for example, by a procedure for ad•
ministrative review of collection practices. At the federal level, such review authority
is vested in the Office of Management and Budget, see 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-11 (1970), as
amended, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3503-04, 3506-07, 3509-10 (Supp. II, 1972), but no comparable
procedure has been discovered at the state level. See Project, supra note 1525, at 1433.
1657. See Welfare and Motor Vehicle statutes coded "D" in Chart, appendix to
this section.
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limiting an agency's right to retain records are almost nonexistent,
except in the area of arrest and criminal identification.1668
Statutes requiring the expungement of arrest records of persons
arrested but not convicted1659 illustrate how some state legislatures
have acted to protect the right of privacy where it is unclear that
the Constitution requires such protection. The arbitrariness of the
criminal record-keeping system, under which a purely fortuitous
encounter with the law opens a file that can adversely affect the
subject's life regardless of his guilt or innocence,1660 has been the
subject of considerable criticism.1661 On the other side, law enforcement agencies have legitimate interests in retaining identification
information, even about persons acquitted,1662 for such purposes as
identifying suspects, victims, and missing persons.1663 Expungement
statutes represent a partial legislative resolution of the conflict between the valid desire of the police to have as much information
on hand as possible and the citizen's important interest in not being
memorialized in police files. The statutes have been criticized for
not going far enough,1664 but they do offer a considerable degree of
1658. As was noted in the discussion of statutory authorization for collection of
information, see text at notes 1646-49 supra, the fact that criminal record-keeping is
an end in itself distinguishes it from other areas in which the record is merely a
means to performance of another function. This perhaps explains why criminal recordkeeping practices have been subject to greater scrutiny. The only statute discovered
that addresses retention of other records is NEB. REv. STAT. § 79--4,157 (Supp. 1974),
which requires destruction of school disciplinary records three years after the subject
leaves school.
1659. See Arrest/Crim ID Statutes coded "E" in Chart, appendix to this section.
See also ALAs. STAT. § 12.62.040(3) (1962) (requiring establishment of procedures for
the purging of records based on equitable considerations and lapse of time since the
subject's last contact with police).
1660. See, e.g., Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970), discussed
in the text at notes 1910-12 infra.
1661. See, e.g., Cohn, "Criminal Records"-A Comparative Approach, 4 GA. J. INT.
&: CoMP. L. 116 (1974); Comment, Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records:
Judicial Response, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 850 (1970); Note, supra note 1650; Comment,

Police Records of Arrest: A Brief for the Right To Remove Them from Police Files,
17 ST. LOUIS L.J. 263 (1972).
1662. The term "arrest record" is generally used to describe nonconviction arrest
data retained after disposition of the case. Such records include identification data
such as fingerprints and photographs, facts surrounding the current arrest and, sometimes, subsequent proceedings. The term does not refer to records leading to conviction, which become true criminal records, or to investigate files, which raise special
problems of protecting police investigations and informants. Comment, 38 U. Cm. L.
REv., supra note 1661, at 852 n.11 (1971). As used in this discussion, "arrest record"
includes identification data stored in state criminal identification systems.
1663. Arrest records are also used by police in deciding whether to rearrest or to
bring formal charges, by prosecutors in determining the category of offense to be
charged and whether plea-bargaining is appropriate, by courts in setting bail and in
sentencing, and by parole boards in deciding whether to grant parole. Id. at 855.
1664. The major criticisms are that the statutes usually do not apply to local police
or identification agencies, they seldom require recall of records disseminated to other
agencies, such as the FBI, they rarely contain enforcement provisions, and they place
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protection by allowing persons not charged or convicted to demand
return or expungement of arrest identification records.100G
The arrest record problem is significant, for according to FBI
statistics, several million arrests occur each year that are not followed by a conviction,1666 and in many instances judgments concernthe burden of seeking return on the subject. See id. at 853; Note, supra note 1650, at
278; Comment, Branded: Arrest Records of the Unconvicted, 44 U. Miss. L.J. 928, 93134 (1973). See also note 1665 infra.
1665. Denial of privacy protection to convicted criminals is consistent with the no•
tion of the tort law that those who voluntarily remove themselves from the anonymous
mass by, for example, committing a criminal act, have "waived" their right of privacy
at least in relation to their criminal conduct. See note 1592 supra and accompanying
text.
Only a few expungement statutes cover the records of persons actually convicted.
Alaska, for example, does not give the subject an absolute right to the return of records, but rather requires that procedures be established for removing information
from the central system based on consideration of age, the nature of the record, and the
interval following the last contact with a law enforcement agency. See AI.As. STAT,
§ 12.62.040 (1962). This statute gives less protection for the innocent subject than most
other statutes since expungement is not a matter of right, but it also leaves open tho
possibility of some protection for the convicted offender. The California statute, CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1203.4-.45 (West Supp. 1975), applies only to convicted felons. It appears, however, to be concerned more with the state's interest in rehabilitation than
with the subject's interest in privacy. See Comment, supra note 1664, at 932.
Among the statutes directed at the records of persons not charged or convicted,
there is considerable variation in the scope and extent of the right of expungement.
Most of the expungement statutes require the record-subject to request the return of
records. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.ll (1964). In Maine, the subject must pro•
vide the clerk of court with a list of agencies believed to hold arrest records, and their
duty to expunge arises only upon notification of the acquittal. See ME. REV. STAT,
ANN. tit. 16, § 600 (Supp. 1974). In contrast, MICH. CoMP. LAws § 28.243 (1970) requires
automatic return of the record. CONN. GEN. STAT, ANN. § 54-90 (Supp. 1975) provides
for automatic erasure upon acquittal, but requires a petition for erasure if the clmrge
is terminated by nolle prosequi.
The effect of expungement also varies. Under some statutes the effect is to erase
the arrest from the file completely. See, e.g•• MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.243 (1970); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-15, 54.-90 (Supp. 1975). In Maine the effect of e.xpungement is
expressly defined as prohibiting dissemination, restoring civil rights and prohibiting
use of the record for impeachment purposes at trial, but apparently the record remains
in the files. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 600.1 (Supp. 1974). The Missouri statute combines confidentiality and expungement: if a person is not charged within 30 days, tl1e
file is required to be closed to all persons except the subject; if there is no conviction
within one year following the closing of the record, it is to be expunged. Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 610.100 (Vernon Supp. 1975). However, if the subject is charged, a subsequent
dismissal or acquittal merely closes the record, and does not e.xpunge it. Mo. ANN, STAT,
§ 610.105 (Vernon Supp. 1975).
Finally, some of the statutes exempt certain cases from the expungement provision. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.ll (1964) (no expungement if arrestee was convicted of a felony within past ten years): MICH. COMP. LAws § 28,243 (1970) (expungement only on court order if arrestee has any prior conviction other than traffic offenses
or if charged with a sex offense).
1666. FBI statistics for the nation indicate over 9 million arrests for 1973. Of the
adults arrested for FBI Crime Index offenses, less than 62 per cent were convicted ot
the offense charged or a lesser offense; of the juveniles arrested, about half neitlier had
formal charges preferred against them nor were referred to juvenile authorities. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 1973, at 30, 34-35 [hereinafter
CRtME REPORT].
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ing an individual's character are made on the basis of a prior arrest
without regard to the disposition of the charge.1667 In the absence
of express statutory authorization many courts have been unable to
discover any basis in constitutional or tort law for requiring police
departments to return or expunge the records of persons who were
arrested but not convicted.1668 However, some courts have been persuaded that the maintenance or dissemination of information that
would tend to associate the innocent individual with criminal activity
places him in a false light, for which, under the common law, injunctive relief is appropriate. 1669 Moreover, there are indications that the
balance may be shifting in favor of privacy. The growing realization
that arrest records are, in practice if not in theory, a serious threat
to personal privacy, coupled with developments in the federal constitutional law of privacy,1670 have led at least two state courts to
require a showing of compelling need to justify retention of records
not leading to conviction.1671 But judicial recognition of a broad
1667. Coffee, The Future of Sentendng Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH. L. REv. - (1975).
1668. As one commentator pointed out, the cases "run the gamut from denying
any relief concerning the availability of records of arrests which did not lead to conviction, through the granting of limited relief, to complete expunction • • . ." Cohn,
supra note 1661, at 135. At least one federal circuit court has long recognized expungement of records, including arrest records, as an appropriate remedy when necessary to preserve basic legal rights. See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 968 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
In McGovern v. Van Ripen, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (Ch. 1945), the court concluded that the right of privacy was one of the "natural and inalienable rights" secured by the state constitution and approved the federal courts' procedure of granting
cxpungement without express statutory authorization. Until very recently, other state
courts have not placed the arrestee's right of privacy on a constitutional footing, and
the weight of authority denied the expungement remedy in the absence of a statute
mandating such a remedy. See, e.g., Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1,
24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962); Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 S.2d 132, 136 (Fla. 1969); State ex rel.
Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946), affd. after retrial, 225 Ind. 360,
74 N.E.2d 914 (1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 834 (1948).
These cases contrast the strong public interest in effective law enforcement with
what was seen as a comparatively weak privacy interest. In Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 Ill.
App. 2d 81, 87-88, 142 N.E.2d 818, 822 (1957), for example, the court took judicial notice of the fact that the records were not open to the general public. Similarly, it has
been suggested that retention of files comprehensible only to responsible officials, such
as fingerprint files, present no risk of harm to the subject through improper dissemination, see State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 377, 66 N.E.2d 755, 760 (1946),
and that retention of arrest records is not an invasion of privacy because the file
"merely create[s] images of a suspect's physical characteristics." Walker v. Lamb, 254
A.2d 265, 267 (Del. Ch. 1969). These rationales are analogous to the publicity and
"private facts" requirements of the tort law. See notes 1582 &: 1587 supra.
1669. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946).
See also text at note 1577 supra.
1670. See text at notes 1789-915 infra.
1671. See Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 21 (1971); Davidson v. Dill,
IBO Colo. 123, 503 P .2d 157 (1972). In Eddy the court based the record subject's fundamental right of privacy on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The court
said that the state's interest in retaining arrest records for future law enforcement
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right to the return of arrest records, whether based on constitutional
or common-law principles, may be a cumbersome technique for
dealing with a complex problem.1672 As the variation among the
statutes1673 indicates, the statutory mechanism for protecting the
underlying privacy interests in this situation is more flexible in its
ability to accommodate the countervailing public interest in law
enforcement, and may therefore be a more desirable resolution of
the problem.
Another type of statute dealing with retention of criminal recorcls1674 prohibits the storage of certain information on a centralized
system.1675 Like the expungement statutes, these storage statutes postpone dealing with threats to privacy until after information has been
collected. However, both types of statutes may influence police behavior at the acquisition stage because the police will be discouraged
from acquiring information they cannot keep. 1676 It has been suggested that a more effective solution would be to impose direct limipurposes was premised on the assumption that a person once arrested might be the
subject of police interest in the future, However, when the arrestee is not convicted,
there is no justification for the inference, and there is thus no compelling interest in
retaining the record. 5 Wash. App. at -, 487 P.2d at 216.
It may well be that Eddy and Davidson are the breaking edge of the law in this
area. The decisions, however, have been criticized for over-extending the right of
privacy recognized by the Supreme Court in Griswold. See, e.g., Comment, Constitutional Law-A Right of Privacy in Photographs and Fingerprints, 17 N.Y.L.F. 1126,
1128-29 (1972). If other courts do not agree that "the right of an individual, absent
a compelling showing of necessity by the government, to the return of his fingerprints
and photographs, upon an acquittal is a fundamental right implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, -, 487 P.2d 211, 217 (1971),
retention would almost certainly be sustained as it has been in the past under a
rational relation test.
1672. One court pointed out in refusing to create a nonstatutory expungement
remedy,
The magnitude of the task of returning fingerprints and photographs on demand,
and making certain that they are returned to the correct person, is a matter for
legislative consideration.
If the legislature should come to the conclusion, in general, that there should
be delivery of the items, there would still be the matter of possible classification
according to the types of offense charged, what demand would be necessary, and
other details requiring the particularity of a statute,
Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6-7, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696, 699-700 (1962).
1673. See note 1665 supra.
1674. These are statutes dealing with police files other than the mere identification
data in arrest records. See note 1662 supra.
1675. E.g., Ar.As. STAT. § 12.62.020 (1962) provides for the establishment of rules
"concerning the specific classes of criminal justice information which may be collected
and stored in criminal justice information systems," and provides that information
collected under other provisions of law, such as the ta.x and education titles, shall not
be stored on such a system. See also IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 749B.8 (intelligence data shall
not be stored in computerized files), 749B.9 (surveillance data shall not be stored in
manual or computer files) (Supp. 1974).
1676. See Note, supra note 1650, at 1174.
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tations on police power to acquire information,1677 but as the retention statutes indicate, the more common judgment apparently is
that it is difficult, and perhaps not desirable, to attempt to control
police behavior in the field. Controls on retention are a less restrictive constraint on agency information practices and may, in general,
be an appealing alternative for legislatures unwilling to limit agency
discretion by imposing direct controls on acquisition.
The concern that inaccurate arrest records may harm an innocent
person1678 broaches the general problem whether the subject of a
government file has a right to monitor its content and to contest its
inaccuracies. Inaccuracies ·will inevitably appear in a government
file, and the subject may offer the best assistance in spotting and
correcting mistakes or significant omissions.1679 Denying the subject
access to the file maintained on him deprives the state of this assis•
tance and harms the subject's privacy interest, not only through the
threat that the record portrays the subject in a false light, but also
by keeping the subject uncertain about what personal information
the government holds and might disclose. Such uncertainty infringes
on one's feeling of control over the dissemination of the details of
one's individuality.1680 The right of subject access to government
files is part of what has been called the privacy right of accuracy
control.1681
Some state statutes respect this privacy right by providing for
subject access to certain records closed to public inspection, such as
arrest,1682 welfare,1683 education,1684 and parole records.1685 In the
1677. See Cohn, supra note 1661, at 138. Cohn points out that the practice of opening permanent records immediately upon arrest is unique to this country.
1678. See, e.g., Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972); Eddy v. Moore,
5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971); note 1660 supra.
1679. Karst, supra note 1562, at 367-68.
1680. See, e.g., Westin, Databanks in a Free Society: A Summary of the Project on
Computer Databanks, reprinted in Joint Hearings, supra note 1641, at 96. The right
of access being advocated here is to be distinguished from the due process right to see
any records used in connection with a denial of governmental benefits. See, e.g., Banner v. Smolenski, 315 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Mass. 1970), which distinguished between a
welfare recipient's due process right to see records used at a benefit hearing, and a
general right of access to the entire file, which it held Massachusetts law did not provide.
1681. See, e.g., A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 32-37 (focusing on the particular accuracy problems posed by computerized files).
1682. See, e.g., Arrest statutes coded "X" in Chart, appendix to this section.
1683. See, e.g., Welfare statutes coded "X" in Chart, appendix to this section.
1684. See, e.g., School Records statutes coded "X" in Chart, appendix to this section.
These statutes generally give the right of acce~ to parents of children under 18, and
for purposes of this disc~ion, parental access is treated as the functional equivalent
of subject access.
Statutory treatment of school records will no doubt be significantly affected by the
recent federal education amendments, which require subject-access to records of all
institutions receiving federal aid. See text at notes 1947-53 infra.
1685. See, e.g., Parole statutes coded "X" in Chart, appendix to this section.
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absence of an express subject access statute in these areas, courts
have differed as to whether a requirement of confidentiality bars
disclosure to the subject of the record. With respect to welfare
records, two New York trial courts have reached contrary results.
One court granted subject access, holding that the purpose of confidentiality is to protect the welfare recipient,1686 while the other
held that the requirement of confidentiality included the subject,
although its holding left open the possibility of examination by the
subject upon a showing of special circumstances.1687 A federal district court in Massachusetts concluded that a welfare recipient had
no right to inspect those parts of his case record not being used at
a hearing on his benefits because welfare records were not "public
records" under the state open-records act.1688 But an Oregon court
reached a contrary result,1689 distinguishing the Massachusetts decision on the ground that Oregon's welfare records were public
records. While welfare records in Oregon were exempted from the
open-records requirement by a specific confidentiality statute, reasoned the court,1690 the exemption should be strictly construed in
light of the general policy favoring disclosure: Because the purpose
of the confidentiality statute was to protect the privacy of the recipients, they did not fall within the class of persons to whom
disclosure was forbidden. 1691 Absent statutory guidance, other courts
have upheld the parental right to inspect school records1692 and have
denied prisoners' claims to inspect parole records. 1693 While many
of these decisions have thus permitted disclosure, it is of significance
that the decisions tum on the general right of access to a closed file;
none has recognized a privacy interest in subject access to government files.
1686. See In re Mellion, 58 Misc. 2d 441, 295 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
, 1687. See Turner v. Barbaro, 56 Misc. 2d 53, 287 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct, 1967), The
court gave no indication of what those special circumstances might be.
1688. See Banner v. Smolenski, 315 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Mass. 1970), Accord, Tex.
Atty. Gen. Op. No. H-249 (March I, 1974).
1689. See Stivahtis v. Juras, 13 Ore. App. 579, 511 P.2d 421 (1973).
1690. See 13 Ore. App. at -, 511 P .2d at 426.
1691. 13 Ore. App. at -, 511 P.2d at 426.
1692. See, e.g., Van Allen v. McCleary, 27 Misc. 2d 81, 211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1961). See
Comment, Parental Right To Inspect School Records, 20 BUFFALO L. REV, 255 (1970),
However, the general practice of school officials is still to deny parents and pupils access to school records. Indeed one survey concluded that "parents and pupils arc more
often denied access to school records than any other category of potential users."
Goslin &: Bordier, supra note 1640, at 56.
1693. See, e.g., Application of Mailer, 174 N.Y.S.2d 59 (County Ct. 1958). See Tex.
Atty. Gen. Open Records Dec. No. 11 (Nov. 23, 1973). But see Taylor v. State, 27 Misc.
2d 719, 215 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Ct. CI. 1961) (holding that the confidentiality statute did
not preclude inspection of decedent's prison and hospital records when his administratrix waived the doctor-patient privilege and no third parties were involved in the
records).
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Statutes making certain records confidential for the purpose of
protecting the subject's privacy clearly should not be construed to
defeat this fledgling privacy interest in subject access. Where the
purpose of a confidentiality statute is to safeguard state interests,
such as the sources of information or candidness of bureaucratic
opinion, these interests should be taken into account. They should
be weighed, however, against the privacy interest in subject access
rather than against the more general interest in public access. Often
state interests ·will be paramount. A legislature or court may legitimately conclude that a prisoner should not have access to his parole
records after engaging in a balancing of the government's specific
interest in nondisclosure to the subject1694 against the subject's privacy right. A similar balancing process could lead to the conclusion
that an individual does not have a right to examine his police
records in the absence of express statutory permission: 1695 even
commentators who support a broad right of privacy have not suggested that the right of subject access in this area should go beyond
the ordinary rules of criminal discovery. As one commentator has
stated, "[i]t is true that some inaccuracies will be cleared up by
the subject, but the risk of compromising investigative leads and the
identity of useful informers outweighs the subject's interest in the
statements in the file made by witnesses who testify against him."1696
Some statutes that grant subject access, particularly in the area
of education records, also attempt to accommodate the state interest
in nondisclosure. For example, an Oregon statute opening education
files addresses the concern that nonprofessionals are unable to interpret evaluative files by requiring that "behavioral" records be open
to inspection only in the presence of a person qualified to interpret
them.1697 The Delaware statute attempts to mitigate the chilling
effect that disclosure to students or parents might have on expressions
of professional opinion by eliminating tort suits against teachers
based on their remarks in evaluative files. 1698 Similarly, several state
statutes dealing with parole records attempt to accommodate the
conflicting individual and governmental interests by granting the
1694. The concern of police that opening their investigative files will have a chilling effect on informants and subject informants to physical danger applies more to
the subject of the file than to any other person. Cf. Langert v. Tenney, 5 App. Div. 2d
586, 588-89, 173 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (1958), appeal dismissed, 5 N.Y.2d 875, 155 N.E.2d
870, 182 N.Y.S,2d 25 (1959).
1695. See, e.g., State v. Mattio, 212 La. 283, 298, 31 S.2d 801, 805, cert. denied, 332
U.S. 818 (1947); State v. Dallao, 187 La. 391, 439, 175 S. 4, 20 (1937) (both dismissing the
defendant's claim to inspect his own arrest records and police reports on the ground
that such records were closed to public inspection).
1696. Karst, supra note 1562, at 368 &: n.119, citing Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657 (1957).
1697. See ORE. REv. STAT. § 336.195 (1975).
1698. See DEL. CODE .ANN. tit. 14, § 4111 (1974).
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parole board discretion to disclose when it would be in the best
interests of the prisoner.1600 This scheme has the drawback that an
interested party-the parole board-makes the determination
whether to allow disclosure. The statute clearly aids the subject seeking access in any legal dispute, however, by expressly recognizing
the validity of the underlying privacy interest and by providing a
standard, however minimal, by which a court could determine
whether disclosure is appropriate.
The second half of the privacy right of accuracy control, complementing the right of subject access, is the right to require that inaccurate or incomplete records be corrected. One court, in a jurisdiction without a specific statutory remedy, held that a state bureau of
criminal identification was under "no duty to change or alter its
records on the basis of the unsubstantiated word of the concerned
individual,"1700 thereby implying that the state also had no duty to
investigate a subject's claim. A rigorous dissent, however, argued that
courts must provide a remedy in such cases:
[Today,] vast repositories of personal information may easily be assembled into millions of dossiers characteristic of a police state. Our
age is one of shriveled privacy. Leaky statutes imperfectly guard a
small portion of these monumental revelations. Appellate courts
should think twice, should locate a balance between public need and
private rights, before deciding that custodians of sensitive personal
files may with impunity refuse to investigate claims of mistaken identity or other error which threaten the subject with undeserved
loss.1101
Some state legislatures have agreed that the subject of an arrest
record must have an opportunity to contest the accuracy of the
record.1102 With regard to other records, however, legislatures have
1699. See Mo• .ANN. STAT. § 549.285 (Supp. 1975); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-3206
(Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN, § 41-17-18 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-59-0i (Supp.
1973).
1700. White v. State, 17 Cal. App. 3d 621, 630, 95 Cal. Rptr. 175, 181 (1971). The
case presented a classic, or, in the words of the dissent, "Kafkaesque," horror study of
arrest record inaccuracy. See 17 Cal. App. 3d at 634, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 184 (Friedman,
J., dissenting). Plaintiff had a record dating from a "youthful scrape of the joyriding
variety" in 1939. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 632, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 183. In 1941 he was er•
roneously identified from his mug shot as a check forger, and the charge was entered
on his record. "During the following years the erroneous forgery entry on this record
at the Bureau caused rejection of applications for employment as a policeman and the
actual loss of one police job. Eventually he discovered the cause of these rejections
and in 1967 went to the Bureau ••• requesting correction." 17 Cal. App. 3d at 633,
95 Cal. Rptr. at 183. During the course of his efforts to have the file corrected, the
plaintiff was apparently allowed to see it, but there is no intimation in the majority
opinion that the state bureau was under a duty to permit this.
1701. White v. State, 17 Cal. App. 3d 621, 631, 95 Cal. Rptr. 175, 181-82 (1971).
1702. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN, § 749B.5 (Supp. 1974); ALAS, STAT, § 12.62.030(c)
(1974).
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not granted subjects such an opportunity. It may be true that the
potential for harm is greatest where inaccurate arrest records are
involved, but inaccuracies in other records can be equally damaging
to the individual. The government interest in denying record subjects a right of challenge is essentially financial and not insignificant
if such a right brought large numbers of requests for inspection and
correction. Because much of the financial and psychological damage
caused by government information-handling is a consequence of
inaccurate records, however, the over-all privacy concern could be
reduced by according subjects a right of challenge. Moreover, such
a right provides subjects significant privacy protection without disturbing current acquisition, retention, and dissemination patterns.
In areas where requiring an agency to investigate subject allegations
of error would be too costly, an alternative might lie in allowing
subject access and granting the subject an opportunity to prove
inaccuracies.
With the exception of the few expungement and subject access
statutes, statutory protection of privacy is largely limited to the final
stage of the information-handling process-dissemination. The dissemination problem has undoubtedly received greater attention than
the earlier stages of the process because it is more readily seen as a
threat to individual privacy. Nevertheless, as an earlier study has
concluded, the state laws governing dissemination hardly constitute
a well-planned program of privacy protection. 1703 A major failing
that undercuts the effectiveness of the scattered statutes regulating
dissemination is the general absence of provisions for notification of
the subject when the agency receives a request involving his file. 1704
If a subject does happen to learn of the proposed dissemination in
time, he clearly has standing to object.1705 However, in most contexts the subject does not learn of the request unless notified, and
the subject's privacy interest is thus left in the hands of the record
keeper.
State open-records acts that exempt information the disclosure of
which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy1706 give
the record keeper at least the right to raise the subject's privacy
1703. Project, supra note 1525, at 1438.
1704. See, e.g., Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. No. H-90, at 8 (Aug. 29, 1973).
1705. For example, in Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F-2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936), the depositor was said to have standing to restrain a search of his bank record by the IRS,
the court noting that to deny standing on the ground that the records were the bank's
property ignored substance for form, since the bank had no interest in contesting the
search.
1706. See notes 1218-19 supra and accompanying text. In addition to statutes containing a specific exemption for invasion of privacy, some statutes exempt records
made confidential by law, including judicial decisions, see, e.g., TEX. REv. CIV. STAT.
.ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(l) (Supp. 1974), and thus may include the common-law right
of privacy.
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interest to resist dissemination. However, it is often unclear whether
such provisions impose a duty on the record keeper to protect t~e
privacy rights of record subjects.1707 It seems doubtful that agencies
can adequately defend so personal a right as privacy, for in the
absence of the threatened party, the decision can be based only on a
rigid and formalistic conception of the privacy interest.1708 Statutes
requiring that specific records be kept confidential afford a more
certain protection against disclosure since they limit the record
keeper's discretion to disseminate information. Often, however, the
subject's privacy interest will be receiving an indirect benefit from
statutes primarily designed to protect the government's interests in
nondisclosure.
The pattern of statutory protection of welfare records is unique
because federal law requires as a condition of participation in the
federally funded assistance programs that states "take steps to restrict
use or disclosure of information to purposes directly connected with
the administration of assistance."1709 The majority of states comply
with the federal requirement via statutes making confidential all
records kept in connection with federally funded assistance programs.1710 The federal requirement protects these records not only
against disclosure to the public, but also against use by the state for
other purposes.1711 Federal law expressly permits the states to make
1707. Exemptions from open-records laws are generally said to be permissive rather
than mandatory. See note 1216 supra. Cf, text at notes 1141-51 supra, Three states,
however, distinguish between permissive and mandatory exemptions: included in the
first category are exemptions that protect governmental interests, such as that for investigatory files and interagency memoranda, while the second category contains exemptions aimed at the record subject's privacy interest, such as medical, welfare, and
school records. See CoLO. REY. STAT. ANN. § 24.-72-204 (1973); MD, ANN. CODE art. 76A,
§ 3 (Supp. 1974); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.3 (Supp. 1973). The Texas statute also
makes clear that "confidential" information shall not be disseminated, and provides
civil and criminal sanctions for wrongful dissemination. TEX, REv. Cxv. STAT, ANN,
art. 6252-17(a), § 10 (Supp. 1974). The Texas Attorney General concluded that while
public disclosure "must never violate a right of privacy or confidentiality," agencies
could continue to disclose information exempted by the Act if such a right was not
violated. See Tex. Atty. Gen. Open Records Dec. No. ISA, at IO (March 25, 1974),
1708. See, e.g., Tex. Atty, Gen. Open Records Dec, No, 2 (Sept. 10, 1973), applying
Prosser's formula, see text at note 1577 supra, to determine whether certain records of
the Department of Public Welfare must be disclosed,
1709. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (1970).
1710. See Welfare statutes coded "H" and "J" in Chart, appendix to this section,
A few of these states, however, run general assistance programs, which are not subject
to the federal requirements. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. &: !NSI'NS. CODE § 17006 (West 1972);
COLO, R.Ev. STAT, ANN. §§ 30-11-101 to -104 (1973),
1711. For example, the California Attorney General concluded that such records
could not be disclosed to the county tax assessor to confirm eligibility for a specific
homeowner's exemption even though it was the only reasonable means of administering the exemption. 55 CAL. OP. ATTY, GEN, 74, 78 (1972). As well as making case rec•
ords confidential, the California statute prohibits disclosure of names of recipients,
See CAL. WELF. &: !NSTNS. CODE § 10850 (West 1972). The California legislature could,
consistent with federal law, permit disclosure of names. See notes 1712 &: 1713 infra,
The California Attorney General suggested such an amendment as a solution to the
particular problem presented, See 55 CAL. OP. ATTY. GEN, 79.
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public the names, addresses, and amounts paid to recipients as long
as such information is not used for political or commercial purposes.1712 Most states have taken advantage of this provision and have
expressly authorized the publication of such lists,1713 but several continue to protect the identity of recipients from public disclosure.1714
These variations in the protection afforded welfare records
reflect differing conceptions of the welfare recipient's right of
privacy. The general confidentiality of case record information
required by federal law seems to protect a zone of privacy similar to
that recognized by the common law.1715 Such records include information relating to family life, health, finances, and other matters that
fall within the usual conceptions of "private facts." The zone of
privacy protected by the federal requirements goes beyond the zone
protected by the tort law in that it covers caseworker narratives
evaluating such information.1716 Those state statutes that protect
the identity of recipients, on the other hand, could be viewed as
either recognizing a general interest in anonymity, or recognizing
that the receipt of assistance is itself a private or embarrassing fact
that falls within the zone of privacy. Tort law concepts also influence
the way in which the open-records acts' requirement of full government disclosure interact with the welfare requirements of confidentiality. For example, one state attorney general applying an openrecords act found that information relating to legitimacy, family life,
and the emotional adjustment of the subjects was within the zone of
privacy and hence nondisclosable.1717 However, he concluded, "basic"
information such as the identity of the recipients and of the programs under which they received benefits was not within the exemption and could therefore be entered on an inter-agency informationsharing system.1718
Records of adoption are the only other records made confidential
1712. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, ch. 521, § 618, 65 Stat. 569, provided that, "[n]o state ••• shall be deprived [of any payments due under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601-606] by reason of the enactment ••• of any legislation prescribing any conditions under which public access may be had to records of the disbursement of any
such funds • • • , if such legislation prohibits the use of any list or names obtained
through such access to such records for commercial or political purposes."
1713. See Welfare statutes coded "J" or "P" in Chart, appendix to this section. In
Pennsylvania, however, the statute has been construed to allow disclosure of addresses
and amounts of assistance only when a particular name is provided, but not to allow
or compel disclosure of a general list of recipients. See McMullan v. Wohlgemuth,
453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 970 (1974).
1714. See Welfare statutes coded "H" in Chart, appendix to this section.
1715. See text at note 1577 supra.
1716. Zimmerman, supra note 1637, at 325.
1717. See Tex. Op. Atty. Gen. No. H-90 (Aug. 29, 1973); Tex. Atty. Gen. Open
Records Dec. No. 2 (Sep. 10, 1973); Tex. Atty. Gen. Open Records Dec. No. 9 (Nov.

12, 1973).
.
l
1718. See Tex. Op. Atty. Gen. No. H-287 (April 29, 1974). Texas law does not pro-

vide for publication of lists of welfare recipients.
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by statute in almost all of the states.1719 Like case history information
protected by the welfare statutes, adoption records deal with matters
of family life that might be considered private under tort law.1720
Additional privacy protection arises from the fact that in many jurisdictions the sealing of such records is a final step in the process of
legitimating the new family and rendering it legally indistinguishable from a natural family. By contrast, the records arising out of the
state's licensing functions are generally not protected by statute. For
example, driver's license records are expressly open to public inspection in the majority of states.1721 However, physical and mental
health information, such as the results of vision tests, is commonly
confidential in accordance with the traditional view that matters
of personal health are entitled to be private.1722
Several states authorize the sale of automobile licensing information for commercial purposes.1723 In Lamont v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles,1724 a three-judge federal district court upheld this
practice against the claim that it constituted an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy. The court found that because the information
was not vital or intimate and was contained in a public record available to anyone on demand, the state was perfectly justified in providing a packaging service for commercial users in order to generate
additional revenues.1725 This practice of selling mailing lists is insensitive to the individual's interest in controlling the flow of information about his identity. Because the licensing records are public,
this interest is already little protected, but the sale to commercial
organizations involves the additional harm of subjecting the licensee
1719. See Adoption statutes coded "C" in Chart, appendix to this section.
1720. See also Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 670 (1973) (identifying matters of family life as one of the areas afforded_ broad constitutional protection); text at notes 1898-900 infra.
1721. See Motor Vehicle statutes coded "P" in Chart, appendix to this section, It
should be noted in addition that motor vehicle records required to be kept by law
will be disclosable under an applicable open-records statute even when not expressly
made public,
1722. See, e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 1808.5 (West 1971); N.C. GEN, STAT, § 20-27
(Supp. 1974). In states that have ·open-records laws such provisions pose substantial
administrative difficulties, since a method must be devised for providing public access to the records while protecting part of the contents, See, e.g., State ex rel, Patterson v. Ayers, 171 Ohio St. 368, 171 N.E.2d 508 (1960); 55 CAL. OP. An:Y, GEN. 122
(1972).
1723. See, e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 1810 (West 1971): FLA. STAT, ANN. § 319.25
(5)(a) (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 9-1-1-8 (Burns 1973): N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-2-8
(1972): N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 202(3) (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-26
(Supp. 1974); OHio R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 4053.26 (Page 1973); PA, STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 417
(1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-120 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN, § 59-711 (1968); UTAH CODE
t\NN. § 41-2-12.1 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-32 (1974).
1724. 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y.), a/jd. per curiam, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. l!l67),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968).
1725. 269 F. Supp. at 883-84.
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to unsolicited commercial contacts. While an individual's interest in
avoiding such contacts is not at the core of the privacy interest
and thus is not worthy of constitutional (or perhaps even commonlaw) protection, the state's interest in generating rather small
amounts of revenue is not compelling either. This is an area in which
legislatures should exercise self-restraint, and strike a balance that is
more respectful of individual privacy interests.
At least half of the states make some tax records confidential,1726
with income tax returns more commonly protected than property tax
returns. 1727 It has been said that the purpose of such statutes is to
assure the taxpayer that information supplied ·will be used only for
the purposes of computing and enforcing his tax obligation,1728
thereby furthering the state interest in encouraging taxpayers to
make complete and honest disclosure of needed information1729 and
only consequentially protecting the taxpayer's privacy interests. Such
protection ceases when a different paramount state interest is furthered by disclosure. For example, all such statutes authorize exchange of relevant information ·with agencies of other tax-collecting
authorities and to law enforcement officials in connection with prosecution for tax offenses,1730 and a few authorize broader dissemination
for other governmental purposes.1731
Courts in general have narrowly construed the privacy protection
afforded by tax statutes, and subjected tax information to public
disclosure in the absence of express statutory protection.1782 Thus in
Gallagher v. Boller,1733 the court refused to infer from the statutory
protection of mandatory property statements a legislative intention
to make documents relating to tax exemptions confidential as well.
The court found that the voluntary nature of the application for
exemption was a reasonable explanation for its omission from the
1726. See Tax statutes coded "C" in Chart, appendix to this section.
1727, For example, compare IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 6-3-6-8 (Burns 1973) (income
tax), with § 6-1-39-2 (Burns 1973) (property tax); MD• .ANN. CODE art. 81, § 300 (1957)
(income tax), and art. 81, § 45(b) (1957) (personal property tax), with art. 81, § 45(a)
(1957) (real property tax); N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 77:19 (1970), as amended, § 544:8
(Supp. 1973) (income tax), with § 76:7 (1970), as amended, § 544:8 (Supp. 1973) (property tax).
1728, See In re Department of Taxation & Fin., 1939 N.Y. OP. ATIY. GEN. 207.
1729. Webb v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Cal. 2d 509, 319 P.2d 621 (1957).
1730. See Tax statutes coded "C" in Chart, appendix to this section.
1731. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 206.466 (Supp. 1974) (authorizing disclosure to any state officer when required for efficient administration of the laws).
1732. See, e.g., National Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Permenter, 195 S.2d 603 (Fla.
App. 1967); Tex. Atty. Gen. Letter Advisory No. 76 Gan. 11, 1974). Courts have disagreed on whether statutory confidentiality renders the substance of the record privileged, and thus permits the taxpayer to refuse to produce his copies of tax returns,
see Webb v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Cal. 2d 509, 319 P.2d 621 (1957), or whether it
merely regulates the behavior of the officials who maintain the government's copies.
See Application of Second Additional Grand Jury, 234 N.Y.S. 2d 64 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
1733, 231 Cal. App. 2d 482, 41 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964).
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statutory protection.1734 Similarly, one court held that a requester
under a state open-records act was entitled to copy the computer
tapes of property tax appraiser reports.1730 The court noted that
most of the information on the tapes could be obtained from visual
inspections of the property and thus found "nothing in the information here that would qualify as an invasion of privacy."1730 Although
this requester was an individual engaged in noncommercial research,
the decision again leaves the door open to abuse of the state powers
of data collection by institutional commercial users who might well
disseminate information more broadly. Thus, the decision reflects
a lack of sensitivity to the problems posed by the dissemination of
data produced by the government's unique capacity for collection
and collation.
While a few states deal with the confidentiality of education
records by statute (generally mandating confidentiality1737), most
have delegated responsibility for school records to the local school
districts.1738 Either technique can be relatively effective in achieving
an equilibrium of competing interests: school boards may unduly
favor teacher and administrator demands for privacy at the expense
of countervailing interests supporting disclosure to, for example,
students and parents, but local regulations can be more detailed,
more :flexible, and more responsive to local needs. The practices of
1734. 231 Cal. App. 2d at 491, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
1735. See Mense v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 311 A,2d 116 (1973).
1736. 113 N.H. at -, 311 A,2d at 119.
1737. See Education statutes coded "G" in Chart, appendix to this section, In ad•
dition, several states exempt scholastic records from disclosure under open-records
acts. See, e.g.• ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2804 (1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.'7 (1973); Mo.
ANN. CooE art. 76A, § 3(c) (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 71-51-1 (1961), as amended,
(Supp. 1973); s.c. CODE ANN. § 1-20.1 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 15-305 (1973),
as amended (Supp. 1974); TE.x. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-l'la, § 3(a)(l4) (Supp,
1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.I-342(b)(3) (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv. CODE § 42,1'7.BlO(a)
(1974); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.3(d) (Supp. 1973). In Maryland and Wyoming ft is
clear that the exemption for these records is mandatory. See note 1707 supra, The
National Committee for Citizens in Education advocated specific statewide standards
for school record-keeping practices, See Joint Hearings, supra note 1641, at 195,96
(statement of S. Salett).
1738. Goslin &: Bordier, supra note 1640, at 48.
At least one state has accommodated the interest in local control by expressing
the policy of confidentiality in a state statute while granting local districts rule-mak•
ing authority to implement the policy. See ORE. REv. STAT, § 336.195 (1975), Under
§ 336.205, any records designated as confidential under the authority of that section
"shall not be deemed a public record for purposes of ORS 192.005," the open-records
act. This approach has the disadvantage, however, of allowing local districts to con•
tinue to disclose records to employers and others.
In contrast with the discretionary treatment of elementary and secondary records,
the Oregon statute dealing with community college records specifically witholds from
public inspection, absent consent of the subject, evaluative information including
grades, the results of psychometric tests, disciplinary action, and "other personal mat•
ters." ORE. REv. STAT. § 341,290(19) (1975).
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school districts in the absence of statutory direction vary,1739 although a common pattern is to disseminate records to police, prospective employers and a few others, but not to students or to the
public in general.1740 Often a local policy conflicts with state law or
policy. One instance of conflict arose when the New York City Board
of Education prohibited the dissemination of names and addresses
to private investigators and commercial interests seeking to trace
families through the medium of school records.1741 In weighing this
local New York rule against the common-law right to inspect public
records, one court concluded that the right to inspect in connection
with the preparation of a criminal defense was overriding, but noted
that the rule would have been given effect had the requester's interest in dissemination not been so great.1742 It seems that a local rule
of confidentiality would not override a state statutory requirement
of disclosure. Thus, the privacy interests of students and teachers is
most threatened by state open-records acts that require disclosure
of records unless specifically exempted, without inquiry into the
motives of the requester.1743 Under such acts there is little chance
that the needed balancing of interests will occur. The decision under
the Texas open-records act that a state university must disclose the
names and addresses of entering freshmen to the proprietor of a local
bookstore,1744 for example, stands in marked contrast with the careful
balancing of interests in the New York decision.
In all of the foregoing areas, present confidentiality statutes deal
primarily with protecting personal privacy interests. In the area of
law enforcement activities, however, the dominant impetus for confi1739. Goslin &: Bordier, supra note 1640, at 56.
1740. Id. A survey of state and local practices with respect to school records concluded that, while parents and children are most often denied access to school records, "[t]hese same records • • • are available to a broad variety of local, state, and
federal agencies as well as to such private organizations as banks, employers and even
credit bureaus." Joint Hearings, supra note 1641, at 193 (statement of S. Salett, Senior
Associate, National Committee for Citizens in Education).
1741. See Marmo v. Board of Educ., 56 Misc. 2d 517, 517-18, 289 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52
(Sup. Ct. 1968), citing the Board's Manual of School Office Procedures and Practices.
1742. See Marmo v. Board of Educ., 56 Misc. 2d 517, 519, 289 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (Sup.
Ct. 1968).
1743. See statutes cited in note 1242 supra.
1744. Tex. Atty. Gen. Open Records Dec. No. 16 Gan. 14, 1974). The opinion concluded that although the act exempts "student records at educational institutions,''
TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(I4) (Supp. 1974), the exemption did not
apply to students' names and addresses. Tex. Atty. Gen. Open Records Dec. No. 16, at
1. Since the Texas act has an exemption based on the subject's right of privacy, see
note 1569 supra, the decision also indicates that that right is not construed as protecting one's name and address from unauthorized disclosure to commercial interests.
Finally, this result points up the weakness of open-records act exemptions as a means
of protecting privacy, since such exemptions are usually strictly construed in light of
the policy favoring disclosure. See, e.g., 36 ORE. OP. ATIY. GEN. 543, 543-44.
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dentiality has been a number of important governmental interests.
For example, many states make parole and probation records confi•
dential,1745 but most such statutes have been construed as protecting
agency information sources rather than the privacy of the parolee or
probationer.1746 Similarly, records of law enforcement agencies are
almost universally exempted from disclosure under open-records
laws, thus protecting the government's need for secrecy in this
area.1747 A few states have separate statutes making arrest and criminal identification records confidential,1748 but the statutes also generally protect state rather than individual interests. The Maine
statute, for example, permits disclosure of arrest and criminal identification information even on pending cases as long as disclosure
would not jeopardize investigation or prosecution.1740 Moreover, at
least one commentator has alleged that arrest information can be
obtained even where statutes prohibit its dissemination.mo Only a
few criminal record statutes provide significant protections for the
individual's right of privacy by not only limiting dissemination to
certain named officials but by providing civil and criminal sanctions
for ,;vrongful disclosure.1751 Even these statutes, however, do not
attempt to control all law enforcement units.1762
1745. See Parole statutes· coded "C" in Chart, appendix to this section.
1746. See, e.g., Jordan v. Loos, 204 Misc. 814, 125 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1953); Application
of Mailler, 174 N.Y.S.2d 59 (County Ct. 1958). Some statutes, however, seem to be at
least somewhat concerned with the subject's privacy interest, since they permit disclo•
sure when it would be in the best interests of the defendant. See statutes cited in note
1699 supra.
1747, See note 1223 supra and accompanying text. See also Comment, 38 U. Cnt.
L. REv. 850 (1970), supra note 1661, at 862. One attorney general has construed such an
exemption as applying only to investigatory information and internal files: "the name,
age, address, offense and disposition in each arrest, should be extracted from the more
detailed offense reports" and disclosed under the open-records act. Tex. Atty. Gen.
Open Records Dec. No. ISA, at 10 (March 25, 1974).
1748. Such statutes generally apply only to information in the hands of state
bureaus of criminal identification. See Arrest/Crim. ID statutes coded "C" in Chart,
appendix to this section.
1749. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1631 (1964). It also makes available any infor•
mation revealed in open court, which seems to reflect the traditional tort notion that
once information is made public it cannot normally recapture the elusive quality of
privateness. See note 1587 supra and accompanying text.
1750. See Note, supra note 1650, at 1163. Limiting the dissemination of all criminal
records, particularly to prospective employers, assists the convicted offender in start•
ing a new life without the stigma and handicaps of his criminal record, see, e.g.,
Comment, supra note 1525, at 660, and protects the innocent from the dangers of in•
accuracy and misrepresentation inherent in a centralized record-keeping system.
1751. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. §§ 749B.2 (limiting dissemination to criminal jus•
tice agencies and requiring that a list be kept of persons to whom data is disseminated),
749B.6 (civil remedy), 749B.7 (criminal sanctions) (Supp. 1974); AI.As. STAT. §§ 12.62.030
(a) (limiting dissemination), 12.62.060 (civil and criminal remedies) (1962).
1752. The dissemination provision of the Iowa statute applies only to the state
bureau. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 749B.2, .13 (Supp. 1974). The Alaska statute applies
to criminal justice information systems funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration. See AI.As. STAT. § 12.62.070(1) (1962).
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States have given even less statutory attention to providing
remedies for individuals harmed by dissemination of governmentheld information than they have to controlling that process. Some
states have statutes that create a private right of action for harm done
by official violations in general1758 or for wrongful disclosure of certain confidential information.1754 Most state confidentiality statutes,
however, provide either criminal sanctions1755 or no sanctions at
aU.1750 Tort law protects against republication by nonofficials of
information made confidential by law,1757 but does not provide a
remedy against officials because of the doctrine of governmental
immunity.1758 However, courts may in the absence of an express
statutory remedy imply a cause of action against a government official for violation of a statutory duty to hold records confidential. A
New York court, for example, held that a former inmate of a state
mental hospital had a cause of action against the director for unlawful disclosure of case record information.1759
Professor Blaustein has suggested that statutes protecting the
1753. See, e.g., KY. REv. SrAT. ANN. § 446.070 (1972) ("A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by
reason of the violation •••"). A line of cases applying this provision to disclosure of tax
information in violation of a confidentiality statute made clear that the statute created
a cause of action only against those officials who fell within the statutory prohibition.
Thus a city commissioner who allowed the plaintiff's tax return to be spread upon the
public records of the Commission was liable, see Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky.
524, 177 S.W.2d 369 (1943); but a member of a mayor's advisory committee, see Tomlin
v. Taylor, 290 Ky. 619, 162 S.W.2d 210 (1942), and the newspaper that republished the
information, see Maysville Transit Co. v. Taylor, 296 Ky. 527, 177 S.W.2d 371 (1943),
were not.
1754. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 749B.6 (Supp. 1974); ALAs. SrAT. § 12.62.060 (1962)
(arrest records).
1755. ~ee all statutes code "S" in Chart, appendix to this section.
1756. See, e.g., CAL. REv. & TAX CODE§ 451 (West 1971).
1757. For example, a Florida court was willing to imply a cause of action against
a newspaper for publication of a court docket entry of plaintiff's voluntary narcotic
commitment proceedings under a statute making such records confidential. See Patterson v. Tribune Co., 146 S.2d 623 (Fla. App. 1962). But cf. note 1587 supra. Prosser
believes that publication of a confidential record is actionable. See Prosser, supra note
1564, at 395-96. A Colorado court, however, expressed doubt, in dictum, that the
statute making welfare records confidential created any rights in the recipient. See
Lincoln v. Denver Post, 31 Colo. App. 283, -, 501 P.2d 152, 153 (1972). The court
held that if the recipient had any right of privacy in her welfare records, it was lost
when she was indicted for welfare fraud. 31 Colo. App. at-, 501 P.2d at 154.
1758. See note 1568 supra.
1759. See Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944), afjd.,
269 App. Div. 970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1945). The court applied the general rule that
"where a positive duty is imposed by statute, a breach of that duty will give rise to a
cause of action for damages on the part of the person for whose benefit the duty was
imposed; and, in such cases, if the statute itself does not provide a remedy, the common law will furnish it." 183 Misc. at 775, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (emphasis added). Thus,
this principle is applicable only if the confidentiality statute is interpreted to protect
the privacy interest of the subject, rather than the government's interest in. nondisclosure.
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confidentiality of certain government-held information arise from
the same concern for spiritual privacy or inviolate personality that,
in his view, has motivated the development of the tort law.1760 It
could be argued that the parallels benveen the common law and the
confidentiality statutes reflect instead a common limitation on the
privacy concept. Thus, while it appears that not all such statutes are
aimed at protecting the subject's right of privacy-indeed, some
conflict with that right by denying the subject access to his own
file 1761-the "zones of privacy" created by the statutes do seem to
be similar to the "private facts" requirement of the tort law. Intimate details of birth or family,1762 indigency,1763 and health or
mental health information1764 are all matters that fall within the tort
standard of facts objectionable to a reasonable person. In contrast,
the nonconfidentiality of driver's license records,110u which contain
fairly innocuous information, reflects the tort law's apparent failure
to protect a general right of selective disclosure. Statutes that seem to
go beyond the tort law, such as those dealing with tax. records, are
generally explainable in terms of the state's interests in nondisclosure.1766 In short, today's state statutory protections add little
conceptually to the individual's right of privacy as set forth by
Prosser. Because of the ad hoc, record-by-record approach, the statutory law, like the tort law, does not protect the fundamental "right
to be let alone," said to be the underpinning of privacy law.
It has been suggested that, in light of the need for greater openness in government, the correct approach to the problem of personal
privacy in government-held information is not to limit disclosure of
such information but to "restrict the government's right to gather
personal information in the first instance."1767 In any case, there is a
need for greater legislative attention to the problems of government
information. Despite a growing awareness of the magnitude of the
threat to privacy, only Minnesota and Utah have enacted comprehensive statutes regulating the collection, retention, and dissemination of information by all government agencies, and defining the
See Bloustein, supra note 1564, at 993-1000.
See text at notes 1678-93 supra.
See, e.g., Adoption statutes in Chart, appendix to this section.
See, e.g., Welfare statutes in Chart, appendix to this section.
For example, the exception for health information in motor vehicle records.
See note 1722 supra and accompanying text. In addition, hospital and mental hospital
records are often made confidential. See, e.g., Aroz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86-404 (1947);
CAL. WELF. & lNSTNs. ConE § 5328 (West 1975); Kv. REv. STAT. § 210.285 (1972); Mn,
ANN. CoDE art. 43, § II (1957); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-81-17 (1972); N.J. STAT, ANN.
§ 30:4-126.1 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-50 (1968),
1765. See text at note 1721 supra.
1766. See text at notes 1728-29 supra.
1767. Letter from Sharyn L. Smith, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, to the
Michigan Law Review, Aug. 26, 1974.
1760.
1761.
1762.
1763.
1764.
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rights of data subjects.1768 The statutes are similar in structure and
approach, but there are some significant differences.
By not focusing on the type or sensitivity of information involved, the Minnesota statute recognizes the individual's broad
privacy interest in controlling the flow of all information.1769 In
contrast, the Utah statute limits some rights of data subjects to
"confidential" or "private" information as defined by a state records
committee.1770 Both statutes impose a standard of necessity on the
collection1771 and retention1772 of personal data. In light of the general judicial unwillingness to second-guess administrative determinations of need1778 this requirement alone might not afford much protection. However, the statutes also provide for the promulgation of
statewide rules to implement the general policies,1774 so that the
"necessity" standard may be given more content in regulation.
Under the Minnesota and Utah statutes, data subjects have a
right to know the intended uses of requested data1775 and whether
they may legally refuse a request for information.1776 In addition,
record keepers are required to file a statement of intended uses of
data with the state commissioner1777 and use of information for other
than stated purposes without the consent of the subject is prohibited.1778 Under the Minnesota law, however, a use is proper as long
as the record keeper first makes an additional filing of intended
1768. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.162-.168 (Supp. 1975); Ch. 194, §§ 1-12, [1975]
Laws of Utah 870. A bill regulating the use and transfer of computerized data by
both government and private interests was defeated in Ohio. Joint Hearings, supra
note 1641, at 218. Bills have also been introduced in California, id. at 1876, and Washington. Id. at 1944. For a full discussion of the arguments and issues raised by comprehensive privacy legislation, see the analysis of the new federal law at notes 19662214 infra.
1769. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 15.162 Subd. 3 (Supp. 1975).
1770. Ch. 194, §§ 3(6), (7), 7(2)-(4), [1975] Laws of Utah 871, 872.
1771. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.164(a) (Supp. 1975); Ch. 194, § 6(1), [1975] Laws of
Utah 872. This is similar to the provision in the federal law. See text at notes 1987-88
infra.
1772. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.l64(e) (Supp. 1975); Ch. 194, § 6(5), [1975] Laws of
Utah 873.
1773. See note 1636 supra.
1774. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.164 (Supp. 1975); Ch. 194, § 6, [1975] Laws of Utah
872-73.
1775. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.l65(b) (Supp. 1975). Under the Utah law, this
right applies only to requests for confidential or personal data. Ch. 194, § 7(2), [1975]
Laws of Utah 873.
1776. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.l65(c) (Supp. 1975). The Utah provision is limited
to confidential or personal data. Ch. 194, § 7(3), [1975] Laws of Utah 873.
1777. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.165(a) (Supp. 1975); Ch. 194, § 7(1), [1975] Laws of
Utah 873.
1778. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.165(d) (Supp. 1975); Cb. 194 § 7(4), [1975] Laws of
Utah 873. For a discussion of comparable provisions in the federal law see notes 210723 infra.
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uses.1779 Without any restrictions on the record keeper's power to
amend its filed statement of purpose this provision clearly weakens
the protection against dissemination of personal information. In
addition, the Minnesota statute gives no clue as to the relationship
benveen the use restrictions and the state open-records act,1780 and
the Utah statute cryptically asserts that it shall not be construed to
restrict or modify existing rights of access to public records.1781
Again, however, regulations might tighten up the statutory provisions. Both statutes also give the subject a right of access and challenge,1782 but the Minnesota provision is weak in two respects. First,
the record keeper apparently has the choice of merely informing the
subject of the "content and meaning of the data" without actually
showing him or her the file. 1783 Second, the subject has no right of
access to records made confidential by statute.1784 This exception
ignores the possibility that confidentiality may be for the protection
of the subject. In contrast, the Utah law at least ensures that the
subject access decision will be based on the relevant considerations
by distinguishing benveen "confidential data," which, in the opinion
of the state records committee should not be available to the subject,1785 and "private data," which should be open to the subject.1780
Finally, the Minnesota statute subjects any "political subdivision,
responsible authority or state" to civil liability to anyone damaged
by a violation of its provisions.1787 The Utah statute imposes liability
only on the record keeper designated as the responsible authority
under the act.1788 In addition to actual damages plus costs and attorney's fees, both statutes provide for exemplary damages for willful
violations.
Despite their weaknesses, the Minnesota and Utah statutes represent an important, and perhaps understandably cautious step toward
rationalizing and controlling state information systems. Such an ap•
proach is superior to a continuation of the ad hoc development of
the right of privacy for several reasons. First, many instances of governmental intrusion are properly matters of political judgment in
1779. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.165(e) (Supp. 1975).
1780. See MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 15.17 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
1781. Ch. 194, § IO, [1975] Laws of Utah 874.
1782. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.165(e), (f) (Supp. 1975); Ch. 194, §§ 7(5), (6), (1975]
Laws of Utah 873-74.
1783. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.165(e) (Supp. 1975).
1784. MINN. STAT, ANN. § 15.165(e) (Supp. 1975). The subject also has no right of
access to medical or psychological files.
1785. Ch. 194, § 3(6), [1975] Laws of Utah 871.
1786. Ch. 194, § 3(7), [1975] Laws of Utah 871.
1787. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.166 (Supp. 1975). Willful violation of the provisions
of the act is made a misdemeanor by§ 15.167.
1788. Ch. 194, § 8, (1975] Laws of Utah 874.
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which the exercise of legislative restraint is a more appropriate solution than the imposition of judicial constraints. Second, the profound threat to personal privacy that is posed by expanding governmental activity is really only understandable in the context of governmental activities as a whole. One might not be overly concerned
with driver's license and tax records were it not for the correlative
impact of welfare, education, arrest, and numerous other records. It
is the cumulative effect of governmental dossiers that seriously
threatens individual identity in today's complex society, a threat
that can be combatted only by a comprehensive legislative program
accommodating the individual's right of privacy, the government's
informational needs, and the public's interest in open government.

3. Appendix: State Statutes
This compilation is not exhaustive; rather it is a detailed sampling
of state statutes.

Legend:
A- authorizes collection of infor- H-makes all welfare records conmation
fidential
B- establishes state bureau of J- makes welfare records conficriminal identification
dential but names of recipients
C- makes record confidential may be disclosed
D- grants agency discretion to M- authorizes or requires maindestroy records
tenance of files
E- arrest record expungement
0- authorizes or requires dissemiF- gives broad discretion regardnation
ing information to be collected P- record made public
(e.g., "and any other informa- R- rule-making authority for contion deemed necessary")
fidentiality granted to agency
G-requires collection (e.g., duty S- imposes sanction
to fingerprint)
X- authorizes subject access
C
C
C
C
C
S, X, C
C
C
C
C
C

X, C
C
C

Adoption Records
Ar.A. CoDE tit. 27, § 5 (Supp. 1973).
Ar.As. STAT.§ 20.10.130 (1962).
ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 56-117 (1947).
CAL. Crv. CODE§ 227 (West 1954).
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 19-4-104 (1973).
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-66 (Supp. 1974).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 923-24 (1974).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1973).
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.181 (1969).
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-419 (1973).
HAWAII REv. STAT.§ 578-15 (1968).
InAHo CODE§ 16-1511 (Supp. 1974).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-18 (1973).
IND. ANN. STAT. CODE§ 31-3-1-5 (1973).
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C
S, C
C
C
C
C
C
S, C

M, C; C
C
C; C; C
S, C

X, C
X, C
C; S, C
S, C
C
C
S, C
C

C

A., M; S, C
S, C

X, C

s, C

M, C
C
C

X, C
C
C
C
C
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lowA CODE ANN. § 238.24 (1969).
KAN. STAT. .ANN. § 59-2279 (1964).
KY. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 199.570 (1972).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:437 (West 1965).
ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 534 (1964).
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 210, § 5C (Supp. 1974).
M1cH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 710.11 (Supp. 1974).
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 259.31 (1964).
Miss. CODE .ANN.§ 93-17-25 (1972).
Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 453.120 (Vernon 1952).
MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. § 10-703 (1968); § 59-512 (1970).
NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 43-113 (1974).
NEV. R.Ev. STAT.§ 127.130 (1973); § 127.140 (1973); § 440.320
(1973).
N.H. R.Ev. STAT. .ANN.§ 170-B:19 (Supp.1973).
N.J. STAT. .ANN.§ 9:3-31 (1960).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-34 (1973).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 4138.3(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974);
DoM. REL. LAw § 114 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25 (Supp. 1974).
N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-15-16 (1971).
Omo R.Ev. CODE.ANN.§ 3107.14 (Page 1972).
OKLA. STAT. .ANN. tit. 10, § 57 (1961).
ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 7.211 (1975).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 450.802(2) (1964).
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 23-3-14 (1968); § 23-3-23 (Supp.
1974).
S.C. CoDE .ANN. § 15-1291.28 (1962) (protects records of
state domestic relations court).
S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 25-6-15 (1967).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-130 (1955).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.17 (Supp. 1973).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-15 (1953).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 452 (1974).
VA. CODE.ANN.§ 63.1-236 (1973).
WASH. R.Ev. CODE§ 26.32.120(2) (1974).
W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 48-4-4 (Supp. 1974).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48-93 (1974).
WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 1-708(c) (Supp. 1973).

Arrest and Criminal Identification Records
M, A, O; .AI.As. STAT. § 12.62.020 (1962) (only specified information
E; X; S
may be stored on central computer system); § 12.62.040

(1962) (bureau must establish procedures for destruction
of records on basis of certain listed factors); § 12.62.030(c)
(1962); § 12.62.060 (1962).
B; M, A; Aru:z. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.§ 41-1750A (Supp. 1973); § 41-1750B.I
O; X; S
(Supp. 1973); §§ 41-1750B.5 to .8 (Supp. 1973); § 411750B.9 (Supp. 1973); §41-1750D (Supp. 1973).
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B;A,M, .ARK. STAT. .ANN. § 5-832 (1947); § 5-833 (Supp. 1973);
O,X;G
§ 5-838 (Supp. 1973).
F;O CAL. PENAL CODE§ IIlOl (West 1972); § II076 (West 1972)
A, O; E; C

O;X;A
G,O
B;A
A; E, S, C
A; E; S, C

M,B;A
A,B,X
B;G;M;O
E, S; A; C

B;A,E
B;M; G;E
F, G; C,

E,X;S
B; F,M;

F,G,E
F,G
F, G;
C,M,S
B;F,M; G

M;G
E

B;A,O
B;M;G

B;A,M;
G,E
B,M;A; G
G;C

(criminal identification information may be disseminated
only to those specified in the statute).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-12 (1958); § 29-15 (Supp. 1974);
§ 29-16 (1958).
DEL. CODE .ANN. tit. II, § 85II (1974); tit. 11, § 8511(4)
(1974); tit. II, § 8519 (1974) (limits access to certain
authorized individuals).
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 30.31 (Supp. 1973).
GA. CODE .ANN. § 92A-301 (1972); § 92A-302 (1972).
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 28-52 (1968); § 28-54 (Supp. 1974).
ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 206-1 to -5 (1973); ch. 38, § 206-5
(1973) (petition for expungement must be accompanied
by a waiver of claims against arresting officer); ch. 38,
§ 206-7 (1973).
IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 10-1-1-12 (1973); § 10-1-1-20
(1973).
IowA CODE ANN.§§ 749B.l-.20 (Supp. 1974).
LA. REv. STAT. .ANN. § 15:581.1 (West 1967); §§ 15:581.2, .19
(West 1967); § 15:581.8 (West 1967); §§ 15:581.10 (West
Supp. 1975), .17 (West 1967).
ME. REv. STAT. .ANN. tit. 15, § 2161A (Supp 1974), tit. 16,
§ 600 (Supp. 1974); tit. 25, § 1542 (Supp. 1974); tit. 25,
§ 1631 (1964).
MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 28.241-.249 (1970); § 28.243 (1970).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.0I (1964); § 299C.09 (1964);
§ 299C.10 (1964); § 299C.ll (1964).
Mo• .ANN. STAT. § 222.050 (Vernon 1952); §§ 610.100-.105
(Vernon Supp. 1975); § 610.115 (Vernon Supp. 1975).
MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 82A-1202 (Supp. 1974), amending
§ 80-2001 (1966); § 80-2002 (1966); § 80-2003 (1966).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-209 (1964).
N.H. REv. STAT. .ANN. § 106-B: 13 (1964);
§ 106-B:14 (Supp. 1973).
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 53:1-12 (1953); § 53:1-13 (1953); § 53:1-15
(1953).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-1 (1953); § 39-3-8 (1953).
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAw § 79e (McKinney Supp. 1974).
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 114-12 (1966); § 114-19 (Supp. 1975).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-60-01 (1960); § 12-60-10 (1960);
§ 12-60-11 (Supp. 1973).
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 109.51 (Page 1969); § 109.57 (Page
Supp. 1973); § 109.60 (Page Supp. 1973).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 152 (1961); tit. 74, § 157 (1961);
tit. 74, § 158 (1961) (excludes misdemeanants or violators
of city ordinances).
ORE. REv. STAT.§ 181.510 (1975); § 181.540 (1975).
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B;F; G;

R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 12-1-4 (1969); § 12-1-7 (1969);

E,S

§ 12-1-10 (1969) (excludes those charged with violations
of ordinances or "minor offenses"); § 12-1-12 (1969).
S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 23-5-1, 23-6-5 (1967); § 23-5-4
(1967); § 23-6-9 (1967).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 15-305 (Supp. 1974).
TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(14) (1966).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-59-9 (1953); § 77-59-17 (1953);
§ 77-59-27 (Supp. 1973); § 77-35-17.5 (1953).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2051 (Supp. 1974); tit. 20, § 2054
(Supp. 1974); tit. 20 § 2056 (Supp. 1974).
VA. CoDE ANN. § 15.1-135 (1973); § 19.1-19.3 (Supp. 1974);
§ 19.1-19.6 (Supp. 1974).
WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 43.43.500 (1974); § 43.43.700 (1974);
§ 43.43.705 (imposes civil liability for wrongful disclosure;
only identification data and public records may be disclosed, and only to criminal justice agencies); § 43.43.710
(1974); § 43.43.730 (1974); § 43.43.735 (1974).
W. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 15-2-29(a) (1972); § 15-2-29(d) (1972)
(bureau may furnish information to private agencies,
but only with ·written authorization of the subject);
§ 15-2-29(g) (1972); § 15-2-29(h) (1972).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 165.83 (1974); § 165.84 (1974).

F; G,S; 0

C
A,B
G;M;C;E
F,B; G,R,
S;C,R
A;G;A
A,B; F; 0,
S; C; E,X;

F,G
B,F; C;
G;E

F,B;F, G

Parole Records
Ar.As. STAT.§ 33.15.140 (1962).
CAL. PENAL CODE§ 3046 (West 1970).
CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-104 (1973).
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 947.14 (1974).
GA. CODE ANN. § 77-533 (1973); § 77-991 l (1973).
KY. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.§ 439.510 (1972).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-21 (1972).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 549.285 (Vernon Supp. 1975).
MoNT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. § 95-3206 (Supp. 1974).
NEB. R.Ev. STAT.§ 29-2626 (1964).
NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 213.1098 (1973).
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 30:4-123.31 (1953).
N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 41-17-18 (1953).
N.Y. CoRREc. LAw § 221 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12-59-04 (Supp. 1973).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1401 (1964); tit. 19, § 1403 (1964);
tit. 19, § 1405 (1964) (requires destruction of fingerprints
of those acquitted).
C s.c. CODE ANN. § 55-579 (1962).
A, M, R TENN. CODE ANN.§ 40-3616 (1955).

C, X
C
C
A, M, R
C; S
C
C
C, X
M, C, X
M
C
C, M, R
C, X
R
C, X
F; G; E

Motor Vehicle Records
M; P
C; P

ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 73 (1958); tit. 36, § 74(44) (1958).
CAL. VEHICLE CODE§ 1808.5 (West 1971) (medical infonna.
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C,D

P,S,D
P
M;P

P,D
M
P

P,D
p

A,M,P;

D;A
A;M;
D,M,P
M,P
F;M;P
M,P
D,M

D,P
P
P
P;P

P
P;M,D

F
P;D

M
M,P
A;M
F;M;P

P,R;P
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tion must be held confidential); § 1810 (West 1971)
(authorizes sale of information).
COLO. REv. STAT. .ANN. § 42-1-206 (1973); § 42-1-215 (1973).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 14-10 (1958).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 305 (1974) (makes public all
records less than three years old; provides sanctions for
unauthorized use of older records).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.25(5)(a) (1968) (authorizes sales of
information).
GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-429 (1972); § 92A-603 (1972).
IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 9-1-1-8 (Burns 1973) (authorizes
compilation and sale of information).
IowA CODE ANN. § 321.199 (1966).
LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 47: 1508(7) (West 1970) (makes public
any information "not generally considered confidential").
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 90, § 30 (Supp. 1974).
M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§§ 257.502, 4.740-.760 (1970).
Mo. .ANN. STAT. § 301.350 (Vernon 1972); § 301.360 (Vernon
1972); § 302.171 (Vernon 1972).
MoNT. REv. CODES .ANN. § 31-130 (Supp. 1974); § 31-141
(Supp. 1974); § 53-101 (Supp. 1974).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-412 (1974).
NEV. REv. STAT.§ 483.290 (1973); § 483.400 (1973); § 485.135
(1973).
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 259: IO (1966).
N.J. STAT. .ANN. § 39:3-28 (1953).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-2-8 (1972) (authorizes sale of information).
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 202(3) (McKinney Supp. 1974)
(authorizes sale of information).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-26, -27 (Supp. 1974) (excepts medical
information and provides for copying service).
Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 4503.26 (Page 1973) (authorizes
sale of information); § 4507.25 (Page 1973).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 6-117(g), (h) (Supp. 1974).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 417 (1971) (authorizes sale of information); tit. 75, § 610 (1971).
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.§ 31-10-12 (1968).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-120 (1962) (authorizes sale of information);§ 46-121 (1962).
S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 32-12-60 (1967).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-711 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1974)
(authorizes sale of information).
TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b, § 6 (1969); art. 6687b,
§ 21 (1969).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-2-11 (1953); § 41-2-12 (1953);
§ 41-2-12.1 (1953) (authorizes sale of information).
VA. CoDE ANN.§ 46.1-31 (1974); § 46.1-32 (1974) (authorizes
sale of information).
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F; D, P W. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 17-2-6 (1974); § 17A-2-14 (1974).
M Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 343.23 (1971).
A; M WYo. STAT. ANN. § 31-276.10 (Supp. 1973); § 31-276.19
(Supp. 1973).

School Records
C;X

c,x

C

c,x
c,x
R;X;D
C,D,X; M
C,D,E,
X;R;M
P,R

M
M
C,R,X
G,M

s

C

A

CAL. EDuc. CoDE § 10751 (West 1974); § 10757 (West 1974).
Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-204 (1973).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-209 (1958) (medical and psychological exams).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4111 (1974) (protects school
officials by denying a cause of action against them for
the contents of records).
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 805 (Supp. 1974).
MASs. .ANN. LAws ch. 71, § 34D (Supp. 1974); ch. 71, § 34E
(Supp. 1974); ch. 71, § 34F (Supp. 1974).
Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-15-3 (Supp. 1974); § 37-15-1 (Supp.
1974).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-4,157 (Supp. 1974); § 79-4,158 (1943);
§ 79-443 (1971 ).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-19 (1953) (provides rule-making
power for public inspection of records; relieves school
officials from liability for furnishing information).
N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 142 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 3319.32 (Page 1972).
ORE. REv. STAT.§ 336.195 (1975).
PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 24, §§ 15-1531 to-1532 (1962).
R.I. GEN. LA.ws ANN. § 16-38-5 (1969) (prohibits use of
questionnaires which would violate a student's right
of privacy ·without prior approval of the school board).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 15-305 (Supp. 1974).
VA. CODE .ANN. § 18A-5-5 (1974).

w.

Tax Returns

c,s
C
C,D

C; C, S;
C, S
C,S; C,S

A;C

c,s
c,s

C,P; C, S

ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 786(28) (1958).
ALAs. STAT.§ 09.25.100 (1962).
.ARK. STAT. .ANN. § 84-2046 (1947).
CAL. REv. & TAX CODE§ 451 (West 1971) (property); § 16563
(West 1970) (gift);§ 30455 (West 1970) (cigarette).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1412 (1973) (property); §§ 47-152l(a),
(e) (1973) (income).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92-3208,-3213 (1974); § 92-3216 (1974).
HAWAII REV. STAT.§ 235-116 (1968).
!LL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 9-917 (1973) (allows names and
addresses to be published).
IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 6-1-39-2 (Burns 1972) (makes income information confidential but assessment information public);§ 6-3-6-8 (1972).
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C
C
C,D, S
P; C,X;
C,S;D

c,s
C, S, 0

C, S
C,D
C,D,S
M,P;C

C;D
F

c,s
c,s
A; S, C
c,x,s
C; C; C
C,S;F

O;D
C,S;
C,D,S

c,s
C,S

A,C

c,x,s
C, D,X,
S;F

c,s

C, S
C
C; P, S;

c,x,s
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IowA CoDE ANN. § 422.20 (1971); § 422.21 (Supp. 1974);
§ 450.68 (1971).
KY. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 131.190 (Supp. 1974).
LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.§ 44:4(1) (West 1951).
ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5340 (Supp. 1973).
Mn. ANN. ConE art. 81, § 45(a) (1957) (real property); art.
81, § 45(b) (1957) (personal property); art. 81, § 300
(1957) (income); art. 81, § 301 (1957).
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 62, § 58 (Supp. 1974).
M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 206.465-.466 (Supp. 1974)
(makes available to any state officer when required for
efficient administration of laws).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.61 (1964).
Miss. ConE ANN. § 27-7-83 (1972).
MoNT. R.Ev. ConES ANN. § 84-4931 (Supp. 1974).
N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 76:7 (1970), as amended, § 544:8
(Supp. 1973) (property); § 77:19 (1970), as amended,
§ 544:8 (Supp. 1973) (income).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:50-8 (1953); § 54:50-10 (1953).
N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 17-15A-10 (1953).
N.Y. TAX LAw § 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-259 (Supp. 1974).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-42 (1972); § 57-38-57 (1972).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 205 (1961).
ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 306.129(1) (1975); § 308.290 (1975);
§ 314.835 (1975).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 731 (Supp. 1975); tit. 72, § 3402401.B (1964).
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 44-1-14 (1970); § 44-1-15 (1970).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-307 (1962) (income);
§ 65-1477 (1962).
S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 10-43-48 (1967) (bank income
tax).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2630 (Supp. 1974) (income from
stocks and bonds).
TEX. TAX. GEN. ANN. art. 1.031 (1969).
UTAH ConE ANN. § 59-14-72 (1974).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5815 (Supp. 1974); tit. 32, § 5867
(1970).
VA. ConE ANN. § 58-46 (Supp. 1974). (governor may authorize any information to be made public).
WASH. R.Ev. CODE§ 83.36.020 (1974).
w. VA. CODE ANN.§ 11-21-S0(d) (1974).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.11(44)(a) (Supp. 1974) (prohibits sale
of information, but authorizes newspaper publication of
information); § 71.11(44)(b) (Supp. 1974) (requires net
tax paid or payable by any taxpayer to be made available
upon request of any resident); § 71.11(44)(c) (Supp. 1974).
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Welfare Records
D;J ALA. ConE tit. 49, § 12(3le) (Supp. 1973); tit. 49, § 17(32)
(Supp. 1973).
H AI.As. STAT. § 47.05.030 (Supp. 1974).
R Aru:z. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-135 (Supp. 1975).
H,R,S ARK. STAT. ANN§ 83-138 (1960).
H,S;X; CAL. WELF. 8c !NSTNs. ConE § 10850 (West 1972), as
amended, (West Supp. 1975); § 10850.2 (West 1972);
D;J
§§ 10851 (1972), § 10851.5 (West Supp. 1975); § 17006
(West 1972).
H,R,S, CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-1-114 (1973); §§ 30-17-101 to
-104 (1973) (applicable to nonfederally funded programs).
X;P
H,S;M,P CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-83 (1958); § 17-291 (applicable
to nonfederally funded programs).
H,S DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31 § 1101 (1974).
J;S D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-211 (1973); § 3-212 (1973).
A,O;D FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.365 (Supp. 1974); § 409.375 (Supp.
1974).
J,R;S GA. ConEANN. § 99-2910 (1968); § 99-9903 (1968).
H;S;A HAWAII REv. STAT. § 346-10 (1968); § 346-11 (1968);
§§ 346-29, -72 (1968).
H,R IDAHO CODE § 56-221 (1948).
J;P ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-9 (1973); ch. 23, § 11-11 (1973).
I INn. ANN. STAT. ConE §§ 12-1-10-2, -3 (Burns 1973).
A;H,S lowA ConE ANN. § 239.3 (Supp. 1974); § 217.30 (Supp. 1974).
J,S KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-713(b) (1973).
H;D KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 205.175 (1972); § 205.180 (Supp. 1974).
J,S LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:65 (West Supp. 1974).
H ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4496 (Supp. 1974).
H,S Mn. ANN. ConE art. 88A, § 6 (1957).
H,S MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 271, § 43 (1956).
H MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 400.35 (1970).
P,S Miss. ConE ANN. § 43-1-19 (1972) (names and amounts
received are public; sanctions provided against "political
or commercial" use of such information).
M;J,S Mo. ANN. STAT. § 205.940 (Vernon 1972); § 208.120 (Vernon
Supp. 1975).
A,M; ], MoNT. REv. ConES ANN. § 71-231 (1971); §§ 71-231.1 to
D,S
-231.3 (1971).
J;S NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 68-313 to -313.1 (1971); § 68-314 (1971),
R;D NEV. REv. STAT. § 422.290 (1973); § 426.480 (1973).
M,F N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8-111 (Supp. 1974).
J,R,S N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 13-1-37 (1968).
C N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw §§ 136, 136a (McKinney Supp. 1974)
(news agency allowed to inspect disbursement records
upon providing assurance that names and addresses of
recipients will not be disclosed; tax department can use
records in fraud investigations).
], s N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-45 (Supp. 1974).
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H, S N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-09-13, 50-24-31 (1974).
P Omo R.Ev. CODE .ANN. § 329.091 (Page Supp. 1974) (makes
public lists of names and amounts of assistance; prohibits
commercial or political use).
], S OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56; § 183 (1961).
J ORE. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 411.320-.335 (1975) (prohibits use £or
commercial and political purposes).
], R PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 404 (Supp. 1974) (prohibits commercial or political uses of names).
H, X, S R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 40-6-12 (Supp. 1974).
R; P S.C. CODE ANN. § 71-14 (1962); § 71-14.1 (Supp. 1974).
]; R; S S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 28-1-29 to -31 (1967); § 28-1-32
(1967); § 28-1-35 (1967).
P; ], S TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-117 (1973); § 14-329 (1973).
H TEX. R.Ev. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 695c, § 33 (1964).
P, R, S UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-15a-19, -26 (1974).
H VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2511 (Supp. 1974).
H, S VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.1-53 (Supp. 1974).
I, S WASH. R.Ev. CODE§ 74.04.060 (1974).
], S w. VA. CODE ANN.§ 9-11-:16 (1969).
], S Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.53 (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
], R, S WYo. STAT. ANN. § 42-19 (Supp. 1973).

C. The Federal Constitutional Law of Privacy
I. Inherent Limitations on the Federal Government's
Power To Collect Information
The federal government is restricted to operating within the
powers enumerated in the Constitution-a restriction that constitutes an inherent limitation on information collection by both
Congress and the executive branch. While the power of Congress
to collect information1789 is nowhere specifically enumerated, it has
1789. See generally M. DIMOCK, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING COMMITIEES (1929);
E. EBERLING, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (1928); M. MCGEARY, THE DEVELOPMENTS
OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE POWER (1940); Alfange, Congressional Investigations

and the Fickle Court, 30 U. CIN. L. REv. 113 (1961); Boudin, Congressional and Agency
Investigations: Their Uses and Abuses, 35 YA. L. REv. 143 (1949); Coudert, Congressional Inquisition and Individual Liberty, 15 VA. L. REv. 537 (1929); Cousens, The
Purpose and Scope of Investigations Under Legislative Authority, 26 GEO. L.J. 905
(1938); Driver, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress To Punish Contempts of Its Investigating Committees, 38 VA. L. REv. 887 (1952); Ford, The Lawyer
and the Congressional Investigation, 21 S. CAL. L. REv. 242 (1948); Gose, The Limits
of Congressional Investigating Power, IO WASH. L. REv. 61 (1935); Hamilton, The Inquisitorial Power of Congress, 23 A.B.A.J. 511 (1937); Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REv. 153 (1926); Lashley, The Investigating Power of Congress: Its Scope and Limitations, 40 A.B.A.J. 763
(1954); Loring, Powers of Congressional Investigation Committees, 8 MINN. L. REv.
595 (1924); Massey, Congressional Investigations and Individual Liberties, 25 U. CIN.
L. REV. 323 (1956); Merry, The Investigating Power of Congress: Its Scope and Limitations, 40 A.B.A.J. 1073 (1954); McGeary, The Congressional Power of Investigation, 28
NEB. L. REv. 516 (1949); Moreland, Congre§sional Investigations and Private Persons,
40 S. CAL. L. REv. 189 (1967); Tunstall, fhe Investigating Power of Congress: Its
Scope and Limitations, 40 VA. L. REv. 875 (1954).
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been found to exist by implication as a necessary adjunct to the exercise of those powers that are enumerated.1790 There are five express
powers from which congressional authority to collect information
can be implied: the powers to enumerate the population,17°1 to impeach,1792 to judge congressional election retums,1793 to discipline
and expel members of Congress,1794 and to legislate.1700 The census
clause of the Constitution literally permits merely an enumeration
of "free Persons ... excluding Indians not taxed,"1796 although the
census has in fact been used extensively as a means of collecting information from the citizenry.1797 The Supreme Court has not yet
ruled whether the census power will support collection of information unrelated to actual enumeration,1798 and the deliberations of
the framers are unrevealing.1700 One could logically conclude that
the scope of the census power is limited to an actual counting. The
Second Circuit, however, has held that the express language of the
1790. The seminal case concerning implied powers is McCulloch v. Maryland, 1'7
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). For a discussion of implied powers in the context of the
collection of information see McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160-75 (1927).
1791. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, requires: "The actual Enumeration shall be made
within three years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and
within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law
direct."
1792. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, provides: "The House of Representatives •••
shall have the sole Power of Impeachment." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 6, provides:
"The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments."
1793. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 5, cl. 1, provides: "Each House shall be the Judge ot
the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members ••••"
1794. U.S. CoNsr. art I, § 5, cl. 2, provides: "Each House may ••• punish its Mem•
bers for disorderly 13ehaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."
1795. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 1, provides: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives." Legislative powers are enumerated more specifically in
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
1796. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
1797. See Hearings on the Census, supra note 1509, at 460 (memorandum from
the Census 13ureau). See also Fernandez, The Census, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 245 (1969);
text at notes 1925-38 infra; notes 1990-93 infra and accompanying text.
1798. The Court, in Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 45'7, 536 (1870) (Legal Tender
Cases) noted in dictum:
[A] power may exist as an aid to the execution of an express power, or an aggregate of such powers, though there is another express power given relating in
part to the same subject but less extensive. Another illustration of this may be
found in connection with the provisions respecting a census. The Constitution orders an enumeration of free persons in the different States every ten years. The
direction extends no further. Yet Congress has repeatedly directed an enumeration
not only of free persons in the States but of free persons in the Territories, and
not only an enumeration of persons but the collection of statistics respecting age,
sex, and production. Who questions the power to do this?"
1799. See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1'787, 600-06 (M. Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937). The debates do not indicate the intended scope of the census power.
The primary discussions related to problems of representation, i.e., whether wealth
was a proper measure and who would be counted.
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Constitution limiting the census to an enumeration "does not prohibit the gathering of other statistics, if 'necessary and proper,' for
the intelligent exercise of other powers enumerated in the constitution, and in such case there could be no objection to acquiring this
information through the same machinery by which the population is
enumerated ...•" 1800
An implied power to investigate exists under each of the other
four powers. It is available to Congress for the purpose of collecting
information necessary to an informed exercise of those powers,1801
but is limited by the breadth of the express functions to which it
attaches. Three of these express functions-the power to impeach,
the power to judge congresional election returns, and the power to
discipline and expel members of Congress-are judicial in nature.1802
Because Congress is primarily a legislative body and because the three
judicial powers reserved to Congress are extremely limited in scope,
the investigative powers arising under these functions will be used
in far fewer instances than the investigative power falling under the
legislative function. 1803
The parameters of the investigative power inferred from the
legislative function were established in Kilbourn v. Thompson1804
and McGrain v. Daugherty.1805 Prior to 1880, the courts had given
Congress almost unlimited power to investigate,1806 but in Kilbourn,
the Supreme Court upheld a citizen's right not to respond to congressional subpoenas issued in an investigation in furtherance of an
illegitimate purpose. The Court noted that the inquiry could not be
"simply a fruitless investigation into the personal affairs of indi1800. United States v. Moriarity, 106 F. 886, 891 (2d Cir. 1901).
1801. Concerning investigations relating to the power to legislate see Eastland v.
United States Servicemen's Fund, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4635, 4639-40 (U.S. May 27, 1975);
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); text at notes 1804-19 infra. Concerning
investigations relating to the power to judge congressional election returns see Barry
v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929). Concerning investigations
relating to the power to discipline and expel members of Congress see In re Champ•
man, 166 U.S. 661, 668 (1897). See generally Moreland, supra note 1789.
1802. Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 613 (1929).
1803. Although it is clear that the power of investigation exists under the impeachment clause, no cases have arisen on this matter. See Moreland, supra note 1789, at
224. Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929), is the only case
directly concerning the investigative power pursuant to the congressional authority
to judge election returns, although both United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937),
and Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972), indicated that such a power exists. Finally, other than Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), which assumes but does
not discuss the investigative power, In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897), is the sole
Supreme Court case on investigations relating to the authority to discipline and expel
members. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), does, however, discuss in dictum the nature and extent of the congressional power to discipline members.
1804. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
1805. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
1806. See Moreland, supra note 1789, at 189-211, and cases cited therein.
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viduals,"1807 but must be capable of resulting in "valid legislation on
the subject to which the inquiry referred."1808 In McGrain, the Court
upheld subpoenas issued in an investigation of the Justice Department for the purpose of formulating reform legislation. The Court
reasoned that "[a] legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which
the legislation is intended to affect or change."1800 It is today clear
that the legislative power "encompasses inquiries concerning the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes . . . , includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to
remedy them ... , [and] comprehends probes into departments of the
Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste." 1810
Thus, while the requirement of a proper legislative purpose constitutes a restraint on Congress, the sphere of legitimate legislative
activity, as the Court suggested recently in Eastland v. United States
Serivcemen's Fund,1811 is sufficiently broad to justify an inquiry into
almost any question of national interest.
A further limitation on the congressional investigative power is
that all questions must be pertinent to the asserted legislative purpose.1812 When an investigation is conducted by either the full House
or Senate this limitation is of little consequence since Congress'
1807. 103 U.S. at 195.
1808. 103 U.S. at 195. Of interest are the conflicting interpretations given Kilbourn
by the majority and concurring opinions in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 43 U.S.L.W. 4635 (U.S. May 27, 1975), discussed in the text at notes 1873-76 in•
fra. In Kilbourn the House of Representatives attempted to punish an individual for
contempt for refusal to comply with a congressional subpoena. The Court invalidated
the House's effort, reasoning that the subject matter of the investigation was judicial
and not legislative, and that the House had thus "assumed a power which could only
be properly exercised by another branch of the government ••• ," 103 U.S. at 192,
The majority in Eastland stated that the subpoena at issue in Kilbourn was subject
to attack because it was not essential to legislating. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4640. The con•
curring opinion of Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stewart, however, stated that the
individual in Kilbourn was able to attack the subpoena because his suit was brought
against the House Sargeant at Arms, who was carrying out the unconstitutional di•
rective, rather than against House members or their legislative aides. 43 U.S.L.W. at
4643. The concurring justices thus sought to emphasize that congressional subpoenas
within the legislative sphere are subject to attack as long as Congressmen or their
aides are not the parties defendant.
1809. 273 U.S. at 175. The Court also observed: "In actual legislative practice power
to secure needed information ••• has long been treated as an attribute of the power
to legislate. It was so regarded in the British Parliament and in the Colonial Icglsla•
tures before the American Revolution; and a like view has prevailed and been carried
into effect in both houses of Congress and in most of the state legislatures." 273 U.S.
at 161.
1810. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
1811. 43 U.S.L.W. 4635, 4639-41 (U.S. May 27, 1975).
1812. See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929). See also Deutch v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). The pertinency requirement has been codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 192 (1970).
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power to legislate in so many areas virtually ensures that there will
be a proper legislative purpose to which almost any question could
be pertinent.1813 Most investigations, however, are carried out by
congressional committees1814 or federal agencies1815 to which Congress
has delegated its investigatory power for specific purposes through
authorizing resolutions or statutes.1816 Authorizing resolutions are
often broad in scope, but there is at least a minimal requirement
that such resolutions delineate the agency's "jurisdiction and purpose with sufficient particularity" to ensure that compulsory process
is used only in furtherance of a legislative purpose,1817 and at times
agency investigations exceeding the bounds of congressional authorizations have been disallowed and witnesses permitted to forgo
responding to inquiries.1818 While Congress can amend delegating
legislation to enable questions to satisfy the purpose and pertinancy
requirements, amending resolutions or legislation require considerable congressional effort and are unlikely to be enacted except in
cases of great concern. Where a witness objects to the pertinancy of
a question at a committee hearing, "unless the subject matter has
been made to appear with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the
investigative body . . . to state for the record the subject under
inquiry at that time and the manner in which the propounded
questions are pertinent thereto." 1819 On the basis of this requirement, which is derived from the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, the Court on several occasions has reversed contempt
convictions resulting from refusals to answer investigative in1813. See Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929).
1814. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
1815. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Electric Bond
8: Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1928);
ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894). See also Note, Investigatory Powers of Congress
and Administrative Agendes, 26 WASH. U. L.Q. 531 (1941). Congress' power of investigation was held to be delegable to federal administrative agencies in ICC v. Brimson,
154 U.S. 447 (1894).
1816. For codified examples of congressional delegation of investigatory powers to
administrative agencies see 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1970) (examination of books, papers, or
records to ascertain the accuracy of any tax return); 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-11 (1970) (procedure to be followed by federal agencies in collecting information, including hearings
as to the necessity of such collection). See generally 13 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44, 61, 62, 101,
102, 131, 141, 142, 161, 301 (1970) (permitting Census Bureau to collect information
unrelated to enumeration).
1817. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 201 (1957). See Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
1818. Several early cases disallowed agency investigations exceeding the bounds ot
congressional authorities. See, e.g., Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908); United States
v. Louisville 8: N. R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915); FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S.
298 (1924). See Mechem, Fishing Expeditions by Commissions, 22 MICH. L. R.Ev. 765
(1924).
1819. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 214-15 (1957).
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quiries: 1820 because a witness can object to questions on pertinancy
grounds, fundamental fairness requires that he not be placed in
jeopardy of a contempt citation without being afforded the opportunity to judge for himself the question's pertinancy.
The executive branch's power to investigate is similarly expansive, derived principally from the President's authority to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."1821 The scope of the President's investigatory power under this provision, while not yet tested
in the courts,1822 is presumably limited only by the same purpose
and pertinancy requirements that limit congressional investigations.1823 Because of the myriad laws to enforce, however, these
requirements are only minor restrictions. This power to investigate
is apparently subject to narrowing by Congress since Congress can
revoke any law it enacts and can presumably, therefore, revoke
executive power to collect information necessary to enforce any
law.1s24

2. The Constitutional Right of Disclosural Privacy
In interpreting certain provisions of the Bill of Rights to protect
the individual from governmental intrusions, the Supreme Court
has spoken broadly of a right of privacy. Although there is no explicit constitutional recognition of such a right, the Court "has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas
or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution."182u A right
of privacy has been found in the fourth amendment,1826 the first
amendment,1827 penumbras emanating from the first eight amend1820. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). See also Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Sweezy v. New Hamp•
shire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). But see Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
1821. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 3. The power to investigate may also be implied from
other constitutionally enumerated powers of the President, such as the power of pardon granted in U.S. CoNsr. arL II, § 2.
1822. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. I (1972), the plaintiffs challenged an Army
civilian-surveillance program used to gather information allegedly necessary to an in•
telligent use of force in cases of civil disorder. The Court, holding the case nonjus•
ticiable because the record showed no objective harm, noted that "it is significant that
the principle sources of information were the news media and publications in general
circulation." 408 U.S. at 6. This statement implies that the executive's use of the in•
vestigative power does not clearly controvert plaintiff's rights so long as the informa•
tion was already public. The concept of "public facts" is rooted in the common law
of privacy. See text at notes 1584-90 supra.
1823. See text at notes 1804-20 supra.
1824. The limitations on the manner in which the executive can collect information
imposed by statutes such as the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
§ 802, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2516-18 (1970), evidence the truth of this proposition.
1825. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
1826. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
1827. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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ments,1828 the ninth amendment,1829 and the concept of ordered
liberty guaranteed by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.1830 Significantly, in discussing the right of privacy, the Court has not distinguished benv-een disclosural privacythe right to control the flow of information concerning the details
of one's individuality1831-and that aspect of privacy concerning the
individual's ability to decide whether to perform certain acts or to
undergo certain experiences, an aspect accurately characterized as
privacy relating to personal autonomy.1832 Many of these cases, especially the "privacy cases,"1833 have focused on the privacy of autonomy.
It is the purpose of this section to analyze the degree of protection for
disclosural privacy offered by each of the constitutional sources of
privacy protection,1834 to determine whether these separate protections are capable of being generalized into a unitary right of disclosural privacy, and to ascertain when government interests in
information acquisition, retention, and dissemination will override individual privacy interests.
Except for the third amendment's ban on the quartering of
soldiers in any house without the owner's consent in times of peacea very narrow prohibition-the fourth amendment comes closer to
mentioning a right of privacy than any other provision of the Con1828, See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1829. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
1830. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also, Beaney, The Constitutional
Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. Cr. REv. 212.
1831. See text at note 1525 supra. Note that the term "privacy" as defined here is
not necessarily the same as the right that is protected at common law. See text at
notes 1562-625 supra.
1832. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (disclosure), with Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (autonomy). For a discussion of the disclosure-autonomy
distinction see Beardsley, Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, in PRIVACY 56
CT, Pennock &: J. Chapman eds. 1971). See also Greenawalt, The Right of Privacy, in
THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 299 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971); Gross, The Concept of Privacy,
42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34 (1967); Note, supra note 1720; Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy
Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1974).
1833. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). See text at notes 1877-902 infra.
1834. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination does deal with an
individual's interest in disclosural privacy, cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-65 (1961) (Black, J., concurring), but the privacy protection afforded by that amendment is minimal because incriminating testimony can be compelled if either use or transactional immunity from prosecution is
conferred on the witness. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Zicarelli
v. State Commn. of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972). The fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination also does not apply to the compelled production of privately held but legally required records. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380
(1911). Nor does the privilege apply "to records required by law to be kept in order
that there may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation .•• .'' Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380
(1911). See also Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
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stitution.1835 An examination of some of the principal search and
seizure cases suggests a broad concern for privacy underlying the
fourth amendment. For example, in Boyd v. United States1836 the
Court struck down a statute empowering a court to require a defendant to produce personal papers; it reasoned that the essence of an
unreasonable search and seizure is "not the breaking of his doors,
and the rummaging of his drawers, . . . but . . . the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property ...." 1837 In holding that the fourth amendment limits the
compulsory production of evidence in addition to prohibiting unlawful searches,1838 the Court provided protection for a privacy concept broad enough to include both disclosure and autonomy.1830
In Olmstead v. United States, 1840 the Supreme Court retreated
from the broad formulation of Boyd to a mechanistic interpretation
of the fourth amendment by sanctioning a home telephone tap that
did not constitute a technical trespass. Chief Justice Taft, writing
for the Court, interpreted the fourth amendment as forbidding only
"an actual physical invasion of [one's] house." 1841 By emphasizing
the manner rather than the effect of the invasion, the holding narrowed the concept of privacy underlying the fourth amendment. In
1835. The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides: "The right of the peo•
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." See generally A. AMSTER•
DAM, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL REsrRAlNTS ON SEARCH, SEIZURE, ARREST, DETENTION AND
INTERROGATION BY STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS (1966); P. GAY, THE POLICEl\fAN
AND THE ACCUSED (1965); L. KoLBREK & G. PORTER, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND
SEIZURE (1965); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF TIIE FOURTH AMENDMENT
To THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974); Note, The Concept of Privacy and the
Fourth Amendment, 6 U. M1cH. J. L. REF. 154 (1972).
1836. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
1837. 116 U.S. at 630.
1838. See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727 (1878). But cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
1839. Boyd demonstrates that the fourth amendment serves two purposes: the protection of individual privacy and the protection of the individual against the compulsory production of evidence to be used against him, as well as against unlawful
searches. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946). Based on this dual purpose analysis, one could argue that the "right to be let alone" attaches only in a
criminal context, since, as the Court noted in Boyd, the fourth and fifth amendments
"run almost into each other." 116 U.S. at 630. However, the inference that privacy
is fully protected by the fourth amendment only when the individual is suspected of
criminal activity was rejected by the Court in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967).
1840. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Cf. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (slight
physical penetration of premises by a spike microphone constitutes a technical trespass and, if made without a warrant, is an illegal search).
1841. 277 U.S. at 466.
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an often-quoted dissent, Justice Brandeis adhered to the broader
view:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfaction
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Am.endment.1s42
One author interpreted Justice Brandeis' construction of the fourth
amendment to require that "all government intrusions on a person's
privacy at home, in his papers and effects, and on his free movement
would have ... to be justified, with the government forced to bear
the burden of showing why a particular form of interference was
reasonable. Privacy, though not absolute, would have a high place
in the hierarchy of protected values." 1843
In Katz v. United States, 1844 the Court returned to a more expansive view of the fourth amendment by excluding evidence obtained by
the use of an electronic listening and recording device attached to
the outside of a public phone booth. Abandoning the Olmstead
trespass doctrine,1845 the Court based its decision on the sweeping
proposition that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection ....
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected."1846 The fourth
amendment applied in this instance, the Court stated, because the
defendants had "justifiably relied" 1847 upon the privacy afforded by
the public phone booth. In his concurrence, Justice Harlan understood the Court's holding to require
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
1842. 277 U.S. at 478.
1843. Beaney, supra note 1830, at 227.
1844. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
1845. 389 U.S. at 353. The Court refused to overrule Olmstead expressly, but Justice Harlan, concurring, felt that Olmstead, "which essentially rested on the ground
that conversations were not subject to the protection of the Fourth Amendment" had
been overruled. 389 U.S. at 362 n.•.
1846. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
1847. 389 U.S. at 353.
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of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus, a man's home is, for
most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders
are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has
been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would
not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.1848
While the Katz view of the privacy concept underlying the fourth
amendment goes only to disclosure and not to autonomy, and is
therefore not as broad as the implications of Boyd, the decision suggests that the fourth amendment-equally applicable in the noncriminal context1849-gives rise to a zone of privacy adhering to the
individual,1850 at times even in situations outside the home.18ti1 Because the test turns on what society deems a reasonable expectation
of privacy, the individual of course receives more protection within
his home than without, in accordance with the common law prior
to the Constitution.1852 But, while applicable in a broad range of
contexts, this fourth amendment right of disclosural privacy affords
minimal protection because it must yield in the face of reasonable
government intrusion. While the fourth amendment has been interpreted to require probable cause or a warrant for searches in the criminal context1853 and in administrative searches involving physical intrusions by government agents into the home,1854 it is satisfied in the
case of questionnaires if the information sought is "reasonably
1848. 389 U.S. at 361.
1849. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360, 377 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1850. The notion of a "zone of privacy" outside the home was apparently rejected
in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973). However, unlike Katz, which
was a disclosure case, Paris involved the privacy of autonomy. Petitioners in Paris had
been enjoined by the Georgia supreme court from exhibiting two allegedly obscene
films. They argued that the constitutional doctrine of privacy laid down in Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), where the Court held that the possession of obscene ma•
terials in the home was beyond the reach of the state's criminal law because the Constitution protected the right to receive information and ideas and to be generally free
from government intrusion, applied outside the home as well. The Court rejected this
extension of Stanley, holding that the privacy of the home could not be equated with
a general zone of privacy that follows a consumer of obscene materials wherever he
goes. 413 U.S. at 66. These cases indicate that certain aspects of privacy of autonomy,
while protected inside the home, are not necessarily protected outside the home. The
privacy of disclosure, however, is oriented to the person, not to the place, and thus
should follow the individual wherever he may be. Thus, Paris should not be inter•
preted as rejecting the zone of privacy notion with respect to disclosure.
1851. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
1852. See Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment,
1960 SUP. Cr. REv. 46.
1853. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 323 (1972);
Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1969).
1854. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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related to governmental purposes and functions.''1855 Under this
test, census questionnaires have been sustained,1856 despite the wide
scope of census questions.1857 Moreover, witnesses subpoened by
grand juries cannot challenge information requests by alleging that
the grand jury lacked any reasonable ground for suspecting any
criminal violations,1858 nor can they object to questions on relevance
grounds.1859 In sum, fourth amendment privacy poses at most a minor
barrier to government collection of information from the population
at large.
A line of cases beginning in the 195O's suggests that the first
amendment is a source of a right of disclosural privacy.1860 Many of
these cases involved legislative investigations conducted by the
House Un-American Activities Committee, or by similarly purposed
state committees. The controversies arose when witnesses before the
committees refused to answer questions concerning the association
of other individuals with the Communist Party on the basis that the
first amendment barred the committee from forcing such disclosure.1861 The Court concluded that "privacy of association" was a
necessary concomitant to first amendment freedoms, that forced disclosure would abridge those freedoms, and that to justify such an
abridgement a state must "convincingly show a substantial relation
benv-een the information sought and a subject of overriding and
compelling state interest.''1862 Other related cases have similarly made
clear that a state's power to make inquiries about a person's beliefs
or associations is limited by the first amendment.1868 In the areas of
public employment1864 and bar admission1865 in particular the Court
has disallowed broad sweeping inquiries for purposes of determining
1855. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1856. See United States v. Rickenbacker, 309 F.2d 462, 463 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 962 (1963).
1857. See text at notes 1925-38 infra; notes 1990-93 infra and accompanying text.
1858. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Levinson v. Attorney General, 321 F.
Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See generally United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
1859. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919). See also United States v. Girgenti,
197 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1952).
1860. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). See also Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
1861. The issue in these cases was not whether the committees had the inherent
investigative power to require answers but whether the Bill of Rights served as a
limitation on the inherent investigative power. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 114 n.2 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 75 (1959).
1862. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Commn., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1962).
1863. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
1864. See, e.g., Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
1865. See, e.g., In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401
U.S. 1 (1971).
.
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fitness that discourage the exercise of first amendment rights. Thus,
although these cases have focused on the "chilling effect" that disclosure would have on the exercise of first amendment freedoms, 1800
they clearly hold that the first amendment protects disclosural privacy
interests and lend at least some support for the construction of a right
of disclosural privacy.
There are, however, two limitations on the general rule that
governments cannot violate constitutional rights when acquiring information1867 that may restrict an individual's ability to assert a first
amendment privacy right as a defense to a governmental demand for
informaton. First, recipients of information requests generally are
unable to assert by way of defense violations of the constitutional
rights of third parties,18 68 at least where no injury in fact is demonstrated by the recipient.1809 This bar on the assertion of constitutional jus tertii has many exceptions, however, and in recent years
it has been honored mostly in the breach.1870 Thus, in NAACP v.
Alabama1811 the NAACP was allowed to assert the first amendment
rights of its members in response to a state request for its membership list. Similarly, in Griswold v. Connecticut1812 a doctor and a
birth control official were permitted to assert the privacy rights of
the recipients of contraceptives as a defense to criminal charges of
aiding and abetting the use of birth control devices. Second, as
pointed out in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund 11s7a the
speech and debate clause limits the ability to raise constitutional defenses in response to requests for information from members of Congress or their aides. In Eastland, the plaintiff organization sought to
enjoin implementation of a congressional subpoena duces tecum that
directed a bank to produce the organization's bank records and alleged
that compliance with the subpoena would violate the organization's
first amendment rights. Had the subpoena been issued directly to
the organization, it could have resisted and tested the subpoena in a
1866. But see Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Commn., 372 U.S. 539, 565,
570 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Beaney, supra note 1830.
1867. See Watkins v. United States, 554 U.S. 178, 188 (1957). See also Darcnblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). It is interesting to note that the early cases, e.g.,
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173 (1927); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
190 (1880), which limited the scope of the investigative power by inherent purpose and
pertinency requirements rather than by the Bill of Rights, were motivated at least in
part by a desire to protect a citizen's "private affairs."
1868. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1974) (Brennan, J,,
dissenting); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972); Tileston v. Ullman, 318
U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam).
1869. See Note, Standing To Assert Constitutional ]us Tertii, 88 HARV, L. REV. 423,
428-31 (1974).
1870. See Note, supra note 1869, at 423 n.3 (citing cases).
1871. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
1872. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1873. 43 U.SL.W. 4635 (U.S. May 27, 1975).
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contempt proceeding.1874 In this context, however, the speech and
debate clause limited the scope of the inquiry to whether the congressional act was within the sphere of legislative activity.1875 While
significant, the restriction on the assertion of constitutional rights
resulting from the speech and debate clause is of limited force: it
arises only at the federal government level when information is requested of third parties by members of Congress or by congressional
aides carrying out legislative tasks.1 s10
The final three possible constitutional bases for a right to privacy-the penumbras emanating from the first eight amendments,
the ninth amendment, and the concept of ordered liberty guaranteed
by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendmentshave been explored collectively in a series of cases dealing with the
privacy of autonomy. In Griswold v. Connecticut,1877 the Court struck
do,vn statutes prohibiting the prescription or use of contraceptives
in so far as the statutes related to married couples. Six justices, in
three opinions, found an independent right of privacy, although they
could not agree on its source. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
advanced the penumbra theory.1878 He attempted to demonstrate
that the Bill of Rights applies to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and protects the right of marital
privacy by arguing that the specific guarantees of the first eight
amendments give rise to "peripheral rights"1879 without which the
specific rights would be less secure. Thus, he asserted that the first
amendment, whose penumbra includes associational privacy, the
third amendment, which prohibits quartering soldiers in any house
in time of peace without the owners' consent, the fourth amendment,
which protects against unreasonable search and seizure, and the fifth
amendment, which protects the citizen against self-incrimination,
when taken together give rise to "zones of privacy."1880
Rejecting the penumbra approach, Justice Harlan considered
the right of privacy so fundamental that it was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and hence protected by due process.1881
Justice Harlan had previously advanced the fundamental rights ap1874. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4638 n.14, 4641 n.16.
1875. 43 U.SL.W. at 4638.
1876. The concurring opinion in Eastland by Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stewart suggested that the plaintiff organization could have raised its constitutional rights
by employing a different procedure with different parties defendant: "Our prior cases
arising under the Speech and Debate Clause indicate only that a Member of Congress
or his aide may not be called upon to defend a subpoena against constitutional objection, and not that the objection will not be heard at all." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4643.
1877. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1878. 381 U.S. at 484.
1879. 381 U.S. at 483.
1880. 381 U.S. at 484.
1881. 381 U.S. at 500.
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proach to privacy in Poe v. Ullman, 1882 where he stated that "it is
not the particular enumeration of rights in the first eight Amendments which spell out the reach of Fourteenth Amendment due
process, but rather . . . those concepts which are considered to embrace those rights 'which are ... fundamental; which belong ... to the
citizens of all free governments.' " 1883 This approach apparently was
also adopted by Justice Goldberg, even though he joined in the
Court's opinion and stated that he was adding his own opinion
merely to "emphasize the relevance of [the ninth] Amendment.''
Justice Goldberg argued that the ninth amendment "shows a belief
of the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are
not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive. " 1884 One must look, he stated, to the " 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people to determine whether a principle is
so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental.' " 1885 The right
of privacy in Justice Goldberg's view was just such a fundamental
personal right, which emanated "from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.''1 886
The debate over the constitutional source of the right of privacy
apparently was settled in Roe v. Wade, 1887 in which the Court upheld
a woman's absolute right to have an abortion in the first trimester
of pregnancy. This holding struck down a state statute making abortions illegal except where the mother's life is endangered.1888 Adopting the fundamental rights approach, the Court held that the "right
of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state actions, as we
feel it is, or, as the district court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to en1882. 367 U.S. 497, 539-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1883. 367 U.S. at 497. Justice White, concurring in Griswold, also found justification
in the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, but he refused to recognize
that this liberty gave rise to an independent right of privacy. See 381 U.S. at 502-07.
Justices Black and Stewart dissented on the ground that the fourteenth amendment
makes applicable to the states no rights beyond those specifically incorporated in the
first ten amendments. See 381 U.S. at 507-31.
1884. 381 U.S. at 492.
1885. 381 U.S. at 493 (brackets in original), quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
1886. 381 U.S. at 494, quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
1887. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65
(1973).
1888. The Court did, however, reverse the district court's decision to the extent
that it had held that this right of privacy was unqualified, holding instead that the
state's interest in protecting the potentiality of human life in the second and third
trimesters of pregnancy was sufficiently strong to permit some regulation of abortion.
See 410 U.S. at 154.
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compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."1889 Because the plaintiff in Roe v. Wade was an unmarried
woman,1890 the holding affirms that the right of privacy attaches to
the individual and is not restricted to the marital relationship. There
are at least two reasons that may explain why the Court settled on
the fundamental rights approach. First, the composition of the Court
had changed drastically. Of the five justices who joined the majority
in Griswold, only Justices Douglas and Brennan remained; additionally, both Justices Black and Harlan had departed. Second, the
Court could have found the penumbra theory unmanageable because
it opened up so much uncharted ground. The fundamental rights
approach has been a traditional one1891 and, because of the amorphous quality of the "liberty" concept, the approach is no less open
to expansion than the penumbra! argument.
One other Supreme Court case, Stanley v. Georgia,1 892 expanded
the privacy concept to include the right to possess obscene materials
in one's home. While the Court ostensibly based its holding on the
first amendment, the decision drew in part upon a "fundamental ...
right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusions into one's privacy. " 1893 The privacy underpinning in Stanley was clearly significant, because the case is difficult
to reconcile with other cases holding that the first amendment does
not apply to obscenity,1894 and because the right recognized in
Stanley is limited to the house,1895 unlike most first amendment
1889. 410 U.S. at 153.
1890. 410 U.S. at 120.
1891. As early as Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court recognized certain "fundamental" rights that would be protected despite their lack of explicit recognition in the Constitution. In subsequent cases, the Court recognized as fundamental.
rights included in the liberty clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments the personal intimacies of the home, the family, procreation, motherhood, marriage, and child
rearing. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stauley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925). See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 12 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), in which Justice Marshall stated that the right of privacy should extend
to the selection of living companions: "The choice of household companions-of
whether a person's 'intellectual and emotional needs' are best met by living with
family, friends, professional associates or others-involves deeply personal considerations as to the kind and quality of intimate relationships within the home. That
decision surely falls within the ambit of the right to privacy protected by the Constitution." 416 U.S. at 16. If these rights apply to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, one may also find a right of privacy either in
that same clause or in the liberty clause of the fifth amendment applying to the
federal government.
1892. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
1893. 394 U.S. at 564.
1894. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
1895. See 394 U.S. at 558.

1292

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 73:971

rights. Moreover, the Court cited Griswold in addition to first
amendment cases to support the proposition that "the right to receive information and ideas" is "fundamental to our free society."1800
In short, the Court apparently relied on first amendment considerations to justify expanding the incipient privacy right.
The contours of the privacy right developed by these cases seem
extraordinarily difficult to determine, for the activities it has been
invoked to protect lack a clear interrelationship. The Court often
speaks of privacy as if it were a single right, but it seems more
accurate to conceive of privacy as that characteristic common to
those individual actions that the Court has been willing to recognize
as fundamental rights. Thus, the Court has stated that "only personal
rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,' ... are included in this guarantee of personal privacy."1897 It is clear that not all fundamental rights fall within the
ambit of the privacy right, but an underpinning of strong privacy
interests seems to enhance the possibility that a particular right will
be deemed fundamental. The actions protected thus far in the name
of privacy relate to the home,1898 the family,1800 and individual sexuality.1000 The Court seems to be guided by its perception of activities
that society views as private and that are thus not fit subjects for
government regulation.1901 But it is not at all clear what other actions
popularly considered private will receive constitutional protection.1002
The above-discussed privacy cases involve autonomy, not disclosure. A right of disclosural privacy, however, can be derived from
the fundamental privacy rights by analogy to the first amendment
right of disclosural privacy: Disclosure of information relating to an
individual's participation in particular activities may deter an individual from engaging in those activities. Where the activities have
the status of fundamental rights, any such deterrent effect would be
an impermissible "chill." But the disclosural privacy right derived
1896. 394 U.S. at 564.
1897. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. ll3, 152 (1973).
1898. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 12 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1899. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); State v. Elliott, 44 U.S.L.W.
2044 (N.M. Ct. App. July 9, 1975).
1900. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Population Servs. Intl. v. Wilson,
44 U.S.L.W. 2033 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1975).
1901. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1902. See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homo•
sexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613 (1974); Note, supra note 1720.
A few state courts, interpreting the federal Constitution have c.'l:tended the right
of privacy to other areas. See Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 128, 503 P.2d 157, 161
(1~72); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, -, 487 P .2d 211, 217-18 (1971) (arrest records);
City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 266-68, 466 P.2d 225, 230-32, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 6-8 (1970) (financial disclosures by public officials).
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from the privacy cases arg1iably should go beyond those situations in
which a chilling effect can be shown. For example, requiring disclosure of the reasons why a woman decides to have an abortion may
not deter the exercise of this fundamental right because the consequences of having an unwanted child are so enormous. Nevertheless,
this information seems so private that the government should not
in most instances be able to require its disclosure. The same high
regard for privacy that led the Court to conclude that government
regulation of abortions is improper, at least in the first trimester,
should mandate disclosural privacy with regard to information concerning abortions in the first trimester. In situations where the state's
regulatory purposes are outweighed by a concern for individual
privacy, the state should be unable to investigate, even for a tangentially related purpose such as public health, without showing a
very strong interest. Thus, with regard to information relating to
contraception, the bearing and rearing of children, private obscenity,
and any other activities recognized as fundamental privacy rights, it
can be argued that there is a corresponding fundamental right of
disclosural privacy, although no case to date has so held.1903 While
the right of disclosural privacy derived in this manner from fundamental rights would not be as broad as the disclosural privacy right
inferred from the fourth amendment, its exceptions would be more
restricted. A state infringement of fundamental rights can only be
justified by a compelling state interest1904 and the infringing legislation "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake."1905 Thus it seems possible to develop a right of
disclosural privacy offering more protection than the broad but low
walls of the fourth amendment.
1903. But cf. Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.), on remand, 364 F. Supp. 536
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
The Supreme Court bypassed an opportunity to discuss this issue in Roe v. Norton,
43 U.S.L.W. 4874 (U.S. June 24, 1975), which involved a challenge to a state statute
providing criminal sanctions for mothers of illegitimate children receiving AFDC
assistance who refused to divulge the name of the putative father of the child. A threejudge district court had upheld the statute against claims of denial of due process and
equal protection and invasion of right to privacy, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. The Social Security Act was amended in the interim, however, and the case
was remanded for reconsideration in light of that development.
On the state level, the New York supreme court, in Schuhnan v. New York City
Health &: Hospitals Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 1093, 335 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1972), vacated and remanded, 41 App. Div. 2d 714, 341 N.Y.S.2d 242, judgment reinstated, 75 Misc. 2d 150,
346 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1973), revd., 44 App. Div. 2d 482, 355 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1974),
found that a state law requiring disclosure of the name and address of abortion
patients was void because it violated the patient's constitutional right to privacy. In
reversing, the Appellate Division relied on its finding that there was "a sufficient compelling state interest • • • to justify limiting the fundamental right of privacy as•
serted ••.•" 44 App. Div. 2d at - , 355 N.Y.S.2d at 785. See generally Note, supra note
1720, at 770-72.
1904. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
1905. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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It would be somewhat misleading to treat disclosural privacy as a
unitary right, because it is derived from dissimilar freedoms of action
guaranteed by the first and fourth amendments and by the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. One particular distinction is that the disclosural privacies implied from the
fundamental rights of autonomous privacy depend much more on a
notion that disclosure would be offensive to societal norms than do
the disclosural privacy rights inferred from the first amendment. In
addition, first amendment disclosural rights require the demonstration of a chilling effect on the freedom of association or speech, while
the other disclosural privacy rights arguably exist independent of
any chilling effect. Nevertheless, the disclosural privacy rights probably have enough similarities to make it convenient to speak of them
as one class of rights.
One principal similarity among the disclosural privacy rights is
the standard the government must meet to justify an infringement.
In all cases the state must show a compelling state interest,1000 a very
heavy burden. Even this standard has been viewed as a balancing
test,1907 however, and it is possible to argue that the individual's disclosural privacy interest is not entitled to as much weight as the
individual's interest in exercising the underlying first or fourth
amendment rights or privacy rights of autonomy. The individual's
right to act is arguably more important than his right not to disclose
what he does. For example, it seems more important to protect the
decision whether to bear a child than to protect the woman's right
to disclose that decision.
The application of this compelling state interest standard may
yield results that are varying and difficult to predict. Because disclosural privacy rights are derived from other constitutional rights,
the weight of each disclosural right may vary according to the weight
of the underlying right. It has been maintained, for example, that
the first amendment rights are entitled to a special degree of protection.1908 On the other side, the force of the government's interest in
1906. Several state courts have found a compelling state interest sufficient to override the privacy right. See Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry. v. Lopez, - Kan.-,-, 531 P.2d
455, 467 (1975) (state's interest in preventing employment discrimination justified
release of arrest and conviction records to state civil rights commission); Schulman v.
New York City Health &: Hospitals Corp., 44 App. Div. 2d 482, -, 355 N.Y.S.2d 782,
785 (1975) (state's interest in regulating abortions justified disclosure of abortion patient's name and address to :Board of Health). But see Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash,
App. 334, -, 487 P.2d 211, 217-18 (1971) (state did not show a compelling state interest
in retaining arrest records of acquitted persons).
1907. Cf. Note, Reaffirming the Freedom of the Press: Another Look at Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 73 MICH. L. R.Ev. 186, 199 (1974); Note, Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulare Lake :Basin Water Storage District: Opening the Floodgates in Local
Spedal Government Elections, 72 MICH. L. R.Ev, 837 (1974).
· 1908, See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-72 (1964); West Virginia
State :Bd. of Educ. v. :Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638-42 (1943); Whitney v. California, 274
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disclosure may depend upon the source of the governmental investigative power being invoked. For example, the congressional investigative power implied from the impeachment function may present
a stronger governmental interest than the investigative power implied from the legislative function. In an investigation under the
impeachment function, the integrity of the institutions of government are involved, while in an investigation under the legislative
function, only the ability to pass a specific piece of legislation is at
stake. Although the legislative investigatory power is important, it
is arguably less compelling than that implied from the impeachment
function.
Even if courts are willing to recognize as extensive a disclosural
privacy right as advocated above, there remains a need for legislative
action if individuals are to be protected adequately from intrusive
government information acquisition. One reason is that the balancing test gives little guidance concerning the proper limits of government intrusion into individual privacy, for the test leaves a judge
free to apply his own value judgments in assessing competing state
and individual interests in a particular case. A second reason is that
because the right of disclosural privacy draws its strength from
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, it may be difficult to expand
that right beyond matters relating to first amendment freedoms,
sexual relations, the family, and the home. In any case, greater detail
and flexibility in the protection of privacy interests can be accomplished legislatively. Moreover, a societal reassessment of conflicting
interests is easier to implement when the original balance is struck
legislatively than when the balance is accorded a constitutional
dimension and is thus not within the legislature's power to change.
In addition to the need for legislative control of information
acquisition, there is need for legislation in the areas of information
retention and dissemination if the individual privacy interests at stake
are to be adequately protected. The implications of the privacy right
for these other aspects of information-handling are limited. In particular, simple retention of such information does not appear to
represent any further infringement of the constitutionaJ right. But
in many instances, on a policy level, the government's desire to retain collected information indefinitely will not justify the resulting
injury to individual privacy interests.
To be sure, in some areas the retention of information about an
individual may continue to serve a purpose, at least as long as the
individual is alive. Criminal conviction records, for example, are
used as an important tool for sentencing after subsequent convictions.
U.S. 357, 373-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 628-31 (1919) (Holmes &: Brandeis, JJ., dissenting). But see Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 90-97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
,
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Even where the purpose for which the information was collected can
no longer be served, the government may nevertheless legitimately
desire to retain the information in order to avoid the burden of having to recollect it, should it ever be needed again. The principal
problem encountered with record retention is the possibility of disclosure, either intentional or inadvertent, to other persons or agencies of personal information traceable to specific individuals.1000
This danger appeared so substantial to the court in Menard v.
Mitchell1910 that it viewed an order to expunge FBI records concerning an illegal arrest as a proper means of preventing inadvertent
disclosure. The court stated that "if appellant can show that his arrest was not based on probable cause it is difficult to find constitutional justification for its memorialization in the FBl's criminal
files," 1911 especially because dissemination of that information might
subject the appellant's reputation to substantial injury.1912
While legislation is needed, it is arguable that the right of disclosural privacy protects against the possibility that information may
be accidentally revealed.1013 If the government can assure confidentiality, there seems to be no constitutional requirement for disposal
of information validly acquired. Moreover, dissemination by the
collecting agency to other federal agencies of personally identifiable
information would be permissible where the other agencies can show
a need that is sufficiently compelling to justify collecting the information from the source itself. But, arguably, the right of disclosural
privacy is violated unless each new governmental unit can satisfy
such a test and unless the subject is given timely notice of any attempt
at intra-governmental transfer: The agency from which the information is sought cannot be expected to assert satisfactorily the subject's
rights. For the same reason, the collecting agency should have to
make a new showing of need sufficient to justify collecting the in•
1909. See, e.g., A. MILLER, supra note 1503. But cf. DATABANKS, supra note 1502,
Proposals for a national data center have been criticized extensively because of confi•
dentiality problems. See, e.g., A. MILLER, supra; Note, Privacy and Efficient Govern•
ment: Proposals for a National Data Center, 82 HARV. L. REv. 400 (1968); notes
2100-04 infra and accompanying text.
1910. 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970). On remand, 328 F. Supp. '118 (D.D.C, 1971),
however, the district court declined to order expungement and instead enjoined disclosure of the records to prospective employees other than agencies of the government,
328 F. Supp. at 728. On appeal from this district court refusal to expunge, the court
of appeals remanded the case with orders "to remove appellant's record from [the]
criminal files." Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 101'1, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also
Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Mackey, 387 F. Supp.
1121 (D. Nev. 1974).
1911. 430 F.2d at 492.
1912. On the problems of confidentiality in this conte..xt see Symposium, Computers,
Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211 (1968); Comment, supra
note 1525,
1913. But cf, Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App.-,-, 487 P.2d 211, 218 (1971); David,
son v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 128, 503 P.2d 157, 162 (19'12).
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formation before it can use the information for a new purpose.
Finally, it is clear that dissemination to individuals or to private
organizations without the consent of the person to whom the information pertains1914 is unwarranted because private parties can
never show the required compelling state interest or national governmental purpose.1915

D. Federal Statutory Protection for Privacy Prior to
the Privacy Act of 1974
Prior to the Privacy Act of 1974, which is the first congressional
effort at comprehensive privacy legislation, Congress attempted to
reduce the damage to privacy caused by government data-handling
through specific acts dealing with specific types of information.
These enactments deal to varying degrees with all five critical problems of a data-gathering system: types of information that can be collected,1916 methods of collection,1917 retention,1918 dissemination,1919
1914. But could an individual, in supplying the information to the government in
the first place, be deemed to have consented to such dissemination? This is obviously
not the case where the individual has objected to governmental collection in the first
instance. But where the individual merely provides the requested information without
objecting, the question becomes more difficult and depends upon the circumstances
surrounding the initial disclosure. There is no reason to suppose that the ordinary
common-law consent doctrine would not apply. Under this doctrine, consent may be
either express or implied. Consent may be implied from silence only where a reasonable person would speak if he objected. Consent may also be inferred from custom
or usage. Consent will be held invalid where it is obtained under situations of duress,
where the threat is direct. The privilege is limited to the conduct to which the party
actually consents, or to acts of a substantially similar nature. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 1565, at 101-08. Yet one must consider that a governmental request for information may be inherently coercive. This has led Professor Miller to comment that "[E]ven
a questionnaire sent out under the imprimatur of a federal agency has an intimidating
effect on some people, a weakness that often is played upon by the agency in its
follow-up practices." A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 186.
1915. But see Tosh v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 482 F.2d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1973),
holding that no right of privacy was invaded by the release of arrest records to nonlawenforcement persons for other than law enforcement purposes when those persons
"present a legitimate need for and interest in the material."
1916. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2511, 2516 (Supp. I 1971) (collection of information by interception of oral and
wire communications); 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970) (collection of criminal records by the
federal government); 44 U.S.C. § 3505 (1970) (prohibiting federal agencies from collecting information that another agency has already been authorized to obtain); 44
U.S.C. § 3506 (1970) (determination as to the necessity of collection of information by a
federal agency upon the objection of a party having a "substantial interest"); 44 U.S.C.
§ 3509 (1970) (requiring federal agencies to submit comprehensive plans for the collection of information); 44 U.S.C.A. § 3512 (Supp. Feb. 1975) (collection of information
by independent regulatory agencies); 44 U.S.C. § 3511 (1970) (imposing penalties upon
persons who fail to furnish requested information).
1917. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2511, 2516, 2518 (Supp. I 1971) (permitting the collection of information by interception of wire or oral communications and outlining the authorization procedure for
such interceptions); 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970) (requiring the minimization of the burden
placed on persons compelled to furnish information to federal agencies); 44 U.S.C.
§ 3505 (1970) (prohibiting multiple collection of information by various agencies).
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and remedies for a party injured by unlawful dissemination.102°Four
major acts that exemplify the types of privacy protection Congress
1918. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970) (retention of criminal identification records):
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 § l00I(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3578 (1970) (retention of
criminal conviction records). The statutes regulating records-management by the Administrator of General Services are 44 U.S.C. § 2905 (1970) (establishing standards for
the retention of records of continuing value); 44 U.S.C. § 2907 (1970) (establishing
records storage centers); 44 U.S.C. § 2909 (1970) (allowing the Administrator to authorize the retention of records). The statutes regulating records-management by federal
agencies are 44 U.S.C. §§ 3101-07 (1970). Regarding the disposal of records see 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-14 (1970), especially section 3310, providing for the disposal of records consti·
tuting a menace to health, life, or property and section 3314, providing that the proce•
dures for the disposal of records outlined in this chapter are to be exclusive.
1919. Numerous federal statutes regulate disclosures related to personal life. See,
e:g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-8lt (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970)
(disclosure of confidential information by government employees); 38 U.S.C, § 3301
(1970) (VA records); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802, 18
U.S.C. § 2511 (1970) (general prohibition against disclosure of the contents of inter•
cepted wire and oral communications); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1306 (1974) (disclosure of information in the possession of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and
the Department of Labor); Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention,
Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970 § 333, 42 U.S.C. § 4582 (1970) (prohibiting
the disclosure of the names of individuals who were the subjects of research on alcohol
abuse); 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970) (disclosure of criminal identification information): Orga•
nized Crime Control Act of 1970 § IO0l(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3578 (1970) (disclosure of criminal conviction records); Postal Reorganization Act § 2, 39 U.S.C. § 410 (1970) (disclosure
of information by the Post Office). Other statutes regulate the disclosure of financial
and business records. See, e.g., INT, REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 6103 (disclosure of tax returns);
Federal Trade Commission Act § 6(£), 15 U.S.C. § 46(£) (1970) (disclosure of trade
secrets and names of customers); 7 U.S.C. § 608(d) (1970) (disclosure of information
under the Agricultural Adjustment Act); Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 321, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77uuu (1970) (disclosure of confidential information collected by the SEC). See GovERNMENT DossIER, supra note 1511, at 26-29. However, provisions allowing the discretionary release of data by high ranking officials are common, thereby significantly
lessening the assurance of limited access. See, e.g., 13 U.S.C. § 8(a) (1970) (release of
census data by Secretary of Commerce). Other data, the disclosure of which is not
specifically restricted by statute, may be declared confidential and its disclosure limited
pursuant to regulations promulgated under agency rule-making powers, See, e.g., 32
C.F.R. §§ 1608.1-.17 (1974) (Selective Service System records); 15 C.F.R. §§ 30.90-.91
(1974) (import-export data held by the Census Bureau).
Several statutes regulate agency transfer of records. See, e.g., 44 U.S.C. § 2906 (1970)
(permitting the Administrator of General Services to inspect the records of any federal
agency); 44 U.S.C. § 3507 (1970) (requiring agencies to cooperate with other agencies
in making information available to each other); 44 U.S.C. § 3508 (1970) (limiting the
types of information that may be disclosed by federal agencies).
1920, See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2520 (1970) (authorizing the recovery of civil damages, including punitive awards, it
the interception of a wire or oral communication by a government official was unauthorized); Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 616, 617, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 16810 (1970).
Many of these statutes contain sanctions against the violating party. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970) (criminal
penalties for the violation of the disclosure provisions on the interception of wire and
oral communications); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970) (violations of the procedures specified
for the interception of wire 6r oral communications can be punished by contempt and
the suppression of evidence so obtained); 13 U.S.C. § 214 (1970) (penalties for wrongful
disclosure of census data); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7213 (penalty for unlawful dis•
closure of tax returns); 44 U.S.C. § 3508 (1970) (penalties for the unlawful disclosure
of informatio~ by federal agencies),,
.
·, .
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has employed are the provisions governing the census,1921 the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,1922 the Family Edu-.
cational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,1923 and the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.1924 An analysis of these statutes reveals that the
piecemeal approach to privacy protection has proved to be largely
inadequate: None of these statutes provides protection for privacy
interests at all stages of the information-handling cycle.
Congress has authorized the Census Bureau to collect information about agriculture,1925 crime and delinquent classes,1926 religious
bodies,1927 population, unemployment, and housing,1928 and foreign
commerce and trade.1929 The authorizing legislation does not prevent
the Bureau from obtaining information from any person or source
it chooses. Indeed, it specifically permits the Secretary of Commerce
to request other governmental offices or departments to provide
data1930 and to contract with educational and other research organizations for the preparation of monographs and other reports and
materials of a similar nature.1931 Collection of information by the
Bureau is facilitated by sections providing for the imposition of
criminal penalties upon persons refusing to answer questions or answering falsely and upon persons who fail to assist census employees
in certain specified situations.1932 Significantly, the authorizing legislation has no provisions specifying the methods to be used in collecting the information.1933
The statute allows the Bureau to use collected information only
for statistical purposes1934 and prohibits the publication of data. that
can be identified with a particular establishment or individual and
the examination of individual reports by any nonemployee of the
Bureau.1985 The statute does provide, however, that the Secretary
may disclose population, agriculture, and housing information for
1921. 13 u.s.c. §§ 1-307 (1970).
1922. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 28,
42, 47 U.S.C.).
·
1923. 20. U.S.C.A. § 1232g (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1924. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-8lt (1970). ,
1925. See, e.g., 13 U.S.C. § 41 (1970) (cotton statistics); 13 U.S.C. § 61, (1970) (statistics
on oilseeds, nuts, kernels, fats, oils, and greases).
1926. See, e.g., 13 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
1927. See, e.g., 13 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
1928. See 13 U.S.C. § 141 (1970) (permitting a decennial census).
1929. See 13 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
1930. 13 u.s.c. § 6 (1970).
1931. 13 u.s.c. § 13 (1970).
1932. See 13 U.S.C. §§ 221-25 (1970).
1933. But ue 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3503-05 (1970) (applying to all federal agencies).
1934. 13 u.s.c. § 9 (1970).
.
1935. 13 U.S.C. § 9 (1970). This section does not, however, apply to information obtained from public records.
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"genealogical and other proper purposes" to anyone requesting such
information,1936 with the sole stipulation being that such information
may not be used "to the detriment of" people to whom the information relates.1937 The sole remedy provided for wrongful disclosure
of information is the imposition of criminal penalties upon the disclosing employee: 1938 no provision is made for compensating the
party injured by the disclosure.
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as
amended by the Crime Control Act of 1973,1939 includes numerous
provisions regulating what information may be collected and what
methods may be used in criminal investigations.1940 The Act prohibits the use of illegally intercepted wire or oral communications,1941 and requires that law enforcement research and statistical
information identifiable to a particular person not be used for any
purpose other than that for which it was obtained, that such information be immune from legal process, and that such information
not be used as evidence or for any other purpose in any proceeding
without the consent of the person furnishing the information.1942 It
further requires procedures to keep stored information current and
to assure that the security and privacy of the information is protected,
and entitles an individual who believes that criminal-history information concerning him contained in an automated system is inaccurate, incomplete, or maintained in violation of the Act, to review
and obtain a copy of such information for purposes of challenge or
correction.1943 The Act imposes criminal fines on those violating the
section on law enforcement research and statistical information,1944
and fines or imprisonment on those willfully violating the provisions
on wire and oral communications.1945 The Act also allows for the
recovery of civil damages by a person whose wire or oral communi1936. 13 U.S.C. § 8(a) (1970).
1937. 13 U.S.C. § 8(c) (1970). A number of state court decisions define "detriment,"
although no clear consensus emerges from these cases. See, e.g., Supervisors of County
of :Boone v. Village of Rainbow Gardens, 14 Ill. 2d 504, 153 N.E.2d 16 (1958); State
ex rel. Pritchard v. :Board of Health, 198 S.2d 490 (La. Ct. App. 1967): State ex rel,
Lytell v. :Board of Health, 153 S.2d 498 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Stahl v. :Board of Fin,, 62
N.J. Super. 562, 163 A.2d 396 (1960): Wilkins v. City of New York, 25 Misc. 2d 2'1, 207
N.Y.S.2d II (Sup. Ct. 1960); Edwards v. Edwards, 239 S,C. 85, 121 S.E.2d 432 (1961),
1938. 13 u.s.c. § 214 (1970).
1939. Pub. L. No. 93-83, 87 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 40, 42
U.S.C.).
1940. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (Supp. I 1971).
1941. 18 u.s.c. § 2511 (1970).
1942. 42 U.S.C. § 377I(a) (Supp. III 1973).
1943. 42 U.S.C. § 377l(b) (Supp. III 1973),
1944. 42 U.S.C. § 377l(c) (Supp. III 1973).
1945. 18 u.s.c. § 2511(1) (1970).
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cations are unlawfully intercepted, including punitive damages and
attorney's fees.1946
The final two statutes limit information gathering by federally
regulated private and state institutions rather than by the federal government. They are nevertheless germane to the subject of limitations
on the federal government's power to collect and keep personal data
because they indicate congressional concern for individual privacy
and include some particularly strong safeguards.
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (Education Act), applicable to all schools receiving federal funds, deals
with the retention and dissemination of school-related information.
It provides that students over the age of eighteen or attending "an
institution of postsecondary education" and parents of all other students1947 are to have the "right to inspect and review any and all
official records, files and data directly related" to the students that
are "intended for school use or to be available to parties outside the
school or school system. "1948 The Act further provides that there shall
be an "opportunity for a hearing to challenge the content of [the]
. . . school records, to insure that the records are not inaccurate,
misleading or otherwise in violation of the privacy or other rights
of students ...."1949 The Act prohibits the release of "personally
identifiable records" without the consent of a student over eighteen
or at a post-secondary educational institution, or of the parents of
students under 18 except under limited circumstances.1950 Where
release of information is permitted to a third party, that party may
not further disseminate the information without the consent of the
parents or the student.1951 The Act also requires that the parents or
students be informed of the rights accorded them under it.1952 Violation of the provisions of the Act results in the termination of federal funding to the violating institution.1953
The purpose of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Credit Act),1954
which applies to purely private organizations, is to ensure "that the
1946. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970). The section provides a complete defense, however,
for the good faith reliance on a court order and for actions taken in certain emergency
situations.
1947. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(d) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1948. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(a}(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1949. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(a)(2) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1950. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(b) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1951. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(b)(4)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1952. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(e) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1953. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1232g(a), (b), (c) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1954. See generally Note, The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 56 MINN. L. REv. 819
(1972); Comment, The Fair Credit Reporting Act: Are Business Credit Reports Regulated1, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1229; Comment, The Impact of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
50 N.C. L. R.Ev. 852 (1972).
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consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance,
and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to
the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy,
and proper utilization of such information . . . .''1955 The Credit
Act does not contain any provisions limiting the scope of information that may be collected. It does, however, provide that the consumer must be informed that a report is being prepared about him,
and requires advance notice and other special measures of protec•
tion where a report will involve interviews with friends and others
concerning the subject's personal life.1956 The bulk of the Credit Act
relates to the retention and dissemination of information. It requires
agencies to follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum
possible accuracy of the information they report,1957 and like the
Education Act, grants the consumer the right to learn what is in his
file. 1958 The Credit Act also requires that obsolete information be
removed from consumer reports1959 and that challenged information
be reported with a statement of the consumer's side of the dispute.1000
Section 604 requires the consumer's permission before a credit reporting bureau may furnish any person with a credit report concerning him, except for a few specified purposes.1961 Notwithstanding
this provision, however, certain information may be provided to gov•
ernmental agencies.1962 An aggrieved person can recover actual damages and attorney fees for negligent noncompliance with the Act1963
and punitive damages as well for willful noncompliance.1964 The Act
also imposes criminal penalties on officers or employees of a con•
sumer reporting agency who knowingly and willfully disclose infor•
mation concerning an individual to a person not authorized to receive that information.1965
All four of these acts provide at least some degree of protection
for individual privacy interests. However, none is comprehensive. Of
the four, none constitutes a real limitation on information acquisition: the Census provisions and Education Act place no restrictions
on acquisition, the Crime Act prohibits only certain interceptions
. of oral and wire communications, and the Credit Act limits only
1955. Fair Credit
1956. Fair Credit
1957. Fair Credit
1958. Fair Credit
1959. Fair Credit
1960. Fair Credit
1961. 15 U.S.C. §
1962., Fair Credit
1963. Fair Credit
1964. Fair Credit
1965. Fair Credit

Reporting Act
Reporting Act
Reporting Act
Reporting Act
Reporting Act
Reporting Act
1681b (1970).
Reporting Act
Reporting Act
Reporting Act
Reporting Act

§ 602, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1970).
§ 606, 15 U.S.C. § 1681d (1970).
§ 607(b), 15 U.S.C. § 168le(b) (1970),
§ 609, 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (1970),
§ 605, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1970).
§ 611, 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1970).
§
§
§
§

608,
617,
616,
620,

15
15
15
15

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§
§
§
§

1681£ (1970).
16810 (1970).
1681n (1970).
168lr (1970).
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interviews with friends and others concerning the personal life of
the subject of a credit report. At the retention stage, all of the acts
except the Census provisions have significant restraints on government information-handling, including provisions for subject access
and challenge. In particular, the Crime and Credit Acts place affirmative duties on agencies to ensure that records are kept current. In the
area of dissemination, all four of the acts apply: the Education and
Credit Acts severely limit disclosure without the consent of the subject, the Crime Act allows most information to be used only for the
purpose for which it was obtained, and the Census provisions, while
allowing dissemination for proper purposes, proscribe the use of
such information to the detriment of the subject. Finally, by way of
remedies for the injured party, the acts are largely silent. The Credit
Act apparently allows full recovery for negligent noncompliance with
its provisions, but the Census and Education provisions have neglected the issue and the Crime Act allows recovery only for unlawful interceptions of wire and oral communications. Taken together, these acts demonstrate that a comprehensive privacy act was
needed both to assure protection at all stages of the government's
information-handling process, and to make the various privacy protections applicable to a much wider range of information-handling
settings.

E. The Privacy Act of 1974
The Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act)1966 attempts to protect
individual privacy interests by restricting the information practices
of federal agencies.1967 Although the Privacy Act deals with all stages
1966. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (Supp. Feb. 1975). The Senate bill, S. 3418, 93d· Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974), differed in several ways from the House bill, H.R. 16373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974). No conference report was prepared. For a comparison of the Senate and House
versions and the compromises reached see Analysis of House and Senate Compromise
Amendments to the Federal Privacy Act, in 120 CONG. R.Ec. Hl2,243-4.6 (daily ed.
Dec. 18, 1974).
The provisions of the Privacy Act that directly limit the acquisition, retention and
dissemination of information and that grant the rights of subject notice, access, and
challenge do not go into effect until 270 days following the day of enactment. Privacy
Act § 8, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (note) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1967. The Privacy Act relies on the definition of agency provided in section 552(e)
of the FOIA. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975). For a discussion
of that definition see te.xt at notes 334-64 supra.
S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), as originally proposed, would have regulated all
information systems. Proponents of this approach pointed to the proliferation , of
private information systems, examples of invasions of privacy by nongovernmental
organizations, and the need for a comprehensive approach to the problem. Joint Hearings, supra note 1641, at 161 {testimony of H. Eastman, representing the ACLU). See
also id. at 242 (statement of D. McGraw, Assistant Commissioner of Administration,
Minnesota). However, other witnesses argued that the first privacy legislation should
be limited to regulating the information systems of the federal government. For example the National Retail Merchants Association thought the "risks to personal privacy
created by governmental, as compared to private personal data systems" were sufficient
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of the information-handling process, it primarily addresses the problems of subject access and dissemination. The Privacy Act requires
publication of the existence and characteristics of all personal information systems kept by every federal agency,1068 permits individuals1000
to have access to records containing personal information about
them,1970 and requires the subject's consent to nonroutine transfers
of such information.1971 The Privacy Act also imposes criminal penalties1972 and provides for civil remedies.1073 As a whole, the Act
adopts a broad formulation of the right of privacy, which protects
the individual's interest in controlling the dissemination of the details of his identity.
In the hearings on the Privacy Act, many agencies argued that
the adoption of a broad privacy concept would prevent proper
agency administration1974 and prove unduly expensive.1071l Privacy
advocates questioned these assertions in some instances,1070 but urged
to warrant different legislation. Id. at 629. Professor Westin warned that a national
registry of all data banks, including political, racial, religious, and ideological groups,
might threaten first amendment rights. Id. at 71.
It seems wise that Congress limited the Privacy Act's coverage to federal agencies.
The coalition of business, agencies, and state governments opposing extension of the
Act could have defeated any broad privacy bill, crippled it, or delayed its passage
for a long time. An act regulating federal information systems allows private organizations to regulate themselves voluntarily. It also provides a precedent for later privacy
legislation, if needed.
1968. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(4) (Supp. Feb. 1975), set out in note 2052
infra.
1969. The Act defines "individual" as a "citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence." Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(a)(2)
(Supp. Feb. 1975). It was argued in the hearings that privacy is an individual right
and that corporate and individual interests should be protected in separate legislation.
See Access to Records, Hearings on H.R. 12206 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (statement of T. McFee, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Management Planning of Technology, HEW), 207 (statement of
Representative Abzug) (1974) [hereinafter Hearings on Access]. But see id. at 207 (statement of Representative Koch).
1970. See text at notes 2055-69 infra.
1971. See text at notes 2107-23 infra.
1972. See text at notes 2154-56 infra.
1973. See text at notes 2129-53 infra.
1974. For example, the spokesperson for the VA testified, "It is considered appropriate to observe that the provisions of the bill could materially interfere with the
agency's performance of its mission in ways other than increased administrative work
load." Hearings on Records, supra note 1517, at 131. See also id. at 89 (statement of
H. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice),
109 (statement of D. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense).
1975. See id. at 62 (Civil Service Commission), 89 Gustice Department), 109 (Defense
Department), 132 (VA).
1976. The General Services Administration permits individual access to records and
the Deputy Assistant Secretary testified that the provision was not an undue burden on
administration. Id. at 129. Moreover, experience with the access requirements of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1970), has shown that credit agencies
have not been overburdened by requests for access. Hearings on Access, supra note
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that in any case the nation should accept any unavoidable costs of
ensuring privacy.1977 The final bill thus represented a compromise
between these interests.1978 In several respects, however, the compromises made to secure passage of the Act unwisely diluted privacy
protection. First, the Act fails to establish an adequate standard for
restricting data acquisition.1979 Second, it almost completely ignores
the need to regulate methods of data-gathering. 1980 Third, although
the Act provides significant protection during the retention stage,1981
in several respects it severely restricts the right of subject access.1982
Fourth, agencies can too easily evade the general requirement that an
agency disseminate information about an individual only with his
consent.1983 Fifth, the provision establishing a civil cause of action
for those injured by violations of the Act is ambiguous and could
be interpreted to limit severely the instances in which this remedy
is available.1984 Sixth, the exemptions to the Privacy Act could be
drawn more narrowly without interfering with important government functions. 1985 Finally, the provisions integrating the Privacy
Act with the FOIA are ambiguous and could result in startling
amendments to the FOIA.1986 This section examines the deficiencies
and interpretative difficulties in the provisions of the Privacy Act
relating to each of these problem areas.

I. Acquisition
The Privacy Act authorizes each agency to collect1987 "only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute
or by executive order of the President."1988 The "relevant and necessary" standard,1989 however, does little to limit government collection
1969, at 264-65 (testimony of S. Feldman, Assistant Director for Special Statutes, Bureau
of Consumer Protection).
1977. See 120 CONG. REc. H2462 (daily ed. April 2, 1974). The Office of Management
and Budget was unable to provide an accurate cost estimate of the administration of
the Privacy Act. S. REP. No. 93-1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1974).
1978. See 11 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Docs. 7 ijan. 1, 1975).
1979. See text at notes 1987-2019 infra.
1980. See text at notes 2020-51 infra.
1981. See text at notes 2052-54 infra.
1982. See text at notes 2055-88 infra.
1983. See text at notes 2107-23 infra.
1984. See text at notes 2129-38 infra.
1985. See text at notes 2163-95 infra.
1986. See text at notes 2196-211 infra.
1987. The actual word used by the Privacy Act is "maintain," defined as including
"maintain, collect, use, or disseminate." Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(a)(3) (Supp.
Feb. 1975).
1988. Privacy Act§ 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
1989. Some members of Congress had opposed any limits on acquisition because
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of data, as evidenced by questionnaires propounded in recent years
by agencies that have long operated under similar standards. For
example, Bureau of the Census guidelines for census questions include both relevance and need requirements.1000 Nevertheless, the
list of questions proposed for the decennial census of 1970, which
engendered considerable controversy, included questions on religious
affiliation, social security numbers, physical and mental handicaps,
registration and voting records,1991 smoking, moonlighting, union
membership, and household pets.1992 It also included questions on
rent paid, value of houses owned, earnings, airconditioning, plumbing facilities, number of divorces, and the number of babies women
had had.1993 A much-criticized federal questionnaire, the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey1994 issued under the aegis of the
Census Bureau at the request of the Department of Health, Educathey doubted that a standard could be found that would give individuals some pro•
tection without also preventing agencies from carrying out their functions. Cf, Hearings
on Access, supra note 1969, at 97 (statement of Representative Koch). They also thought
that such a restriction was not necessary because a right of subject access could be used
to discover and expose to Congress any agency excesses. Id. These arguments, however,
fail to recognize that mere collection of data may produce psychological harm, see text
at notes 1536-40 supra, or a "chilling effect" on the exercise of first amendment rights.
See text at notes 1541-49 supra; Hearings on Access, supra, at 119-34. Moreover, reliance
on congressional oversight is unrealistic. First, an individual may be unwilling to
disclose to his elected representatives activities that might be considered un-American
or unnatural. Second, it may be difficult to gain the attention of Congress, and, third,
even if the individual is heard, Congress may not take any remedial action. See also
STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 93n CONG., Isr SESS., REPORT ON Mn.rrARY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVILIAN POLITICS
7 (Comm. Print 1973) (hereinafter MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVlLIAN PoLITJcs]. Finally, congressional oversight is necessarily an ad hoc approach. A general standard
allows resolution of many problems before they arise.
At the hearings on the Privacy Act, witnesses proposed a variety of alternatives to
the relevant and necessary standard for limiting government-information acquisition,
At one extreme, the director of the ACLU argued that there arc some questions that
cannot be justified on the basis of government need. Hearings on the Census, supra
note 1509, at 270-78. At the other extreme, the standard of "relevant to a valid governmental function" was suggested. Id. at 106 (testimony of A. Miller, National Law
Center, George Washington University). Intermediate suggestions included "a clear[ly]
demonstrated need for the data," id. at 186 (testimony of A. Miller, Professor, University of Michigan Law School), and "reasonably necessary to a governmental purpose
or for significant public information." Id. at 225 (letter from C. Fried, Professor,
Harvard Law School).
1990. Hearings on the Census, supra note 1509, at 238.
1991. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 1515, at 12.
1992. A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 135.
1993. Hearings on the Census, supra note 1509, at 153. After congressional hearings,
the Bureau of the Census omitted the questions in the first list but not those in the
second. Id. passim. CJ. Hearings on the 1970 Census Questions Before the Subcomm,
on the Census and Statistics of the House Comm. on the Post Office and Civil Service;
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (hereinafter Hearings on the 1970 Census Questions].
1994. The questionnaire is reprinted in Hearings on the Census, supra note 1509,
at 883-924.
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tion, and Welfare,1995 asked questions such as: "taking things altogether, would you say you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too
happy these days,"1996 "do you have any artificial dentures," 1997 "what
were you doing most of last week,"1998 "do you or your spouse see
or telephone your parents as often as once a week,"1999 "what is the
total number of gifts that you give to individuals per year."2000 These
questions were defended as relevant and necessary for . legitimate
governmental purposes.2001 Similarly, agencies have defended a real
estate survey asking for details about recent property acquisitions,
including character of the property, price paid, method of payment,
and amount of mortgage, 2002 and a Department of Defense questionnaire, distributed to retired members of the military reserve, asking
not only how much the veteran earned in the previous year but also
how much other members of the family earned.2003
As demonstrated by the foregoing examples of government information demands, the elasticity of the "relevance" concept and the
large number of conceivable governmental "needs" make them unsatisfactory standards for limiting acquistition. A more flexible balancing approach would seem more desirable because of its ability
to reconcile the conflicting interests on a case-by-case basis. Such a
balancing test should forbid the collection of information about any
individual unless the collector-agency can show a clearly demonstrable need that outweighs the individual privacy interests and should
require consideration of at least the following factors: First, consideration should be given to the sensitivity of the information sought.
Information entitled to constitutional2004 or common-Iaw2005 protec1995. Id. at 883.
1996. Id. at 897 (question 55).
1997. Id. at 901 (question 64b).
1998. Id. at 884 (question 1).
1999. Id. at 904 (question 75a).
2000. Id. at 907 (question 99a).
2001. See id. at 233-68 (testimony of W. Cbartener, Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Economic Affairs).
2002. Reprinted in id. at 12-13.
2003. Reprinted in id. at 37-53.
Congressional hearings on federal questionnaires suggested that some questions
had been included upon request by private organizations, id. at 188 (testimony of
A. Miller, Professor, University of Michigan Law School), some were unnecessary
because the information was already available, id. at 33, and some were included for
no apparent reason. Id. at 57 (statement of Senator Ervin). Federal employees have
probably been subjected to the most offensive information demands. They have been
asked to disclose such personal matters as race, religion and national origin, political,
social, and sexual activities, family assets, and personal feelings about religion, family,
and sex. S. REP. No. 90-534, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967).
2004. See text at notes 1789-915 supra.
2005. See text at notes 1562-625 supra.
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tion would be the most sensitive, followed by information generally
regarded as private and hence not commonly divulged. Under this
test, for example, an agency would have to demonstrate a greater
need in order to justify acquisition of information concerning an
individual's political affiliation, which is constitutionally protected, 2006 than it would to justify collection of an individual's name,
age, and sex. Second, consideration should be given to the importance
of the purpose for which the information is sought and the logical
nexus benveen the information and that purpose. The IRS, for
example, has a greater need for :financial information than does the
Bureau of Census; the Department of Defense has a greater need to
inquire into the general personal background of a person being considered for certain sensitive positions than the Postal Service does
to make broad-ranging inquiries prior to promotion of its employees.
Similarly, the agency need for information from government benefit
recipients and government employees is greater than the need for
information from those merely being surveyed. Third, consideration
should be given to the form in which the information is to be stored.
If the information will not be kept in individually identifiable files
there is little potential for harm and a lesser demonstration of need
should suflice.2007 Finally, consideration should be given to the intended length of retention and breadth of dissemination. As each
increases, so does the danger of misuse.
The Privacy Act does subject government acquisition of information to strict requirements in one significant area. It provides in subsection (e)(7) that no agency shall collect information "describing
how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual
about whom [a] record is maintained or unless pertinent to and
within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity."2008 The
provision, presumably a reaction to military and CIA surveillance
of civilians,2009 was designed to protect the preferred status of the
2006. See text at notes 1860-63 supra.
2007. Even where information is not stored in individually identifiable files there
is reason to require a showing of need before data collection because of the potential
psychological harm and chilling effect on the exercise of rights. See text at notes
1536-49 supra.
2008. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(7) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2009. Congressional hearings conducted in 1974 revealed that military surveillance
of civilian activities had originated in World War I and had been going on, in vary•
ing degrees of intensity, ever since. In the wake of the riots in urban areas and on
college campuses in the 1960's, the Army expanded its intelligence system so that by
1970 it was monitoring virtually all political protest in America. It was estimated tllat
the Army had files on over 100,000 civilians unaffiliated with the Armed Forces. STAFF
OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITtlTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM, ON THE JUDICIARY,
92D CONG., 2n SESS., ARMY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVILIANS: A DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS 76
(Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter ARMY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVII.IANS]. The collection
plans promulgated were broad and vague, resulting in the gathering of much irrele-
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first amendment.2010 It goes further than the Constitution, however,
by not requiring the demonstration of a "chilling effect."2011 Yet in
two respects the provision is deficient. First, the provision should
give similar protection to the other, equally critical facets of the
right of disclosural privacy, such as information relating to sexual
attitudes and conduct and to personal activities with those related
by blood or marriage.2012 Second, the exception to the provision allowing collection of information with individual consent fails to
recognize the fact that in many contexts information requests are
coercive. The Senate report on the rights of federal employees found
that in the federal service and similar organizational situations an
employer information request is equivalent to a command.2013 Government benefit recipients are similarly situated. To ensure full
protection for the underlying constitutional rights in these situations,
the provision instead should have required a knowing and intelligent consent.2014
Subsection (e)(3) of the Privacy Act requires each agency collecting information to "inform each individual whom it asks to supply
information [of] . . . (A) the authority . . . which authorizes the
solicitation of the information and whether disclosure is mandatory
or voluntary; (B) the principal purpose or purposes for which the
information is intended to be used; (C) [the uses that can be made
of the information without his consent]; and (D) the effects on him,
if any, of not providing all or any part of the requested information."
The apparent purpose of this requirement is to provide the individual with sufficient information to make an intelligent decision
whether to surrender information or to challenge the information
vant, incorrect, ambiguous, and useless information. MILITARY SURVEILLANCE oF CIVILIAN Pour1cs, supra note 1989, at 6. Information ·was collected about financial affairs,
sex lives, and psychiatric histories, often by covert means. ARMY SURVEILLANCE OF CI•
VILIANS, supra, at 96.
The investigating Senate subcommittee rejected arguments that the monitoring
was reasonably related to the duty of the Army to protect against a possible re-occurrence of civil disorders, and found that "there is no question that Inilitary surveillance
of civilian political activity is illegal, at least in the sense that it was not authorized
by law•••• [T]he subcommittee cannot imply the need for such domestic operations
from the military's limited domestic mission." MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVILIAN
PoUTics, supra, at 7. The report also concluded that the military's activities were in
violation of the first amendment. Id. at 9.
2010.
2011.
2012.
2013.
2014.

S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 56.
See text at note 1866 supra.
See text at notes 1898-900 supra.
S. REP. No. 90-534, supra note 2003, at 5.

If the right to privacy were acknowledged as a constitutional one, it is arguable that a knowing and intelligent waiver would be mandated by the Constitution.
Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Because the Supreme Court has modified this standard with respect to -some rights, see, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), it is preferable that the statute incorporate the stricter standard.

1310

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '13:971

request. Such knowledge is likely to increase participation in datagathering, enhance the reliability of information provided, reduce
public resentment and suspicion of government practices, and encourage the public to comment on agency policy.201u However, three
additions to subsection (e)(3) would aid in more fully achieving
these goals and would make the provision more consistent with the
Act's broad concept of the privacy right.
Principally, when the person from whom the information is
sought will be the subject of the file, the collecting agency should
explain to that individual his right to challenge collection and the
procedure for challenge, and his rights of access to the file for the
purpose of ensuring its accuracy.2016 Additionally, before an agency
collects information about a data subject from third persons, the
agency should be required to reveal to the subject the names of such
third persons and the type of information to be sought from them,
except in situations where the agency is justified in keeping the existence of the investigation secret from the data subject. When information is collected from third persons, the subject's right of access
to the :file is an inadequate privacy protection2017 because without
notice the subject will in most instances have little reason to suspect
that the file exists. To be sure, information known to others is not
protected by the common-law concept of privacy.2018 But the statute's
protection should extend to this aspect of data acquisition because
people are more inclined to respond to government requests for information than individual requests, 2010 and because the government,
by virtue of its size and resources, has a greater capacity to disseminate
information about an individual than has any private person.
A further problem with subsection (e)(3) is that its notice provisions apply only when an agency collects information by asking the individual directly. Because the Privacy Act imposes almost no limitations on the methods an agency can use to gather information, an
agency could in some circumvent notice requirements by gathering
data from third parties or by utilizing covert procedures. One solution to this problem would be to require notice to the data subject
unless notice would frustrate legitimate programs of covert surveillance. A better solution, discussed below, is to limit agency use of
nondirect methods of data collection.
2015. See Joint Hearings, supra note 1641, at 2304-07 (report prepared by A. Bell
for the Committee on Rulemaking and Public Information of the Administrative
Conference of the United States).
2016. The rights of subject access and challenge are discussed in the text at notes
2055-98 infra.
2017. See text at notes 2049-51 infra.
2018. See text at notes 1586-87 supra.
2019. See Hearings on the Census, supra note 1509, at 194 (testimony of A. Miller,
Professor, University of Michigan Law School), 215 (testimony of C. Fried, Professor,
Harvard Law School).
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2. Methods of Data Collection

The Privacy Act's sole restriction on methods of data acquisition
is the requirement in subsection (e)(2) that agencies "collect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject
individual when the information may result in adverse determinations about an individual's rights, benefits, and privileges under
Federal programs." The provision reflects the basic principle of
fairness, advocated by the Senate's report on the Privacy Act, "that
where government investigates a person, it should not depend on
hearsay or 'hide under the eaves,' but inquire directly of the individual about matters personal to him or her."2020 It also "supports
the principle that an individual should to the greatest extent possible
be in control of information about him which is given to the government."2021 The provision thus disfavors acquisition from third parties
or by covert means, although it recognizes implicitly that such methods may be necessary "for financial or logistical reasons or because
of other statutory requirements."2022 While the legislative history
makes clear that minor financial or logistical concerns are not to
outweigh privacy interests,2023 it does not answer the critical questions
of when it will not be "practicable" to collect from the subject and
when subsection (e)(2) will be overridden by other statutes. As originally introduced, the subsection (e)(2) "greatest extent
practicable" requirement applied to all government information acquisitions. In order to meet agency objections based on the needs
of certain civil and criminal law enforcement programs, the provision was limited to instances where the information sought could
affect the receipt of direct benefits under a federal program.2024 The
limitation was a rather crude method, however, of satisfying the
agency objections. For example, although criminal investigations
are completely exempted from subsection (e)(2) by the general exemptions of subsection (j)(2),2025 not all civil investigations are
exempted. Thus, in a social security fraud investigation, which could
lead to a denial of benefits, the agency presumably would be required to comply with subsection (e)(2). More significantly, the
limitation as enacted exempts numerous informational studies that
are not aimed at civil law enforcement and are not related to the
granting or denying of benefits under federal programs.2026 Rather
2020. S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 47.
2021. 120 CONG. REc. Hl2,245 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974).

2022. Id.
2023. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 48.
2024. Id. at 47.
2025. See text at note 2174 infra, arguing that such an exemption is unnecessary.
2026. Therefore, under the Privacy Act the sensitive information gathered in the
Longitudinal Retirement History Survey, see text at notes 1994-2000 supra, could be

1312

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '13:971

than carve out in rough fashion an exception to the requirements of
subsection (e)(2), Congress should have established a general standard
applicable to all information acquisition that would take into account the nature of the agency's activities and the importance of
the state's need for the information, as well as considerations of practicability. A provision prohibiting the use of any method of information collection that is unreasonable would allow these factors to be
taken into account. Such a standard would require a balancing of the
nature of the agency's function and considerations of practicability
against privacy interests.
A reasonableness standard for acquisition methods could also
remedy another deficiency of the Privacy Act-its failure to give an
agency any guidance as to what methods of collection it may use once
it has determined that it must collect information directly from the
data subject. Hearings on the use of mandatory questionnaires, 2027 lie
detector2028 and psychologica12020 tests, and military surveillance of
civilians2030 have reflected congressional concern for this problem but
have failed to produce any legislative solutions. A standard of reasonableness would clearly preclude the use of any presently illegal or
unauthorized acquisition methods. The reasonableness of othenvise
legal and authorized methods should depend at least on the government interest served by collection of the information, the reliability
of the method, the dangers posed by the method, the degree of control the method allows the subject to retain over the amount of information revealed, and the practicability of alternative methods
available. Inclusion of the first factor allows the government to use
otherwise unreasonable methods if it can demonstrate a sufficiently
great need. The second factor requires consideration of the extent
to which the proposed method will collect accurate information.
The third factor accounts for the fact that some methods of acquisition, such as covert surveillance, are potentially more dangerous than
others because of a greater likelihood of misuse or because of their
sought from persons other than the individual. The same possibility exists with re•
gard to all other "informational" surveys.
2027. Hearings on the Census, supra note 1509.
2028. Hearings on Privacy and the Rights of Federal Employees Before the Sub•
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter Hearings on Federal Employees]; Hearings on the Use of
Polygraphs by the Federal Government Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 88th Cong,, 2d Sess., 89th Cong,, 1st Sess. (1964-1965) [herein•
after Hearings on Polygraphs].
2029. Hearings on Psychological Testing Procedures and the Rights of Federal Em•
ployees Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter Hearings on Psychological Testing].
2030. Military Surueillance Hearings on S. 2318 Before the Subcomm. on Constitu•
tional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [here•
inafter Hearings on Military Surueillance].
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potential psychological impact. The fourth factor requires consideration 0£ the basic privacy issue-the ex.tent to which the data subject
retains control over the information flow. The final factor ensures
that the least offensive method will be used unless rendered infeasible by financial or logistical circumstances.
Consideration of these factors would probably lead to the conclusion, for example, that the use of lie detector and psychological tests
to measure suitability for employment or promotion is unreasonable.
The lie detector's reliability is suspect because of its dependence
on the physiology of the testee 2031 and because lie detector results are
susceptible to conscious manipulation by the testee. 2032 Psychological
tests have recently come under attack because of racial bias2033 and
because of the absence of objective sd.entific principles to guide in
the construction and evaluation of such tests.2034: Moreover, the persons evaluating test results often lack the expertise needed to make
the results reliable.2035 In addition, these testing methods are dangerous because repeated use may lead to conformity among employees?036 may inhibit the exercise of rights,2037 and may even degrade
the individual.2038 Such tests necessarily lead to the unnecessary acquisition of sensitive information2039 and thus infringe on the indi2031. H.R. REP. No. 89-198, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1965).
2032. Id. at 12-13.
2033. See A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 91-92. See also Hearings on Spedal In•
quiry on Invasions of Privacy Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1965) [hereinafter House Spedal Inquiry].
2034. See Hearings on Psychological Testing, supra note 2029, at 33 ("personality
testing is closer to alchemy and other nonsciences than it is to the truth"), 43.
2035. See A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 97-98. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 89-198, supra
note 2031, at 2, 14.
2036. Herman, Privacy, the Prospective Employee and Employment Testing: The
Need To Restrict Polygraph Testing, 47 WASH. L. RF.v. 73, 112 (1971).
2037. Hearings on Federal Employees, supra note 2028, at 221 (testimony of L.
Speiser).
2038. Herman, supra note 2036, at 86.
2039. Though the questions asked in a polygraph examination vary with each examiner, the aim is always to cover a broad range of topics in search of "unusual responses." The questioner then delves into the "problem" area. Hearings on Polygraphs,
supra note 2028, at 38. Consider the sample question in a proposed manual for adapt·
ing the polygraph to pre-employment screening:
HAVE YOU EVER SUFFERED A NERVOUS BREAKDOWN?
If so, when; cause and period of adjustment; frequency; hospitalized or not; family problems; mental maladjustment; service connected; mild or severe; unable to
face reality; carries world's problems on his shoulders; criminal act or tendencies;
claustrophobia; afraid of height; insecurity;. failed in all endeavors; heavily in
debt; amnesia; and others,
R. FERGUSON, THE POLYGRAPH IN PRIVATE INDUSIRY 133-35 (1966).
The questions asked on personality tests are often even more probing, inquiring
into matters of physical conditions and bodily functions, religious beliefs, and attitudes
toward sex and sexual behavior. For example, consider the following questions on the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory administered to Peace Corps volunteers
(to be answered true or false):
17. My father was a good ~
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vidual's control over what information he releases. Psychological tests
in particular have been characterized as "tests that are designed to
overbear the will of the individual ... by reaching behind conscious
articulation."204° Finally, there are less intrusive alternative methods
of evaluating employees and job applicants,2041 as evidenced by the
fact that many governments and organizations do not find a need to
resort to such tests.2042 It is arguable that government interests in
national security and the safety of government employees justify use
of these tests in limited circumstances.2043 However, in light of all
the objectionable characteristics of these tests, it is doubtful that
even these important government interests would make these methods reasonable in the context of employment and promotion.
Under this reasonableness of means test the use of mandatory
questionnaires similarly would be unreasonable in many cases. The
compulsion of responses under implicit or explicit threats of punishment or loss of employment deprives the respondent of any real
choice not to answer, and hence of any control over the information
he reveals. Congressional hearings on this method suggest that in
most instances voluntary questionnaires present an adequate alternative,2044 and various private research groups and states have succeeded
in obtaining sufficient responses to voluntary questionnaires. 2040 In
certain situations the importance of the government's need for the
18.
19.
27,
75.
78.
290.
387.

I seldom have constipation.
My sex life is satisfactory.

Evil spirits possess me at times.
I get angry sometimes.
I like poetry.
I believe my sins are unpardonable.
I have had no difficulty holding my urine.
Hearings on Federal Employees, supra note 2028, at 5-6.
2040. Herman, supra note 2036, at 128, A few labor arbitration decisions have denied the admissibility of polygraph results, in part because of the invasion of privacy,
See, e.g., Town and Country Food Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 332, 335 (1962); Lag Drug Co.,
39 Lab. Arb. 1121, 1123 (1962).
2041. For example, careful interviews, analysis of past job performance, aptitude
tests, and simulated exercises. Herman, supra note 2036, at 87.
2042. Cf. A. Miu.ER, supra note 1503, at 93. Twelve states have made the use of
polygraphs in the employment context illegal. Four states specifically apply the pro,
hibition to governmental agencies. Herman, supra note 2036, at 97-98. In 1953, the
AEC discontinued use of the polygraph because the marginal increase in security did
not offset the costs in personnel recruitment and employee morale. H.R. REP. No.
89-198, supra note 2031, at 16.
The Guidelines for Testing and Selecting Minority Job Applicants prepared by
the California State Fair Employment Commission practically prohibit the use of personality testing as a pre-employment screening device. Id. at 119-20. A representative
of the CSC testified that his agency does not use personality tests in any personnel
decisions because, "these tests are subject to distortion, either purposefully or other•
wise. Therefore, the scores are undependable as a basis for employment decisions,"
House Special Inquiry, supra note 2033, at 37.
2043. See A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 98.
2044. See Hearings on the Census, supra note 1509, at 219.
2045. See id. at 132-47 (testimony of Representative Betts).
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information probably does justify use of mandatory questionnaires.
For example, enumeration of the population is arguably of special
importance because it is specifically required by the Constitution2046
and because it must be accurate in order to serve as the basis for
apportionment for representation.2047 Therefore, responses to questions on the decennial census regarding enumeration could probably
be made mandatory. An agency may also be justified in compelling
government employees and those seeking employment, and persons
seeking or currently obtaining government benefits, to answer relevant questions.2048 However, the agency would not be justified in
compelling answers to questions that do not bear on the granting
of the job or benefit.
A general standard of reasonableness would not only cover all the
methods problems ignored by the Privacy Act but would subsume
the current subsection (e)(2) test. The probable result of employing
such a standard would be to increase the number of instances in
which direct collection from the individual is required. Direct collection accords the subject more control over the disclosure of information about himself than alternative methods of collection from
third parties or by ,covert means. Recent experience casts doubt on
the reliability of covert surveillance,2049 and data collected from third
parties is generally less likely to be reliable than data collected directly from the data subject.2050 Moreover, covert methods pose the
danger that irrelevant information will be collected because such
methods are insufficiently selective2°51 and because the subject cannot
object to the collection of particular data. Thus, the reasonableness
test would require direct collection from the data subject unless the
government can show that direct collection is not practicable or that
the government need to use other ~ethods is paramount.

3. Retention
An individual needs some control over information retained by
the government in order to minimize the danger of invasions of his
2046. U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 2. The Constitution does not, however, require that response to the census be mandatory.
2047. However, it is arguable that even this reason does not justify compelling response. The 1960 census was considered sufficiently accurate even though the census
was not returned by or never reached 3 per cent of the population as a whole, and 16
per cent of young nonwhites in ghetto areas. Hearings on the Census, supra note
1509, at 295.
2048. It might be argued that answers to questions in these situations are not
really compelled because the person could forgo the job or benefit rather than answer
the questions. This argument overlooks the fact that such a choice may not be available to a welfare or social security recipient or to a person needing or "locked-into" a
federal job. See note 1622 supra.
2049. See note 2009 supra.
2050. Cf. S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 48.
2051. See note 2009 supra.
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privacy. By giving the subject of a file the rights of notice, access, and
challenge, the Privacy Act enables an individual to find out if an
agency has collected information about him, what the information
is, and how he can amend it.
The Privacy Act grants the right of notice in two provisions.
Subsection (e)(4) requires each agency to publish in the Federal
Register at least annually a notice of the existence and character
of the systems of records it maintains that is sufficiently explicit to
enable an individual to guess accurately which agencies maintain
records about him. 2052 Subsection (£)(1) requires agencies to respond
to individual inquiries as to whether the information systems named
by the individual contain records pertaining to him. An individual
can thus locate all federal records pertaining to him by first consulting the Federal Register and then writing to all the agencies that
maintain the type of records likely to concern him. These provisions
of the Privacy Act have been criticized on the ground that it is unrealistic to expect individuals to go to the trouble of ·writing to the
agencies.2053 However, requiring agencies to notify all persons about
whom they presently maintain files would be inordinately expensive.
Moreover, in the future each agency will have to notify file subjects
when it collects information directly from them.2054 The approach
taken by the Privacy Act on this point thus appears to be a reasonable
accommodation of privacy interests and the financial considerations
of administration.
The creation of general rights of subject access and challenge is
perhaps the most important contribution of the Privacy Act.2066 Sub2052. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(4) (Supp. Feb, 1975), requires that each
agency
maintaining a system of records subject to the provisions of • • • this subsection,
publish in the Federal Register at least annually a notice of the existence and
character of the system of records, which notice shall include(A) the name and location of the system;
~
(B) the categories of individuals on whom records are maintained in the sys•
tem;
(C) the categories of records maintained in the system;
(D) each routine use of the records contained in the system, including the
categories of users and the purpose of such use;
(E) the policies and practices of the agency regarding storage, retricvabillty,
access controls, retention, and disposal of the records;
(F) the title and business address of the agency official who is responsible for
the system of records;
(G) the agency procedures whereby an individual can be notified at his request
if the system of records contains a record pertaining to him;
(H) the agency procedures whereby an individual can be notified at his request
how he can gain access to any record pertaining to him contained in the
system of records, and how he can contest its content; and
(I) the categories of sources of records in the system.
2053. See Hearings on Records, supra note 1517, at 52 (statement of Representative
Mikva). See also Hearings on Access, supra note 1969, at 98 (statement of Reprcsenta•
tive Abzug).
2054. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text following
note 2014 supra.
2055. A 1974 survey of federal agency information practices revealed that only 53
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section (d)(l) establishes a general right of subject access by requiring
each agency to permit any individual, upon request, to review his
record and obtain a copy of it.2056 Such a right of access is the first
step toward effective individual control over government information practices and is a necessary prerequisite to a right of challenge
and to control over dissemination of the file. Furthermore, it enables
individuals to discourage government collection of irrelevant information: When inspection reveals improper information in a file, the
subject can publicize the agency's improper acquisition of data in
order to put political pressure on the agency. 2057 Finally, the right
of access enables the individual to obtain "the psychological sense of
having satisfied oneself about what is really [in his file]." 2058
Despite the broad language of this provision,2059 it does not apply
to the CIA,2060 the Secret Service,2061 and to criminal2062 law enforcement agencies. Blanket exemptions for these agencies are examined
below.2003 The Act also exempts, without regard to the agency, the
following six categories of information: classified information,2064
statistical information,2065 "examination material used solely to deper cent of the responding agencies permit an individual to review his or her entire
file. See FEDERAL DATA BANKS, supra note 1515, at XLIII, LUI. The survey did not report on the rights of subject challenge. The FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, 5
U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. Feb. 1975), allows access to some records, but gives no right of
challenge.
2056. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d) (Supp. Feb. 1975), provides:
Access to Records.-Each agency that maintains a system of records shall(!) upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any information pertaining to him which is contained in the system, permit him and
upon his request, a person of his own choosing to accompany him, to review the
record and have a copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form comprehensible to him, except that the agency may require the individual to furnish a written
statement authorizing discussion of that individual's record in the accompanying
person's presence.
Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(c) (Supp. Feb. 1975), requires each agency both
to keep an accounting of disseminations of records to other agencies, and to allow
subject access to such accountings. Subsection (c) thus facilitates the right of access
and challenge by enabling the subject to find his file no matter where it has been
transferred.
2057. Hearings on Access, supra note 1969, at 97 (testimony of Representative
Koch).
2058. S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 60.
2059. The only restriction in the subsection itself is that "nothing in this section
shall allow an individual access to information compiled in reasonable anticipation ot
a civil action or proceeding." Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(5) (Supp. Feb, 1975).
This clause is meant to ensure that the Privacy Act does not alter the present rules of
discovery. S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 75.
2060. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(j)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2061. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2062. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(j)(2) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2063. See text at notes 2163-82 infra.
2064. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2065. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(4) (Supp. Feb. 1975),

1318

Michigan Law Review

[.Vol, 73:971

termine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in
the federal service,''2066 information obtained prior to the effective
date of the Privacy Act under either an express or implied promise
of confidentiality if release of the information would identify the
source,2067 information supplied by third parties under an express
pledge of confidentiality after the effective date of the Act if disclosure would identify the source,2068 and material relating to the
subject's health, unless certain "special procedures" are established.2060 The first three categories are reasonable: the last three,
however, deserve special attention.
An agency may not conceal the existence of information in the
fourth category-that obtained from third parties prior to the effective date of the Act-and must characterize it at least in some very
general way.2070 While the provision purports to recognize the privacy
interests of those persons who supplied information under a promise
of secrecy prior to the effective date of the Act, the provision fails to
protect those interests completely. First, the provision does not require agencies to deny access to this information. Second, the provision only applies to investigatory material compiled for civil2071 and
criminal2072 law enforcement purposes, investigatory material compiled for determining suitability for federal employment,2073 evaluation material used to determine potential for promotion in the
Armed Services,2074 and material held by the CIA.2076 While most
third-party information collected by the federal government may
fall into one of these three categories, the privacy interests of all
persons who divulged information under an express or implied
promise of confidentiality should be protected.
Under the fifth category, agencies are allowed to withhold the
same types of third-party information obtained after the effective
2066. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(6) (Supp. Feb. 1975), allows the cxemp•
tion of this material when "disclosure ••• would compromise the objectivity or fairness
of the testing or examination process." This provision was designed to protect "actual
competitive examinations and rating schedules." Hearings on Access, supra note 1969,
at 290. It should not be interpreted, at it might be if read literally, to allow agencies
to prevent access to the results of an individual's psychological tests, Cf. text at notes
2081-88 infra.
2067. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552a(k)(2), (k)(5), (k)(7) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2068. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552a(k)(2), (k)(5), (k)(7) (Supp. Feb, 1975).
2069. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(f)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2070. 120 CONG. REc. Hl2,244 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974).
2071. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(2) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2072. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(j)(2) (Supp. Feb. 1975). The exemption for
criminal law enforcement agencies includes this and other information, See text at
note 2169 infra.
2073. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(5) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2074. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(7) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2075. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(j)(l) (Supp. Feb, 1975). All files held by the
CIA are exempted. See text at notes 2180-82 infra.
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date of the Act, but only if the third parties were given an express
promise of confidentiality. At the hearings on the Privacy Act, agencies emphasized the need to be able to promise confidentiality in
order to get candid evaluations of employees2076 and evidence or
leads in law enforcement investigations.2077 But, in light of the resulting infringement of the privacy interests of data subjects, there
should be some requirement that pledges of confidentiality be
granted only when necessary and only where there is a strong, clearly
justified societal interest at stake.2078 Criminal- and civil-law enforcement and national security seem to be nvo such interests. In the nvo
other areas referred to by the Privacy Act, however, the societal
interests at stake are arguably less important: representatives of some
federal agencies have testified that they do not need the power to
give pledges of confidentiality in order to carry out employmentrelated investigations,2079 and it would seem that, absent national
security implications, the military could also conduct promotionrelated investigations without granting pledges of confidentiality.
The reasonableness standard regulating methods of acquisition that
was recommended above2080 would subsume this whole question by
limiting the instances in which information could be collected from
confidential sources. This more flexible standard would both better
protect the privacy interests of data subjects and aid agencies by
allowing them to grant pledges of confidentiality in certain circui::nstances where they are not currently authorized to do so. It might,
for example, allow agencies to withhold information revealing a
confidential source where disclosure would endanger the physical
safety of the informant.
The sixth category of information exempt from the notice and
challenge provisions unnecessarily limits subject access to medical records by allowing an agency to establish "special" procedures for the
disclosure to an individual of medical records, including psychological records, pertaining to him. The House report on the Act reveals
that this provision was included because of the feeling that the transmission of medical information could have an adverse effect upon an
2076. The statement of the Department of Defense is typical: "It is almost axiomatic to observe that if persons who are interviewed know that the interview will be
revealed to the subject of the file, that it would have a chilling effect on their willingness to give a forthright statement of what they know about the subject." Hearings
on Access, supra note 1969, at 240.
2077. See, e.g., id. at 149 (statement of M. Lawton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice).
2078. Hearings on Access, supra note 1969, at 162 (testimony of T. McFee, Deputy
Assistant Secretary, HEW).
2079. See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 1641, at 466 (testimony of the representative of the FTC).
2080. See text following note 2026 supra.
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.individual.2081 In such a case the House report suggests that the
agency could release the information to a doctor named by the requesting individmu..2082 The report would also allow an agency to
adopt other rules to apprise a person of medical information about
him. It is urn;lear what other procedures are envisioned, but the
report seems to imply that an individual need not have complete
access to his file, even after it is transmitted to his doctor. In certain
respects, allowing patknts access to their own records seems to be a
'better policy than selective disclosure, First, nonaccess of patients
to their records may prevent the correction of innocent errors.20 as
Second, it is rathe:i;- incongruous to allow doctors to decide what
information a patient may have concerning himself, especially where
there might be a question of malpractice.2084 Third, involving patients in medical record-keeping helps establish good doctor-patient
relations an,d contributes to the quality of health care.2oai; On the
other side, it is urged that records should not be disclosed because
they are in technical language that patients cannot understand. But
this problem can more easily be remedied by ensuring that patients
receive explanations of their records.2° 50 It is also feared that disclosure to a patient that he has a terminal disease may cause him
emotional and psychological harm.2087 However, the policy that a
doctor should decide whether a patient should be informed about his
condition is paternalistic. At least one state has codified the patient's
right of access to all medical records except those of mental hospitals.2088 A similar approach in the Privacy Act would be more consistent with the Act's over-all policy of vesting control in the individual over the flow of information about him, In light of the
layman's need for explication of much medical information, the
agency should be allowed to insist on disclosure to a doctor desig:pated by the subject, but the doctor should then be required to
disclose the entire substance of the records to the subject.
A final concern with respect to the right of access is that the cost
of the procedure to the subject not nullify the right. The Privacy
Act authorizes agencies to charge fees only for the cost of making
copies of the record12089 thereby sparing the subject the potentially
large cost of search for and review of records.2000 The Act also avoids
2081. _H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1974).
2082. Id.
2083. Joint Hearings, supra note 1641, at 2243-44 (report of B. Kaiser),
2084. Id. at 2244.
2085. Id. at 2242.
20~6. Id.
2087. See id. at 2243.
2088. See MAss. Af/N. LAws <;h. Ul, § 70 (1975).
2089. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(f)(5) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2090. The Director of the Bureau of Manpower Information Systems of the CSC
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making the right of access illusory by not requiring the data subject
to examine his file at the place it is kept. The Senate had advocated
that individuals be allowed to receive copies of their files by mail
upon written request and with proper identification,2091 but as
enacted the Act only requires each agency "to establish procedures
for the disclosure to an individual" of his file. 2092 Although this provision would seem to allow an agency to use the mails, it unfortunately does not guarantee that data subjects will be able to resort to
such a procedure.
Complementing the right of access is the other major provision
of the Privacy Act, the right to challenge. Subsection (d)(2) fully
incorporates the right of challenge with respect to all records to
which the individual has a right of access. Together the rights of
access and challenge enable the individual to ensure that the government maintains in its files only relevant and accurate information
about him. Further, through challenge of inaccurate or irrelevant
information the individual can exercise a deterrent effect on improper acquisition.
Under subsection (d)(2), each agency must, within ten days following receipt, acknowledge an individual's request to amend his
record2093 and promptly correct the record or inform the individual
of its refusal to do so.2094 The agency must also state its reasons for
refusing to amend and inform the individual of the procedures
established for the review of that refusal. 2095 If the individual seeks
such a review, it must be conducted within thirty days. If after
review the agency still refuses to amend the record, it is required to
notify the individual of his right to file with the agency a concise
statement setting forth his disagreement with the agency,2096 and it
must inform him of his right to seek judicial review in the federal
district courts.2097 Subsection (d)(4) requires the agency to note
has stated that the cost for a search of computerized records is $35 per hour. See Hearings on Access, supra note 1969, at 306.
2091. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 61.
2092. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(f)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2093, Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(2)(A) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2094. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(2)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2095. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2096. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975). In hearings on the
Privacy Act, the Director of the Bureau of Manpower Information Systems of the CSC
stated, "A requirement to accept even a reasonable amount of supplementary material
of the individual's choosing for inclusion in the automated systems would result in
sharply increased operating costs, and with respect to some of these systems we are
planning, could make the systems completely impractical." Hearings on Access, supra
note 1969, at 291. The Act apparently solves this problem by allowing an agency to
note the existence of the statement in the computerized file but file the statement
itself separately.
2097. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975). For a discussion of
the judicial review provisions of the Act see text at notes 2129-38 infra.
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clearly the disputed portions of the record and to provide copies of
the individual's statement of disagreement to any person or agency to
whom the record is subsequently disclosed. Subsection (c)(4) requires
the agency to notify all persons or agencies to whom the disputed
record has already been disseminated of the dispute and of the
individual's statement of correction. While the statutory scheme is
quite comprehensive, it has a few minor deficiencies.
First, until an individual has filed a statement of disagreement,
an agency may disseminate challenged information without noting
the challenge. Thus, for at least a month, an agency can circulate
-incorrect information. As there would be little additional administrative burden in noting the initial amendment request in the individual's record, the disseminating agency should be required to do
so before releasing the file to other agencies. It does not appear as
necessary to require immediate notification of the dispute to prior
recipients, in view of the substantial administrative burden entailed
in notifying them, and in light of subsection (c)(4)'s requirement
that they be notified after the individual has filed a statement of
disagreement.
Second, although subsection (c)(4) requires an agency to notify
prior agency recipients when it amends a file, it does not require the
recipent agencies to amend their files also, as the Senate apparently
intended.2098 The requirement in subsection (e)(l) that each agency
maintain only relevant information may be interpreted to require
the recipient agency at least to investigate the accuracy of the information, but this requirement applies only to recipient agencies that
are covered by the Act. Rather than burdening the individual with
the responsibility of asking each recipient agency whether his record
has been amended, it would seem more sensible to require recipient
agencies that decide not to amend so to notify the individual.
The Privacy Act also addresses possible threats to privacy posed
by agency alteration of information systems. Subsection (o) of the
Act requires each agency to provide adequate notice to Congress of
any proposal to establish or alter any system of records in order to
permit Congress to make an evaluation of the proposal's potential
effect on the right of privacy. This provision, in conjunction with
the subsection (e)(4) requirement that a description of each existing
information system be published in the Federal Register,20°0 should
prevent the maintenance of any secret information systems. Subsection (o) was also intended to prevent the creation of data banks
·without statutory authorization and without proper regard for individual privacy, the confidentiality of data, and the security of the
2098. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 62.
2099. See note 2052 supra and accompanying text.
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system,2100 and to prevent the development of a de facto national
data bank.2101 This final fear is justified, for while an express proposal for a National Data Bank Center was defeated in the mid196O's,2102 the possibility that agencies will consolidate information
systems on their own has remained.2103 Regardless of the merits of
the centralization of information systems,2104 it should not occur
without congressional oversight. Subsection (o) accords Congress the
opportunity to give that oversight. Subsection (o)'s main deficiency
is that it only requires an agency to report proposals to Congress so
that it can evaluate the idea. As it will eventually be necessary to
obtain the agency's own views on the proposal, Congress should have
required, as the Senate bill proposed,2105 that each agency evaluate
2100. S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 64-65.
2101. Id. at 64.
2102. Several such recommendations were made. See SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS,
supra note 1515, at 8-9. For a complete discussion of the proposal see Note, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 400, supra note 1909.
2103. See Hearings on the Census, supra note 1509, at 181 (testimony of A. Miller,
Professor, University of Michigan Law School). See also Joint Hearings, supra note
1641, at 2252-55.
2104. Advocates of the national data-bank center thought it would: (1) make more
data available for researchers; (2) reduce the unit cost of data; (3) enable larger and
more effective samples to the taken; (4) facilitate the canvassing of a wider range of
variables; (5) reduce duplication in government data collection activities; (6) promote
greater standardization of techniques among the agencies; (7) make research efforts
easier to verify; and (8) provide a data processing pool for all the information-handling
agencies. A. MILLER, supra note 1503, at 56-57. See Sawyer &: Schechter, Computers,
Privacy and the National Data Center: The Responsibility of Social Scientists, 23 THE
Mr. PsYCHOLOGISl' 810, 813 (1968). However, the merits of the proposal were never
really given fair consideration. Instead, the proposal became a focal point for the
fears of a loss of privacy. See, e.g., A. MILLER, supra, at 57; Hirsch, Data Banks: The
Punchcard Snoopers, 205 NATION 369 (1967); Miller, The National Data Center and
Personal Privacy, ATLANTIC, Nov. 1967, at 53; U.S. NEWS&: WoRLD REP., May 16, 1966, at
56. Numerous congressional hearings were held, outlining the dangers of consolidation.
See StmCOMM. ON ECONOMIC STATISrICS OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 90TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., R.El'ORT ON THE COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENT STATISl'ICAL
PROGRAMS Goint Comm. Print 1967); Hearings on the Coordination and Integration
of Government Statistical Programs Before the Subcomm. on Economic Statistics of
the Joint Economic Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on Computer Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on the Computer and
Invasion of Privacy Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). It was feared that even statistical data could be used
to injure individuals, that improved capacity for handling data would result in demands for more personal information, that reliance upon computers to make decisions
affecting personal affairs would be increased, that individualized output would eventually be permitted, and that the center by its very existence would increase conformity by compelling people to "act for the record." Note, supra note 1909, at 41112. The criticism of the bill was so ovenvhelming that the National Data Center concept is still not a realistic legislative proposal. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note
1515, at 10.
2105. See S. 3418, § 201(£)(1), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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the effect of its proposal in a privacy impact statement and submit
that statement along with the proposal.2106

4. Dissemination
The great number of transfers of personal information pose a
grave danger to privacy interests. The Privacy Act deals with this
problem by allowing dissemination for "routine" uses, by prohibiting dissemination for "nonroutine" uses without the prior written
consent of the subject,2107 and by requiring that the individual be
notified at the time of collection of the routine uses that may be
made of the information.2108 Subsection (a)(7) defines "routine use"
as "use ... for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for
which the information was collected." A further limitation on dissemination is that transferee agencies subject to the Act must meet
the subsection (e)(l) requirement that agencies maintain only relevant and necessary information.
The present provisions represent a compromise between the
proposal that no records be disclosed outside the collecting agency
without the prior consent of the subject,2109 and the proposal that
agencies be free to disclose information to anyone as long as the subject is notified. 2110 The former proposal ignored the costly duplication of effort that would be required if individuals chose to prevent
all transfers,2111 while the latter gave insufficient weight to the right
of an individual to control the flow of information about him. As
discussed below,2112 the Act made no substantive change in the law
regarding the disclosure of personal information.2118
The scheme adopted by the Privacy Act is subject to attack on
the ground that it gives insufficient control to the subject at the time
of data acquisition. For example, although each agency must inform
the information supplier of the routine uses that may be made of
the information, the Act does not recognize a right to withhold information on the basis of the agency's determination of routine uses.
2106. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 19'77, at 64-65.
210'7. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
' 2108. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(3) (Supp. Feb. 19'75). Subsection (e)(4)
(D)'s requirement that each agency publish "each routine use of the records contained
in the system, including the categories of users and the purpose of such use" provides
additional notice.
2109. See H.R. 9527, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
2110. See H.R. 12206, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
2lll. For example, every three months the Social Security Administration transfers
the earning records of one million persons to state agencies that administer unem•
ployment programs. If consent for the transfer were required and refused, the states
would have to acquire this information on their own. Even a notice requirement
would be unreasonably costly, resulting in four million notices a year. See Hearings
on Access, supra note 1969, at 182.
2112. See text at note 2198 infra.
2113. S(!e ll WEEKJ..Y Co]4P. OF :PRES. Docs. 8 (Jan. 1, 1975).

May-June 1975]

Project

1325

Instead, the Act envisions that Congress will exercise "a vigorous
oversight check on agencies to make certain as much as possible that
no 'nonroutine' transfers of records . . . are either hidden or
blanketed in under the 'routine' category to nullify the basic protections of the law to individuals."2114 Each agency thus can, absent
congressional action, continue to decide the uses for which it can disseminate information it collects; 2116 the SEC's Name and Relationship System, for example, can continue routinely to distribute derogatory information to other agencies,2116 and the Civil Service Commission can continue routinely to transmit information on a subject's
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of
living to various branches of the govemment.2117 To be sure, once
unnecessary or irrelevant information is transferred to an agency for
a routine use, the individual presumably can challenge the retention
of that information under subsection (e)(l). Moreover, individuals
can trace distributions of their records because of the (c)(3) requirement that agencies make available to the subject accountings of file
transfers. These two subsections provide only limited control over the
dissemination of information, however, because they apply only after
dissemination has occurred and they depend on the subject initiating
an inquiry as to whether there have been improper disseminations.
To ensure that individuals retain control over the dissemination of
surrendered information, the Privacy Act should have required that
the individual be able to challenge collection by the collecting
agency on the ground that the information sought is irrelevant to or
unneeded by an agency that has been labeled a routine recipient.
Subsection (b) allows dissemination of records for nonroutine
uses without the prior consent of the individual in a variety of situations where the need for the information is great or the damage to
privacy interests is slight.2118 For example, subsection (b)(4) allows
2114. H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, supra note 2081, at 12.
2115. Moreover, Privacy Act, § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(ll) (Supp. Feb. 1975), allows
an agency to publish in the Federal Register notice of any new use and provide an
opportunity for interested persons to submit arguments. The provision would apparently allow an agency to adopt new "routine uses" for which disclosure could be made
without the data subject's consent.
2116. See FEDERAL DATA BANKS, supra note 1515, at XLIV.
2117. See id.
2118. There are ten situations where information may be disseminated for a nonroutine use without the prior consent of the individual. Five of these are discussed in
the text at notes 2119-23 infra. The other five situations seem inoffensive. Subsection
(b)(l) allows disclosure of the information to those officers and employees of the agency
maintaining the record who need the record to perform their duties. Subsection (b)(6)
allows disclosure to the National Archives. This exemption allows an agency to
gather information of historical importance. For its legislative origin see Hearings on
Access, supra note 1969, at 274-76. Subsection (b)(8) allows disclosure "to a person
pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affecting the health or safety of
an individual if upon such disclosure notification is transmitted to the last known
address of such individual." Subsection (b)(9), allowing dissemination to Congress, and
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disclosure of records to the Bureau of the Census for purposes of
planning because of the strict confidentiality of Census records. 2110
Subsection (b)(5) permits disclosure of records in a nonidentifiable
form to a recipient for use in statistical research because of the
reduced privacy dangers in the transfer of nonidentifiable information and because of the desire to facilitate research.2120 Subsection
(b)(7) exempts from the consent requirement information sought by
an agency for a law enforcement activity, but prevents law enforcement agencies from going on "fishing expeditions" by requiring the
head of the requesting agency to specify in writing the particular
portion of the record desired and the law enforcement activity for
which the record is sought.
Only two of the exemptions are questionable. Subsection (b)(ll)
allows disclosure without consent "pursuant to the order of a court
of competent jurisdiction." The Senate recommended that an agency
be required to serve advance notice on the subject before it disseminates his file pursuant to compulsory legal process.2121 Such a provision is more attractive than the provision adopted because it affords
greater protection to the subject's privacy interests by permitting
him to take appropriate legal steps to suppress a subpoena2122 without unduly burdening the requester, who would already be in court.
The difficulties with subsection (b)(2), which permits disclosures required under the FOIA, are dealt with in the discussion on the interaction of the Privacy Act and the FOIA.2123
Subsection (n) of the Privacy Act deals with a narrow dissemination problem that had attracted earlier congressional attention,2124
by forbidding the sale or rental by an agency of an individual's name
and address unless such action is specifically authorized by law. The
provision was a response to the practice of various government
agencies of selling mailing lists of persons with certain characteristics,
such as gun collectors, amateur radio operators, and licensed pilots,
to commercial and political organizations.212 u The sale of such lists
infringes upon privacy interests not because the individual receives
mail, which can easily be thrown away, but because information
subsection (b)(IO), allowing dissemination to the Comptroller General, facilitate oversight of the administration of the Act.
2119. Laws relating to the Bureau of the Census limit access to census records to
Bureau employees and prohibit their removal from the premises. H.R. REP. No. 931416, supra note 2081, at 12-13. See text at notes 1934-35 supra.
2120. See also Hearings on Access, supra note 1969, at 159, 180-81 (remarks of the
representative of HEW).
2121. See S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 66.
2122. See id.
2123. See text at notes 2196-214 infra.
2124. See generally Hearings on Mailing Lists, supra note 1499.
2125, See id. at 28-29, 70, 136.
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about the individual has been disclosed without his knowledge. Although salutary in purpose, subsection (n) may be of limited force
because it states explicitly that it shall not be construed to require
the withholding of names and addresses othenvise permitted to be
made public, and presumably, therefore, permits disclosure under
the FOIA.2126 Provisions of the FOIA mandating disclosure of information to the public do not apply where disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."2127 This
privacy exemption to the FOIA, however, does not as interpreted
adequately protect privacy interests.2128 In the area of mailing lists,
its disabilities are perpetuated in the Privacy Act because of subsection (n).

5. Remedies and Sanctions
The privacy rights created by the Privacy Act would be meaningless if they were not accompanied by effective remedies or sanctions.
The Act establishes civil and criminal liability for some violations,
but it seems doubtful that such provisions are sufficient to protect
all the rights created by the Act.
Subsection (g)(l) of the Privacy Act provides that an individual
may bring a civil action against an agency in the federal district
courts whenever the agency refuses to amend the individual's
record2129 or refuses access to a record.2130 Thus an individual always
has standing to contest an agency's failure to accord him the rights
of access and challenge. An individual's standing to contest an
agency's failure to maintain his records with accuracy, relevance,
timeliness, and completeness, set forth in subsection (g)(l)(C), extends only to situations in which a determination is made that is
adverse to the individual. Subsection (g)(l)(C) apparently refers to
violations of subsection (e)(5) only, but might also include violations of (e)(l). Because the next subsection states only that it
applies to violations of "any other provision,"2131 it is left unclear
whether an individual alleging a violation of (e)(l) must await an
adverse determination as required by (g)(l)(C).
With respect to violations of all other primary rights conferred
by the Act, subsection (g)(l)(D) grants standing to an individual
whenever an agency "fails to comply with any other provision of
this section, . . . in such a way as to have an adverse effect on the
individual." While the provision presumably does not require an
2126.
2127.
2128.
2129.
2130.
2131.

120 CONG. R.Ec. Hl2,244 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974).
5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(6) (1970).
See text at notes 700-44 supra.
Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(l)(A) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(l)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(l)(D) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
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adverse administrative determination, the ambiguity of the term
"adverse effect" leaves unclear what an individual must show to
obtain standing. If the adverse effect requirement is only intended
to restrict standing to data subjects whose Privacy Act rights are
violated (through, for example, improper dissemination or improper collection of information), the subsection would impose only
minimal standing requirements. If, however, the adverse effect requirement is intended to restrict standing to individuals who can
prove prima facie that the agency violation resulted in monetary
harm,2132 the Act would fail to recognize that there can be serious
violations of privacy that do not result in such harm.2138
The argument that the adverse effect requirement allows suit by
anyone who is the subject of information acquired or disseminated
in violation of the Privacy Act draws support from the Senate report
on an analogous provision contained in the Senate bill. Although
the phrase "adverse effect" comes from the House bill,2184 the Senate
version granted standing to any "aggrieved person,''218 G a similar
formulation. The Senate report explained that the phrase was
designed to encourage the widest possible citizen enforcement
through the judicial process. This is necessary, as mentioned, since
the Act does not give any administrative body authority to ensure
compliance with the Act. The Committee intends the use of the term
"aggrieved person" to afford the widest possible standing consistent
with the constitutional requirement of "case or controversy" in
Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. In this respect, the provision
is designed, among other things, to supply certain deficiencies in
standing and ripeness which the courts found in Environmental
Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. I (1972), and [California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21 (1974)]. 2186

The failure of the conference staff's report to comment on any compromise in this regard arguably suggests that the House conferees
understood their language to have the same effect. If Congress had
intended to require a showing of actual damage in order to obtain
standing, it could have used the words "actual damages," as it did in
subsection (g)(4)(A), instead of "adverse effect."
There are countervailing indications, however, that the "adverse
effect" requirement of subsection (g)(l)(D) was intended to require
2132. CJ. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) (rejecting a challenge to use of
the military for domestic surveillance and holding that "[a]llegations of a subjective
'chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or
a threat of specific future harm •• .'').
2133. See text at notes 1536-49 supra.
2134. See H.R. 16373, § (g}(l}(C), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
2135. S. 3418, §§ 303(b), (c), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
2136. S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 83.
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a showing of actual hatm. This conclusion is supported by the
structure of subsection (g)(l): Subsections (g)(l)(A) and (g)(l)(B),
providing standing when an agency violates subsections (d)(3) or
(d)(l) of the Act, clearly do not require a showing of actual harm.
If subsection (g)(l)(D) were meant to give standing to any individual
who is affected by any other violations of the Act, there would have
been no need to mention specifically violations of (d)(3) and (d)(l)
in subsections (g)(l)(A) and (g)(l)(B). Moreover, the wording of
subsection (g)(l)(D) comes directly from the language of the House
bill,2137 which is generally more conservative in its protections of
the right of privacy.2138
Given these conflicting indications of congressional intent, courts
should interpret "adverse effect" broadly, and should not require
a showing of actual harm. This interpretation of "adverse effect"
is necessary if the Act is to fulfill its stated purpose to "permit an
individual to determine what records pertaining to him are . . .
disseminated ...." 2189 If an individual can only challenge the dissemination of information that causes him monetary harm he is obviously powerless to prevent much improper dissemination.
The Act grants either damages or injunctive relief, depending
upon the nature of the agency violation, to individuals with standing
to sue. When an agency improperly refuses to amend an individual's
record or improperly refuses an individual access to his records, the
Act authorizes courts to order the agency to correct the record or to
produce the record.2140 In these situations, the Act makes injunctive
relief the exclusive remedy, with no provision for redress of actual
damages suffered from wrongful agency refusal to amend. For all
other violations of the Act the sole remedy appears to be monetary
damages.2141 Damages are not available, however, unless "the agency
2137. See H.R. 16373, § (g)(l)(C), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
2138. See the various Senate proposals mentioned at notes 2091, 2121, & 2136 supra,
and at notes 2145, 2147, 2151, & 2182 infra.
2139. Privacy Act § 2(b)(l), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (note) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2140. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552a(g)(2), (g)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975). Where the
violation alleged is refusal to amend, subsection (g)(2)(A) empowers the court to determine the matter de novo. Where the violation alleged is denial of access to a file,
subsection (g)(3)(A) empowers the court to determine the matter de novo and to examine in camera the contents of any records claimed to be exempted by subsection
(k), discussed in the text at notes 2183-94 infra. In an action under either (g)(2) or
(g)(3), the court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and
other reasonable litigation costs, if the complainant has substantially prevailed. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552a(g)(2)(B), (g)(3)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2141. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(4) (Supp. Feb. 1975) provides:
In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(l)(C) or (D) of this section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was
intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an
amount equal to the sum of(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or
failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the
sum of $1,000; and
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acted in a manner which was intentional or willful.
."2142 This
standard for recovery of damages is a compromise2148 between the
House proposal of the traditional "arbitrary and capricious" standard for review of agency action2144 and the Senate proposal of strict
liability for any agency violation of the Act.2145 The legislative history
indicates that "[o]n a continuum between negligence and the very
high standard of willful, arbitrary, or capricious conduct, this standard is viewed as only somewhat greater than gross negligence." 2140
This comment suggests that liability should not attach unless the
agency's action was so lacking in reason as to approach recklessness.
This requirement obviously imposes a heavy burden on a party
seeking compensation. As the Act does not explicitly provide for
injunctive relief for these violations, a plaintiff who fails to meet
this requirement may be without a remedy. For example, a court
might find that an agency is improperly disseminating files for nonroutine uses without the subjects' consent, and yet be powerless not
only to prevent the dissemination but also to grant compensation to
the subjects. This interpretation is one courts might well try to
avoid, but the Act could have avoided this difficulty either by authorizing injunctive relief with regard to all violations of the Act where
appropriate, 2147 or by setting a lower standard for agency liability, or
both.
Under the Act, damages are to be recovered from the federal
government.2148 If the offending agency were required to pay, such
payments would be reflected in the agency's operating budget and
would perhaps provide a more direct deterrent to violations. The
$1000 floor on recovery provided in the Act2149 presumably represents a compromise benveen the House proposal, which only allowed
recovery of actual damages,2160 and the Senate proposal, which allowed recovery of punitive damages where appropriate. 2161 A provision for punitive damages would seem desirable in order to deter
repeated violations of the Act, although in the absence of direct
(B) the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as deter•
mined by the court.

2142. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(4) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2143. 120 CONG. R.Ec. Hl2,245 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1975).
2144. H.R. 16373, § (g)(3), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
2145. S. 3418, § 303(c), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
2146. 120 CONG. R.Ec. Hl2,245 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974).
2147. S. 3418, § 303(b), 93 Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), would have so provided.
2148. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(4) (Supp. Feb. 1975), set out in note
2141 supra.
2149. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g){4)(A) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2150. See H.R. 16373, § (g)(3)(A), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
2151. See S. 3418, § 303(c)(2), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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recovery from the offending agency, the effectiveness of such deterrence is certainly questionable.
In sum, the Privacy Act allows a data subject to enforce his rights
of access and challenge through injunctive relief, and provides him
with an opportunity to collect damages for the "intentional or willful" retention of inaccurate or irrelevant information once an agency
has made a determination adverse to his interests. Thus, the Act provides relatively full protections against violations of privacy that
occur in the retention stage. With respect to the acquisition and
dissemination stages, however, the remedies provided by the Act are
clearly unsatisfactory. Only damages are available, and to obtain
them the plaintiff must show that the agency acted intentionally and
willfully, and may have to show actual harm. The weakness of the
remedy provisions prevents the accomplishment of the Act's purpose
to "permit an individual to determine what records pertaining to
him are collected, maintained, used, or disseminated .•.." 2152 To
accomplish this purpose, the Act should have given standing to
anyone who is the subject of information involved in a violation of
the Privacy Act and should have provided for actual damages,
punitive damages, and injunctive relief, wherever appropriate, as
the Senate bill had proposed.2153
For violations of provisions that are "key to any effective protection for privacy and confidentiality,"2154 the Act provides criminal
fines of up to $5000. Because "[t]he entire Act would be frustrated
if secret data banks could be created and operated with impunity,"2165 subsection (i)(2) imposes a fine on "[a]ny officer or employee of any agency who willfully maintains a system of records without meeting the notice requirements of [publishing in the Federal
Register] ..••" In response to the equally fundamental need to
guard against willful disregard of the limitations on dissemination,2m subsection (i)(l) imposes fines on any officer or employee of
an agency "who knowing that disclosure of the specific material is
... prohibited, willfully discloses the material in any manner to any
person or agency not entitled to receive it ...." Finally, subsection
(i)(3) makes "[a]ny person who knowing and willfully requests or
obtains any record concerning an individual from an agency under
false pretenses ..." subject to a fine. None of the civil remedies in
the Act would reach individuals guilty of such violations. At least
one other critical provision of the Act probably should have been
2152.
2153.
2154.
2155.
2156.

Privacy Act § 2(b)(l), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (note) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
S. 3418, §§ 303(b), (c), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
S. REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 81.
Id.
Id.
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reinforced by criminal penalties. Because all of the rights granted by
the Privacy Act depend on an individual's ability to find out if an
agency maintains a file on him, the Act should have imposed criminal
liability on any officer or employee of an agency who, in response to
an individual's inquiry about the existence of a file, knowingly responds falsely.
As an aid in enforcing and administering the Privacy Act, the
establishment of a federal privacy board was recommended. 21 1l7 As
enacted, however, the Privacy Act envisions that disputes arising
under it will be settled in the federal courts, and delegates to the
agencies themselves the task of promulgating regulations governing
the administration of the Act. 2168 A federal privacy board has definite
advantages, for it could reduce the case-load burden of the district
courts, promote uniformity by promulgating regulations implementing the Act for all agencies,2169 and reduce the possibility of infractions of the Privacy Act by conducting on-site audits of agency
information systems and files. 2160 The board also could be charged
with the administration of the FOIA, thereby providing oversight
of the interaction between the Privacy Act and the FOIA. Apparently the privacy board proposal failed because Congress was
reluctant to establish yet another federal bureaucracy,2161 and because
the administrative costs would have been great. Instead, the Privacy
Act establishes a Privacy Protection Study Commission, empowered
merely to study agency information practices and to recommend
changes in the Privacy Act.2162
6. Exemptions
The two exemptions to the several provisions of the Privacy Act
are, in general, necessary and reasonably circumscribed. Subsection
(j)(2) allows criminal law enforcement agencies to exempt certain
types of records that they maintain from the provisions granting the
rights of subject notice, access, and challenge,2163 restricting the
215'1. Representative Koch, who introduced the first privacy bil1, favored creation
of a Federal Privacy Board. See 120 CONG, REc. Hl2,248 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974). S.
3418, §§ 101-07, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), incorporated the idea, but H.R. 16373, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), did not establish any type of board to oversee administration of
the Act.
2158. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(f) (Supp. Feb. 1975), requires each agency
to establish procedures governing notice, access, and challenge.
2159. S. 3418, § 103(a)(3), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), gave the board authority to
"develop model guidelines" and "assist Federal agencies in preparing regulations."
2160. This power was explicitly given to the board in the original version of S.
3418, introduced on May I, 1974. The version reported from committee and passed
by the Senate, however, gave the board the power to conduct "inspections." S, 3418,
§ 103(a)(3), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
2161. See, e.g., Hearings on Access, supra note 1969, at 195.
2162. Privacy Act § 5, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (note) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2163. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(d) (Supp. Feb. 1975), discussed in the text

May-June 1975]

Project

1333

acquisition of data2164 and the method of acquisition,2165 requiring
accuracy of retained information,2166 imposing civil liability,2167 and
requiring notice to Congress of any alteration of its system of records.2168 The types of records that may be exempted consist of:
(A) information compiled for the purpose of identifying individual
criminal offenders and alleged offenders and consisting only of identifying data and notations of arrests, the nature and disposition of
criminal charges, sentencing, confinement, release, and parole and
probation status; (B) information compiled for the purpose of a
criminal investigation, including reports of inform.ants and investigators, and associated with an identifiable individual; or (C) reports
identifiable to an individual compiled at any stage of the process of
enforcement of the criminal laws from arrest or indictment through
release from supervision.2169
This list seems to encompass all records held for criminal law enforcement purposes. The exemption thus reflects a decision to leave
the regulation of these records to separate legislation,2170 and reveals
a general fear of hampering criminal investigations2171 by disclosing
investigatory techniques2172 or by discouraging the cooperation of
informants.2173
In general, this law enforcement records exemption is reasonable.
The exemption from restrictions on the type of information that
may be acquired seems necessary because of the difficulty in deterat notes 2055-98 supra. These agencies can also exempt themselves from subsections
(e)(4)(G)-(I), which require publication of the procedures for notice and access, and
from subsection (f), which requires each agency to establish procedures for subject
notice, access, and challenge.
2164. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975), discussed in the
text at notes 1987-2003 supra.
2165. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(2) (Supp. Feb. 1975), discussed in the
text at notes 2020-26 supra.
2166. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(5) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2167. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g) (Supp. Feb. 1975), discussed in the text
at notes 2129-53 supra.
2168. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(o) (Supp. Feb. 1975), discussed in the text
at notes 2099-106 supra.
It is possible that the exemption from subsection (o) is an oversight. The exemptions for agencies appear in subsections (j) and (k). No reference is made in these subsections to any other provision following subsection (k), most of which are relatively
minor. However, the failure to deal with these later provisions means that the CIA
and criminal law enforcement agencies can exempt themselves from the restrictions on
the sale of mailing lists, see text at notes 2124-28 supra, and the development of new
information systems. See text at note 2179 infra.
2169. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(j)(2) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2170. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, supra note 2081, at 18.
2171. See Hearings on Records, supra note 1517, at 88-90 (Department of Justice),
110 (Department of Defense).
2172. Id. at 89-90 (Department of Justice),
~173. ld,
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mining what will be relevant to a criminal investigation; the exemption from the restrictions on method of acquisition is necessary
because collection directly from the individual is generally inconsistent with the nature of criminal investigations. If the broader
"reasonableness" standard for acquisition methods proposed above2174
is adopted, however, a separate exemption would not be necessary
because the standard takes into account the legitimacy and weight
of agency needs and purposes. The exemption from the requirement
that information used in a determination about an individual be
accurate seems solidly grounded because the requirement's purpose,
"to assure fairness to the individual in the determination," 21711 is
adequately guaranteed by the rules of procedure in a criminal trial.
There are, however, several respects in which the law enforcement
records exemption is unduly broad. The first area in which narrowing is feasible is the area of subject access. The Senate bill had
exempted from the right of subject access only information in the
hands of criminal enforcement agencies that, if disclosed to the
subject, would impede current law enforcement proceedings.2176
Recent amendments to the FOIA have replaced an exemption similar
to the Privacy Act's subsection G)(2)(B) with an exemption allowing
nondisclosure only where disclosure would interfere with law enforcement proceedings, deprive a person of his right to a fair trial,
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, disclose the identity
of confidential sources who are protected by the provisions of the
Act, disclose investigate techniques or procedures, or threaten the
life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.2177 It is curious
that Congress found it necessary to enact a broad provision in the
Privacy Act when it had been satisfied with a more tailored exemption to the FOIA. Also, there seems to be no reason to exempt
criminal law enforcement agencies from civil liability for violations
of the few provisions that do apply to them. While criminal penalties
remain applicable to violations of many of those provisions, they do
not compensate the aggrieved individual. Improper disclosure of
investigatory material to employers, for example, could seriously
harm innocent individuals.2178 Finally, the exemption to the requirement that Congress be notified of any alteration in the agency's
system of records seems inexplicable, especially in light of the recent
2174. See text following note 2026 supra.
2175. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e)(5) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2176. S. 3418, § 203(b), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
2177. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See text at notes 745-828 stipra.
2178. The ACLU presented a number of examples of individuals wlto lost jobs or
were subjected to police harassment because of the dissemination of arrest records or
intelligence information. Hearings on Criminal Justice Data Banl'5, supra note 1550,
at 252-59.
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congressional concern over proposed consolidation of criminal information systems.2179
Subsection G) also allows the CIA to exempt any of its records
from the same provisions. The purpose of the exemption appears to
be the protection of national security interests.2180 Yet the Act already contains a narrower exemption for classified documents,2181
and there seems to be no reason to exempt all CIA records, since a
blanket exemption would undoubtedly protect many records without any national security significance.2182
A narrower exemption in subsection (k) authorizes any agency
to exempt certain specific records from the provisions dealing with
subject notice, access, and challenge2183 and from those concerning
acquisition of data.2184 The subsection covers classified documents,2185
investigatory material compiled for civil law enforcement purposes,2188 Secret Service files, 2187 testing or examination material con2179. See id. passim. The FBI has consolidated files on over 20 million individuals
and computerized records on over 450,000 persons. Id. at 17. There are no formal regulations concerning distribution of these records. Id. at 18-19. The FBI currently has
limited programs for sharing criminal information, id. at IO, and because of the growing concern over organized crime, with its interstate ramifications, there has been
more and more pressure to consolidate investigative records. Id. at 18.
2180. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1416, supra note 2081, at 18.
2181. See text at note 2185 infra.
2182. The Senate had proposed a narrower exemption because "[m]any personnel
files and other systems may not be subject to security classification or may not cause
damage to the national defense or foreign policy simply by permitting the subjects
of such files to inspect them and seek changes in their contents under this Act." S.
REP. No. 93-1183, supra note 1977, at 74.
2183. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552a(d), (c)(3), (c)(4)(G), (H), (I), (f) (Supp. Feb.
1975).
2184. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(e}(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2185. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k.}(l) (Supp. Feb. 1975), exempts records
"subject to the provisions of section 552(b)(l) of this title." See text at notes 506-35
supra.
2186. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k.)(2) (Supp. Feb. 1975) exempts:
(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than material within the scope of subsection (j)(2) of this section: Provided, however,
That if any individual is denied any right, privilege, or benefit that he would
othenvise be entitled by Federal law, or for which he would othenvise be eligible, as a result of the maintenance of such material, such material shall be provided to such individual, except to the extent that the disclosure of such mate•
rial would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the
Government under an express promise that the identity of the source would be
held in confidence, or, prior to the effective date of this section, under an implied
promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence.
Representative Koch had argued that no exemption was needed for civil law enforcement agencies. 120 CoNc. R.Ec. Hl2,248 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974). Two factors may
differentiate criminal law enforcement agencies. First, the prevention of crime is usually thought to be a more fundamental societal goal. Second, suspected criminals are
protected from deprivations of benefits by stricter constitutional guarantees. Yet, a
representative of the FTC testified that failure to protect its files from access would
"wreak havoc on their ability to enforce their • • • statutes." Hearings on Access, supra note 1969, at 266-67.
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cerning federal employment,2188 and information that would reveal
the identity of an informant where such information was obtained in
order to determine suitability or eligibility for federal employment,
military service, federal contracts, for access to classified informa•
tion,2189 or for promotion in the armed services.2100
Subsection (k) also exempts records "required by statute to be
maintained and used solely as statistical records." 2101 Subsection (a)(6)
defines a "statistical record" as "a record in a system of records maintained for statistical research or reporting purposes only and not
used in whole or in part in making any determination about an
identifiable individual, except as provided by section 8 of title 13."
This last clause accommodates Census Bureau records.2102 The
exemption from the subject notice, access, and challenge provisions
is reasonable because access and challenge would frustrate the timely
production and dissemination of data. The exemption from restrictions on data acquisition, however, is unwise, for the result is to
leave unregulated the types of irrelevant questions for which the
census and other federal questionnaires have been criticized2103 and
to overlook the dangers to privacy from unrestrained acquisition
of data.2104
To prevent the exemptions from swallowing the Privacy Act in
practice, subsection (p) provides that the President shall submit to
Congress an annual report "listing for each Federal agency the
number of records . . . exempted from the application of [the
Privacy Act] under the provisions of subsections (j) and (k). . , ."
Congress recently added a similar provision to the FOIA to facilitate
congressional oversight of the exemptions to that Act.2100

7. Interaction Between the FOIA and the Privacy Act
It is obvious that the public's right to know about government
conduct, guaranteed by the FOIA, will sometimes collide with the
equally important right guaranteed by the Privacy Act to control
the flow of personal information. The balancing of interests required to resolve this conflict was undertaken in the FOIA rather
than in the Privacy Act. The FOIA provides flexible exemptions
from its disclosure requirements, especially exemption (b)(6), which
protects information the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
2187.
2188.
2189.
2190.
2191.
2192.
2193.
2194.
2195.

Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(3)
Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(6)
Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(5)
Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(7)
Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(k)(4)
See text at note 1934 supra.
See text at notes 1990-93 supra.
See text at notes 1536-49 supra.
See text at notes 939-42 supra.

(Supp. Feb.
(Supp. Feb.
(Supp. Feb.
(Supp. Feb.
(Supp. Feb,

1975).
1975).
1975).
1975).
1975).
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unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.2196 These exemptions
necessitate a balancing of conflicting interests and envision the dissemination to third parties of some types of information but not of
other types. The Privacy Act, on the other hand, adopts a blanket
approach that confers on the data subject control over the dissemination of all records (with certain rigid exceptions) without reference
to the nature of the information they contain.2197 In particular, the
Privacy Act contains four provisions that together purport to exempt
disclosures that are required under the FOIA from all of the dissemination restrictions in the Privacy Act. The intention, as indicated in
the legislative history of the Privacy Act, was "to preserve the status
quo as interpreted by the courts regarding the disclosure of personal
information under [the FOIA]."2198 The result, therefore, is that
disclosure decisions are made under the FOIA rather than under the
Privacy Act.
Subsection (b)(2) of the Privacy Act exempts agencies disclosing
information under the FOIA from the obligation to obtain the data
subject's ·written consent prior to dissemination. This exemption
seems reasonable because it prevents individuals from frustrating
legitimate FOIA requests. In order to facilitate data subject challenges to FOIA requests through reverse FOIA suits,2 199 however,
the Privacy Act should have required that an individual be notified
when an FOIA request is made £or his file. Without such a notific::i.tion requirement, the Act accords too little protection to privacy
because agencies cannot be depended on to assert individual privacy
interests vigorously. Subsection (c)(l) of the Privacy Act similarly
exempts FOIA disclosures from the requirement that each agency
keep accountings of the disseminations of each file. While it is possible that disclosure of the identities of FOIA requesters to data
subjects might discourage some FOIA requests, that danger seems
too remote to outweigh the subject's privacy interest in knowing
how information about him is being disseminated.
Subsection (e)(6) of the Privacy Act exempts FOIA disclosures
from its requirement that an agency make reasonable efforts to assure
the accuracy of an individual file prior to dissemination. This exception does not change the procedures under the FOIA, which itself
does not require that an agency disclose o~ly accurate files, As the
FOIA is intended to enable citizens to monitor the workings of
government,2200 such a requirement ·within the FOIA would be sub2196. See generally text at notes 700-44 supra.
2197. The Privacy Act drew its exemptions very specifically. No "balancing" decisions must be made to decide if a record is exempted. Cf. text at notes 496-500 supra.
2198. 120 CoNc. R.Ec. Hl2,244 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974).
2199. See text at notes 1182-67 supra.
2200. See text at note 2096 supra.
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ject to attack on the ground that it would enable agencies to prevent
citizens from discovering that improper information is being collected and maintained. This exemption in the Privacy Act should
not present any serious dangers to privacy because of the protection
provided by exemption six of the FOIA. The Privacy Act exemption
perpetuates, however, the deficiencies, discussed above,2201 associated
with FOIA exemption six.
In the area of subject access, the interaction of the FOIA and the
Privacy Act is delicate. In addition to the right of subject access contained in the Privacy Act, the principle underlying the FOIA of
maximizing disclosure of agency records could provide a right of
subject access in some situations, although the FOIA has not been
so used in most of the litigation to date. 2202 There are limitations in
both acts, however, on the right of subject access, and an agency
desiring to avoid disclosure may well try to use the limitations in
one act to bar subject access under both. Subsection (q) of the
Privacy Act states that the FOIA exemptions may not be used to
block subject access under the Privacy Act. The applicability of the
Privacy Act subject access limitations to the FOIA, however, is dealt
with only indirectly by subsection (b)(3) of the FOIA, which allows
nondisclosure of information "specifically exempted from disclosure
by statute.''2203 The question then is whether information exempted
from subject access under the Privacy Act is "specifically exempted
from disclosure" within the meaning of FOIA subsection (b)(3).
The Privacy Act exemptions, despite their grant of discretion to
the heads of certain agencies to exempt certain records,2204 are probably sufficiently specific to satisfy the terms of (b)(3). 220 u There are,
however, two convincing arguments that (b)(3) does not incorporate
the limitations on subject access contained in the Privacy Act. First,
the Privacy Act does not literally require that certain records be kept
confidential from the subject. Instead, it merely exempts certain
records from its own subject access requirements. Although the
Privacy Act does not contain an express provision authorizing subject access where specifically authorized by another statute, the Privacy Act should probably be so interpreted in light of its apparent
policy in favor of subject access.
Second, if (b)(3) incorporates into the FOIA the Privacy Act
limitations on subject access, then it must also incorporate all of the
2201. See text at notes 700-44 supra.
2202. But see Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313 (D.D.C. 1974), where
the plaintiff was denied disclosure of FBI files concerning him. Representative Koch,
the losing plaintiff there, was one of the leading sponsors of the Privacy Act, See 120
CONG. REc. Hl2,248 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974).
2203. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
2204. Privacy Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552a(j), (k) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
2205. See text at notes 568-610 supra.
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disclosure limitations of the Privacy Act. This result flows from
subsection (a)(3) of the FOIA, which has been interpreted to require
that disclosures under the FOIA be made without reference to the
identity of the requester.2206 Information withheld from the data
subject under the Privacy Act, therefore, could be withheld under
(b)(3) from all requesters under the FOIA. An interpretation of
(a)(3) to allow the withholding of information, under subsection
(b)(3), from the data subject alone, would lead to the nonsensical
result that data subjects would be barred from access to information
available under the FOIA to third parties. Incorporation of the Privacy Act subject access limitations into the FOIA, via subsection
(b)(3), would thus lead to the conclusion that despite its apparent
intention not to alter the FOIA,2207 Congress in effect amended the
FOIA exemptions to be at least as broad as the Privacy Act exemptions. The result would be that all CIA files, for example, even if
unclassified, would be exempted from the FOIA, as well as virtually
all criminal investigatory files, despite the recent amendments narrowing subsection (b)(7) of the FOIA.
If the disclosure limitations of the Privacy Act are not incorporated into the FOIA via subsection (b)(3), data subjects could try
to obtain access to their files under the FOIA wherever the FOIA
exemptions are narrower than those in the Privacy Act, ·as they are
with respect to criminal investigatory files. There are still several
other obstacles, however, to subject access under the FOIA. For
example, an agency might assert the (b)(6) exemption to the extent
information in the file concerns the subject's private affairs. The
subject should be able to overcome that obstacle with the very
sensible argument that disclosure to him of information concerning his own private affairs would certainly not violate his privacy.
This argument, however, violates the rule against taking into consideration the identity of the particular requester in applying the
FOIA exemptions.2208 Further, subject access might arguably consti•
tute a waiver by the data subject of his right of privacy. Rejection of
these formalistic arguments would be consistent with the proposal
made above to employ balancing in deciding whether to release
material covered by the (b)(6) exemption to the FOIA.2209 Similar
arguments could be used to circumvent the FOIA (b)(4) exemption
for financial information,2210 if it were employed to block subject
access. One legitimate justification, however, for an agency denial of
2206. See note 458 supra and accompanying text.
2207. See text at note 2198 supra.
2208. See note 458 supra and accompanying text. In FOIA exemption six cases the
courts have sometimes considered the identity and interests of the requester. See text
at notes 716-34 supra.
2209. See text at notes 741-44 supra.
2210. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970). See text at notes 611-47 supra.
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subject access under the FOIA is the (b)(5) exemption for inter- and
intra-agency memoranda.2211
The potential obstacles to subject access under the FOIA show
that the Privacy Act's right of subject access-where applicableimproves the protection of privacy interests. With respect to the
other privacy interests, such as being notified that a file is maintained, being able to challenge inaccurate or irrelevant information
in one's file, and having control over inter-agency dissemination of
the file, the Privacy Act, despite its deficiencies-especially its failure
to control adequately inter-agency dissemination,2212 its insufficient
remedies to enforce the rights it creates,2213 and its overbroad exemptions2214-dearly represents a major step toward satisfactory safeguards for individual privacy. There is need, however, for a clarification of the interaction of the Privacy Act and the FOIA. The
best method of resolving current ambiguities would probably be
to delineate within the Privacy Act the full scope of the right of
subject access, and to make clear that the Privacy Act exemptions
do not apply to the FOIA. The FOIA and Privacy Act exemptions need not be made uniform in all respects, but Congress
should reexamine the exemptions in both acts to ensure that
in no instance can a third party obtain access to a file under the
FOIA where the Privacy Act denies access to the subject.
2211. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970). See text at notes 648-99 supra. This exemption
was used to deny access in Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 316
(D.D.C. 1974).
2212. See text at notes 2107-28 supra.
2213, See text at notes 2129-62 supra.
2214. See text at notes 2163-95 supra.

